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T.  E.  PAGE,  LiTT.D.,  AND  W.  H.  D.  ROUSE,  LiTT.D. 













»  *      .  •   • » . 

*    t 


Introduction  ^^^^  ^" 

Book  I  ^ 

Book  II  ^^ 

Book  III 
Book  IV 

Book  V  ^^^ 

,  J  505 




de  Fiiii- 


The  de  FhnliHS  Bonoram  el  Mahrum  is  a  treatise  ^ 
on  tile  theory  of  Ethics.  It  expounds  and  criticizes 
the  three  ethical  systems  most  prominent  in  Cicero's 
day,  the  Epicurean,  tlie  Stoic  and  that  of  the  Aca- 
demy under  Antiochus.  The  most  elaborate  of 
Cicero's  philosophical  writings,  it  has  had  fewer 
readers  than  his  less  technical  essays  on  moral  sub- 
jects. But  it  isof  importance  to  the  student  of  philo- 
sophy as  the  only  systematic  account  surviving 
from  antiquity  of  those  rules  of  life  whicli  divided 
the  allegiance  of  thoughtful  men  during  the  cen- 
turies when  the  old  religions  had  lost  tlieir  hold  and 
Christianity  had  not  yet  emerged.  And  the  topics 
that  it  handles  can  never  lose  their  interest. 

The  title  'About  the  Ends  of  Goods  and  Evils'  ^^'.'"'."/^ 
requires  explanation.     It  was  Aristotle  who  put  tlie  "■'  — '- 

ethical  problem  in  the  form  of  the  question.  What  UJ-t'. 
is  the  TeAos  or  End,  the  supreme  aim  of  man's  en- 
deavourj  in  the  attainment  of  which  his  Good  or 
Well-being  lies?  For  Aristotle,  Telvf  connoted  not 
only  'aim,'  but  completion';  and  he  found  the 
answer  to  his  question  in  the  complete  development 
and  right  exercise  of  the  faculties  of  man's  nature, 
and  particularly  of  the  distinctively  human  faculty 
of  Reason.  The  life  of  the  Intellect  was  the  Best, 
the  Chief  Good;  and  lesser  Goods  were  Means  to 
the  attainment  of  this  End.  Thus  was  introduced 
the  notion  of  an  ascending  scale  of  Goods,  and  this 
affected  the  interpretation  of  the  term  Telos.  Telo» 
came  to  be  understood  as  denoting  not  so  much  the 
end  or  aim  of  endeavour  as   the  end  or  extreme 


point  of  a  series,  the  topmost  good.  To  this  was 
naturally  opposed  an  extreme  of  minus  value,  the 
topmost,  or  rather  bottommost,  evil.  The  expres- 
sions TcAos  dyaOiav,  tIAos  KaKiov,  End  of  Goods,  of 
Evils,'  do  not  occur  in  extant  Greek  (though  Dio- 
genes has  T€\tKa  KaKoi,  final  evils  *),  but  they  are 
attested  by  Cicero's  translation  ^»w  honorum  et  malo- 
rum.  As  a  title  for  his  book  he  throws  this  phrase 
into  the  plural,  meaning  different  views  as  to  the 
Chief  Good  and  Evil.'  Hence  in  title  and  to  some 
extent  in  method,  the  de  Finihus  may  be  compared 
with  such  modem  works  as  Martineau's  Types  of 
Ethical  Theory  and  Sidgwick's  Methods  of  Ethics, 

'cero  as  a  Cicero  belongs  to  a  type  not  unknown  in  English 

nter  on  life,  that  of  the  statesman  who  is  also  a  student  and  a 
•tlosophy,  writer.  From  his  youth  he  aspired  to  play  a  part  in 
public  affairs,  and  the  first  step  towards  this  ambition 
was  to  learn  to  speak.  He  approached  Greek  philo- 
sophy as  part  of  a  liberal  education  for  a  political 
career,  and  he  looked  on  it  as  supplying  themes  for 
practice  in  oratory.  But  his  real  interest  in  it  went 
deeper;  the  study  of  it  formed  his  mind  and  hu- 
manized his  character,  and  he  loved  it  to  the  end  of 
his  life. 

In  his  youth  he  heard  the  heads  of  the  three  chief 
Schools  of  Athens,  Phaedrus  the  Epicurean,  Diodo- 
tus  the  Stoic,  and  Philo  the  Academic,  who  had 
come  to  Rome'  to  escape  the  disturbances  of  the 
Mithradatic  War.  When  already  launched  in  public 
life,  he  withdrew,  at  the  age  of  27  (79  b.c),  to  devote 
two  more  years  to  philosophy  and  rhetoric.  Six 
months  were  spent  at  Athens,  and  the  introduction 
to  de  Finibus  Book  V  gives  a  brilliant  picture  of  his 

•  •  • 



student  life  there  with  his  friends.  No  passage 
more  vividly  displays  what  Athens  and  her  memories 
meant  to  the  cultivated  Roman.  At  Athens  Cicero 
attended  the  lectures  of  the  Epicurean  Zeno  and  the 
Academic  Antiochus.  Passing  on  to  Rhodes  to 
work  under  the  leading  professors  of  rhetoric,  he 
there  met  Posidonius,  the  most  renowned  Stoic  of 
the  day.  He  returned  to  Rome  to  plunge  into  his 
career  as  advocate  and  statesman;  but  his  Letters 
show  him  continuing  his  studies  in  his  intervals  of 
leisure.  For  many  years  the  Stoic  Diodotus  was  an 
inmate  of  his  house. 

Under  the  Triumvirate,  as  his  influence  in  politics 
waned,  Cicero  turned  more  and  more  to  literature. 
His  earliest  essay  in  rhetoric,  the  de  Inventione,  had 
appeared  before  he  was  twenty-five ;  but  his  first 
considerable  works  on  rhetoric  and  on  political 
science,  the  de  Oratore,  de  RepubUca,  and  de  Legibus, 
were  written  after  his  return  from  exile  in  57.  The 
opening  pages  of  de  Finibus  Book  III  give  a  glimpse 
of  his  studies  at  this  period.  In  51  he  went  as 
Governor  to  Cilicia ;  and  he  -wrote  no  more  until  the 
defeat  of  Pompey  at  Pharsalus  had  destroyed  his 
hopes  for  the  Republic. 

After  his  reconciliation  with  Caesar  and  return  to 
Rome  in  the  autumn  of  46,  Cicero  resumed  writing 
on  rhetoric.  In  February  45  came  the  death  of  his 
beloved  daughter  Tullia,  followed  soon  after  by  the 
final  downfall  of  the  Pompeians  at  Munda.  Crushed 
by  public  and  private  sorrow,  he  shut  himself  up  in 
one  of  his  country  houses  and  sought  distraction  in 
unremitting  literary  work.  He  conceived  the  idea, 
as  he  implies  in  the  preface  to  de  Finibus,  of  render- 
ing a.  last  siervice  to  his  counti-y  by  bringing  the 




9f  ^e      treasures  of  Greek  thought  within  the  reach  of  the 

"*'  Roman  public.     Both  his  Academica  and  de  Finibus 

were  compiled  in  the  following  summer ;  the  latter 

was  probably  presented  to  Brutus^  to  whom  it  is 

dedicated^  on  his  visit  to  Cicero  in  August  45  (ad 

Att.  XIII,  44).    Seven  months  later  Brutus  was  one 

[of  the  assassins  of  Caesar.     In  the  autumn  of  44 

\  Cicero  flung  himself  again  into  the  arena  with  his 

/attack  on  Antony,  which  led  to  his  proscription  and 

I  death  in  December  43. 

Excepting  the  de  Oratore,  de  RepuhUca  and  de 
LegibuSy  the  whole  of  Cicero's  most  important 
odo/  writings  on  philosophy  and  rhetoric  belong  to 
7sition,  46-44  B.C.  and  were  achieved  within  two  years. 
Such  a  mass  of  work  so  rapidly  produced  could 
hardly  be  original,  and  in  fact  it  made  no  claim  to 
be  so.  It  was  designed  as  a  sort  of  encyclopaedia 
of  philosophy  for  Roman  readers.  Cicero's  plan  was 
to  take  each  chief  department  of  thought  in  turn, 
and  present  the  theories  of  the  leading  schools  upon 
it,  appending  to  each  theory  the  criticisms  of  its 
opponents.  Nor  had  his  work  that  degree  of  inde- 
pendence which  consists  in  assimilating  the  thought 
of  others  and  recasting  it  in  the  mould  of  the  writer's 
own  mind.  He  merely  chose  some  recent  hand-book 
on  each  side  of  the  question  under  consideration, 
and  reproduced  it  in  Latin,  encasing  passages  of 
continuous  exposition  in  a  frame  of  dialogue,  and 
adding  illustrations  from  Roman  history  and  poetry. 
He  puts  the* matter  frankly  in  a  letter  to  Atticus 
(XII,  52):  "You  will  say,  ^What  is  your  method  in 
such  compositions  ? '  They  are  mere  transcripts,  and 
cost  comparatively  little  labour;  I  only  supply  the 
words,  of  which  I  have  a  copious  flow."  In  de  Finibtis 



(I,  6)  he  rates  his  work  a  Httle  higher,  not  without 
justice,  and  claims  to  be  the  critic  as  well  as  the 
interpreter  of  his  authorities. 

This  method  of  writing  was  consonant  with  Cicero's  Cicero's 
own  position  in  philosophy.     Since  his  early  studies  ^*(^<^^*« 
under  Philo  he  had  been  a  professed  adherent  of  the 
New  Academy,  and  as  such  maintained  a  sceptical  \  ^ 
attitude  on  questions  of  knowledge.     On  morals  he    f' 
was  more  positive ;  though  without  a  logical  basis  for  \ . 
his  principles,  he  accepted  the  verdict  of  tb^  common  \ 
moral  conscience  of  his  age  and  county.     Epicure- 
anism^-lie^abhorred   as   demoralizing     The   Stoics 
rep^ed  himNijy  their  harshness  anja  narrowness,  but. 
Sracted  him  by  their  strict  morality  and  lofty  the- 
ology.    His  competence  for  th^^task  of  interpreting 
Greek  thought  to  Rome  v^as  of  a  qualified  order. 
He  had  read  much,  and  h^  heard  the  chief  teachers 
of  the  day.     But  with  yl^arning  and  enthusiasm  he 
combined   neither  depth   of  insight  nor  scientific 
precision.     Yet  his^s^rvices  to  philosophy  must  not 
b^^^i^errated.     Jrfe  introduced  a  novel  style  of  ex- 
positiSiT^CDpious,  eloquent,  impartial  and  urbane; 
and  he  created  a  philosophical  terminology  in  Latin 
which   has   passed  into   the   languages  of  modem 

The  de  Finibtcs  consists  of  three  separate  dialogues.  Contents  of 
each  dealing  with  one  of  the  chief  ethical  systems  ^®  Finibus. 
of  the  day.  The  exponents  of  each  system,  and  the 
minor  interlocutors,  are  friends  of  Cicero's  younger 
days,  all  of  whom  were  dead  when  he  wrote ;  brief 
notes  upon  them  will  be  found  in  the  Index.  The 
rdle  of  critic  Cicero  takes  himself  throughout. 

The  first  dialogue  occupies  Books  I  and  II ;  in  the 



former  the  Ethics. of  Epicurus  are  expounded,  and 
in  the  latter  refuted  from  the  Stoic  standpoint.  The 
scene  is  laid  at  Cicero's  villa  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Cumae,  on  the  lovely  coast  a  little  north  of 
Naples.  The  spokesman  of  Epicureanism  is  L.  Man- 
lius  Torquatus,  a  reference  to  whose  praetorship 
(II,  74)  fixes  the  date  of  the  conversation  at  50  b.c, 
shortly  after  Cicero* s  return  from  his  province  of 
Cilicia.  A  minor  part  is  given  to  the  youthful 
C.  Valerius  Triarius. 

In  the  second  dialogue  the  Stoic  ethics  are  ex- 
pounded (in  Book  III)  by  M.  Cato,  and  criticized  (in 
Book  IV)  from  the  standpoint  of  Antiochus  by 
Cicero.  Cicero  has  run  down  to  his  place  at  Tuscu- 
lum,  fifteen  miles  from  town,  for  a  brief  September 
holiday,  while  the  Games  are  on  at  Rome ;  and  he 
meets  Cato  at  the  neighbouring  villa  of  Lucullus, 
whose  orphan  son  is  Cato's  ward.  A  law  passed  by 
Pompey  in  52  b.c.  is  spoken  of  (IV,  l)  as  Hew,  so 
the  date  falls  in  that  year;  Cicero  went  to  Cilicia 
in  51. 

The  third  dialogue  (Book  V)  goes  back  to  a  much 
earlier  period  in  Cicero's  life.  Its  date  is  79  and  its 
scene  Athens,  where  Cicero  and  his  friends  are 
eagerly  attending  lectures  on  philosophy.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  Old  Academy"  of  Antiochus  is  main- 
tained by  M.  Pupius  Piso  Calpumianus,  and  after- 
wards criticized  by  Cicero  from  the  Stoic  point  of 
view ;  the  last  word  remains  with  Piso.  The  others 
present  are  Cicero's  brother  and  cousin,  and  his 
friend  and  correspondent  Titus  Pomponious  Atticus, 
a  convinced  Epicurean,  who  had  retired  to  Athens 
from  the  civil  disorders  at  Rome,  and  did  not  return 
for  over  twenty  years, 


In  Book  I  the  exposition  of  Epicureanism  pro-  Cicero's 
bably  comes  from  some  compendium  of  the  school,  j'**p-^*-'j?  ^ 
which  seems  to  have  summarized  (l)  Epicurus' s  essay 
On  the  Telos,  (2)  a  resum6  of  the  points  at  issue 
between  Epicurus  and  the  Cyrenaics  (reproduced  I, 
65  ff),  and  (s)  some  Epicurean  work  on  Friendship 
(I,  65-70). 

The  Stoic  arguments  against  Epicurus  in  Book  II 
Cicero  derived  very  likely  from  Antiochus ;  but  in  the 
criticism  of  Epicurus  there  is  doubtless  more  of 
Cicero's  own  thought  than  anywhere  else  in  the 

The  authority  for  Stoicism  relied  on  in  Book  III 
was  most  probably  Diogenes  of  Babylon,  who  is 
referred  to  by  name  at  III,  33  and  49. 

In  Books  IV  and  V  Cicero  appears  to  have  followed 

Alexander  the  Great  died  in  323  and  Aristotle  in  Post-Aristo 
322  B.C.  Both  Epicurus  and  Zeno,  the  founder  of  *pl^P  j^^ 
Stoicism,  began  to  teach  at  Athens  about  twenty  years 
later.  The  date  marks  a  new  era  in  Greek  thought 
and  Greek  life.  Speculative  energy  had  exhausted 
itself;  the  schools  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  showed 
little  vigour  after  the  death  of  their  founders.  En- 
lightenment had  undermined  religion,  yet  the  philo- 
sophers seemed  to  agree  about  nothing  except  that 
things  are  not  what  they  appear;  and  the  plain 
man's  mistrust  of  their  conclusions  was  raised  into  a 
system  of  Scepticism  by  Pyrrho.  Meanwhile  the 
outer  order  too  had  changed.  For  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle the  good  life  could  only  be  lived  in  a  free 
city-state,  like  the  little  independent  Greek  cities 
\irhich  they  knew ;  but  these  had  now  fallen  under 

•  •  • 




the  empire  of  Macedon,  and  the  barrier  between 
Greek  and  barbarian  was  giving  way.  The  wars  of 
-Alexander's  successors  rendered  all  things  insecure ; 
exile,  slavery,  violent  death  were  possibilities  with 
which  every  man  must  lay  his  account. 

Epicureanism  and  Stoicism,  however  antagonistic, 
have  certain  common  features  corresponding  to  the 
needs  of  the  period.  Philosophy  was  systematized, 
and  fell  into  three  recognized  departments.  Logic, 
Physics  and  Ethics ;  and  for  both  schools  the  third 
department  stood  first  in  importance.  Both  schools 
offered  dogma,  not  speculation ;  a  way  of  life  for  man 
as  man,  not  as  Greek  citizen.  Both  abandoned 
idealism,  saw  no  reality  save  matter,  and  accepted 
sense  experience  as  knowledge.  Both  studied  the 
world  of  nature  only  in  order  to  understand  the 
position  of  man.  Both  looked  for  a  happiness 
secure  from  fortune's  changes';  and  found  it  in  peace 
of  mind,  undisturbed  by  fear  and  desire.  But  here 
the  rival  teachers  diverged :  Epicurus  sought  peace 
in  the  liberation  of  man's  will  from  nature's  law, 
Zeno  in  submission  to  it;^  and  in  their  conceptions 
of  nature  they  differed  profoundly. 

nirean-  Formal  Logic  Epicurus  dismissed  as  useless,  but 
onic  ^^  raised  the  problem  of  knowledge  under  the 
heading  of  Canonic.  The  Carum  or  measuring-rod, 
the.  criterion  of  truth,  is  furnished  by  the  sensations 
and  by  the  irdOr)  or  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain. 
Epicurus' s  recognition  of  the  latter  as  qualities  of 
any  state  of  consciousness  and  as  distinct  from  the 
sensations  of  sight,  hearing,  etc.,  marks  a  notable 

*  Et  mihi  res  non  me  rebus  suhiungere  conor,  says  Horace 
of  his  lapses  from  Stoicism  into  Cyrenaicism. 



advance  in   psychology.     The   sensations   and   the 
feelings    determine    our     judgment     and    volition 
respectively,  and  they  are  all    true,'  i.e.,  real  data 
of  experience.     So  are  the  irpo\ri\l/€is,  or    precon- 
ceptions' by  which  we  recognize  each  fresh  sensa- 
tion, i.e.,  our  general  concepts;  for  these  are  accu- 
mulations of  past  sensations.     It  is  in  vTro\rj\l/€is, 
opinions,'  i.e.,  judgments   about   sensations,   that  'j 
/error  can  occur.     Opinions  are  true  only  when  con-  \ 
I  firmed,  or,  in  the  case  of  those  relating  to  imper- 
0  ceptible  objects  (e.g.  the  Void),  when  not  contra- 
dicted by  actual  sensations.     Thus  Epicurus  adum-   ' 
brated,    however    crudely,    a    logic    of    inductive  ' 

His  Natural  Philosophy  is  touched  on  in  de  Finibus,  Epicurean 
I,  c.  vi.  It  is  fully  set  out  in  the  great  poem  of  ^^J^sics, 
Cicero's  contemporary,  Lucretius,  who  preaches  his 
master's  doctrine  with  religious  fervour  as  a  gospel 
of  deliverance  for  the  spirit  of  man.  Epicurus  adopt- 
ed the  Atomic  theory  of  Democritus,  according  to 
which  the  primary  realities  are  an  infinite  number  of 
tiny  particles  of  matter,  indivisible  and  indestructi-» 
ble,  moving  by  their  own  weight  through  an  infinite 
expanse  of  empty  space  or  Void.  Our  perishable 
world  and  all  that  it  contains  consists  of  temporary 
clusters  of  these  atoms  interspersed  with  void.  In- 
numerable other  worlds  beside  are  constantly  form- 
ing and  dissolving.  This  universe  goes  on  of  itself: 
there  are  gods,  but  they  take  no  part  in  its  guidance ; 
they  live  a  life  of  untroubled  bliss  in  the  empty  spaces 
between  the  worlds.  The  human  soul  like  every- 
thing else  is  material;  it  consists  of  atoms  of  the 
smallest  and  most  mobile  sort,  enclosed  by  the 
coarser  atoms  of  the  body,  and  dissipated  when  the 



body  is  dissolved  by  death.     Death  therefore  means 

Thus  man  was  relieved  from  the  superstitions  that 
preyed  upon  his  happiness, — fear  of  the  gods  and 
fear  of  punishment  after  death.  But  a  worse  tyranny 
remained  if  all  that  happens  is  caused  by  inexorable 
fate.  Here  comes  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Swerve, 
which  Cicero  derides,  but  which  is  essential  to  the 
system.  Democritus  had  taught  that  the  heavier 
atoms  fell  faster  through  the  void  than  the  lighter 
ones,  and  so  overtook  them.  Aristotle  corrected  the 
error ;  and  Epicurus  turned  the  correction  to  account. 
He  gave  his  atoms  a  uniform  vertical  velocity,  but 
supposed  them  to  collide  by  casually  making  a  slight 
sideway  movement.  This  was  the  minimum  hypo- 
thesis that  he  could  think  of  to  account  for  the 
formation  of  things;  and  it  served  his  purpose  by 
destroying  the  conception  of  a  fixed  order  in  Nature. 
The  capacity  to  swerve  is  shared  by  the  atoms  that 
compose  the  human  soul ;  hence  it  accounts  for  the 
action  of  the  will,  which  Epicurus  regards  as  entirely 
undetermined.  In  this  fortuitous  universe  man  is 
free  to  make  his  own  happiness. 
epicurean  In  Ethics  Epicurus  based  himself  on  Aristippus, 

the  pupil  of  Socrates  and  founder  of  the  School  of 
Cyrene.  With  Aristippus  he  held  that  pleasure  is  the 
only  good,  the  sole  constituent  of  man's  well-being. 
Aristippus  had  drawn  the  practical  inference  that 
the  right  thing  to  do  is  to  enjoy  each  pleasure  of  the 
moment  as  it  offers.  His  rule  of  conduct  is  summed 
up  by  Horace's  Carpe  diem.  But  this  naif  hedonism 
was  so  modified  by  Epicurus  as  to  become  in  his  hands 
an  entirely  different  theory.  Its  principal  tenets  are: 
that  the  goodness  of  pleasure  is  a  matter  of  direct 



intuition^  and  is  attested  by  natural  instinct^  as  seen 
in  the  actions  of  infants  and  animals ;  that  all  men's 
conduct  does  as  a  matter  of  fact  aim  at  pleasure ;  that 
the  proper  aim  is  to  secure  the  greatest  l)alance  of 
pleasure  over  pain  in  the  aggregate;  that  absence 
of  pain  is  the  greatest  pleasure,  which  can  only  be 
varied,  not  augmented,  by  active  gratification  of  the 
sense ;  that  pleasure  of  the  mind  is  based  on  pleasure 
of  the  body,  yet  that  mental  pleasure  may  far  sur- 
pass bodily  in  miEignitude,  including  as  it  does  with 
the  consciousness  of  present  gratification  the  memory 
of  past  and  the  hope  of  future  pleasure ;  that  un- 
natural and  unnecessary'  desires  and  emotions  are  a 
chief  source  of  unhappiness;  and  that  Prudence, 
Temperance  or  self-control,  and  the  other  recognized 
virtues  are  therefore  essential  to  obtain  a  life  of 
the  greatest  pleasure,  though  at  the  same  time  the 
virtues  are  of  no  value  save  as  conducive  to  pleasure. 

This  original,  and  in  some  respects  paradoxical, 
development  of  hedonism  gave  no  countenance  to  the 
voluptuary.  On  the  contrary  Epicurus  both  preached 
and  practised  the  simple  life,  and  the  cultivation  of 
the  ordinary  virtues,  though  under  utilitarian  sanc- 
tions which  led  him  to  extreme  unorthodoxy  in  some 
particulars.  Especially,  he  denied  any  absolute 
validity  to  Justice  and  to  Law,  and  inculcated  absten.- 
tion  from  the  active  duties  of  citizenship.  To  Friend- 
ship he  attached  the  highest  value;  and  the  School 
that  he  founded  in  his  Garden  in  a  suburb  of  Athens, 
and  endowed  by  will,  was  as  much  a  society  of 
friends  as  a  college  of  students.  It  still  survived 
arid  kept  the  birthday  of  its  founder  in  Cicero's  time. 

Epicurus  is  the  forerunner  of  the  English  Utilita- 
rians ;  but  he  differs  from  them  in  making  no  attempt 


^^1  to  con 

^^B  happit 

^^P  others 

^r  is  agaj 


to  combine  hedonism  witli  altruisni.  'The  greatest 
happiness  of  tlie  greatest  number '  is  a.  formula  that 
counterpart  in  antiquity.  The  problem  that 
when  the  claims  of  self  conflict  with  those  of 
others  was  not  explicitly  raised  by  Epicurus.  But  it 
against  the  egoism  of  his  Ethics  at  least  as  much 
as  against  its  hedonistic  basis  that  Cicero's  criticisms 
are  really  directed. 

The  Stoics  paid  mucli  attention  to  Logic.  In  this 
department  they  included  with  Dialectic,  which  they 
developed  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  Aristotle, 
Grammar,  Rhetoric,  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Criterion. 
The  last  was  their  treatment  of  the  problem  of  know- 
ledge. Like  Epicurus  they  were  purely  empirical, 
but  unlike  him  they  conceded  t«  the  Sceptics  that 
sensations  are  sometimes  misleading.  Vet  true  sensa- 
tions, they  maintainedjare  distinguishable  &om  false ; 
they  have  a  clearness'  which  compels  tlie  assent' 
of  the  mind  and  makes  it  comprehend '  or  grasp 
the  presentation  as  a  true  picture  of  the  CKtemal 
object.  Such  a  comprehensible  presentation,' 
KaTaKiprriKii  ^vrairta.,  is  the  criterion  of  truth ;  it  is 
a  presentation  that  arises  from  an  object  actually 
present,  in  conformity  with  that  object,  stamped  on 
the  mind  like  the  impress  of  a  seal,  and  such  as 
could  not  arise  from  an  object  not  actually  present.' 
So  their  much-debated  formula  was  elaborated  in 
reply  to  Sceptical  critics.  If  asked  how  it  happens 
that  false  sensations  do  occur — e.g.,  that  a  straight 
stick  half  under  water  looks  crooked — the  Stoics 
replied  that  error  only  arises  from  inattention ;  care- 
fill  observation  will  detect  the  absence  of  one  or 
other  of  the  notes  of  '  clearness.'     I'lie  Wise  Man 


never    assents'  to  an     incomprehensible  presenta- 

In  contradiction  to  Epicurus^  the  Stoics  taught  Stoic 
that  the  universe  is  guided  by,  and  in  the  last  resort  Physics, 
is,  God.  The  sole  first  cause  is  a  divine  Mind,  which 
realizes  itself  periodically  in  the  world-process.  But 
this  belief  they  expressed  in  terms  uncompromisingly 
materialistic  Only  the  corporeal  exists,  for  only  the 
corporeal  can  act  and  be  acted  upon.  Mind  there- 
fore is  matter  in  its  subtlest  form;  it  is  Fire  or 
Breath  (spirit)  or  Aether.  The  primal  fiery  Spirit 
creates  out  of  itself  the  material  world  that  we  know, 
and  itself  persists  within  the  world  as  its  heat,  its 
tension,'  its  soul ;  it  is  the  cause  of  all  movement, 
and  the  source  of  life  in  all  animate  creatures,  whose 
souls  are  detached  particles  of  the  world-soul. 

The  notion  of  Fire  as  the  primary  substance  the 
Stoics  derived  from  Heracleitus.  Of  the  process  of 
<*reation  they  offered  an  elaborate  account,  a  sort  of 
imaginary  physics  or  chemistry,  operating  with  the 
hot  and  cold,  dry  and  moist,  the  four  elements  of 
fire,  air,  earth  and  water,  and  other  conceptions  of 
previous  physicists,  which  came  to  them  chiefly 
through  the  Peripatetics. 

The  world-process  they  conceived  as  going  on 
according  to  a  fixed  law  or  formula  {\dyo<i)^  effect 
following  cause  in  undeviating  sequence.  This  law 
they  regarded  impersonally  as  Fate,  or  personally  as 
divine  Providence ;  they  even  spoke  of  the  Deity  as 
being  himself  the  Logos  of  creation.  Evidences  of 
design  they  found  in  the  beauty  of  the  ordered 
world  and  in  its  adaptation  to  the  use  and  comfort 
of  man.  Apparent  evil  is  but  the  necessary  imperfec- 
tion of  the  parts  as  parts ;  the  whole  is  perfectly  gooc 




As  this  world  had  a  beginning,  so  it  will  have  an 
end  ill  lime;  it  is  moving  on  towards  »  universal 
coiitUKTittio»,  in  which  all  things  «ill  return  to  the 
primal  Vin  from  which  they  sprang.  But  only  for 
a  moment  will  unity  be  restored.  The  causes  that 
opcnted  before  must  opcrati-  again;  once  more  the 
creative  |iroc«ss  will  begin,  and  all  things  will  recur 
cjtaclly  as  they  have  occurred  already.  So  existence 
goes  on,  repeating  itself  in  an  unending  series  of 
identical  cycles. 

Such  rigorous  determinism  would  seem  to  leave  no 
room  for  human  freedom  or  for  moral  choice.  \  et  the 
Stoics-BUUBbuiMd- that  though  man's  acts  like  all 
other  events  are  fore-ordained,  his  will  is  free.  Obey  the 
divine  ordinance  in  any  case  he  must,  but  iFrests  with 
him  to  do  so  willingly  or  with  reluctance.  To  under- 
stand the  world  in  which  he  finds  himself^  and  to  sub- 
mit his  will  thereto — herein  man's  well-being  lies. 

On  this  foundation  they  reared  an  elaborate  stnic- 
tuje  of  Ethics.  Their  formula  for  conduct  was  To 
live  in  accordance  with  nature.'  To  interpret  this, 
they  appealed,  bke  Epicurus,  to  instinct,  but  with  a 
different  result.  According  to  the  Stoics,  not  plea- 
sure but  self-preservation  and  things  conducive  to  it 
are  the  objects  at  which  infants  and  animals  aim. 
Such  objects  are  primary  in  the  order  of  nature'; 
and  these  objects  and  others  springing  out  of  them, 
viz.,  all  that  pertains  to  the  safety  and  the  fiill  deve- 
lopment of  man's  nature,  constitute  the  proper  aim 
of  human  action.  The  instinct  to  seek  these  objects 
is  replaced  in  the  adult  by  deliberate  intention;  as 
his  reason  matures,  be  learns  (if  unperverted)  to 
understand  the  plan  of  nature  and  to  find  his  happi- 
ness in  willing  conformity  with  it.  'I1iis  tightness  of 


understanding  and  of  will  (the  Stoics  did  not  separate 
the  two,  since  for  them  the  mind  is  one)  is  Wisdom 
or  Virtue,  which  is  the  only  good ;  their  wrongness  is 
Folly  or  Vice,  the  only  evil.  Not  that  we  are  to  ignore 
external  things:  on  the  contrary,  it  is  in  choosing 
among  them  as  Nature  intends  that  Virtue  is  exercised. 
But  the  attainment  of  the  natural  obj  ects  is  immaterial ; 
it  is  the  effort  to  attain  them  alone  that  counts. 

This  nice  adjustment  of  the  claims  of  Faith  and 
Works  was  formulated  in  a  series  of  technicalities. 
A  scale  of  values  was  laid  down,  and  on  it  a  scheme 
of  conduct  was  built  up.  Virtue  alone  is  good' 
and  to  be  sought,'  Vice  alone  ^evil'  and  ^to  be 
-shunned';  all  else  is  ^indifferent.'  But  of  things 
indifferent  some,  being  in  accordance  with  nature, 
are  promoted '  or  preferred '  (Trporyy/Acva),  as 
having  worth '  (a^ta),  and  these  are  *  to  be 
chosen';  others,  being  contrary  to  nature,  are  de- 
promoted  '  {aTTiyjrporjyfjLeva)  as  having  unworth ' 
(aTTo^ta,  negative  value),  and  these  are  ^to  be  re- 
jected'; while  other  things  again  are  absolutely 
indifferent,'  and  supply  no  motive  for  action.  To 
aim  at  securing  things  promoted,'  or  avoiding 
their  opposites  is  an  appropriate  act  *  {KaOrJKov) : 
this  is  what  the  young  and  uncomipted  do  by  in- 
stinct. When  the  same  aim  is  taken  by  the  rational 
adult  with  full  knowledge  of  nature's  plan  and 
deliberate    intent    to   conform   with    it,   then   the 

appropriate    act '    is     perfect,'    and    is   a      right 
action '  or  ^  success '  {KaTopOmfm)}     Intention,  not 

*  Cicero  inevitably  obscures  the  point  in  rendering  KadrjKov 
by  officium.    To  say  that  fungi  officio,  *  to  do  one's  duty,* 
is  not  rectefacere  makes  the  doctrine  sound  more  paradox 
cal  than  it  really  was. 



achievement,  constitutes  success.  Tfee  only  failure,* 
'error*  or  sin*  (the  term  afxdp'rnfm  includes  all 
these  notions)  is  the  conduct  of  the  rational  being 
who  ignores  and  violates  nature. 

In  identifying  the  Good  w^ith  Virtue  and  in  inter- 
preting Virtue  by  the  conception  of  Nature,  the 
Stoics  were  following  their  forerunners  the  Cynics ; 
but  they  parted  company  with  the  Cynics  in  finding 
a  place  in  their  scheme  for  Goods  in  the  ordinary 
sense.  For  though  they  place  pleasure  among 
things  absolutely  indifferent,*  their  examples  of 
things  promoted  * — life,  health,  wealth,  etc. — are 
pretty  much  the  usual  objects  of  man*s  endeavour. 
Hence,  whereas  the  Cynics,  construing  the  natu- 
ral *  as  the  primitive  or  unsophisticated,  had  run 
counter  to  convention  and  even  to  decency,  the 
Stoics  in  the  practical  rules  deduced  from  their 
/  principles  agreed  in  the  main  with  current  morality, 
I  and  included  the  recognized  duties  to  the  family 
\  and  the  state. 

But  their  first  principles  themselves  they  enunci- 
ated m  a  form  that  was  violently  paradoxical.  Virtue 
\being  a  state  _ofjnward-rightgpusness  they  T^garded 
as  something  absolute.  Either  a  man  has  attained  to 
1%  ^Tien  he  i^  at' once  completely  wise,  good  and 
happy,  and  remains  so  whatever  pain,  sorrow,  or 
misfortune  may  befall  him ;  or  he  has  not  attained  to 
it,  in  which  case,  whatever  progress  he  has  made 
towards  it,  he  is  still  foolish,  wicked  and  miserable. 
So  stated,  the  ideal  was  felt  to  be  beyond  man's 
reach.  Chrysippus,  the  third  head  of  the  school, 
confessed  that  he  had  never  known  a  Wise  Man. 
Criticism  forced  the  later  Stoics  to  compromise. 
The  Wise  Man  remained  as  a  type  and  an  ensample ; 


but  positive  value  was  conceded  to  moral  progress, 
and  'appropriate  acts'  tended  to  usurp  the  place 
that  strictly  belonged  to    right  acts/ 


The  last  system  to  engage  Cicero's  attention,  that  The 
of  his  contemporary  Antiochus,  is  of  much  less  in-  Academy, 
terest  than  the  two  older  traditions  with  which  he 
ranges  it. 

Within  a  century  of  the  death  of  its  founder  Plato, 
the  Academy  underwent  a  complete  transformation. 
Arcesilas,  its  head  in  the  middle  of  the  third  cen- 
tury B.C.,  adopted  the  scepticism  that  had  been 
established  as  a  philosophical  system  by  Pyrrho  two 
generations  before,  and  denied  the  possibility  of 
knowledge.  He  was  accordingly  spoken  of  as  the 
founder  of  a  Second  or  New  Academy.  His  work 
was  carried  further  a  century  afterwards  by  Car- 
neades.  Both  these  acute  thinkers  devoted  them- 
selves to  combating  the  dogmas  of  the  Stoics. 
Arcesilas  assailed  their  theory  of  knowledge;  and 
Cameades  riddled  their  natural  theology  with  shafts 
that  have  served  for  most  subsequent  polemic  of  the 
kind.  On  the  basis  of  philosophic  doubt,  the  New 
Academy  developed  in  Ethics  a  theory  of  reasoned 
probability  as  a  sufficient  guide  for  life. 

The  extreme  scepticism  of  Cameades  led  to  a 
reaction.  Philo,  who  was  his  next  successor  but 
one,  and  who  afterwards  became  Cicero's  teacher  at 
Rome,  reverted  to  a  more  positive  standpoint.  Doing 
violence  to  the  facts,  he  declared  that  the  teaching 
of  the  Academy  had  never  changed  since  Plato,  and 
that  Arcesilas  and  Cameades,  though  attacking  the 
Criterion  of  the  Stoics,  had  not  meant  to  deny  all 
possibility  of  knowledge.     The  Stoic     comprehen* 


sion '  was  impossible^  but  yet  there  was  a  clearness* 
about  some  impressions  that  gives  a  conviction  of 
their  truth. 

The  next  head^  Antiochus,  went  beyond  this 
ambiguous  position^  and  abandoned  scepticism  alto- 
gether. Contradicting  Philo,  he  maintained  that 
the  true  tradition  of  Plato  had  been  lost,  and  pro- 
fessed to  recover  it,  calling  his  school  the  *01d 
Academy.'  But  his  reading  of  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy was  hardly  more  accurate  than  Philo*s.  He 
asserted  that  the  teachings  of  the  older  Academics 
and  Peripatetics  and  of  the  Stoics  were,  in  Ethics 
at  all  events,  substantially  the  same,  and  that  Zeno 
had  borrowed  his  tenets  from  his  predecessors, 
merely  concealing  the  theft  by  his  novel  termin- 

The  latter  thesis  is  argued  in  de  Finibus,  Book  IV, 
while  Book  V  gives  Antioclius*s  version  of  the  ^  Old 
Academic  and  Peripatetic '  Ethics,  which  he  himself 
professed.  His  doctrine  is  that  Virtue  is  sufficient 
for  happiness,  but  that  in  the  highest  degree  of 
happiness  bodily  and  external  goods  also  form  a  part. 
The  Stoics  will  not  call  these  latter  ^  goods,'  but 
only  things  promoted';  yet  really  they  attach  no 
less  importance  to  them. 

Antiochus  could  only  maintain  his  position  by 
ignoring  nice  distinctions.  The  Ethics  of  Aris- 
totle in  particular  seem  to  have  fallen  into  complete 
oblivion.  Aristotle's  cardinal  doctrines  are,  that 
well-being  consists  not  in  the  state  of  virtue  but  in 
the  active  exercise  of  all  human  excellences,  and 
particularly  of  man's  highest  gift  of  rational  con- 
templation ;  and  that  though  for  this  a  modicum  of 
external  goods  is  needed,  these  are  but  indispensable 


conditions^  and  in  no  way  constituent  parts^  of  the 
Chief  Good. 

The  fact  is  that  philosophy  in  Cicero's  day  had 
lost  all  precision  as  well  as  originality.  It  must  be 
admitted  that  de  Finibus  declines  in  interest  when  it 
comes  to  deal  with  contemporary  thought.  Not  only 
does  the  plan  of  the  work  necessitate  some  repetition 
in  Book  V  of  arguments  already  rehearsed  in  Book  IV ; 
but  Antiochus's  perversion  of  preceding  systems 
impairs  alike  the  criticism  of  the  Stoics  and  the 
presentation  of  his  own  ethical  doctrine. 

The  text  of  this  edition  is  founded  on  that  of  The  Text. 
Madvig^  whose  representatives  have  kindly  per- 
mitted use  to  be  made  of  the  latest  edition  of  his 
de  Finibus y  dated  1876.  Madvig  first  established 
the  text  of  the  book;  and  it  is  from  no  lack  of 
appreciation  for  his  Herculean  labours  that  I  have 
ventured  here  and  there  to  modify  his  results, 
whether  by  adopting  conjectures  suggested  in  his 
notes,  or  by  preferring  MSS.  readings  rejected  by 
him,  or  conjectures  made  by  other  scholars  and  in 
one  or  two  places  by  myself.  In  supplementing 
Madvig's  work  I  have  derived  much  help  from  the 
Teubner  text  of  C.  W.  F.  Miiller,  1904.  Madvig's 
punctuation  I  have  altered  throughout,  both  to  con- 
form it  with  English  usage  and  also  occasionally  to 
suggest  a  different  connection  of  thought. 

Departures  from  Madvig' s  text  (referred  to  as  The  criHca 
Mdv.)  are  noted  at  the  foot  of  the  page.     So  also  ^o*^^* 
are   MSS.   variants   of  importance  for  the   sense ; 
in  such  places  the  readings  of  the  three  best  MSS. 
and  of  the  inferior  group  are  usually  given.    But  no 
attempt  is  made  to  present  a  complete  picture  of 



the  state  of  the  MSS.,  for  which  the  student  must 
go  to  Madvig. 

^SS.  The  best  MSS.  of  de  Finibus  are :  A,  Palatinus  I, 

11th  c,  which  ends  soon  after  the  beginning  of 
Book  IV;  B,  Palatinus  II ;  and  E,  Erlangensis,  1 5th  c. 
These  three  form  one  family,  within  which  B  and  E 
are  more  closely  related.  The  other  MSS.  known 
to  Madvig  form  a  second  family,  inferior  in  general 
to  the  former,  though,  as  Miiller  points  out,  not  to 
be  entirely  dispensed  with.  Both  families  according 
to  Madvig  descend  from  a  late  and  already  consider- 
ably corrupted  archetype. 

Ions,  The   earliest   edition   is  believed  to  have  been 

printed  at  Cologne  in  1467.  Madvig' s  great  com- 
mentary (Copenhagen,  1839,  1869,  1876)  supersedes 
all  its  predecessors.  There  is  a  small  annotated 
edition,  largely  based  upon  Madvig,  by  W.  M.  L. 
Hutchinson  (London,  1909). 

islations.  English  translations  are  those  of  Samuel  Parker 
{Tullys  Five  Books  de  Finibus,  or  Concerning  the  Last 
Objects  of  Desire  and  Aversion,  done  into  English  by 
S,  P.,  Gent,  revised  .  ,  .  by  Jeremy  Collier,  M.A,, 
London,  1702;  page-heading,  TuUy  of  Moral  Ends; 
a  2nd  edition  published  by  Bliss,  Oxford,  1812);  of 
Guthrie  (London,  1 744) ;  of  Yonge  (in  Bohn*s  series, 
1 848)  ;  and  of  J.  S.  Reid  (Cambridge,  1 883,  now  out 
of  print).  The  first  of  these,  and  the  German  version 
of  Kirchmann  in  the  Philosophische  Bibliothek  (l  868), 
I  have  consulted  occasionally,  the  former  with  plea- 
sure, but  neither  with  much  profit. 

s  of  The  fullest  treatment  in  English  of  the  subjects 

rence.       dealt  with  in  de  Finibus  will  be  found  in  Zeller's 
Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics  and  Eclectics,     Zeller's 
monumental  work  requires  supplementing  especially 


in  regard  to  Stoicism.  Recent  books  of  value  are 
Arnold's  Roman  Stoicism,  Hicks' s  Stoic  and  Epicurean, 
and  Bevan's  Stoics  and  Sceptics,  Reid's  edition  of 
Academica  is  a  mine  of  information  about  Cicero's 
philosophical  work.  For  the  sources,  a  selection  for 
beginners  is  Adam's  Texts  to  Illustrate  Greek  Philo- 
sophy after  Aristotle, 

I  must  express  my  gratitude  to  my  friend  Miss 
W.  M.  L.  Hutchinson  for  reading  the  proofs  of  my 
translation  and  doing  much  to  improve  it.  Nor  can 
I  forget  my  debt  to  the  late  Dr  James  Adam,  whose 
lectures  on  de  Finibus  first  aroused  my  interest  in 
ethical  theory. 

H.  R. 






On  p.  22,  note y  for  Democritus  read  Epicurus. 







1  I.  Non  eram  nescius^  Brute,  cum  quae  summis  in- 
geniis  exquisitaque  doctrina  philosophi  Graeco  ser- 
mone  tractavissent  ea  Latinis  litteris  mandaremus^ 
fore  ut  hie  noster  labor  in  varias  reprehensiones  in- 
curreret.  Nam  quibusdam,  et  iis  quidem  non  admo- 
dum  indoctis,  totum  hoc  displicet  philosophari. 
Quidam  autem  non  tam  id  reprehendunt  si  remissius 
agatur,  sed  tantum  studium  tamque  multam  operam 
ponendam  in  eo  non  arbitrantur.  Erunt  etiam,  et  hi 
quidem  eruditi  Graecis  litteris,  contemnentes  Lati- 
nas,  qui  se  dicant  in  Graecis  legendis  operam  malle 
consumere.  Postremo  aliquos  futuros  suspicor  qui  me 
ad  alias  litteras  vocent,  genus  hoc  scribendi,  etsi  sit 

2  elegans,  personae  tamen  et  dignitatis  esse  negent. 
Contra  quos  omnes  dicendum  breviter  existimo. 
Quamquam  philosophiae  quidem  vituperatoribus 
satis  responsum  est  eo  libro  quo  a  nobis  philosophic 
defensa  et  collaudata  est  cum  esset  accusata  et 
vituperata  ab  Hortensio.  Qui  liber  cum  et  tibi  pro-' 
batus  videretur  et  iis  quos  ego  posse  iudicare  arbi- 
trarer,  plura  suscepi,  veritus  ne  movere  hominum 
studia  viderer,  retinere  non  posse.     Qui  autem,  si 

*This  book  was  called  Horiensius^  and  formed  an  intro- 
duction to  Cicero's  philosophical  writings.  Fragments  only 
are  extant. 




1  I.  My  dear  Brutus, — ^The  following  essay,  I  am  Preface :choi< 
well  aware,  attempting  as  it  does  to  present  in  a  Latin  defended^ 
dress   subjects   that  philosophers    of    consummate 

ability  and  profound  leartiyrig  have  already  handled 
in  Greek,  is  sure  to  encounter  criticism  from  different 
quarters.  Certain  persons,  aHd:^'those  not  without 
some  pretension  to  letters,  disa:pprdve  of  the  study 
of  philosophy  altogether.  Others  "do  not  so  greatly 
object  to  it  provided  it  be  followed  in  dilettante 
fashion ;  but  they  do  not  think  it  ought  to  Wga^e  so 
large  an  amount  of  one's  interest  and  attention.  '■  A 
third  class,  learned  in  Greek  literature  and  contemp- 
tuous of  Latin,  will  say  that  they  prefer  to  spend  their 
time  in  reading  Greek.  Lastly,  I  suspect  there  will 
be  some  who  will  wish  to  divert  me  to  other  fields  of 
authorship,  asserting  that  this  kind  of  composition, 
though  a  graceful  recreation,  is  beneath  the  dignity 

2  of  my  character  and  position.    To  all  of  these  objec- 
tions I  suppose  I  ought  to  make  some  brief  reply.  The  Philosophy 

•    j«        •      »      X.  r    t-•^  i_i_'jjt  deserving  of 

indiscriminate  censure  of  philosophy  has  indeed  been  study," 
sufficiently  answered  already  in  the  book*  which  I 
wrote  in  praise  of  that  study,  in  order  to  defend  it 
against  a  bitter  attack  that  had  been  made  upon  it 
by  Hortensius.  The  favourable  reception  which  that 
volume  appeared  to  obtain  from  yourself  and  from 
others  whom  I  considered  competent  judges  en- 
couraged me  to  embark  upon  further  undertakings ; 
for  I  did  not  wish  to  be  thought  incapable  of  sus- 
taining the  interest  that  I  had  succeeded  in  arousing. 
b2  S 


maxime  hoc  placeat,  moderatius  tamen  id  volunt  fieri^ 
diflicilem  quandam  temperantiam  postulant  in  eo 
quod  semel  admissum  coerceri  reprimique  non  potest ; 
ut  propemodum  iustioribus  utamur  illis  qui  omnino 
avocent  a  .philosophia^  quam  his  qui  rebus  infinitis 
modum  constituant  in  reque  eo  meliore  quo  maior  sit 

3  medioeritatem  desiderent.  r.Sive*enim  ad  sapientiam 
perveniri  potest^  non  paranda  nobis  solum  ea  sed 
fhienda  etiam  est;  ^^ive  hoe  difficile  est,  tamen  nee 
modus  est  ullus .  investigandi  veri  nisi  in  veneris,  et 
quaerendi  defetigatio  turpis  est  cum  id  quod  quae- 
ritur  sif  pulchemmum.  Etenim  si  delectamur  cum 
scribiir\us,*quis  est  tarn  invidus  qui  ab  eo  nos  abducat? 
Sin  laboramus,  quis  est  qui  alienae  modum  statuat 

!•.  fndustriae?     Nam  ut  Terentianus  Chremes  non  in- 

•  humanus,  qui  novum  vicinum  non  vult 

Fodere  aut  arare  aut  aliquid  ferre  denique — 
(non  enim  ilium  ab  industria  sed  ab  illiberali  labore 
deterret),  sic  isti  curiosi,  quos  offendit  noster  minime 
nobis  iniucundus  labor. 

4  II.  lis  igitur  est  difficilius  satisfacere  qui  se  Latina 
scripta  dicunt  contemnere.  In  quibus  hoc  primum 
est  in  quo  admirer,  cur  in  gravissimis  rebus  non 
delectet  eos  sermo  patrius,  cum  iidem  fabellas  Latinas 
ad  verbum  e  Graecis  expressas  non  inviti  legant. 
Quis  enim  tam  inimicus  paene  nomini  Romano  est, 
qui  Enni  Medeam  aut  Antiopam  Pacuvi  spemat  aut 

'^Terence,  Jleau fan fimommenos,  i.  i.  17. 

BOOK  I.  i-ii 

The  second  class  of  critics,  who,  however  much  they  and  of 
approve  of  philosophy,  nevertheless  would  rather  t^o'^^sh  stud: 
have  it  less  eagerly  prosecuted,  are  asking  for  a 
restraint  that  it  is  not  easy  to  practise.  The  study 
is  one  that  when  once  taken  up  admits  of  no  restriction 
or  control.  In  fact,  the  attitude  of  the  former  class, 
who  attempt  to  dissuade  us  from  philosophy  alto- 
gether, seems  almost  less  unreasonable  than  that  of 
those  who  would  set  limits  to  what  is  essentially  un- 
limited, and  expect  us  to  stop  half-way  in  a  study 

3  that  increases  in  value  the  further  it  proceeds.  If 
Wisdom  be  attainable,  let  us  not  only  win  but  enjoy 
it ;  or  f f  attainment  be  difficult,  still  there  is  no  end 
to  the  search  for  truth,  other  than  its  discovery.  It 
were  base  to  flag  in  the  pursuit,  when  the  object  pur- 
sued is  so  supremely  lovely.  Indeed  if  we  like  writing, 
who  would  be  so  churlish  as  to  debar  us  from  it  ?  Or 
if  we  find  it  a  labour,  who  is  to  set  limits  to  another 
man's  exertions  ?  No  doubt  it  is  kind  of  Chremes 
in  Terence's  play  to  urge  his  new  neighbour 

Neither  to  dig  nor  plough  nor  burdens  bear*: 
for  it  is  not  industry  in  general,  but  toil  of  a  menial 
kind,  from  which  he  would  deter  him ;    but  only  a 
busybody  would  take  exception  to  an  occupation 
which,  like  mine,  is  a  labour  of  love. 

4  II.  A  more  difficult  task  therefore  is  to  deal  with  Justification  of 
the  objection  of  those  who  profess  a  contempt  for  philosophy  int^c 
L#atin  writings  as  such.  What  astonishes  me  first  of  all  ^**"** 
about  them  is  this, — why  should  they  dislike  their 

native  language  for  serious  and  important  subjects, 
when  they  are  quite  willing  to  read  Latin  plays  trans- 
lated word  for  word  from  the  Greek  ?  Who  has  such 
a  hatred,  one  might  almost  say,  for  the  very  name  of 
Roman,  as  to  despise  and  reject  the  Medea  of  Ennius 


reiciat  quod  se  iisdem  Euripidis  fabulis   delectari 
dicat^  Latinas  litteras  oderit?     Synephebos  ego,  in- 
quit,  potius  Caecili  aut  Andriam  Terenti  quam  ut- 

5  ramque  Menandri  legam  ?  A  quibus  tantum  dissentio 
ut,  cum  Sophocles  vel  optime  scripserit  Electram, 
tamen  male  conversam  Atili  mihi  legendam  putem, 
de  quo  Licinius  ferreum  scriptorem/  venim  opinor 
scriptorem  tamen,  ut  legendus  sit.  Rudem  enim 
esse  omnino  in  nostris  poetis  aut  inertissimae  segnitiae 
est  aut  fastidi  delicatissimi.  Mihi  quidem  null!  satis 
eruditi  videntur  quibus  nostra  ignota  sunt.     An 

Utinam  ne  in  nemore — 
nihilo  minus  legimus  quam  hoc  idem  Graecum,  quae^ 
autem  de  bene  beateque  vivendo  a  Platone  disputata 

6  sunt,  haec  explicari  non  placebit  Latine?  Quid  si 
nos  non  interpretum  fungimur  munere,  sed  tuemer 
ea  quae  dicta  sunt  ab  iis  quos  probamus,  eisque  no- 
strum iudicium  et  nostrum  scribendi  ordinem  adiungi- 
mus?  quid  habent  cur  Graeca  anteponant  iis  quae 
et  splendide  dicta  sint  neque  sint  conversade  Graecis  ? 
Nam  si  dicent  ab  illis  has  res  esse  tractatas,  ne  ipsos 
quidem  Graecos  est  cur  tam  multos  legant  quam 
legendi  sunt.  Quid  enim  est  a  Chrysippo  praeter- 
missum  in  Stoicis  ?     Legimus  tamen  Diogenem,  An- 

*The  opening  of  Ennius*s  Medea  Exsuly  cp.  Euripides, 
Medea  ^f, 


BOOK  I.  ii 

or  the  AnUope  of  Pacuvius,  and  give  as  his  reason  that 
though  he  eiyoysthe  corresponding  plays  of  Euripides 
he  cannot  endure  books  written  in  Latin  ?  What,  he 
cries,  am  I  to  read  The  Young  Comrades  of  Caecilius,  or 
Terence's  Maid  of  Andros,  when  I  might  be  reading 

5  the  same  two  comedies  of  Menander?  With  this  sort 
of  person  I  disagree  so  strongly,  that,  admitting  the 
Electra  of  Sophocles  to  be  a  masterpiece,  I  yet  think 
Atilius's  poor  translation  of  it  worth  my  while  to 
read.  An  iron  writer,'  Licinius  called  him ;  still, 
in  my  opinion,  a  writer  all  the  same,  and  therefore 
deserving  to  be  read.  For  to  be  entirely  unversed 
in  our  own  poets  argues  either  the  extreme  of  mental 
inactivity  or  else  a  refinement  of  taste  carried  to  the 
point  of  excess.  To  my  mind  no  one  can  be  styled 
a  well-read  man  who  does  not  know  our  native 
literature.     If  we  read 

Would  that  in  forest  glades — ^ 
just  as  readily  as  the  same  passage  in  the  Greek/ 
shall   we   object  to   having    Plato's   discourses   on 
morality  and   happiness   set  before  the  reader  in 

6  Latin  ?  And  supposing  that  for  our  part  we  do  not 
fill  the  office  of  a  mere  translator,  but,  while  preserv- 
ing the  doctrines  of  our  chosen  authorities,  add 
thereto  our  own  criticism  and  our  own  arrangement : 
what  ground  have  these  objectors  for  ranking  the 
writings  of  Greece  above  compositions  that  are  at 
once  brilliant  in  style  and  not  mere  translations  from 
Greek  originals?  Perhaps  they  will  rejoin  that  the 
subject  has  been  dealt  with  by  the  Greeks  already.  But 
then  what  reason  have  they  for  reading  the  multitude 
of  Greek  authors  either  that  one  has  to  read  ?  Take 
Stoicism:  what  aspect  of  it  has  Chrysippus  left 
untouched?     Yet    we    read    Diogenes,   Antipater, 



tipatrum^  Mnesarchum^  Panaetium^  multos  alios^  in 
primisque  familiarem  nostrum  Posidonium.  Quid? 
Theophrastus  mediocriteme  delectat  cum  tractat 
locos  abAristotele  ante  tractates?  Quid?  Epicureinum 
desistunt  de  iisdem^  de  quibus  et  ab  Epicuro  scriptum 
est  et  ab  antiquis,  ad  arbitrium  suum  scribere  ?  Quodsi 
Graeci  leguntur  a  Graecis^  iisdem  de  rebus  alia  ratione 
compositis^  quid  est  cur  nostri  a  nostris  non  legantur? 

7  III.  Quamquam  si  plane  sic  verterem  Platonem 
aut  Aristotelem  ut  verterunt  nostri  poetae  fabulas^ 
male^  credo^  mererer  de  meis  civibus  si  ad  eorum 
cognitionem  divina  ilia  ingenia  transferrem.  Sed  id 
neque  feci  adhuc  nee  mihi  tamen  ne  faciam  inter- 
dictum  puto.  Locos  quidem  quosdam^  si  videbitur^ 
transferam^  et  maxime  ab  iis  quos  modo  nominavi^ 
cum  incident  ut  id  apte  fieri  possit;  ut  ab  Homero 
Ennius^  Afranius  a  Menandro  solet.  Nee  vero,  ut 
noster  Lucilius^  recusabo  quo  minus  omnes  mea 
legant.  Utinam  esset  ille  Persius !  Scipio  vero  et 
Rutilius  multo  etiam  magis;  quorum  ille  indicium 
reformidans  Tarentinis  ait  se  et  Consentinis  et 
Siculis  scribere.  Facete  is  quidem^  sicut  alia^;  sed 
neque  tam  docti  tum  erant  ad  quorum  indicium 
elaboraret,  et  sunt  illius  scripta  leviora,  ut  urbanitas 

8  summa  appareat^  doctrina  mediocris.  Ego  autem 
quem  timeam  lectorem,  cum  ad  te,  ne  Graecis  qui- 

^  alia  Mdv.  ;  alias  MSS. 

^Lucilius,  the  satirist,  148-103  B.C.,  avowed  that  he  wrote 
for  the  moderately  learned  like  Laelius,  not  for  great 
scholars  like  Persius :  *  Persium  non  euro  legere,  Laelium 
Decimum  volo*  (Cic.  de  Or.  2.25).  In  the  next  sentence 
here  Cicero  seems  to  refer  to  some  other  passage  of 
Lucilius,  in  which  he  put  his  claims  still  lower  and  pro- 
fessed to  write  for  illiterate  provincials,  not  for  cultured 
noblemen  like  Scipio  Africanus  Minor  and  P.  Rutilius  Rufus. 


BOOK  I.  ii-iii 

Mnesarchus^  Panaetius^  and  many  others,  not  least 
our  friend  Posidonius.  Again^  Theophrastus  handles 
topics  j)reviously  treated  by  Aristotle,  yet  he  gives 
us  no  small  pleasure  all  the  same.  Nor  do  the  Epi- 
cureans cease  from  writing  as  the  spirit  moves  them 
on  the  same  questions  on  which  Epicurus  and  the 
ancients  wrote.  If  Greek  writers  find  Greek  readers 
when  presenting  the  same  subjects  in  a  different 
setting,  why  should  not  Romans  be  read  by  Romans  ? 
III.  Yet  even  supposing  I  gave  a  direct  trans- 
lation of  Plato  or  Aristotle,  exactly  as  our  poets 
have  done  with  the  plays,  would  it  not,  pray,  be 
a  patriotic  service  to  introduce  those  transcendent 
intellects  to  the  acquaintance  of  my  fellow-country- 
men ?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  this  has  not  been 
my  procedure  hitherto,  though  I  do  not  feel  I  am  de- 
barred from  adopting  it.  Indeed  I  expressly  reserve 
the  right  of  borrowing  certain  passages,  if  I  think 
fit,  and  particularly  from  the  philosophers  just  men- 
tioned, when  an  appropriate  occasion  offers  for  so 
doing;  just  as  Ennius  regularly  borrows  from  Homer, 
and  Afranius  from  Menander.  Nor  yet  shall  I  object, 
like  our  Lucilius,*  to  all  the  world's  reading  what  I 
write.  I  only  wish  his  Persius  were  alive  to-day! 
and  still  more  Scipio  and  Rutilius,  in  fear  of  wliose 
criticism  Lucilius  protests  that  he  writes  for  the 
public  of  Tarentum,  Consentia  and  Sicily.  Here  of 
course,  as  elsewhere,  he  is  not  to  be  taken  too 
seriously.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  not  such 
learned  critics  in  his  day,  to  tax  his  best  efforts ;  and 
also  his  writings  are  in  a  lighter  vein:  they  show 
consummate  wit,  but  no  great  erudition.  I,  however, 
need  not  be  afraid  of  any  reader,  if  I  am  so  bold 
as   to   dedicate   my  book  to  you,  who   rival   even 


dem  cedentem  in  philosophia^  audeam  scribere? 
Quamquam  a  te  ipso  id  quidem  facio  provocatus 
gratissimo  mihi  libro  quern  ad  me  de  virtute  inisisti. 
Sed  ex  eo  credo  quibusdam  usu  venire  ut  abhorreant 
a  Latinis^  quod  inciderint  in  inculta  quaedam  et 
horrida,  de  malis  Graecis  Latine  scripta  deterius. 
Quibus  ego  assentior^  dum  modo  de  iisdem  rebus  ne 
Graecos  quidem  legendos  putent.  Res  vero  bonas 
verbis  electis  graviter  ornateque  dictas  quis  non 
legal  ?  Nisi  qui  se  plane  Graecum  dici  velit,  ut  a 
9  Scaevola  est  praetore  salutatus  Athenis  Albucius. 
Quem  quidem  locum  cum  multa  venustate  et  omni 
sale  idem  Lucilius^  apud  quem  praeclare  Scaevola : 


Graecum  te,  Albuci,  quam  Romanum  atque 

Municipem  Ponti,  Tritanni,  centurionum, 
Praeclarorum    hominum    ac    primorum   signife- 

Maluisti  dici ;  Graece  ergo  praetor  Athenis, 
Id  quod  maluisti,  te,  cum  ad  me  accedis,  saluto : 
Xaipc,*  inquam,  ^Tite!'  Lictores,  turma  omnis 

cohorsque  ^ : 
Xaipc,   Tite!*  Hinc   hostis   mi   Albucius,   hinc 


^cohorsque  Manutius,  Mdv.;  chorusque^  MSS. 

BOOK  1.  iii 

the  Greeks  as  a  philosopher.  Still,  you  yourself 
challenged  me  to  the  venture,  by  dedicating  to  me 
your  delightful  essay  On  Virtue,  But  I  have  no 
doubt  that  the  reason  why  some  people  take  a 
dislike  to  Latin  literature  is  that  they  have  happened 
to  meet  with  certain  illiterate  and  uncouth  produc- 
tions which  are  bad  Greek  books  in  worse  Latin' 
versions.  I  have  no  quarrel  with  these  persons, 
provided  that  they  also  refuse  to  read  the  Greek 
writers  on  the  same  subjects.  But  given  a  noble 
theme,  and  a  refined,  dignified  and  graceful  style, 
who  would  not  read  a  Latin  book  ?  Unless  it  be  some 
one  ambitious  to  be  styled  a  Greek  out-and-out,  as 
9  Albucius  was  greeted  by  Scaevola  when  the  latter 
was  praetor  at  Athens.  I  am  again  referring  to 
Lucilius,  who  relates  the  anecdote  with  much  neat- 
ness and  point ;  he  puts  the  following  excellent  lines 
into  the  mouth  of  Scaevola: 

"  You  vow*d,  Albucius,  that  to  suit  ye 
*Twas  as  a  Greek  we  must  repute  ye ; 
^ Roman'  and    Sabine'  being  names 
Your  man  of  ton  and  taste  disclaims ! 
You  jscom'd  to  own  your  native  town, — 
Which  bore  such  captains  of  renown 
As  Pontius  and  Tritannius  bold. 
Who  in  the  van  Rome's  ensigns  hold. 
And  so,  at  Athens  when  I  lay. 
And  your  respects  you  came  to  pay. 
My  worship,  humouring  your  freak. 
Gave  you  good-morrow  straight  in  Greek, 
With  '  Ckaire,  Titus  !  *  '  Chaire/  bawl 
Guards,  aides-de-camps,  javelin-men  and  all ! 
— Hence  comes  it  that  Albucius  hates  me. 
Hence  as  his  bitterest  foe  he  rates  me." 



10  Sed  iure  Mucius.  Ego  autem  mirari  satis  non^  queo^ 
unde  hoc  sit  tarn  insolens  domesticarum  rerum  fasti- 
dium.  Non  est  omnino  hie  docendi  locus^  sed  ita 
sentio  et  saepe  disserui^  Latinam  linguam  non  mode 
non  inopem,  ut  vulgo  putarent,  sed  locupletiorem 
etiam  esse  quam  Graecam.  Quando  enim  nobis^  vel 
dicam  aut  oratoribus  bonis  aut  poetis^  postea  quidem 
quam  fuit  quern  imitarentur^  uUus  orationis  vel 
copiosae  vel  elegantis  omatus  defuit? 

IV.  Ego  vero,  quoniam  ^  forensibus  opens,  laboribus, 
periculis  non  deseruisse  mihi  videor  praesidium  in 
quo  a  populo  Romano  locatus  sum,  debeo  profecto, 
quantumcumque  possum,  in  eo  quoque  elaborare  ut 
sint  opera,  studio,  labore  meo  doctiores  cives  mei, 
nee  cum  istis  tanto  opere  pugnare  qui  Graeca  legere 
malint,  modo  legant  ilia  ipsa,  ne  simulent,  et  iis 
servire  qui  vel  utrisque  litteris  uti  velint  vel,  si  suas 

1 1  habent,  illas  non  magno  opere  desiderent.  Qui 
autem  alia  malunt  scribi  a  nobis,  aequi  esse  debent, 
quod  et  scripta  multa  sunt,  sic  ut  plura  nemini  e 
nostris,  et  scribentur  fortasse  plura  si  vita  suppetet ; 
et  tamen  qui  diligenter  haec  quae  de  philosophia 
litteris  mandamus  legere  assueverit,  iudicabit  nulla 
ad  legendum  his  esse  potiora.    «Quid  est  enim  in 

'  mirari  satis  non  Mdv.  (satis  mirari  non  Or.);  mirari  non 
^quoniam  Mdv.,  cum,  MSS. 


BOOK  I.  iii-iv 

10  Mucius's  sarcasm  was  however  deserved.  But  for 
my  part  I  can  never  cease  wondering  what  can  be 
the  origin  of  the  exaggerated  contempt  for  home  pro- 
ducts that  is  now  fashionable.  It  would  of  course 
be  out  of  place  to  attempt  to  prove  it  here,  but  in  my 
opinion,  as  I  have  often  argued,  the  Latin  language, 
so  far  from  having  a  poor  vocabulary,  as  is  commonly 
supposed,  is  actually  richer  than  the  Greek.  Wlien 
have  we,  that  is  to  say  when  have  our  competent 
orators  or  poets,  at  all  events  since  they  have  had 
models  to  copy,  ever  lacked  any  of  the  resources 
either  of  the  florid  or  the  chaste  style  ?  

IV.  In  my  own  case,  just  as  I  trust  I  have  done  The  task  not 
my  duty,  amidst  the  arduous  labours  and  perils  of  a  dignity  of  a 
public  career,  at  the  post  to  which  the  Roman  people  statesman. 
appointed  me,  so  it  is  assuredly  incumbent  on  me 
also  to  use  my  best  endeavours,  with  such  zeal, 
enthusiasm  and  energy  as  I  possess,  to  promote  the 
advancement  of  learning  among  my  fellow-country- 
men.   Nor  need  I  be  greatly  concerned  to  join  issue 
with  people  who  prefer  to  read  Greek,  provided  that 
they  actually  do  read  it  and  do  not  merely  pretend 
to  do  so.     It  is  my  business  to  serve  those  who 
desire  to  enjoy  both  literatures,  or  who,  if  books  in 
their  own  language  are  available,  do  not  feel  any 

1 1  great  need  of  Greek  ones.  Those  again  who  would 
rather  have  me  write  on  other  subjects  may  fairly 
be  indulgent  to  one  who  has  written  much  already 
— in  fact  no  one  of  our  nation  more — and  who  per- 
haps will  write  still  more  if  his  life  be  prolonged. 
And  even  were  it  not  so,  anyone  who  has  made  a 
practice  of  studying  my  philosophical  writings  will 
pronounce  that  none  of  them  are  better  worth  read-  supreme  imp* 
ing  than  the  present  treatise.     For  what  problem  tance  of  ethic 


vita  tanto  opere  quaerendum  quam  cum  omnia  in 
philosophia^  turn  id  quod  his  libris  quaeritur,  qui  sit 
finisj  quid  extremum^  quid  ultimum  quo  sint  omnia 
bene  vivendi  recteque  faciendi  consilia  referenda; 
quid  sequatur  natura  ut  summum  ex  rebus  expeten- 
dis^  quid  fugiat  ut  extremum  malorum?  Qua  de  re 
cum  sit  inter  doctissimos  summa  dissensio^  quis  alie- 
num  putet  eius  esse  dignitatis  quam  mihi  quisque 
tribuat,    quid    in   omni    munere  vitae   optimum  et 

12  verissimum  sit  exquirere?  An,  partus  ancillae 
sitne  in  fructu  habendus,  disseretur  inter  prineipes 
civitatis,  P.  Scaevolam  Maniumque  Manilium,  ab 
iisque  M.  Brutus  dissentiet  (quod  et  aeutum  genus 
est  et  ad  usus  civium  non  inutile,  nosque  ea  scripta 
reliquaque  eiusdem  generis  et  legimus  libenter  et 
legemus) ;  haec  quae  vitam  omnem  continent 
neglegentur?  Nam  ut  sint  ilia  vendibiliora,  haec 
uberiora  certe  sunt.  Quamquam  id  quidem  licebit 
iis  existimare  qui  legerint.  Nos  autem  hanc  omnem 
quaestionem  de  finibus  bonorum  et  malorum  fere 
a  nobis  explicatam  esse  his  litteris^  arbitramur,  in 
quibus,  quantum  potuimus,  non  modo  quid  nobis 
probaretur  sed  etiam  quid  a  singulis  philosophiae 
disciplinis  diceretur  persecuti  sumus. 

13  V.   Ut  autem  a  facillimis  ordiamur,  prima  veniat 

'^littetis:  Mdv.  with  others  conjectures  libris, 

BOOK  I.  iv-v 

does  life  offer  so  important  as  all  the  topics  of 
philosophy^  and  especially  the  question  raised  in 
these  volumes — What  is  the  End,  the  final  and  \  Or/^J.  *  i 
ultimate  aim,  which  gives  the  standard  for  all  prin-  \  ^  \ 
ciples  of  right  living  and  of  good  conduct?  What  \  ,  j^ 
does  Nature  pursue  as  the  thing  supremely  desirable,  J  v.'/^*^ 
what  does  she  avoid  as  the  ultimate  evil?  It  is 
a  subject  on  which  the  most  learned  philosophers 
disagree  profoundly;  who  then  can  think  it  de- 
rogatory to  such  esteem  as  each  may  assign^  to 
me,  to  investigate  what  is  the  highest  good  and  the 
truest  rule  in  every  relationship  of  life  ?  Are  we  to 
have  our  leading  statesmen  debating  such  topics  as 
whether  the  offspring  of  a  female  slave  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  belonging  to  the  party  who  has  hired  her, 
Publius  Scaevola  and  Manius  Manilius  upholding 
one  opinion  and  Marcus  Brutus  the  contrary  (not  but 
what  such  discussions  raise  nice  points  of  law,  as 
well  as  being  of  practical  importance  for  the  business 
of  life ;  and  we  read  and  shall  continue  to  read  with 
pleasure  the  treatises  in  question  and  others  of  the 
same  nature) ;  and  shall  these  questions  which  cover 
the  entire  range  of  conduct  be  neglected  ?  Legal 
handbooks  no  ^oubt  command  a  readier  sale,  but 
philosophy  is  unquestionably  richer  in  interest. 
However,  this  is  a  point  that  may  be  left  to  the 
reader  to  decide.  In  the  present  work  we  believe 
we  have  given  a  more  or  less  exhaustive  exposition 
of  the  whole  subject  of  the  Ends  of  Goods  and 
Evils.  The  book  is  intended  to  contain  so  far  as 
possible  a  complete  account,  not  only  of  the  views 
that  we  ourselves  accept,  but  also  of  the  doctrines 
enunciated  by  all  the  different  schools  of  philosophy. 
V.  To  begin  with  what  is  easiest,  let  us  first  pass 



in  medium  Epicuri  ratio^  quae  plerisque  notissima 
est;  quam  a  nobis  sic  intelleges  expositam,  ut  ab 
ipsis  qui  earn  diseiplinam  probant  non  soleat  aecura- 
tius  explicari.  Verum  enim  invenire  volumus,  non 
tamquam  adversarium  aliquem  convincere. 

Accurate  autem  quondam  a  L.  Torquato^  homine 
omni  doctrina  erudito^  defensa  est  Epicuri  sententia 
de  voluptate,  a  meque  ei  responsum,  cum  C.  Triarius, 
in  primis  gravis  et  doctus  adulescens^  ei  disputationi 

1 4  interesset.  Nam  cum  ad  me  in  Cumanum  salutandi 
causa  uterque  venisset^  pauca  primo  inter  nos  de 
litteris,  quarum  summum  erat  in  utroque  studium; 
deinde    Torquatus,      Quoniam    nacti    te,"    inquit^ 

sumus  aliquando  otiosum,  certe  audiam  quid  sit  quod 
Epicurum  nostrum  non  tu  quidem  oderis,  ut  fere 
faciunt  qui  ab  eo  dissentiunt^  sed  certe  non  probes^ 
eum  quem  ego  arbitror  unum  vidisse  verum  maxi- 
misque  erroribus  animos  hominum  liberavisse  et* 
omnia  tradidisse  quae  pertinerent  ad  bene  beateque 
vivendum ;  sed  existimo  te,  sicut  ncfttrum  Triarium, 
minus  ab  eo  delectari  quod  ista  Platonis,  Aristoteli, 
Theophrasti  orationis  omamenta  neglexerit.  Nam 
illud  quidem  adduci  vix  possum^  ut  ea  quae  senserit 

15  ille  tibi  non  vera  videantur."        Vide  quantum^''  in- 

quam^     fallare,  Torquate.     Oratio  me  istius  philo- 

sophi  non  ofFendit ;  nam  et  complectitur  verbis  quod 

vult  et  dicit  plane  quod  intellegam;  et  tamen  ego 

a  philosopho^  si  afierat  eloquentiam^  non  asperner^  si 

BOOK  I.  V 

in  review  the  system  of  Epicurus^  which  to  most  introduction  t< 
men  is  the  best  knoMm  of  any.     Our  exposition  of  it,  ^2*Ethirao/^ 
as  you  shall  see,  will  be  as  accurate  as  any  usually  Epicurus: 
given  even  by  the  professed  adherents  of  his  school,  scene  of  the 
For  our  object  is  to  discover  the  truth,  not  to  refute  <^*°8ue. 
an  opponent. 

An  elaborate  defence  of  the  hedonistic  theory 
of  Epicurus  was  once  delivered  by  Lucius  Tor- 
quatus,  a  scholar  of  consummate  erudition;  to  him 
I  replied,  and  Gains  Triarius,  a  youth  of  remark- 
able learning  and  seriousness  of  character,  assisted  at 

14  the  discussion.  Both  of  these  gentlemen  had  called 
to  pay  me  their  respects  at  my  place  at  Cumae.  We 
first  exchanged  a  few  remarks  about  literature,  of 
which  both  were  enthusiastic  students.  Then  Tor- 
quatus  said.  As  we  have  for  once  found  you  at 
leisure,  I  am  resolved  to  hear  the  reason  why  you 
regard  my  master  Epicurus,  not  indeed  with  hatred, 
as  do  most  of  those  who  do  not  share  his  views,  but 
at  all  events  with  disapproval.  I  myself  consider  him 
as  the  one  person  who  has  discerned  the  truth,  and 
who  has  delivered  men  from  the  gravest  errors  and 
imparted  to  them  all  there  is  to  know  about  right 
conduct  and  happiness.  The  fact  is,  I  think  that  you 
are  like  our  friend  Triarius,  and  dislike  Epicurus  be- 
cause he  has  neglected  the  graces  of  style  that  you 
find  in  your  Plato,  Aristotle  and  Theophrastus.  For 
I  can  scarcely  bring  myself  to  believe  that  you  think 

5  his  opinions  untrue."  Let  me  assure  you,  Tor- 
quatus,''  said  I,  that  you  are  entirely  mistaken. 
With  your  master's  style  I  have  no  fault  to  find. 
He  expresses  his  meaning  adequately,  and  gives  me 
a  plain  intelligible  statement.  Not  that  I  despise 
eloquence  in  a  philosopher  if  he  has  it  to  ofier,  but 
c  17 


non  habeat^  non  admodum  flagitem.     Re  mihi  non 
aeque  satisfacit^^  et  quidem  locispluribus.  Sed  quot 

homines,    tot  sententiae*;    falli   igitur   possumus." 

Quamobrem  tandem,"  inquit,     non  satisfacit?  te 

enim  iudicem  aequum  puto,  modo  quae  dicat  ille 

16  bene    noris."      "Nisi    mihi    Phaedrum,"    inquam, 

mentitum  aut  Zenonem  putas,  quorum  utrumque 
audivi,  cum  mihi  nihil  sane  praeter  sedulitatem 
probarent,  omnes  mihi  Epicuri  sententiae  satis  notae 
sunt;  atque  eos  quos  nominavi  cum  Attico  nostro 
frequenter  audivi,  cum  miraretur  ille  quidem  utrum- 
que, Phaedrum  autem  etianu  amaret;  cotidieque 
inter  nos  ea  quae  audiebamus  conferebamus,  neque 
erat  umquam  controversia  quid  ego  intellegerem,  sed 
quid  probarem." 

17  VI.      Quid   igitur   est?"    inquit;       audire   enim 

cupio  quid  non  probes."        Principio,"  inquam,  '^in 

physicis,  quibus  maxime  gloriatur,  primum  totus  est 

alienus.     Democritea  dicit,  perpauca  mutans,  sed  ita 

ut  ea  quae  corrigere  vult  mihi  quidem  depravare 

videatur.     Ille  atomos  quas  appellat,  id  est  corpora 

individua  propter  soliditatem,  censet  in  infinito  inani, 

in  quo  nihil  nee  summum  nee  infimum  nee  medium 

nee  intimum^  nee  extremum  sit,  ita  ferri  ut  con- 

cursionibus  inter  se  cohaerescant,  ex  quo  efficiantur 

'^satisfacit  Mdv.  as  below;  MSS,  here  satisfecit, 
■  intimum  Jonas,  Muller ;  ultimum  Mdv.  with  MSS. 

»  Terence,  Phormio  454. 

BOOK  I.  v-vi 

I  should  not  greatly  insist  on  it  if  he  has  not.  But 
his  matter  I  do  not  find  so  satisfactory,  and  that  in 
more  points  than  one.  However,  many  men.  many 
minds '  *:  so  it  is  possible  that  I  am  mistaken.*'  What 
is  it,  pray,*'  he  said,  to  which  you  take  exception? 
For  I  recognize  you  as  a  just  critic,  provided  you 

trines  are."        Oh,"  said  I, 

6  really  know  what  his  doctrines 
"l  know  the  whole  of  Epicurus's  opinions  well 
enough, — unless  you  think  that  Phaedrus  or  Zeno 
did  not  tell  me  the  truth.  I  have  heard  both  of  them 
lecture,  though  to  be  sure  they  convinced  me  of 
nothing  but  their  own  devotion  to  the  system.  In- 
deed I  regularly  attended  those  professors,  in  com- 
pany with  our  friend  Atticus,  who  for  his  part  had  an 
admiration  for  them  both,  and  a  positive  affection  for 
Phaedrus.  Every  day  we  used  to  discuss  together  in 
private  what  we  had  heard  at  lecture,  and  there  was 
never  any  dispute  as  to  what  I  could  understand ; 
the  question  was,  what  I  could  accept  as  true." 

7  VI.    *  Well  then,  what  w  the  point  ?"  said  he ;     I  Cicero  states 
should  very  much  like  to  know  what  it  is  that  you  Epwurusf 
disagree  with."      ^Let  me  begin,"  I  replied,  '  with  phii^"hySs 
the  subject  of  Natural  Philosophy,  which  is  Epicurus*s  either  not  new 
particular  boast.  Here,  in  the  first  place,  he  is  entirely  °^  ^^^  *"*®' 
second-hand.   His  doctrines  are  those  of  Democritus, 

with  a  very  few  modifications.  And  as  for  the  latter, 
where  he  attempts  to  improve  upon  his  original,  in 
my  opinion  he  only  succeeds  in  making  things  worse. 
Democritus  believes  in  certain  things  which  he  terms 
atoms,'  that  is,  bodies  so  solid  as  to ,  be  indivisible, 
moving  about  in  a  vacuum  of  infinite  extent,  which 
has  neither  top,  bottom  nor  middle,  neither  centre  nor 
circumference.  The  motion  of  these  atoms  is  such 
that  they  collide  and  so  cohere  together ;  and  from 
c2  19 


ea  quae  sini>  quaeque   cemantur   omnia;    eumque 
motum  atomorum  nullo  a  principio  sed  ex  aetemo 

18  tempore  intellegi  convenire.  Epicurus  autem^  in 
quibus  sequitur  Democritum,  non  fere  labitur.  Quam- 
quam  utriusque  cum  multa  non  probo^  tum  illud  in 
primis^  quod,  cum  in  rerum  natura  duo  quaerenda 
sint,  unum  quae  materia  sit  ex  qua  quaeque  res 
efficiatur,  alterum  quae  vis  sit  quae  quidque  efficiat, 
de  materia  disseruerunt,  vim  et  causam  efficiendi 
reliquerunt.  Sed  hoc  commune  vitium ;  illae  Epicuri 
propriae  ruinae :  censet  enim  eadem  ilia  individua  et 
solida  corpora  ferri  deorsum  suo  pondere  ad  lineam » 
hunc   naturalem    esse   omnium   corporum   motum; 

1 9  deinde  ibidem  homo  acutus,  cum  illud  occurreret,  si 
omnia  deorsum  e  regione  ferrentur  et,  ut  dixi,  ad 
lineam,  numquam  fore  ut  atomus  altera  alteram 
posset  attingere,  itaque  attulit  rem  commenticiam : 
declinare  dixit  atomum  perpaulum,  quo  nihil  posset 
fieri  minus ;  ita  effici  complexiones  et  copulationes  et 
adhaesiones  atomorum  inter  se,  ex  quo  efficeretur 
mundus  omnesque  partes  mundi  quaeque  in  eo 
essent.  Quae  cum  res  tota  ficta  sit  pueriliter,  tum 
ne  efficit  quidem^  quod  vult.  Nam  et  ipsa  declinatio 
ad  libidinem  fingitur  (ait  enim  declinare  atomum 
sine  causa,  quo  nihil  turpius  physico  quam  fieri  quid- 

*  quidevi  inserted  by  odd. 

BOOK  I.  vi 

this  process  result  the  whole  of  the  things  that  exist 
and  that  we  see.  Moreover,  this  movement  of  the 
atoms  must  not  be  conceived  as  starting  from  a  be- 
ginning, but  as  having  gone  on  from  all  eternity. 

18  Epicurus  for  his  part,  where  he  follows  Democritus, 
makes  no  serious  blunders.  Still,  there  is  a  great 
deal  in  each  of  them  with  which  I  do  not  agree,  and 
especially  this:  in  the  study  of  Nature  there  are  two"^^ 
questions  to  be  asked,  first,  what  is  the  matter  out 
of  which  each  thing  is  made,  second,  what  is  the  force 
by  which  it  is  made ;  now  Democritus  and  Epicurus 
have  discussed  the  question  of  matter,  but  they  have 
not  considered  the  question  of  force  or  the  efficient 
cause.  But  this  is  a  defect  shared  by  both ;  I  now 
come  to  the  lapses  peculiar  to  Epicurus.  H e  believes 
that  these  same  indivisible  solid  bodies  are  borne  by 
their  own  weight  perpendicularly  downward,  which 

1 9  he  holds  is  the  natural  motion  of  all  bodies;  but  then 
in  the  very  same  breath,  being  sharp  enough  to 
recollect  that  if  they  all  travelled  downwards  in 
a  straight  line,  and,  as  I  said,  perpendicularly,  no  one 
atom  would  ever  be  able  to  overtake  any  other  atom, 
he  consequently  introduced  an  idea  of  his  own  inven- 
tion :  he  said  that  the  atom  makes  a  very  tiny  swerve, 
— the  smallest  divergence  possible ;  and  so  are  pro- 
duced entanglements  and  combinations  and  cohe- 
sions of  atoms  with  atoms,  which  result  in  the  creation 
of  the  world  and  all  its  parts,  and  of  all  that  in  them 
is.  Now  not  only  is  the  whole  of  this  affair  a  piece 
of  childish  fancy,  but  it  does  not  even  achieve  the 
result  that  its  author  desires.  The  swerving  is  itself 
an  arbitrary  fiction;  for  Epicurus  says  the  atoms 
swerve  without  a  cause, — yet  this  is  the  capital 
offence  in  a  natural  philosopher,  to  speak  of  some- 



quam  sine  causa  dicere),  et  ilium  motum  naturalem 

omnium  ponderum,  ut  ipse  eonstituit,  e  regione  in- 

'     feriorem  locum  petentium,  sine  causa  eripuit  atomis ; 

nee  tamen  id  cuius  causa  haec  finxerat  assecutus  est. 

20  Nam  si  omnes  atomi  declinabunt^  nullae  umquam 
cohaerescent ;  sive  aliae  declinabunt,  aliae  suo  nutu 
recte  ferentur,  primum  erit  hoc  quasi  provincias 
atomis  dare,  quae  recte,  quae  oblique  ferantur,  de- 
inde  eadem  ilia  atomorum  (in  quo  etiam  Democritus 
haeret)  turbulenta  concursio  hunc  mundi  ornatum 
efficere  non  poterit.  Ne  illud  quidem  physici,  credere 
aliquid  esse  minimum;  quod  profecto  numquam 
putavisset  si  a  Polyaeno  familiari  suo  geometrica 
discere  maluisset  quam  ilium  etiam  ipsum  dedocere. 
Sol  Democrito  magnus  videtur,  quippe  homini  erudito 
in  geometriaque  perfecto ;  huic  pedalis  fortasse :  tan- 
tum  enim  esse  censet  quantus  videtur,  vel  paulo  aut 

21  maiorem  aut  minorem.  Ita  quae  mutat  ea  corrumpit, 
quae  sequitur  sunt  tota  Democriti,  atomi,  inane, 
imagines,  quae  €l8^o\a  nominant,  quorum  incursione 
non  solum  videamus  sed  etiam  cogitemus;  infinitio 
ipsa,  quam  direipiav  vocant,  tota  ab  illo  est,  tum  in- 
numerabiles   mundi   qui   et   oriantur    et   intereant 

a  f>eiBOcritus  explained  sight  as  being  caused  by  the 
impact  on  the  eye  of  films  or  husks  which  are  continually 
being  thrown  off  from  the  surface  of  objects.  These 
*  images,' penetrating  to  the  mind  through  the  pores  of  the 
body^  also  caused  mental  impressions 


BOOK  I.  vi 
Lhitii;  taking  place  uncaused.  Tlieti  alsu  he  gratuit- 
ously deprives  the  atoms  of  what  heliiiuself  dedured 
to  be  the  natural  motion  of  all  heavy  bodies,  namely, 
movement  in  a  straight  line  downwards,  and  yet  he 
does  not  attain  the  object  for  the  sake  of  which  tliis 

20  fiction  was  devised.  For,  if  all  the  atoms  swerve, 
none  will  ever  come  to  cohere  togetlier ;  or  if  some 
swerve  while  others  travel  in  a  straight  linf,  at 
their  own  will  and  pleasure,  in  the  first  place  this 
will  be  tantamount  to  assigning  to  the  atoms  their 
different  spheres  of  authority,  some  to  travel  straight 
and  some  sideways ;  while  secondly  (and  this  is  a 
weak  point  with  Democritus  also)  this  riotous 
hurly-burly  of  atoms  could  not  possibly  result  in  the 
ordered  beauty  of  the  world  we  know.  Again,  it  is 
unworthy  of  a  natural  philosopher  to  deny  the  infinite 
divisibility  of  matter ;  an  error  that  assuredly  Epi- 
curus would  have  avoided,  if  he  had  been  willing  to 
let  his  friend  Polyaenus  teach  him  geometry  instead 
of  making  Polyaenus  himself  unlearn  it.  Democritus, 
being  an  educated  man  and  well  versed  in  geo- 
metry, thinks  the  sun  is  of  vast  size  ;  Epicurus  con- 
siders it  perhaps  a  foot  in  diameter,  for  he  pro- 
nounces it  to  be  exactly  as  large  as  it  appears,  or  a 

n  little  larger  or  smaller.  Thus  where  Epicurus  alters  ' 
the  doctrines  of  Democritus,  he  alters  them  for  the  [ 
worse;  while  for  those  ideas  which  he  adopts,  tlie 
credit  belongs  entirely  to  Democritus, — the  atoms, 
the  void,  the  images,*  or  as  they  call  them,  eidnla, 
whose  impact  is  the  cause  not  only  of  vision  but  also 
of  thought;  the  very  conception  of  infinite  space, 
apeiria  as  they  term  it,  is  entirely  derived  from 
Democritus;  and  again  the  countless  numbers  of 
worlds  that  come  into  existence  and  ^ass  out  of 


cotidie.  Quae  etsi  mihi  nuUo  modo  probantur, 
tamen  Democritum^  laudatum  a  ceteris^  ab  hoc^  qui 
eum  unum  secutus  esset,  noUem  vituperatum. 

22  VII.  "  lam  in  altera  philosophiae  parte,  quae  est 
quaerendi  ac  disserendi,  quae  XoyiKrj  dicitur,  iste 
vester  plane,  ut  mihi  quidem  videtur,  inermis  ac  nu- 
dus  est.  Tollit  definitiones ;  nihil  de  dividendo  ac 
partiendo  docet;  non  quomodo  efficiatur  concluda- 
turque  ratio  tradit;  non  qua  via  captiosa  solvantur, 
ambigua  distinguantur  ostendit;  indicia  rerum  in 
sensibus  ponit,  quibus  si  semel  aliquid  falsi  pro  vero 
probatum  sit,  sublatum  esse  omne  indicium  veri  et 
falsi  putat. .  . . 

23  ...  Confirmat  autem  illud  vel  maxime  quod  ipsa 
natura,  ut  ait  ille,  sciscat  et  probet,  id  est  voluptatem 
et  dolorem.  Ad  haec  et  quae  sequamur  et  quae  fu- 
giamus  refert  omnia.  Quod  quamquam  Aristippi  est 
a  Cyrenaicisque  melius  liberiusque  defenditur,  tamen 
eiusmodi  esse  iudico  ut  nihil  homine  videatur  indi- 
gnius.  Ad  maiora  enim  quaedam  nos  natura  genuit  et 
conformavit,  ut  mihi  quidem  videtur.  Ac  fieri  potest 
ut  errem;  sed  ita  prorsus  existimo,  neque  eum  Tor- 
quatum  qui  hoc  primus  cognomen  in  venit^  aut  torquem 
ilium  hosti  detraxisse  ut  aliquam  ex  eo  perciperet 
corpore  voluptatem  aut  cum  Latinis  tertio  consulatu 

'  invenit  B,  E ;  invenerit  A  and  inf.  MSS. 

*  In  Greek  Logic  Siaipeffis,  the  method  of  defining  a  species 
by  dividing  and  subdividing  a  genus:  cp.  Bk.  II.  §  26. 

'>The  interpretation  is  here  uncertain,  and  probably  more 
than  one  sentence  has  been  lost. 

24        * 

BOOK  I.  vi-vii 

existence  every  day.  For  my  jown  part  I  reject 
these  doctrines  altogether;  but  still  I  could  wish 
that  Democritus^  whom  every  one  else  applauds^  had 
not  been  vilified  by  Epicurus  who  took  him  as  his  sole 

12       VII.      Turn  next  to  the  second  division  of  philo-  Formal  Logic 
sophy^  the  department  of  Method  and  of  Dialectic^  g^er; 
which  is  termed  Logike,     Of  the  whole  armour  of 
Logic  your  founder,  as  it  seems  to  me^  is  absolutely 
destitute.  He  does  away  with  Definition ;  he  lias  no 
doctrine  of  Division  or  Partition*;  he  gives  no  rules 
for  Deduction  or  Syllogistic  Inference^  and  imparts 
no  method  for  resolving  Dilemmas  or  for  detect- 
ing  Fallacies    of   Equivocation.      The   Criteria    of^ 
reality  he  places  in  sensation;  once  let  the  senses  • 
accept  as  true  something  that  is  false^  and  every  ; 
possible  criterion  of  truth  and  falsehood  seems  to 
him  to  be  immediately  destroyed. . . . 

IS       ...^He  lays  the  very  greatest  stress  upon  that  Ws  Ethical 
which,  as  he  declares.  Nature  herself  decrees  and  contrary°to 
sanctions,  that  is  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.  n^t^aim^soiSy 
These  he  maintains  lie  at  the  root  of  every  act  of  Pleasure; 
choice  and  of  avoidance.     This  is  the  doctrine  of 
Aristippus,  and  it  i$  Upheld  more  cogently  and  more 
frankly  by  the   Cyrenaics;   but   nevertheless   it  is 
in  my  judgment  a  doctrine  in  the  last  degree  un- 
worthy of  the  dignity  of  man.  Nature,  in  my  opinion 
at  all  events,  has  created  and  endowed  us  for  higher 
ends.     I  may  possibly  be  mistaken ;  but  I  am  abso- 
lutely convinced  that  the  Torquatus  who  first  won 
that  surname  did  not  wrest  the  famous  necklet  from 
his  foe  in  the  hope  of  getting  from  it  any  physical 
enjoyment,  nor  did  he  fight  the  battle  of  the  Veseris 
against  the  Latins  in  his  third  consulship  for  the  sake 



conflixisse  apud  Veserim  propter  voluptatem.  Quod 
vero  secuii  percussit^  filium^  privavisse  se  etiam  vi- 
detur  multis  voluptatibus,  cum  ipsi  naturae  patrioque 
amori  praetulerit  ins  maiestatis  atque  imperi. 

24  Quid  ?  T.  ^  Torquatus,  is  qui  consul  cum  Cn.  Octavio 
fuit,  cum  illam  severitatem  in  eo  filio  adhibuit  quern 
in  adoptionem  D.  Silano  emancipaverat,  ut  eum, 
Macedonum  legatis  accusantibus  quod  pecunias  prae- 
torem  in  provincia  cepisse  arguerent,  causam  apud  se 
dicere  iuberet,  reque  ex  utraque  parte  audita  pro- 
nuntiaret  eum  non  talem  videri  fuisse  in  imperio 
quales  eius  maiores  fuissent,  et  in  conspeetum  suum 
venire  vetuit,  numquid  tibi  videtur  de  voluptatibus 
suis  cogitavisse?  Sed  ut  omittam  pericula,  labores^ 
dolorem  etiam  quem  optimus  quisque  pro  patria  et 
pro  suis  suseipit^  ut  non  modo  nullam  captet  sed 
etiam  praetereat  omnes  voluptates,  dolores  denique 
quosvis  suscipere  malit  quam  deserere  ullam  offici 
partem^  ad  ea  quae  hoc  non  minus  declarant  sed  vi- 

25  dentur  leviora  veniamus.  Quid  tibi,  Torquate,  quid 
huic  Triario  litterae,  quid  historiae  cognitioque  rerum, 
quid  poetarum  evolutio,  quid  tanta  tot  versuum  me- 
moriavoluptatisafFert?  Necmihi  illud  dixeris:  Haec 
enim  ipsa  mihi  sunt  voluptati,  et  erant  ilia  Torquatis. 
Numquam  hoc  ita  defendit  Epicurus  neque  Metro- 
dorus  aut  quisquam  eorum  qui  aut  saperet  aliquid 


^peraissit  Mdv ,;  percussertt  MSS. 
*''  T,  edd.  from  Li  v.  epit.  54  ;  L,  MSS. 

BOOK  I.  vu 

of  pleasure.  Indeed  in  sentencing  his  son  to  be  be- 
headed^ it  would  seem  that  he  actually  deprived 
himself  of  a  great  deal  of  pleasure ;  for  he  sacrificed 
his  natural  instincts  of  paternal  affection  to  the 
claims  of  state  and  of  his  military  office. 

1 4  Then,  think  of  the  Titus  Torquatus  who  was  consul 

with  Gnaeus  Octavius;  when  he  dealt  so  sternly 
with  the  son  who  had  passed  out  of  his  paternal  con- 
trol through  his  adoption  by  Decius  Silanus — when 
he  summoned  him  into  his  presence  to  answer  to  the 
charge  preferred  against  him  by  a  deputation  from 
Macedonia,  of  accepting  bribes  while  praetor  in  that 
province — when,  afler  hearing  both  sides  of  the  case, 
he  gave  judgment  that  he  found  his  son  guilty  of 
having  conducted  himself  in  office  in  a  manner  un- 
worthy of  his  ancestry,  and  banished  him  for  ever 
from  his  sight, — think  you  he  had  any  regard  for  his 
own  pleasure?  But  I  pass  over  the  dangers,  the 
toils,  the  actual  pain  that  all  good  men  endure  for 
country  and  for  friends,  not  only  not  seeking  plea- 
sure, but  actually  renouncing  pleasures  altogether, 
and  preferring  to  undergo  every  sort  of  pain  rather 
than  be  false  to  any  portion  of  their  duty.  Let  us 
turn  to  matters  seemingly  less  important,  but  equally 

5  conclusive.  What  actual  pleasure  do  you,  Torquatus, 
or  does  Triarius  here,  derive  from  literature,  from 
history  and  learning,  from  turning  the  pages  of  the 
poets  and  committing  vast  quantities  of  verse  to 
memory?  Do  not  tell  me  that  these  pursuits  are. in 
themselves  a  pleasure  to  you,  and  that  so  were  the 
deeds  I  mentioned  to  the  Torquati.  That  line  of 
defence  was  never  taken  by  Epicurus  or  Metrodorus, 
nor  by  any  one  of  them  if  he  possessed  any  intelli- 
gence or  had  mastered  the  doctrines  of  your  schoeL 


aut  ista  didicisset.  Et  quod  quaeritur  saepe  cur  tam 
multi  sint  Epicure!^  sunt  aliae  quoque  causae^  sed 
multitudinem  haec  ma^ime  allicit  quod  ita  putant 
dici  ab  illo,  recta  et  honesta  quae  sint,  ea  facere  ipsa 
»  per  se  laetitiam,  id  est  voluptatem.  Homines  optimi 
non  intellegunt  totam  rationem  everti  si  ita  res  se 
habeat.  Nam  si  concederetur,  etiamsi  ad  corpus  niliil 
referatur,  ista  sua  sponte  et  per  se  esse  iucunda,  per 
se  esset  et  virtus  et  cognitio  rerum,  quod  minime  ille 
vult,  expetenda. 
26  '  Haec  igitur  Epicuri  non  probo/'  inquam.  De  ce- 
tero  vellem  equidem  aut  ipse  doctrinis  fuisset  instru- 
ctior  (est  eiiim,  quod  tibi  ita  videri  necesse  est,  non 
satis  politus  iis  artibus  quas  qui  tenent  eruditi  appel- 
lantur),  aut  ne  deterruisset  alios  a  studiis.  Quamquam 
te  quidem  video  minime  esse  deterritum." 

Vni.  Quae  cum  dixissem,  magis  ut  ilium  provo- 
carem  quam  ut  ipse  loquerer,  tum  Triarius  leniter 
arridens :  Tu  quidem/'  inquit,  to  tum  Epicurum 
paene  e  philosophorum  choro  sustulisti.  Quid  ei 
reliquisti  nisi  te,  quoquo  modo  loqueretur,  intelle- 
gere  quid  diceret?  Aliena  dixit  in  physicis,  nee  ea 
ipsa  quae  tibi  probarentur.  Si  qua  in  iis  corrigere 
voluit,  deteriora  fecit.  Disserendi  artem  nullam 
habuit.     Voluptatem  cum  summum  bonum  diceret, 

primum  in  eo  ipso  parum  vidit,  deinde  hoc  quoque 

BOOK  I.  vii-viii 

Again^  as  to  the  question  oflen  asked^  why  so  many 
men  are  Epicureans,  though  it  is  not  the  only  reason^ 
the  thing  that  most  attracts  the  crowd  is  the  belief  that 
Epicurus  declares  right  conduct  and  moral  worth  to 
be  intrinsically  and  of  themselves  delightful^  which 
means  productive  of  pleasure.  These  worthy  people 
do  not  realize  that^  if  this  is  true,  it  upsets  the 
theory  altogether.  If  it  were  admitted  that  goodness 
is  spontaneously  and  intrinsically  pleasant,  even 
without  any  reference  to  bodily  feeling,  then  virtue 
would  be  desirable  for  its  own  sake,  and  so  also  would 
knowledge;  but  this  Epicurus  by  no  means  allows. 

'These  then,"  said  I,  are  the  doctrines  of  Epi-  and  lastly,  he 
cunis  that  I  cannot  accept.  For  the  rest,  I  could  le^mfng. 
desire  that  he  himself  had  been  better  equipped 
with  learning  (since  even  you  must  recognize  that 
he  is  deficient  in  that  liberal  culture  which  confers 
on  its  possessor  the  title  of  an  educated  man)  or  at 
all  events  that  he  had  not  deterred  others  from  study. 
Although  I  am  aware  that  he  has  not  succeeded  in 
deterring  you." 

VIII.  I  had  spoken  rather  with  the  intention  of  Triarius  rema 
drawing  out  Torquatus  than  of  delivering  a  discourse  mikes  oS°Ep 
of  my  own.     But  Triarius  interposed,  with  a  smile  :  <^"^"'  ^^  °* 

f^^TiT  I.  !-•     n  n    J      T?    •  philosopher 

Why,  you  have  practically  expelled  Epicurus  at  aii. 
altogether  from  the  philosophic  choir.  What  have 
you  left  to  him  except  that,  whatever  his  style  may 
be,  you  find  his  meaning  intelligible  ?  His  doctrines 
in  Natural  Philosophy  were  second-hand,  and  in  your 
opinion  unsound  at  that ;  and  his  attempts  to  improve 
on  his  authority  only  made  things  worse.  Dialectic 
he  had  none.  His  identification  of  the  Chief  Good 
with  pleasure  in  the  first  place  was  in  itself  an 
error,  and  secondly  this  also  was  not  original ;  for  it 



alienuin ;  nam  ante  Aristippus,  et  ille  melius.  Addi- 
27  disti  ad  extremum,  etiam  indoetum  fuisse."  Fieri/' 
inquam^  Triari,  nuUo  pacto  potest  ut  non  dicas  quid 
non  probes  eius  a  quo  dissentias.  Quid  enim  me 
prohiberet  Epieureum  esse,  si  probarem  quae  ille 
dieeret?  cum  praesertim  ilia  perdiseere  ludus  esset. 
Quamobrem  dissentientium  inter  se  reprehensiones 
non  sunt  vituperandae ;  maledicta,  eontumeliae,  tum 
iraeundae^  contentiones  eoneertationesque  in  dispu- 
tando  pertinaces  indignae  philosophia  mihi  videri 
2  8  Solent. ' '  Tum  Torquatus :  ^  Prorsus/  *  inquit,  assefltior ; 
neque  enim  disputari  sine  repreliensione,  nee  cum 
iracundia  aut  pertinacia  recte  disputari  potest.  Sed 
ad  haec,  nisi  molestum  est,  habeo  quae  velim."  An 
me,"  inquam,  nisi  te  audire  vellem,  censes  haec  di- 
cturum  fuisse  ?  "  Utrum  igitur  percurri  omnem  Epi- 
curi  disciplinam  placet,  an  de  una  voluptate  quaeri,  de 
qua  omne  certamen  est?"  Tuo  vero  id  quidem," 
inquam,  arbitratu. "  Sic  faciam  igitur,"  inquit  : 
unam  rem  explicabo  eamque  maximam ;  de  physicis 
alias ;  et  quidem  tibi  et  declinationem  istam  atomo- 
rum  et  magnitudinem  solis  probabo,  et  Democriti 
errata  ab  Epicuro  reprehensa  et  correcta  permulta. 
Nunc  dicam  de  voluptate,  nihil  scilicet  novi,  ea  tamen 
quae  te  ipsum  probaturum  esse  confidam."       Certe," 

*  iraamdae  Mdv. ;  iracundiae  MSS. 



n  said  before,  and  said  better,  by  Aristippus. 
lo  crown  all  you  added  that  Epieurus  was  a  persun 

27  of  no  education."  "Well,  Triarius,"  I  rejoined, 
"when  one  disagrees  with  a  man,  it  is  essential  to 
say  what  it  is  that  one  objects  to  in  his  views.  What 
should  prevent  me  from  being  an  Epicurean,  if  I 
accepted  the  doctrines  of  Epicurus?  especially  as 
the  system  is  an  exceedingly  easy  one  to  master. 
You  must  not  find  fault  with  members  of  opposing 
schools  for  criticizing  each  other's  opinions;  tliough 
I  always  feel  that  insult  and  abuse,  or  ill-tempered 
wrangling    and    bitter,   obstinate    controversy   are 

W  beneath  the  dignity  of  philosophy,"      I  am  quite  of  Tort 
your  mind,"  said  Torguatus;    it  is  impossible  to  de-  Epic 
bate  without  criticizing,  but  it  is  equally  impossible  '''''*' 
to  debate  properly  with  ill-temper  or  obstinacy.  But 
I  have  something  I  should  like  to  say  in  reply  toal! 
this,  if  it  will  not   weary  you."   "Do  you  suppose," 
said  I,  "  that  I  should  have  said  what  1  have,  unless 
I  wanted  to  hear  you  ?  "        Then  would  you  like  me 
to  make  a  rapid  review  of  the  whole  of  Epicurus's 
system,  or  to  discuss  the  single  topic  of  pleasure, 
which  is  the  one  main  subject  of  dispute?"        Oh,"  discmsinii 
I  said,     that  must  be  for  you  to  decide."        Very  ^""'^ 
well  then,"  said  he,      this  is  what  I  will  do,  I  will 
expound  a  single  topic,  and  that  the  most  important. 
Natural  Philosophy  we  will  postpone  ;  though  I  will 
undertake  to  prove  to  you  both  your  swerve  of  the 
atoms  and  size  of  the  sun,  and  also  that  very  many  errors 
of  Democritus  were  criticized  and  corrected  by  Epi- 
curus.  But  on  the  present  occasion  I  will  speak  about 
pleasure  ;  not  that  I  have  anything  original  to  con- 
tribute, yet  I  am  confident  that  what  i  say  will  com- 
mand even  your  acceptance."     "  Be  assured,"  I  said, 


inquam^  pertinax  non  ero  tibique^  si  mihi  probabis 
29  ea  quae  dices,  libenter  assentiar."  Probabo/'  inquit, 
modo  ista  sis  aequitate  quam  ostendis.  Sed  uti 
oratione  perpetua  malo  quam  interrogare  aut  interro- 
gari."  Ut  placet,"  inquam.  Turn  dicere  exorsus  est. 
IX.  Primum  igitur,"  inquit,  sic  agam  ut  ipsi 
auctori  huius  disciplinae  placet :  constituam  quid  et 
quale  sit  id  de  quo  quaerimus,  non  quo  ignorare  vos 
arbitrer,  sed  ut  ratione  et  via  procedat  oratio.  Quaeri- 
mus igitur  quid  sit  extremum  et  ultimum  bonorum, 
quod  omnium  philosophorum  sententia  tale  debet  esse 
ut  ad  id  omnia  referri  oporteat,  ipsum  autem  nusquam. 
Hoc  Epicurus  in  voluptate  ponit,  quod  summum 
bonum  esse  vult  summumque  malum  dolorem ;  idque 
SO  instituit  docere  sic :  Omne  animal  simul  atque  natum 
sit  voluptatem  appetere  eaque  gaudere  ut  summo 
bono,  dolorem  aspemari  ut  summum  malum  et  quan- 
tum possit  a  se  repellere ;  idque  facere  nondum  de- 
pravatum,  ipsa  natura  incorrupte  atque  integre  iudi- 
cante.  Itaque  negat  opus  esse  ratione  neque 
disputatione  quamobrem  voluptas  expetenda,  fii- 
giendus  dolor  sit.  Sentiri  haec^  putat,  ut  calere 
ignem,  nivem  esse  albam,  mel  dulce,  quorum  nihil 
oportere  exquisitis  rationibus  confirmare,  tantum 
satis  esse  admonere.  (Interesse  enim  inter  argumen- 
tum  conclusionemque  rationis  et  inter  mediocrem 
animadversionem  atque  admonitionem :  altera  occulta 

*  haec  A ;  hoc  Mdv.  with  other  MSS. 

BOOK  I.  viii-ix 

that  I  shall  not  be  obstinate^  but  will  gladly  own 
myself  convinced  if  you  can  prove  your  case  to  my 

19  satisfaction.'*      I  shall  do  so,"  he  rejoined,    provided 
you  are  as  £ur-minded  as  you  promise.     But  I  prefer 
to  employ  continuous  discourse  rather  than  question 
and  answer."      As  you  please,"  said  I.    So  he  began. 
IX.      I  will  start  then,"  he  said,  '  in  the  manner 
approved  by  the  author  of  the  system  himself,  by 
settling  what  is  the  essence  and  quality  of  the  thing 
that  is  the  object  of  our  inquiry ;  not  that  I  suppose 
you  to  be  ignorant  of  it,  but  because  this  is  the 
logical   method   of  procedure.     We  are  inquiring,  pleasure  th« 
then,  what  is  the  final  and  ultimate  Good,  which  as  pro^dbJ^Uie 
all  philosophers  are  agreed  must  be  of  such  a  nature  universal  instii 
as  to  be  the  End  to  which  all  other  things  are  shun  pain. 
means,  while  it  is  not  itself  a  means  to  anything 
else.     This  Epicurus  finds  in  pleasure ;  pleasure  he  \ 
holds  to  be  the  Chief  Good,  pain  the  Chief  Evil.    I 

50  This  he  sets  out  to  prove  as  follows :  Every  animal,  / 
as  soon  as  it  is  bom,  seeks  for  pleasure,  and  delights/ 
in  it  as  the  Chief  Grood,  while  it  recoils  from  pain  as 
the  Chief  Evil,  and  so  far  as  possible  avoids  it.  This 
it  does  as  long  as  it  remains  unperverted,  at  the 
prompting  of  Nature's  own  unbiased  and  honest 
verdict.  Hence  Epicurus  refuses  to  admit  any  neces-  \\ 
sity  for  argument  or  discussion  to  prove  that  pleasure  | 
is  desirable  and  pain  to  be  avoided.  These  facts,  ! 
he  thinks,  are  perceived  by  the  senses,  as  that  fire  i 
is  hot,  snow  white,  honey  sweet,  none  of  which  ' 
things  need  be  proved  by  elaborate  argument :  it  is 
enough  merely  to  draw  attention  to  them.  (For  there 
is  a  difference,  he  holds,  between  formal  syllogistic  ' 
proof  of  a  thing  and  a  mere  notice  or  reminder:  ' 
the  former  is  the  method  for  discovering  abstruse  l 
D  S3 


quaedain  et  quasi  involuta  aperiri,  altera  prompts  et 
aperta  indicari.^)  Etcnim  quoniam  detraptis  de  Iio- 
mine  sensilms  reliqui  nihil  est,  necesse  est  quid  aut 
ad  naturam  aut  contra  sit  a  natura  ipsa  iudicari.  Ea 
quid   pevcipit   aut   quid   iudicat,   quo   aut  petat  aut 

S 1  fugiat  aliquid,  praeler  voluptatem  et  dolorem  ?  Sunt 
autem  quidam  e  nostris  qui  haec  subtiliua  velint 
traderCi  et  negent  satis  esse  quid  bonum  sit  aut  quid 
malum  sensu  iudicari,  sed  animo  etiam  ac  ratione 
intellegi  posse  et  voluptatem  ipsam  per  se  esse  ex- 
petendam  et  dolorem  ipsum  per  se  esse  fugiendum. 
Itaque  aiunt  banc  quasi  naturalem  atque  insitam  in 
animis  nostris  inesse  notionem  ut  altemni  esse  appe- 
tendum,altcnim  aspernandum  scnliamus.  Alii  autem, 
quibus  ego  assentior,  cum  a  philosopliis  compluribus 
permulta  dicantur  cur  nee  voluptas  in  bonis  sit  nu- 
meranda  nee  in  malis  dolor,  non  existimant  oportere 
njmium  nos  causae  confidere,  sed  et  argumentandum 
et  accurate  disserendum  et  rationibus  conquisitis  de 
voluptate  et  dolore  disputandum  putant. 

Sa  X.  " Sed  ut  perspiciatis  unde  omnis  iste  natus  error 
sit  voluptatem  accusantium  doloremque  laudantium, 
totam  rem  aperiam,  eaque  ipsa  quae  ab  illo  inventore 
veritatis  et  quasi  artliitecto  beatae  vitae  dicta  sunt 
explicabo.  Nemo  enim  ipsam  voluptatem  quia 
voluptas  sit  aspernatur  aut  odit  aut  fiigit,  sed  quia 
conaequuntur  raagni  dolores  eos  qui  ratione  volupta- 
tem sequi  nesciunt.  Neque  porro  quisquam  est  qui  do- 
•indicari inf.  MS.;  iudicari  UAv.  with  other  MSS, 

BOOK  I.  ix-x 

and  recondite  truths^  the  latter  for  indicating  facts 
that  are  obvious  and  evident.)  Strip  mankind  of 
sensation^  and  nothing  remains;  it  follows  that^ 
Nature  herself  is  the  judge  of  tl\^t  which  is  in  accord- 
ance with  or  contrary  to  nature.  What  does  Nature 
perceive  or  what  does  she  judge  of,  beside  pleasure 
and   pain^  to  guide    her  actions  of  desire  and  o) 

51  avoidance?  Some  members  of  our  school  however 
would  refine  upon  this  doctrine ;  these  say  that  it  is 
not  enough  for  the  judgment  of  good  and  evil  to 
rest  with  the  senses;  the  facts  that  pleasure  is  in 
and  for  itself  desirable  and  pain  in  and  for  itself  , 
to  be  avoided  can  also  be  grasped  by  the  intellect 
and  the  reason.  Accordingly  they  declare  that 
the  perception  that  the  one  is  to  be  sought  after  and 
the  other  avoided  is  a  natural  and  imiate  idea  of  the 
mind.  Others  again^  with  whom  I  agree,  observing 
that  a  great  many  philosophers  do  advance  a  vast 
array  of  reasons  to  prove  why  pleasure  should  not  be 
counted  as  a  good  nor  pain  as  an  evil,  consider  that 
we  had  better  not  be  too  confident  of  our  case ;  in 
their  view  it  requires  elaborate  and  reasoned  argu- 
ment, and  abstruse  theoretical  discussion  of  the 
nature  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

2        X.     But  I  must  explain  to  you  how  all  this  mistaken  But  this  instin 

•  jr  u^»i  jiiT  •  is  qualified  by 

idea  oi  reprobating  pleasure  and  extolling  pam  arose,  calculation:  m 
To  do  so,  I  will  give  you  a  complete  account  of  the  ^f^f^urpiu 
system,  and  expound  the  actual  teachings  of  the  of  pleasure  ove 
great  explorer  of  the  truth,  the  master-builder  of  ^ 
human  happiness.    No  one  rejects,  dislikes  or  avoids  \ 
pleasure  itself,  because  it  is  pleasure,  but  because    j 
those  who  do  not  know   how  to  pursue  pleasure  / 
rationally  encounter  consequences  that  are  extremel]^ 
painful.     Nor  again  is  there  anyone  who  loves  or 
d2  35 


lorem  ipsum  quia  dolor  sit  amet^  consectetur^  adipisci 
velit^  sed  qu  ia  nonnumquam  eiusmodi  tempora  incidunt 
ut  labore  et  dolore  magnam  aliquam  quaerat  volupta- 
tem.  Ut  enim  ad*  minima  veniam^  quis  nostrum 
exercitationem  ullam  corporis  suscipit  laboriosam^ 
nisi  ut  aliquid  ex  ea  commodi  consequatur?  Quis 
autem  vel  eum  iure  reprehenderit  qui  in  ea  voluptate 
velit  esse  quam  nihil  molestiae  consequatur^  vel  ilium 
qui  dolorem  eum  fugiat  quo  voluptas  nulla  pariatur? 

33  At  vero  eos  et  accusamus  et  iusto  odio  dignissimos 
ducimus  qui  blanditiis  praesentium  voluptatum  dele- 
niti  atque  corrupti  quos  dolores  et  quas  molestias 
excepturi  sint  occaecati  cupiditate  non  provident, 
similique  sunt  in  culpa  qui  ofiicia  deserunt  mollitia 
animi,  id  est  laborum  et  dolorum  fuga.  Et  hanun 
quidem  rerum  facilis  est  et  expedita  distinctio.  Nam 
libero  tempore,  cum  soluta  nobis  est  eligendi  optio 
cumque  nihil  impedit  quo  minus  id  quod  maxime 
placeat  facere  possimus,  omnis  voluptas  assumenda 
est,  omnis  dolor  repellendus.  Temporibus  autem 
quibusdam  et  aut  officiis  debitis  aut  rerum  necessita^ 
tibus  saepe  eveniet  ut  et  voluptates  repudiandae  sint 
et  molestiae  non  recusandae.  Itaque  earum  rerum 
hie  tenetur  a  sapiente  delectus  ut  aut  reiciendis 
voluptatibus  maiores  alias  consequatur  aut  perferendis 
doloribus  asperiores  repellat. 

34  Hanc  ego  cum  teneam  sententiam,  quid  est 
cur  verear  ne  ad  eam  non  possim  accommodare 
Torquatos  nostros  ?  quos  tu  paulo  ante  cum  me- 
moriter   tum   etiam   erga   nos   amice    et    benevole 


BOOK  I.  X 

pursues  or  desires  to  obtain  pain  of  itself,  because  it   ^ 
is  pain,  but  because  occasionally  circumstances  occur    / 
in  which  toil  and  pain  can  procure  him  some  great  ^ 
pleasure.   To  take  a  trivial  example,  which  of  us  ever 
undertakes  laborious  physical  exercise,  except  to  ob- 
tain some  advantage  from  it  ?    But  who  has  any  righ^ 
to  find  fault  with  a  man  who  chooses  to  enjoy  a  plea-  j 
sure  that  has  no  annoying  consequences,  or  one  who  J 
avoids  a  pain  that  produces  no  resultant  pleasure  ?  On 
the  other  hand,  we  denounce  with  righteous  indigna- 
tion and  dislike  men  who  are  so  beguiled  and  demora- 
lized by  the  charms  of  the  pleasure  of  the  moment,  so 
blinded  by  desire,  that  they  cannot  foresee  the  pain 
and  trouble  that  are  bound  to  ensue ;  and  equal  blame 
belongs  to  those  who  fail  in  their  duty  through 
weakness  of  will,  which  is  the  same  as  saying  through 
shrinking  from  toil  and  pain.     These  cases  are  per- 
fectly simple  and  easy  to  distinguish.  In  a  free  hour, 
when  our  power  of  choice  is  untrammelled  and  when 
nothing  prevents  our  being  able  to  do  what  we  like 
best,  every  pleasure  is  to  be  welcomed  and  every 
pain   avoided.     But   in   certain   circumstances  and 
owing  to  the  claims  of  duty  or  the  obligations  of 
business  it  will  frequently  occur  that  pleasures  have 
to  be  repudiated  and  annoyances  accepted.  The  wis^ 
man  therefore  always  holds  in  these  matters  to  thisV 
principle  of  selection :  he  rejects  pleasures  to  secure  j 
other  greater  pleasures,  or  else  he  endures  pains  tj/ 
avoid  worse  pains. 

^  This  being  the  theory  1  hold,  why  need  I  be  afraid  This  explains 
of  not  being  able  to  reconcile  it  with  the  case  of  the  eStiy^'dtei?-^"" 
the  Torquati  my  ancestors  ?  Your  references  to  them  tercsted. 
just  now  were  historically  correct,  and  also  showed 
your  kind  and  friendly  feeling  towards  myself;  but 


collegisti ;  nee  me  tamen  laudandis  maioribus  meis 
comipisti  nee  segniorem  ad  respondendum  reddidisti. 
Quorum  facta  quemadmodum,  quaeso^  interpretans  ? 
Sicine  eos  censes  aut  in  armatum  hostem  impetum 
fecisse  aut  in  liberos  atque  in  sanguinem  suum  tam 
crudeles  fuisse^  nihil  ut  de  utilitatibus^  nihil  ut  de 
commodis  suis  cogitarent?  At  id  ne  ferae  quidem 
faciunt^  ut  ita  ruant  itaque  turbent  ut  earum  motus 
et  impetus  quo  pertineant  non  intellegamus ;  tu  tam 
egregios  viros  censes  tantas  res  gessisse  sine  causa? 

35  Quae  fuerit  causa  mox  videro ;  interea  hoc  tenebo,  si 
ob  aliquam  causam  ista^  quae  sine  dubio  praeclara 
sunt,  fecerint,  virtutem  iis  per  se  ipsam  causam  non 
fuisse. — Torquem  detraxit  hosti. — Et  quidem  se  texit 
ne  interiret — At  magnum  periculum  adiit. — In  oculis 
quidem  exercitus. — Quid  ex  eo  est  consecutus? — 
Laudem  et  caritatem,  quae  sunt  vitae  sine  metu 
degendae  praesidia  firmissima. — Filium  morte  multa- 
vit. — Si  sine  causa,  noUem  me  ab  eo  ortum,  tam 
importuno  tamque  crudeli ;  sin  ut  dolore  suo  sanciret 
militaris  imperi  disciplinam  exercitumque  in  gravis- 
simo  bello  animadversionis  metu  contineret,  saluti 
prospexit  civium,  qua  intellegebat  contineri  suam. 

36  Atque  haec  ratio  late  patet.     In  quo  enim  maxima 

consuevit  iactare  vestra  se  oratio,  tua  praesertim,  qui 

studiose  antiqua  persequeris,  claris  et  fortibus  viris 

BOOK  I.  X 

all  the  same  I  am  not  to  be  bribed  by  your  flattery 
of  my  family,  and  you  will  not  find  me  a  less  resolute 
opponent.  Tell  me,  pray,  what  explanation  do  you 
put  upon  their  actions  ?  Do  you  really  believe  that 
they  charged  an  armed  enemy,  or  treated  their 
children,  their  own  flesh  and  blood,  so  cruelly,  with- 
out a  thought  for  their  own  interest  or  advantage  ? 
Why,  even  wild  animals  do  not  act  in  that  way; 
they  do  not  run  amok  so  blindly  that  we  cannot  dis- 
cern any  purpose  in  their  movements  and  their  on- 
slaughts. Can  you  then  suppose  that  those  heroic 
men   performed   their  famous   deeds   without   any 

15  motive  at  all?     What  their  motive  was,  I  will  con- 
sider in  a  moment :  for  the  present  I  will  confidently 
assert,  that  if  they  had  a  motive  for  those  undoubt- 
edly glorious  exploits,  that  motive  was  not  a  love  of 
virtue  in  and  for  itself. — He  wrested  the  necklet 
from  his  foe. — Yes,  and  saved  himself  from  death. — 
But  he  braved  great  danger. — Yes,  before  the  eyes 
of  an  army. — What  did  he  get  by  it? — Honour  and 
esteem,  the  strongest  guarantees  of  security  in  life. 
— He  sentenced  his  own  son  to  death. — If  from  no 
motive,  I  am  sorry  to  be  the  descendant  of  anyone 
so  savage  and  inhuman;  but  if  his  purpose  was  by> 
inflicting  pain  upon  himself  to  establish  his  authority 
as    a    commander,   and    to    tighten   the   reins    of| 
discipline   during   a   very   serious  war  by  holding] 
over  his   army  the   fear  of  punishment,   then  hisl 
action  aimed  at  ensuring  the  safety  of  his  fellow^ 

36  citizens,  upon  which  he  knew  his  own  depended 
And  this  is  a  principle  of  wide  application. 
People  of  your  school,  and  especially  yourself,  who 
are  so  diligent  a  student  of  history,  have  found  a 
favourite  field  for  the  display  of  your  eloquence  in 


commemorandis  eorumque  factis  non  emolumento 
aliquo  sed  ipsius  honestatis  decore  laudandis^  id 
totum  evertitur  eo  delectu  rerum  quern  modo  dixi 
constitutor  ut  aut  voluptates  omittantur  maiorum 
voluptatum  adipiscendarum  causa  aut  dolores  susci- 
piantur  maiorum  dolorum  efFugiendorum  gratia. 
37  XI.  Sed  de  clarorum  hominum  factis  illustribus 
et  gloriosis  satis  hoc  loco  dictum  est.  Erit  enim  iam 
de  omnium  virtutum  cursu  ad  voluptatem  proprius 
disserendi  locus.  Nunc  autem  explicabo  voluptas 
ipsa  quae  qualisque  sit^  ut  tollatur  error  omnis 
imperitonim  intellegaturque  ea  quae  voluptaria, 
delicata^  mollis  habeatur  disciplina  quam  gravis, 
quam  continens,  quam  severa  sit.  Non  enim  banc 
solam  sequimur  quae  suavitate  aliqua  naturam  ipsam 
movet  et  cum  iucunditate  quadam  percipitur  sensibus, 
sed  maximam  voluptatem  illam  habemus  quae  per- 
cipitur omni  dolore  detracto.  Nam  quoniam,  cum 
privamur  dolore,  ipsa  liberatione  et  vacuitate  omnis 
molestiae  gaudemus,  omne  autem  id  quo  gaudemus 
voluptas  est  (ut  omne  quo  ofFendimur  dolor),  doloris 
omnis  privatio  recte  nominata  est  voluptas.  Ut  enim, 
cum  cibo  et  potione  fames  sitisque  depulsa  est,  ipsa 
detractio  molestiae  consecutionem  affert  voluptatis, 

sic  in  omni  re  doloris  amotio  successionem  efficit 

BOOK  I.  x-xi 

recalling  the  stories  of  brave  and  famous  men  of  old^ 
and  in  praising  their  actions^  not  on  utilitarian 
grounds,  but  on  account  of  the  splendour  of  abstract 
moral  worth.  But  all  of  this  falls  to  the  ground  if  the 
principle  of  selection  that  I  have  just  mentioned  be 
established^ — the  principle  of  forgoing  pleasures  for 
the  purpose  of  getting  greater  pleasures,  and  en- 
during pains  for  the  sake  of  escaping  greater  pains. 

XI.     But  enough  has  been  said  at  this  stage  about  The  highest 
the  glorious  exploits  and  achievements  of  the  heroes  i^^Ssen^*  df**' 
of  renown.     The  tendency  of  all  of  the  virtues  to  pain. 
produce  pleasure  is  a  topic  that  will  be  treated  in  its 
own  place  later  on.     At  present  I  shall  proceed  to 
expound  the  essence  and  the  quality  of  pleasure  it- 
self, and  shall  endeavour  to  remove  the  misconcep- 
tions of  ignorance  and  to  make   you  realize  how 
serious,  how  temperate,  how  austere  is  the  school 
that  is  supposed  to  be  sensual,  lax  and  luxurious. 
The  pleasure  we  pursue  is  not  that  kind  alone  whiclv 
affects  our  physical  being  with  a  definite  delightful  \ 
feeling, — a  positively  agreeable  perception  of  the  \ 
senses ;  on  the  contrary,  the  greatest  pleasure  accord-  j 
ing  to  us  is  that  which  is  experienced  as  a  result  of/ 
the  complete  removal  of  pain.  When  we  are  released 
from  pain,  the  mere  sensation  of  complete  emancipa- 
tion and  relief  from  uneasiness  is  in  itself  a  source  of 
gratification.   But  everything  that  causes  gratification 
is  a  pleasure  (just  as  everything  that  causes  annoyance 
is  a  pain).     Therefore  the  complete  removal  of  pain 
has  correctly  been  termed  a  pleasure.     For  example, 
when  hunger  and  thirst  are  banished  by  food  and 
drink,  the  mere  fact  of  getting  rid  of  uneasiness 
brings  a  resultant  pleasure  in  its  train.    So  generally, 
the  removal   of  pain   causes   pleasure   to   take  its 



38  voluptatis.  Itaque  non  placuit  Epicnro  medium  esse 
quiddam  inter  dolorem  et  voluptatem;  illud  enim 
ipsum  quod  quibusdam  medium  videretur^  cum  omni 
dolorc  careret,  non  modo  voluptatem  esse  verum 
ctiam  summam  voluptatem.  Quisquis  enim  sentit 
qucmadmodum  sit  aiFectus,  eum  necesse  est  aut  in 
voluptate  esse  aut  in  dolore.  Omnis  autem  privatione 
doloriH  putat  Epicurus  terminari  summam  voluptatem^ 
ut  postea  variari  voluptas  distinguique  possit^  augeri 

39  amplificarique  non  possit.  At  etiam  Athenis,  ut  a 
ptttre  Hudiebam^  facete  et  urbane  Stoicos  irridente, 
st^itua  est  in  Ceramico  Chrysippi  sedentis  porrecta 
nianUj  quae  manus  significet  ilium  in  hac  esse 
rogatiuncula  delectatum :  Numquidnam  manus  tua, 
sic  ttlfccta  qucmadmodum  afFecta  nunc  est,  deside- 
rat?' — *  Nihil  sane.* — 'At  si  voluptas  esset  bonum, 
dcsidorart^t* — 'ita  credo.* — 'Non  est  igitur  volu- 
ptas bonum/  Hoc  ne  statuam  quidem  dicturam  pater 
aiebtit  si  loqui  posset  Conclusum  est  enim  contra 
C>'rcnaicos  satis  acute,  nihil  ad  Epicurum.  Nam  si 
ea  wla  \\^luptas  esset  quae  quasi  titillaret  sensus,  ut 
itii  dictuu«  et  ad  eos  oum  suavitate  aAlueret  et  illabe- 
rt^tur»  ncc  n\anu$  esse  ccaiteiita  posset  nee  ulla  pars 
v^ouUate  dolivri^^  siixe  iucundo  motu  voluptatis.  Sin 
autem  suuuiv»  w^uptas  est.  ut  Epicuro  placet,,  nihil 
Uv?i)erex  prtmum  tiUi  reete.  Chrysippe,  concessnm  est. 

BOOK  I.  xi 

38  place.  Epicurus  consequently  maintained  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  neutral  state  of  feeling  inter- 
mediate between  pleasure  and  pain;  for  the  state 
supposed  by  some  thinkers  to  be  neutral,  being 
characterized  as  it  is  by  entire  absence  of  pain,  is  it- 
self, he  held,  a  pleasure,  and,  what  is  more,  a  pleasure 
of  the  highest  order.  A  man  who  is  conscious  of  his 
condition  at  all  must  necessarily  feel  either  pleasure 
or  pain.  But  complete  absence  of  pain  Epicurus 
considers  to  be  the  limit  and  highest  point  of 
pleasure ;   beyond  this  point  pleasure  may  vary  in 

39  kind,  but  it  cannot  vary  in  intensity  or  degree.  Yet  at 
Athens,  so  my  father  used  to  tell  me  when  he  wanted 
to  air  his  wit  at  the  expense  of  the  Stoics,  in  the 
Ceramicus  there  is  actually  a  statue  of  Chrysippus 
seated  and  holding  out  one  hand,  the  gesture  being 
intended  to  indicate  the  delight  which  he  used  to 
take  in  the  following  little  syllogism:  Does  your 
hand  want  anything,  while  it  is  in  its  present  condi- 
tion?' Answer:  No,  nothing.' —  But  if  pleasure  were 
a  good,  it  would  want  pleasure.' —  Yes,  I  suppose  it 
would.' —  Therefore  pleasure  is  not  a  good.'  An  argu- 
ment, as  my  father  declared,  which  not  even  a  statue 
would  employ,  if  a  statue  could  speak ;  because  though 
it  is  cogent  enough  as  an  objection  to  the  Cyrenaics, 
it  does  not  touch  Epicurus.  For  if  the  only  kind  of 
pleasure  were  that  which  so  to  speak  tickles  the 
senses,  an  influence  permeating  them  with  a  feeling 
of  delight,  neither  the  hand  nor  any  other  member 
could  be  satisfied  with  the  absence  of  pain  unaccom- 
panied by  an  agreeable  and  active  sensation  of 
pleasure.  Whereas  if,  as  Epicurus  holds,  the  highest 
pleasure  be  to  feel  no  pain,  Chrysippus* s  interlocutor, 
though  justified  in  making  his  first  admission,  that 




nihil  desiderare  manum  cum  ita  esset  afFecta,  secun- 
dum non  recte,  si  voluptas  esset  bonum,  fuisse 
desideraturam.  Idcirco  enim  non  desideraret  quia 
quod  dolore  caret  id  in  voluptate  est. 

40  XII.  "  Extremum  autem  esse  bonorum  voluptatem 
ex  hoc  facillime  perspici  potest:  Constituamus  ali- 
quem  magnis^  multis^  perpetuis  fruentem  et  animo 
et  corpore  voluptatibus,  nullo  dolore  nee  impediente 
nee  impendente ;  quem  tandem  hoc  statu  praestabili- 
orem  aut  magis  expetendum  possimus  dicere?  In- 
esse  enim  necesse  est  in  eo  qui  ita  sit  affectus  et 
firmitatem  animi  nee  mortem  nee  dolorem  timentis, 
quod  mors  sensu  careat,  dolor  in  longinquitate  levis, 
in  gravitate  brevis  soleat  esse,  ut  eius  magnitudinem 

41  celeritas,  diuturnitatem  allevatio  consoletur.  Ad  ea 
cunx  accedit  ut  neque  divinum  numen  horreat  nee 
praeteritas  voluptates  effluere  patiatur  earumque 
assidua  recordatione  laetetur,  quid  est  quod  hue 
possit,  quo  melius  sit/  accedere  ?  Statue  contra  ali- 
quem  confectum  tantis  animi  corporisque  doloribus 
quanti  in  hominem  maximi  cad  ere  possunt,  nulla  spe 
proposita  fore  levius  aliquando,  nulla  praeterea 
neque  praesenti  nee  exspectata  voluptate;  quid  eo 
miserius  dici  aut  fingi  potest  ?  Quod  si  vita  doloribus 
referta  maxime  fiigienda  est,  summum  profecto 
malum  est  vivere  cum  dolore ;  cui  sententiae  consen- 
taneum  est  ultimum  esse  bonorum  cum  voluptate 
vivere.     Nee  enim  habet  nostra  mens  quidquam  ubi 

'  quo  melius  sit  Miiller ;  quod  melius  sit  Mdv.  with  MSS. 

BOOK  I.  xi-xii 

his  hand  in  that  condition  wanted  nothing,  was  not 
justified  in  his  second  admission,  that  if  pleasure  were 
a  good,  his  hand  would  have  wanted  it.     And  the 

reason  why  it  would  not  have  wanted  pleasure  is,  I — ^' 

that  to  be  without  pain  is  to  be  in  a  state  of  pleasure, 
to       XII.     The  truth  of  the  position  that  pleasure  is  the  Pleasure  prov 
ultimate  good  will  most  readily  appear  from  the  by^extreme*^ 
following  illustration.     Let  us  imagine  a  man  living  <^ascs  of  happ 

,  ,  f,  _  ^  ness  and  mise 

in  the  continuous  enjoyment  of  numerous  and  vivid 
pleasures  alike  of  body  and  of  mind,  undisturbed 
either  by  the  presence  or  by  the  prospect  of  pain : 
what  possible  state  of  existence  could  we  describe  as 
being  more  excellent  or  more  desirable?  One  so 
situated  must  possess  in  the  first  place  a  strength  of 
mind  that  is  proof  against  all  fear  of  (death  or  of 
pain;  he  will  know  that  death  means  complete  un- 
consciousness, and  that  pain  is  generally  light  if  long 
and  short  if  strong,  so  that  its  intensity  is  compen- 
sated by  brief  duration  and  its  continuance  by 
H  diminishing  severity.  Let  such  a  man  moreovei 
have  no  dread  of  any  supernatural  power;  let  him 
never  suffer  the  pleasures  of  the  past  to  fade  away, 
but  constantly  renew  their  enjoyment  in  recollec- 
tion,— and  his  lot  will  be  one  which  will  not  admit 
of  further  improvement.  Suppose  on  the  other  hand 
a  person  crushed  beneath  the  heaviest  load  of  mental 
and  of  bodily  anguish  to  which  humanity  is  liable. 
Grant  him  no  prospect  of  ultimate  relief  in  view; 
let  him  neither  have  nor  hope  to  have  a  gleam  of 
pleasure.  Can  one  describe  or  imagine  a  more  piti- 
able state?  If  then  a  life  full  of  pain  is  the  thing 
most  to  be  avoided,  it  follows  that  to  live  in  pain  is 
the  highest  evil ;  and  this  position  implies  that  a  life 
of  pleasure  is  the  ultimate  good.     In  fact  the  mind 



consistat  tamquam  in  extreme,  omnesque  et  metus  et 
aegritudines  ad  dolorem  referuntur,  nee  praeterea 
est  res  ulla  quae  sua  natura  aut  soUicitare  possit  aut 

42  '  Praeterea  et  appetendi  et  refugiendi  et  omnino 
rerum  gerendarum  initia  proficiscuntur  aut  a  volu- 
ptate  aut  a  dolore.  Quod  cum  ita  sit,  perspicuum 
est  omnes  rectas  res  atque  laudabiles  eo  referri  ut 
cum  voluptate  vivatur.  Quoniam  autem  id  est  vel 
summum  vel  ultimum  vel  extremum  bonorum  (quod 
Graeci  rkXos  nominant)  quod  ipsum  nullam  ad  aliam 
rem,  ad  id  autem  res  referuntur  omnes,  fatendum  est 
summum  eSse  bonum  iucunde  vivere. 

XIII.  Id  qui  in  una  virtute  ponunt  et  splendore 
nominis  capti  quid  natura  postulet  non  intellegunt, 
errore  maximo,  si  Epicurum  audire  voluerint,  libera- 
buntur.  Istae  enim  vestrae  eximiae  pulchraeque 
virtutes  nisi  voluptatem  efficerent,  quis  eas  aut 
laudabiles  aut  expetendas  arbitraretur  ?  Ut  enim 
medicorum  scientiam  non  ipsius  artis  sed  bonae 
valetudinis  causa  probamus,  et  gubernatoris  ars,  quia 
bene  navigandi  rationem  habet,  utilitate,  non  arte 
laudatur,  sic  sapientia,  quae  ars  vivendi  putanda  est, 
non  expeteretur  si  nihil  efficeret;  nunc  expetitur 
quod  est  tamquam  artifex  conquirendae  et  compa- 

43  randae  voluptatis.     (Quam  autem  ego  dicam  volu- 

a  i.e.  pain  of  body  :  dolorem  here  has  its  strict  sense, 

BOOK  I.  xii-xiii 

possesses  nothing  in  itself  upon  which  it  can  rest  as 
final.     Every  fear,  every  sorrow  can  be  traced  back\ 
to  pain*;  there  is  no  other  thing  besides  pain  which  I 
is  of  its  own  nature  capable  of  causing  either  anxietjp?* 
or  distress. 

Ij2  Pleasure  and  pain  moreover  supply  the  motives  Pleasure  and 

of  desire  and  of  avoidance,  and  the  springs  of  conduct  ^S^  ^^ 
generally.     This   being   so,  it  clearly  follows  that  y»^  sole  stan- 
actions  are  right  and  praiseworthy  only  as  being  a  | 
means  to  the  attainment  of  a  life  of  pleasure.     But  L 
that  which  is  not  itself  a  means  to  anything  else,  but/    ( 
to  which  all  else  is  a  means,  is  what  the  Greeks  term     ^ 
the  Telos,  the  highest,  ultimate  or  final  Good.     Iz 
must  therefore  be  admitted  that  the  Chief  Good  is  to 
live  agreeably. 

XIII.  Those  who  place  the  Chief  Good  in  virtue  The  Virtues  iw 
alone  are  beguiled  by  the  glamour  of  a  name,  and  ^?^"b^^^i 
do  not  understand  the  true  demands  of  nature.  If  means  to  Plea 
they  will  consent  to  listen  to  Epicurus,  they  will  be . — -^ 
delivered  from  the  grossest  error.  Your  school 
dilates  on  the  transcendent  beauty  of  the  virtues; 
but  were  they  not  productive  of  pleasure,  who  would 
deem  them  either  praiseworthy  or  desirable  ?  We 
esteem  the  art  of  medicine  not  for  its  interest  as 
a  science  but  for  its  conduciveness  to  health ;  the  art 
of  navigation  is  commended  for  its  practical  and  not 
its  scientific  value,  because  it  conveys  the  rules  for 
sailing  a  ship  with  success.  So  also  Wisdom, 
which  must  be  considered  as  the  art  of  living,  Yisdom; 
if  it  effected  no  result  would  not  be  desired ;  but  as  ) 
it  is,  it  is  desired,  because  it  is  the  artificer  thsLZ 

'3  procures  and  produces  pleasure.  (The  meaning  that 
I  attach  to  pleasure  must  by  this  time  be  clear  to 
you,  and  you  must  not  be  biased  against  my  argu- 



ptatem  iam  videtis,  ne  invidia  verbi  labefactetur 
oratio  mea.)  Nam  cum  ignoratione  renim  bonarum 
et  malarum  maxime  hominum  vita  vexetur^  ob  eum- 
que  errorem  et  voluptatibus  maximis  saepe  priventur 
et  durissimis  animi  doloribus  torqueantur^  sapientia 
est  adhibenda^  quae  et  tenroribus  cupiditatibusque 
detraetis  et  omnium  falsarum  opinionum  temeritate 
derepta  eertissimam  se  nobis  ducem  praebeat  ad 
voluptatem.  Sapientia  enim  est  una  quae  maesti- 
tiam  pellat  ex  animis^  quae  nos  exhorrescere  metu 
non  sinat ;  qua  praeceptrice  in  tranquillitate  vivi 
potest^  omnium  cupiditatum  ardore  restincto.  Cupi- 
ditates  enim  sunt  insatiabiles^  quae  non  modo  singtdos 
homines  sed  universas  familias  evertunt^  totam  etiam 

44  labefactant  saepe  rem  publicam.  Ex  cupiditatibus 
odia^  discidia^  discordiae^  seditiones^  bella  nascuntur. 
Nee  eae  se  foris  solum  iactant  nee  tantum  in  alios 
caeco  impetu  incurrunt^  sed  intus  etiam  in  AninrMg 
inclusae  inter  se  dissident  atque  discordant ;  ex  quo 
vitam  amarissimam  necesse  est  efBci^  ut  sapiens  so- 
lum, amputata  drcumcisaque  inanitate  omni  et  errore^ 
naturae  finibus  contentus  sine  aegritudine  possit  et 

45  sine  metu  vivere.  Quae  est  enim  aut  utilior  aut  ad 
bene  vivendum  aptior  partitio  quam  ilia  qua  est  usus 
Epicurus?  qui  unum  genus  posuit  earum  cupiditatum 
quae  essent  et  naturales  et  necessariae,  alterum  quae 
naturales  essent  nee  tamen  necessariae,  tertium  quae 
nee  naturales  nee  necessariae;  quarum  ea  ratio  est 
ut  necessariae  nee  opera  multa  nee  impensa  explean- 
tur ;  ne  naturales  quidem  multa  desiderant,  propterea 


ir  (^rtraiest  picjisures,  anu  i 
lel  pain  of  mind.  Hence  j 
m,  to  rid  us  of  our  feaxsj 
al!  our  errors  and  pre/ 

BOOK  I.  xiii 
ment  owing  to  the  discreditable  associations  of  the 
term,}     The  gre"irt  disturbing  factor  in  man's  life  is  \ 
ignorance  of;  feooQ  ar»J  evil ;  mistaken  ideas  about  J 
these  frequentlyT-ob  us  of  our  greatest  pie» 
torment  us  with  the  most  c] 
we  need  the  aid  of  Wisdom,  1 
and  appetites,  to  root  out  al!  t 
judices,  and  to  serve  as  our  infallible  guide  to  the 
attainment  of  pleasure.     Wisdom  alone  can  banish 
sorrow  from  our  hearts  and  protect  us  from  alarm 
and  apprehension.;  put  yourself  to  school  with  her, 
and  you  may  live  in  peace,  and  quench  the  glowing 
flames   of  desire.     For   the   desires   are    lncapable\ 
of  satisfaction;  they  ruin  not  individuals  only  but  ) 
whole  families,  nay  often  shake  the  very  foundations/ 

4-I.  of  the  state.  It  is  they  that  are  the  source  of  hatred, 
quarrelling  and  strife,  of  sedition  and  of  war.  Nor 
do  thej'  only  flaunt  themselves  abroad,  or  turn  their 
blind  onslaughts  solely  against  others;  even  when 
prisoned  within  the  heart  tliey  quarrel  and  fall  out 
among  themselves;  and  this  cannot  but  render  the 
whole  of  life  embittered.  Hence  only  the 
Man,  who  prunes  away  all  the  rank  growth  c 
and  error,  can  possibly  live  untroubled  by  si 

+5  by  fear,  content  within  the  bounds  that  nature  has 
get,  Notliing  could  be  more  instructive,  more  help- 
ful to  right  living,  than  Epieurus's  doctrine  as  ts 
the  different  classes  of  the  desires.  One  kind  he\ 
classified  as  both  natural  and  necessary,  a  second  asl 
natural  without  being  necessaiy,  and  a  third  asi 
neither  natural  nor  necessary;  the  principle  pf 
classiti cation  being  that  the  necessary  desires  are 
gratified  with  little  trouble  or  expense;  the  natural 
desires  also  require  but  little,  since  nature's  own 

renaer  ine 

the  Wise  ^ 
h  of  vanity  J 


quod  ipsa  natiira  divitias  qnibus  contenta  sit  et  para- 
biles  et  teruiinatas  habet;  iiiaDiuiO  autcm  cupidi- 
tatum    nee    iiiodcis   utlus   nee    Riiis   inveniri   potest. 

^.fi  XIV.  Quod  si  vitatn  omnem  perttirbari  videmus 
erroreet  inscientta,sapientianique  esse  solam  quae  nos 
a  libidinuin  impetu  et  a  formidinum  terrore  viiidicet  et 
ipsius  fortunae  modice  ferre  doceat  iniurias  et  omnes 
monstrct  vias  quae  ad  quictem  et  tranquil  I  itatem 
ferant,  quid  est  cur  dubitemus  dicere  et  sapientiam 
propter  voluptates  expetendam  et  insipientiam  pro- 
pter inolestias  esse  fugiendam  ? 

4'T  Ea<lemque  ratione  ne  temperantiam  quldem  pro- 

pter se  expeteiidam  esse  dicen;ius,  se<l  quia  pacem 
animis  aiFerat  et  eos  quasi  concordia  quadam  placet 
ac  leniat.  Temperantia  est  enim  quae  in  rebus 
aut  expetendis  aut  (ugiendis  ut  rationem  sequamur 
monet.  Nee  enim  satis  est  iudicare  quid  faciendum 
non  faciendumve  sit,  sed  stare  etiam  oportet  in  eo 
quod  sit  iudicntum.  Plerique  autem,  quod  tenere 
atque  servare  id  quod  ipsi  st&tuerunt  non  possunt. 
victi  et  dfbilitati  obiecta  specie  voluptatis  tradunt 
se  libidinibus  constringendos  nee  quid  eventurura 
sit  provident,  ob  eamque  causani  propter  voluptatem 
et  parvam  et  non  necessarian!  et  quae  vel  iiliter 
pararetur  et  qua  etiam  carere  possent  sine  dolore, 
turn  in  morbus  graves,  turn  in  damiia,  turn  in  dede- 
cora  incurrunt,  saepe  etiam  legum    iudiciorumque 

■1-8  poenis  obligantur.  Qui  autem  ita  frui  voluni;  volu- 
ptatibus  ut  nulli  propter  eas  consequantur  dolores,  et 

'  initni)  hollow,  vain,  unreal,  as  the  opposite  or  '  natural ' 
(cf.  gijandBk.  TT- g  j6),  means 'based  on  afalseideaof 

what  la  good  or  necessary':  nl  SI  {rUr  imOviiiur)  oCrt  ^wKai 

Diogenes  Ijierliiis  lo.  i^q. 


BOOK  I.  xiii-xiv 

riches^  which  suffice  to  content  her^  are  both  easily 
procured  and  limited  in  amount ;  but  for  the  imagin- 
ary* desires  no  bound  or  limit  can  be  discovered. 

p6  XIV.  If  then  we  observe  that  ignorance  and  error     \ . 
reduce  the  whole  of  life  to  confusion,  while  Wisdom       1 
alone  is  able  to  protect  us  from  the  onslaughts  of     / 
appetite  and  the  menaces  of  fear,  teaching  us  to    /I 
bear  even  the  affronts  of  fortune  with  moderation,  /  / 
and  showing  usi"  all  the  paths  that  lead  to  calmness  /  / 
and  to  peace,  why  should  we  hesitate  to  avow  that  /  / 
Wisdom  is  to  be  desired  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasures^/ 
it  brings  and  Folly  to  be  avoided  because  of  its 
icjurious  consequences  ? 

1-7       *  The  same  principle  will  lead  us  to  pronounce  that  Temperance; 
Temperance  also  is  not  desirable  for  its  own  sake,\ 
but  because  it  bestows  peace  of  mind,  and  soothes  ] 
the  heart  with  a  tranquillizing  sense  of  harmony.  / 
For  it  is  temperance  that  warns  us  to  be  guided  bj/ 
reason  in  what  we  desire  and  avoid.  Nor  is  it  enough 
to  judge  what  it  is  right  to  do  or  to  leave  undone^ 
we  also  need  to  abide  by  our  judgment.     Most  mem 
however  lack  tenacity  of  purpose;  their  resolution \ 
weakens  and  succumbs  as  soon  as  the  fair  form  of ) 
pleasure  meets  their  gaze,  and  they  surrender  them/ 
selves  prisoners  to  their  passions,  failing  to  fores< 
the  inevitable  result.   Thus  for  the  sake  of  a  pleasur^ 
at  once  small  in  amount  and  unnecessary,  and  one' 
which  they  might  have  .procured  by  other  means  oi 
even  denied  themselves  altogether  without  pain,  th< 
incur  serious  disease,  or  loss  of  fortune,  or  disgrace, 
and  not  infrequently  become  liable  to  the  penalties 

48  of  the  law  and  of  the  courts  of  justice.     Those  on 
the  other  hand  who  are  resolved  so  to  enjoy  their 
pleasures  as  to  avoid  all  painful  consequences  there- 
e2  51 


iudicium  relinent  ne  voluptate  victi  faciant 
id  quod  sentiant  non  esse  faciendum,  ii  voluptatem 
maximam  adipiscuntiir  praetermittenda  voluptate. 
lideni  etiam  dolorem  saepe  perpetiuntur  nCj  si  id 
iiuu  facjaiit,  incidanL  in  maiorem.  Ex  quo  intelle- 
gilur  nee  intemperantiam  propter  se  esse  fugiendam, 
teniperantiamque  expetendam  non,  quia  voluptates 
fugiat  sed  quia  maiores  consequatur. 

XV.  Eadem  fortitudinis  ratio  reperietur.  Nam 
neque  laborum  perfunctio  neque  perpessio  dolorum 
per  se  ipsa  alHcit,  ncc  patientia  nee  assiduitas  nee 
vigiliae  nee  ipsa  quae  landatur  indiistria,  ne  fortitudo 
quidem,  sed  ista  sequimur  ut  sine  cura  metuque  vi- 
vaniiis  animunique  et  corpus  quantum  efficere  possi- 
mus  molestia  liberemus.  Ut  enira  mortis  metu 
omnis  qiiietae  vitae  status  perturbalur,  et  ut  suc- 
cumbere  doloribus  eosqiie  huniili  animo  imbecilloque 
ferre  misenim  est,  ob  eamque  debilitateni  animi 
multi  parentes,  niuiti  amicos,  nonnulli  patriam, 
plerique  autem  se  ipsos  penitus  perdiderunt,  sic 
robuatus  animus  et  excclsus  omni  est  liber  cura  et 
angore,  cum  et  mortem  contemnit,  qua  qui  afFecti 
sunt  in  eadem  causa  sunt  qua  antequuni  nati,  et  ad 
dolores  ita  paralus  est  ut  meminerit  maximos  morte 
finiri,  parvos  molta  habere  intervalla  requietis,  me- 
diocriom  nos  ease  dominos,  ut  si  tolerabiles  sint 
feranius,  si  minus,  animo  aequo  e  vita,  cum  ea  non 
placeat,  tamqiiam  e  theatro  exeamus,     Quibua  rebus 

BOOK  1.  xiv  XV 
from,  and  who  retain  their  facultv  of  judgment  and 
avoid  being  seduced  by  pleasure  into  courses  that 
they  perceive  to  be  wrong,  reap  the  very  highest 
pleasure  by  forgoing  pleasure.     Similarly  also  they 
often     voluntarily    endure    pain,    to    avoid    incur- 
ring greater  pain  by  not   doing  so.    This  clearly 
proves  that  Intemperance  is  not  undesirable  for  its 
own  sake,  while  Temperance  is  desirable  not  because 
it    renounces    pleasures,    but    because    it    procures 
greater  pleasures. 
!)       XV.  "  The  same  account  will  tie  found  to  hold  good 
of  Courage.    The  perfonnance  of  labours,  the  endu- 
rance of  pains,  are  not  in  themselves  attractive,  nor 
are  patience,  industry,  watchfulness,  nor  yet  that 
much  lauded  virtue,  perseverance,  nor  even  couragOv 
but  we  aim  at  these  virtues  in  order  to  live  without  1 
anxiety  and  fear  and  so  far  as  possible  to  be  frep/ 
from  pain  of  niind  and  body.     The  fear  of  death 
plays  havoc  with  the  calm  and  even  tenor  of  life, 
and  to  bow  the  head  to  pain  and  bear  it  abjectly  and 
feebly  is  a  pitiable  thing;  such  weakness  has  caused 
many  men  to  betray  their  parents  or  their  friends, 
some  their  country,  and  very  many  utterly  to  ruin 
themselves.     So  on  the  other  hand  a  strong  and 
lofty  spirit  is  entirely  free  from  anxiety  and  sorrow. 
It  makes  light  of  death,  for  the  dead  are  only  as 
they  were  before  they  were  bom.     It  is  schooled  to 
encounter  pain  by  recollecting  that  pains  of  great    , 
severity  are  ended  by  death,  and  slight  ones  have 
frequent  intervals  of  respite ;  while  those  of  medium   / 
intensity  lie  within  our  own  control :  we  can  l>ea^'^ 
them  if  they  are  endurable,  or  if  they  are  not,  we 
y  serenely  quit  life's  ttieatre,  when  the  play  has 
I  to  please  us.     These  considerations  prove 




intellegitur  nee  timiditateni  ignaviamque  vitupeTiari' 
nee  fortitudiiiem  patieiitiamque  laudari  suo  nomine, 
sed  illas  reici  quia  dolorem  pariant,  has  optari  qui»' 
i-oluptatcm.  *^^ 

J  XVI.  "lustitiarestat.utdeoitinivirtulesitdict 
sed  similia  fere  dici  possunt.  Ut  cnim  sapientii 
teniperantiam,  fortitudinein  copulatas  esse  docui  ci 
voluptate  ut  ab  ea  nullu  modo  nee  divelli  nee  dis- 
trahi  possint,  sic  de  iustitia  iudicandum  est,  quae  noil 
modo  numquam  nocet  cutquam,  sed  contra  semper 
aliqiiid  impertit'  cum  sua  vi  atque  natura,  quod 
tranquillet  animos,  turn  spe  nihil  earum  rerum  de- 
futiirum  quas  natura  non  depravata  drstdeiet.  Et" 
quemadmodum  temeritas  et  libido  ct  ignaWa  semper 
animum  excruciant  et  semper  sollieitant  turbulen- 
taeque  sunt,  sic  iinE£oWtas_si^  cuius  in  mente  con- 
sedit,  hoc  ipso  quod  adest  turbiilenta  est;  si  vero 
molitu  quidpiam  est,  quamvis  occulte  fecerit,  num- 
quam tamen  id  confidet  fore  semper  occuitum. 
Plerumque  improboruni  facta  prime  suspicio  inse- 
quitur,  dein  sermo  atque  fama,  turn  accusator,  turn 
iudex ;  multi  etiam,  ut  te  consule,  ipsi  se  indicave- 
\  51  runt.  Quod  si  qui  satis  sibi  contra  horoinum  con- 
scientiam  saepti  esse  et  mutiiti  videntur,  deorum 
tamen  horrent,  casque  ipsas  sollicitu dines  quibus 
eorum  aiiimi  noctesque  diesque  eiceduntur  a  dis  im- 
mortalibus  supplici  causa  importari  putant  Quae 
nutem  tanta  ex  improbia  factis  ad  minuendas  vitae 

'  impertit  supplied  by  MQIIeri  Mdv.  marks  lacuna. 
-  Et  inserted  by  Mdv. 

'iwprvbitiis  si  sappViQil  by  Mdv.  (cj).  improbori,m,  ii„. 
probe,  improbis,  iiBprobitalem  below). 

HOOK  I.  Nv-xvi 

that  timidity  and  cowurdtce  are  not  biamed,  t 
courage    and    endurance    praised,    on    tlieir 
account;    the    former  are    rejected    because    they 
bring  pain,  the  latter  coveted  because  they  produt 

[)       XVI,     It  remains  to  speak  of  Justice,  to  complete  juaiicp  m 
the  list  of  the  virtues ;  but  tliis  admits  of  practically  ^*' """"*"' 

the  same  treatment  as  the  others.     Wisdom,  Tern-  ^^M 

perance  and  Courage  I  have  shown  to  be  so  closely  ^^H 

linked  with    Pleasure   that   they  cannot  possibly  be  ^^H 

severed  or  sundered  from  it.     The  same  must  be  ^^H 

deemed  to  be  the  case  with  Justice.     Not  only  doesk  ^^H 

Justice  never  cause  anyone  harm,  but  on  the  con-  ^^H 

trary  it  always  brings  some  benefit,  partly  owing  tof  ^^H 

its  essentially  tranquillizing  influence  upon  the  mind,  ^^H 

partly  because  of  the  hope  that  it  warrants  of  a  never-  ^^H 

failing  supply  of  the  things  that  uncorrupted  nature  ^^H 

really  needs.    And  just  as  Rashness,  Licence  and  ^^H 

Cowardice  ever  torment  the  mind,  ever  awaken  trouble  ^^H 

and  discord,  so  Unrighteousnefis,  when  firmly,  rooted  ^^H 

in  .tlie  heart,  causes  restlessness  by  tlie  mere  fact  of  ^^| 

its  presence;  and  if  once  it  has  found  expression  in  ^^H 

some  deed  of  wickedness,  however  secret  the  act,  |  ^^H 

yet^tcan  never  feel  assured  tliatitwill  always  rpmnjn^  .1  ^^^^ 

undetected.     'rheTiSnni  consequences  of  crime  are,  ^^^H 

fitbl  suspiLilUfJ,  next  gossip  and  rumour,  then  comes  ^^^H 

the  accuser,  then  the  judge ;  many  wrongdoers  have  ^^H 

even  turned  evidence  against  themselve3,as  happened  ^^H 

1    in  your  consulship.     And  even  if  any  think  them^  ^^H 

selves  well  fenced  and  fortified  against  detection  by  \  ^^H 

their  fellow-men,  they  still  dread  the  eye  of  heaven,  /  ^^H 

and  fancy  that  the  pangs  of  anxiety  night  and  day/  ^^^| 

^Bnawing  at  their  hearts  are  sent  by  Providence  to  ^^^| 

^fkish  them.     iJut  what  can  wickedness  contribute  ^^^| 

^V                             -  — — -—  ^^1 

moleiftias  accessio  potest  tieri,  quanta  ad  augendas 
cum  conscientia  factor um  turn  poena  legum  Mlioque 
eivium?  Et  tamen  in  quibusdam  neque  pecuniae 
modus  est  neque  honoris  neque  iinperi  nee  libidinLim 
nee  epulurum  nee  reliquamm  eupiditatum,  quas  nulla 
praeda  umquam  improbe  parta  minuit.  potiusque  in- 
fluRimat,  ut  coercendi  magis  quatn  dedocendi  esse 

52  videantur.  Invitat  igitur  vera  ratio  bene  sanos  ad 
iustitiam,  aequitatem,  fidem.  Neque  liomiiii  infanti 
ttut  iinpotenti  iniuste  facta  conducunt,  qui  nee  facile 
cfficcre  possit  quod  conetur  nee  obtinere  si  efTecerit, 
et  opes  vel  fortunae  vet  ingeni  liberalititi  magis  con- 
veniurt,  qua  qui  utuntur  bene  vole  ntiani  sibi  con- 
ciliant  et,  quod  aptissimum  est  ad  quiete  vivendum, 
curitatein;  praesertim  cum  omnino  nulla  sit  causa 

fiS  peccandi:  .quae  enim  cupiditates  a  naturn  profici- 
Gcuntur,  facile  explentur  sine  ulla  iniuria ;  quae  autem 
inancs  sunt,  iis  parendum  nun  est,  nihil  enim  de- 
stderabile  concupiscunt ;  pi  usque  in  ipsa  iniuria  detri- 
roenti  est  quam  in  iis  rebus  cmolumenti  quae  pariuiitut 
iniuria.  Itaque  ne  iustitiam  quidem  recte  quis  dixerit 
per  sc  ipsam  optabileni,  sed  quia  iucunditatis  vel 
plurinium  afferat  Nam  diligi  et  carum  esse  iucun- 
dum  est  propterea  quia  tutioreni  vitam  etvoluptaluia^ 
plcniurem  efficlt.  Itaque  non  ob  ea  solum  incom- 
moila  quae  eveniunt  iniprobis  fiigiendam  improbita- 
teni  putAmus,  sed  multo  etiam  magis  quod, 

H  Muller;    tvluplalem  Mdv.  «III. 



BOOK    I. 

towards  lessening  the  annoyances  of  lifcj  i 
surate  with  its  effect  in  increasing  them,  owing  to\ 
the  burden  of  a  guilty  conscience,  the  penalties  of  j 
the  law  andfhe"hatfedof  one's"fellows?  Yet  never-  | 
tKelesTBome-sfterrtsrduTge  wiihoutilifiit  their  avarice, 
ambition  and  love  of  power,  lust,  gluttony  and 
those  other  desires,  which  ill-gotten  gains  can  never 
dimmish  but  rather  must  inflame  the  more ;  inso- 
much that  tliej  appear  proper  subjects  for  restraint 

52  rather  than  for  reformation.  Men  of  sound  natures, 
therefore,  are  summoned  by  the  voice  of  true  reason 
to  justice,  equity  and  honesty.  For  one  without 
eloquence  or  resources  dishonesty  is  not  good  policy, 
since  it  is  difficult  for  such  a  man  to  succeed  in  his 
designs,  or  to  make  good  his  success  when  once 
achieved.  On  the  other  hand,  for  the  rich  and 
clever  generous  conduct  seems  more  in  keeping, 
and  liberality  wins  tliem  affection  and  good  will,  the 
surest  means  to  a  life  of  peace;  especially  as  there 

53  really   is   no   motive    for  transgressing r   since   the 
desires  that  spring  from  nature  are  easily  gratidcd 
without  doing  any  man  wrong,  while  those  that  are 
imaginary  ought  to  be  resisted,  for  they  set  their 
affections  upon  nothing  that  is  really  wanted ;  while 
there  is  more  loss  inherent  in  Injustice  itself  thafK. 
there  is  profit  in  tiie  gains  it  brings.      Hence  Justice  ^ 
also  caimot  correctly  be  said  to  be  desirable  in  and  I 
for  itself;  it  is  so  because  it  is  so  highly  productive/ 
of  gratification.     For  esteem  and  affection  are  grati- 
fying, because  they  render  life  safer  and  fuller  of 
pleasure.     Hence  we  hold  that  Unrighteousness  is 
to  be  avoided  not  simply  on  account  of  the  dis- 

C?  that  result  from  being  unrighteous,  but 
nore  because  when  it  dwells  in  a  man's 


1  respirare,  nuiii- 

animo  versatur,  numquani  sinit  e 
quam  ncquiescere. 

I  '  Quod  si  ne  ipsarum  guidem  virtutuni  laus,  in  qua 
maxime  ceterortun  philosophorum  exultat  oratio,  re- 
perire  exitum  potest  nisi  dirigatur  ad  voluptatem, 
voluptas  autem  est  sola  quae  nos  vocet  ad  se  et  alticiat 
suapte  natura,  non  potest  esse  dubiuni  quin  id  sit 
summumatqueextremumbonoruni  omnium, lieatequc 
vivere  nihil  aliud  sit  nisi  cum  voluptate  vivere. 

I  XVil.  '  Huic  certae  stabilique  senttntiae  quae  sint 
coniunctaenpUcabobrevi.  Nullusinipsis  error  est  fini- 
bus  bonorum  et  malorum,  id  est  in  voluptate  aut  in 
dolore,sediiiiisrebuspec(.'ant  cum  e  quibus  haec  etiici~ 
fatemur  e  corporis  voluptatibus  et  doloribus  (itaque 
coiicedo  quod  modo  dicebas,  cadere  causasi  qui  e  nostm 
aliter  existimant,  quos  quidem  video  esse  multos,  scd 
imperitos);  quamquam  autem  et  laetitiam  nobis  volu- 
ptas animi  et  molestiam  dolor  aiferat,  eorum  tamen 
utrumque  et  ortum  esse  e  corpore  et  ad  corpus  referri ; 
nee  ob  earn  causam  non  multo  maiores  esse  et  voluptates 
et  dolores  animi  quam  corporis.  Nam  corpore  nihil  nisi 
praesens  et  quod  adest  sentire  possumus,  animo  au- 
tem et  praeterita  et  futum.  Ut  cnim  aeque  doleamus 
[animo],'  cum  corpore  dolemus,  fieri  tamen  perniagna 
accessio  potest  si  aliquodae  ternumetinfuiitumimpen- 

■  [aaima]  brHcketed  by  Mdv. 

a  This  chap ler  appears  to  bean  uniiileiligeiit  Iranscripl  of 
a  siiiumary  of  the  Epicurean  answers  lo  Ihe  tonayving 
Cyreiiaic  criticisms:  (i)  pleasure  is  sometimes  rejected, 
owing;  to  menial  perversion,  (ij  all  pleasure  is  not  bodiiy, 
(3)  bodily  pleasures  are  strong^er  than  mental  ones,  (4) 
absence  of  pain  is  nol  pleasure,  {5)  memory  and  nnticipation 
of  pleasure  are  nol  real  pleasures. 

^  See  £25  above 

ROOK    1.  xvi-xvii 
sart  it  tifvur  suffers  him  to  breathe  freely 
^moment's  rest. 

'  If  then  even  the  glory  of  the  Virtues,  on  whicli 
all    the    o tiler    philosophers    love    to    expatiate    s)T\ 
eloquently,  has  in  the  last  resort  no  meaning  unless  \ 
it  be  based  on  pleasure,  whereas  pleasure  is  the  only   j 
thing  that  is  intrinsically  attractive  and  alluring,  it  I 
cannot  be  doubted  that  pleasure  is  the  one  supreme  | 
and  final  Good  and  that  a  life  of  happiness  is  nothing 
else  than  a  life  of  pleasure. 
.5j         XVII.   ""The  doctrine  thus  firmly  established  has  Mental pleasun 
forol lanes  which  1  will  briefly  expound,  (l)  The  Ends  Spoif bodily; 
of  Goods  and  Evils  themselves,  that  is.  pleasure  and  ^"^"/u^,^"" 
pain, are  not  open  to  mistake;  where  people  go  wrong  '"V|y^^"' 
is-  in  not  knowing  what  things  are  productive  of 
pleasure  and  pain.     (2)  Again,  we  aver  that  mental 
pleasures  and  pains  arise  out  of  bodily  ones  (and 
therefore  I  allow  your  contention'' that  any  Epicureans 
who  think  otherwise  put  themselves  out  of  court;  and 
1  am  aware  that  many  do,  though  not  those  who  can 
speak  with  authority);  but  although  men  do  experi- 
ence mental  pleasure  that  is  agreeable  and  mental 
pain  that  is  annoying,  yet  both  of  these  we  assert 
f^%-'"^^  of  and  are  based  upon  bodily  sensations. 
tV  ^^   "Maintain  that  this  does  not  preclude 
■    f  P'^tsures  and  pains  from  being  much  more 

intense  than  those  of  the  body;since  the  body  can  feel 
on  y  what  is  present  to  it  at  the  moment,  whereas  the 
mind  13  also  cosni?.ant  of  the  past  and  of  the  fiiture. 
for  granting,  that  pain  of  body  ia  equally  painful, 
''^  .?'"',^^"aation  of  pain  can  be  enormously  increased 
i^  J^  '"^  ti»Jit  some  evil  of  unlimited  magnitude 
nd  aan,tion    t:l»reat«ns  to  befaU  us  hereafter. 




Here  malum  nobis opinemur.  Quod idemlicettratisferre 
in  voluptatcm,  ut  ea  maior  sit  si  nihil  tale  metuamus, 
66  lam  iiliid  quidem  perspicuum  est,  maximam  animi 
aut  voluplatem  aut  molestiam  plus  aut  ad  beatam  aut 
ad  miseram  vitam  afferre  momenti  quam  eonim 
utrumvis  si  aeque  diu  sit  in  corpore.  Non  placet 
autem  detracts,  voluptate  aegritudincm  statim  conse- 
qui,  nisi  in  voluptatis  locum  dolor  forte  succcsserit ; 
at  contra  gaudere  nosmet  omittendis  dolorilius, 
etiamsi  voluptas  ea  quae  sensum  moveat  nulla  suc- 
cesserit;  eoque  iiitellegi  potest  quanta  voluptas  sit 
r  non  dolere.  Sed  ut  iis  bonis  erigimur  quae  expecta.- 
mus,  sic  laetjimur  iis  quae  recordamur.  Stulti  autem 
malorun]  memoria  torquentur;  sapientes  bona  prae- 
terita  grata  recovdatione  renovata  delectant.  Est 
autem  situm  in  nobis  ut  et  adversa  quasi  perpetua 
oblivione  obruamus  et  secunda  iucunde  ae  suaviter 
meminerimus.  Sed  cum  ea  quae  praeterierunt  acri 
animo  et  attento  intuemur,  turn  fit  ut  aegritudo  se- 
quatur  si  ilia  mala  sint,  si  bona,  laetitia. 

XVIII.  O  praectaram  beate  vii'endi  et  apertam  et 
simplicem  et  direetam  viam !  Cum  enim  certe  nihil 
homini  possit  melius  esse  quam  vacare  omni  dolore  et 
molestia  perfruique  raasimis  et  animi  et  corporis 
voluptatibus,  videtisne  quam  nihil  praetermittatur 
quod  vitam  adiuvet,  quo  facilius  id  quod  propositum 
est  summum  bonum  consequamur  ?  Claniat  Epicurus 
is  quern  vos  iiimis  voluptatibus  esse  deditum  dicitis, 
non  posse  iucunde  vivi  nisi  sapienter,  lioneste  iuste- 
que  vivatur,  nee  sapienter,  faoneste,  iuste  nisi  iucunde. 

BOOK  L  sWi-K^iii 
tiK  isme  consideration  may  be  transferred  to  pies- 
sure:  a  pleasure  is  ^eater  if  not  accornpanted  by  any 

36  apprebenaon  of  evil.  Tiiis  therefore  clearly  ap- 
pears, that  intense  mental  pleasure  or  distress  con- 
tributes  more  to  our  happiness  or  miserj-  than  a 
bodily  pleasure  or  pain  of  equal  duration.  (■()  But  ■we 
do  not  agree  that  when  pleasure  is  withdrawn  un- 
easiness at  once  ensues,  unless  the  pleasure  happens 
to  have  been  replaced  by  a  pain:  while  on  the  other 
hand  one  is  glad  to  lose  a  pain  even  though  do  active 
sensation  of  pleasure  comes  in  its  place:  a  fact  that 
serves  to  show  how  great  a  pleasure  is 

57  absence  of  pain,  (j)  But  just  as  we  are  elated  by 
the  anticipation  of  good  things,  so  we  are  delighted 
by  their  recollection.  Fools  are  tormented  by  the 
remembrance  of  former  evils;  to  wise  men  memory 
is  a  pleasure — by  it  they  renew  tlie  goods  of  the  past. 
We  have  the  power  if  we  will  both  to  obliterate 
our  misfortunes  by  a  sort  of  permanent  forgetfulness 
and  to  summon  up  pleasant  and  agreeable  memories 
of  our  successes.  But  when  we  concentrate  our  mental 

vision  closefy  on  the  events  of  the  past,  thi 
or  jctadness  ensues  according  as  these  were  evil  or  good. 
XVIII.  '  Here  is  indeed  a  royal  road  to  happiness 
- — open,  simple,  and  direct!  For  clearly  man  can 
have  no  greater  good  than  complete  freedom  from 
pain  and  sorrow  coupled  with  the  enjoyment  of  the 
highest  bodily  and  mental  pleasures.  Notice  then 
how  the  theory  embraces  every  possible  enhancement 
of  life,  every  aid  to  the  attainment  of  that  Chief 
Good  which  is  our  object.  Epicurus,  the  man  whom 
jrou  denounce  as  a  voluptuary,  cries  aloud  that  no 
ti  live  pleasantly  without  living  wisely,  bono ur- 
f  and  justly,  and  no  one  wisely,  honourably  and 


I  Neque  enim  civitas  in  seditioiie  beuta  ease  potest  nee 
in  discordia  dominorum  domus ;  quo  minus  animus  a 
se  ipse  dissidens  sccumque  discordans  gustare  partem 
ullam  liquidae  voluptatis  et  liberae  potest.  Atqui 
pugnantibus  ct  coiitrariis  studils  consiliisque  semper 
ut^ns    nihil    quieti    videre,  nihil    tranquilU    potest. 

I  Quod  si  corporis  griivioribus  morbis  vitae  iucusditas 
impeditur,  quanto  magis  aiiimi  morbis  impediri 
Animi  autem  morbi  sunt  cupiditutes 
nanes  divitiarum,gloriae,  dominationis, 
libidinosarum  etiam  voluptatuni.  Acccdunt  aegritu- 
dines,  moieatiae,  niaerores,  qui  exedunt  aiiimos  con- 
ficiiintque  curis  lioniinum  non  intellegentiuro  nihil 
dolendum  esse  aninio  quod  sit  a  dolore  corporis  prae- 
senti  fiiturove  seiunctum.  Nee  veroquisquani  stultus 
non  horum  morboram  aliquo  laborat;  nemo  igitur 

1  stultus '  non  miser.  Accedit  etiam  mors,  quae 
quasi  saxum  Tantalo  semper  impendet ;  turn  super- 
stitio,  qua  qui  est  inibutus  quietus  esSe  numquam 
potest,  Fraeterea  bona  praeterita  non  ineminerunt, 
pracsentibus  non  fruuntur;  futura  modo  exspectant, 
quae  quia  eerta  esse  non  possuiit,  conficiuntur  et  an- 
gore  et  metu ;  maximeque  cruciantur  cum  sero  sen- 
tiunt  frustra  se  aut  pecuniae  studuisse  aut  imperiis 
aut  opibus  aut  gloriae.  Nullas  enim  consequuntur 
voluptates  quarum  potiendi  spe  inHammati  multos 

I  labores  magnosque  ^usceperunt.  Ecce  autem  aliimi- 
nutiet  angusti. aut  omnia  semper  desperantes,aut  ma- 


-,  MuUer 

:l  Mdv. 

■I  MSS, 


BOOK  I.  xviii 

S8  justly  without  living  pleasantly.  For  n  city  rent  liy 
faction  cannot  prosper,  nor  a  house  whose  masters  ^^ 
arc  at  strii'e;  much  less  then  can  ii  mind  divided  M 
against  itself  and  filled  with  inward  discord  taste  any 
particle  of  pure  and  liberal  pleasure.  But  one  who  i.^ 
perpetually  swayed  by  conflicting  and  incompatible 
counsels  and  desires  can  know  no  peace  or  calm. 

>9  Why,  if  the  pleasantness  of  life  is  diminished  by 
the  more  serious  bodily  diseases,  how  much  more 
must  it  be  diminished  by  the  diseases  of  the  mind '. 
Butextravagantandiniaginarydesires,for  riches,  fame, 
power,  and  also  for  licentious  pleasures,  are  nothing 
but  mental  diseases.  Then,  too,  there  are  grief, 
trouble  and  sorrow,  which  gnaw  the  heart  and  con- 
sume it  with  anxiety,  if  men  fail  to  reahze  that  the 
mind  need  feel  no  pain  unconnected  with  some  pain 
ef  body,  present  or  to  come.  Yet  there  is  no  foolish 
man  but  is  afflicted  by  some  one  of  these  diseases; 
tlierefore  there  is  no  foolish  man  that  is  not  unhappy. 

iO  Moreover,  there  is  death,  the  stone  of  Tantalus  ever 
hanging  over  men's  heads;  and  superstition,  that 
poisons  and  destroys  all  peace  of  mind.  Besides,  they 
do  not  recollect  their  past-nor  enjoy  theii'  present 
blessings;  they  only  look  forward  to  those  of  the 
future,  and  as  these  are  of  necessity  uncertain,  they 
are  consumed  with  agony  and  terror;  and  the  climax 
of  their  torment  is  when  they  perceive  too  late  that 
all  their  dreams  of  wealth  or  station,  power  or  fame, 
have  come  to  nothing.  For  they  never  attain  any  of 
the  pleasures,  the  hope  of  which  inspired  them  to 

}1   undergo  all  their  arduous  toils.     Or  look  again  at 

others,  petty,  narrow-minded  men,  or  confirmed  pes- 

simists,orspiteful,envious,  ill-tempered  creatures,  un* 

sociable,  abusive,  eailtankerous ;  others  again  enslaved 


levoli,  invidi,  difficiles,  lucifugi,  maledici,  morosi,'  alii 
autem  etiara  amakiriis  levitatibus  dediti,  alii  petu- 
lantes,  alii  audaceSj  protervi,  iidem  iiitemperantes  et 
ignavi,  numquam  in  sententia  permanentes,  quas  ob 
causas  in  eorum  vita  nulla  est  intercapedo  moleatiae. 
Igitur  neque  stultomtn  quisqunm  beatus  neque  sapi- 
entium  non  beatus,  Multoque  hoc  melius  nos  verius- 
que  quam  Stoici.  Illi  enim  negant  esse  bonum  quid- 
quam  nisi  nescio  quam  illam  umbram  quod  appellant 
Iiunestum,  non  tam  solido  quam  splendido  nomine ; 
virtutem  autem  nixam  hoc  honesto  nullam  requirere 
voluptatem  atque  ad  beate  vivendum  se  ipsa  esse 
con ten tarn. 

62  XIX.  Sed  possunt  haec  quadam  ratione  dici  non 
modo  non  repugnantibus,  verum  etiam  approbantibus 
nobis.  Sic  enim  ab  Epicuro  sapiens  semper  beatus 
inducitur ;  tiiiltus  habet  cupiditates ;  tieglegit  mortem ; 
de  dis  immortalibus  sine  ullo  metu  vera  sentit;  non 
dubitat,  si  ita  melius  sit,  migrare  de  vita.  His  rebus 
instructus  semper  est  in  voiuptate.  Neque  enim 
terapus  est  ullum  quo  non  plus  voluptatum  habeat 
quam  dolonim.  Nam  et  praeterita  grate  meminit 
et  praesentibus  ita  politur  ut  animadvertat  quanta 
sint  ea  quamque  iucunda,  neque  pendet  ex'  futuris, 
sed  expectat  ilia,  fruitur  praesentibus ;  ab  iisque  vitiis 
quae  paulo  ante  collegi  abest  plurinium,  et  cum  stul- 
torum  vitam  cum  sua  comparat,  magna  afficitur  vo- 
iuptate. Dolores  autem  si  qui  incurrunt,  numquam 
vim  tantam  habent  ut  non  plus  babeat  sapiens  quod 

63  gaudeat  quam  quod  angatur,  OptJme  vero  Epicurus, 
quod  'exiguam'  dixit  'fortunam  intervenire  sapientt. 

I   Mdv.  wilhMSS.        ^M 

BOOK  I.  xviii-xix 
to  the  follies  of  love,  impudent  or  reckless,  wanton, 
lieaclstronfl  and  yet  irresolute,  always  changing  tlieir 
minds.  Such  tailings  render  their  lives  one  unbroken 
round  of  misery.  The  conclusion  is  that  no  foohsh 
man  can  be  happy,  nor  any  wise  man  fail  to  be 
happT.  This  is  ii  truth  that  we  establish  tar  more 
conclusively  than  do  the  Stoics.  For  they  maintain 
that  nothing  is  good  save  that  vngue  phantom  which 
they  entitle  Moral  Worth,  a  title  more  splendid  than 
substantial;  and  say  that  Virtue  resting  on  thisi 
Moral  Worth  has  no  need  of  pleasure,  but  is  herself, 
her  own  sufficient  happiness. 

62       XIX.      At  the  same  time  this  Stoic  doctrine 

stated  in  a  form  which  we  do  not  object  to,  and  in- 
deed ourselves  endorse.  For  Epicurus  thus  represents 
the  Wise  Man  as  always  happy:  his  desires  are  kept 
within  bounds;  death  he  disregards;  he  has  a  true 
conception,  untainted  by  fear,  of  the  Divine  nature; 
if  it  be  expedient  to  depart  from  life,  he  does  not 
hesitate  to  do  so.  Thus  equipped  he  enjoys  per- 
petual pleasure,  for  there  is  no  moment  when  the 
pleasures  he  experiences  do  not  outbalance  the 
pains;  since  he  remembers  the  past  with  delight, 
grasps  the  present  with  a  full  realization  of  its 
pleasantness,  and  does  not  rely  upon  the  future ; 
be  looks  forward  to  it,  but  liuds  his  true  enjoyment 
in  the  present.  Also  he  is  entirely  free  from  the 
vices  that  1  instanced  a  few  moments  ago,  and  he 
derives  no  inconsiderable  pleasure  from  comparing 
his  own  existence  with  the  hfe  of  the  foolish.  More- 
over, any  pains  that  the  Wise  Man  may  encounter  are 
never  so  severe  but  that  he  has  more  cause  forglad- 

»3  ncss  than  for  sorrow.     Again,  it  is  a  fine  saying  of  j 
Epicurus  that  'the  Wise  Man  is  but  little  interfered  ' 
V  65 

Ths  WlH  Mu 

maximasque  ah  eo  et  gravissimas  res  consilio  ipsius 
et  ratioiie  adntinistrari ;  neque  inaiorem  voluptatem 
ex  infinito  tempoiT  aetatis  pcrcipi  posse  qunm  ex  lioc 
percipiatur  quod  videamus  esse  fuiitum.'  In  disle- 
ctica  autem  vestra  nullam  existimavit  esse  nee  ad 
melius  vivendum  nee  ad  eommodius  disserendum 
vim.  In  physicis  plurimum  posuit.  Ea  scientia  et 
vertrorum  vis  et  natura  orationis  et  consequentium 
repugnantiumve  ratio  potest  perspici ;  omnium  autein 
rerum  natura  cagnita  levamur  saperstitione.liberamur 
mortis  metu,  non  conturbamur  i^oratione  rerum,  e 
etiam  morati  melius  erimus  eum  didicerimus  quid 
natura  desideret.  Turn  vero,  si  stabilera  scientiam 
rerum  tenebimus,  aervata  ilia  quae  quasi  delapsa  de 
caelo  est  ad  cognitionem  omnium  regula,  ad  quam 
omnia  iudicia  rerum  dirigentur,  numquam  ullius 
64  oratione  vieti  sententia  desistemus.  Nisi  autem 
rerum  natura  perspecta  erit,  nuUo  modo  poterimus 
cia  defendere.  Quidquid  porro  animo 
omne  oritur  a  sensibus;  qui  si  omnes 
veri  erunt,  ut  Epicuri  ratio  docet,  tum  denique  po- 
terit  aliquid  cogiiosci  et  percipi.  Quos  qui  tollunt 
et  nihil  posse  percipi  dicunt,  ii  remotis  sensibus  ne 

«Epicurus  discarded  the  orliiodox  Logic  (cp.  9  ai),  but 
ntUcked  some  of  ils  problems  in  the  light  of  his  Natural 
Philosaphy:  e,g.  denying  necessity  in  Nature,  be  denied 
the  Law  of  the  Excluded  Middle  {Academica  I.  97,  and  see 
W.  M.  L.  Uulchinson,  de  Finibus  a.  234).  The 'criterion' or 
lest  of  truth  he  treated  under  the  head  of  ■  Canonic '  (iciuib', 
ngula,  a  measuring -rod).  Being  based  on  his  theory  of 
sensation  (§  zi),  'Canonic*  was  ranged  under  'Physic' 
(Diogenes  Laerlius,  lO.  30).  It  made  the  senses  infallible, 
and  the  sole  source  of  knowledge;  and  it  gave  rules  for 
testing  the  validity  of  inference  from  sensation,  which  are 
a  crude  adumbration  of  a  Logic  of  Induction. 

BOOK   I. 

lom  and  ^^H 

)uld    be  ^^M 

with  by  fortune :  the  great  concerns  of  life,  the 
that  matter,  are  controlled  by  his  own  wisdom  a 
.    reason';    and    that     no  greater   pleasure   could 
derived  from  a  hfe  of  infinite  duration  than  is  acttially 
afforded  by  this  existence  which  we  know  to  be 
finite."    Logic,  on  which  your  scliool  lays  such  stress.  Logic  i»  bwIbbi 
he  held  to  be  of  no  effect  either  as  a  guide  to  conduct  based  on  «o» 
or  as  an  aid  to  thought.     Natural  Philosophy  he  L^'cMontor' 
deemed  all-important.     Tliis  science^  explains  to  us  EJji^'^^^gJ 
the  meaning  of  terms,  the  nature  of  predication,  and  »s  removing  tbi 
the  law  of  consistency  and  contradiction ;  secondly,  happiness, 
a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  nature  relieves 
us  of  the  burden  of  superstition,  frees  us  from  fear  of 
death,  and  shields  us  against  tlie  disturbing  effects 
of  ignorance,  which  is  often  in  itself  a  cause  of 
terrifying  apprehensions ;  lastly,  to  learn  what  na- 
ture's  real    requirements   are   improves  the    mond 
character  also.    Besides,  it  is  only  by  6rmly  grasping 
a  well-established  scientific  system,  observing  tlie 
Rule  or  Canon  that  has  fallen  as  it  were  from  heaven 
to  afford  us  a  knowledge  of  the  universe — only  by 
making  that  Canon  the  test  of  all  our  judgments,  that 
we  can  hope  alwaj's  to  stand  fast  in  our  belief,  un- 
fit shaken  by  the  eloquence  of  any  man.     On  the  other 
hand,  without  a  full  understanding  of  the  world  of 
nature  it  is  impossible  to  maintain  the  truth  of  our 
sense-perceptions.     Further,  every  mental  presenta- 
tion has  its  origin  in  sensation ;  so  that  no  knowledge 
or  perception  is  possible,  unless  all  sensations  are 
true,  as  the  theory  of  Epicurus  teaches  that  they 

S  Those  who  deny  the  validity  of  sensation  and 
that  nothing  can  be  perceived,  having  excluded 
f!  67 

id  ipsum  quidem  expedire  possunt  quod  disserunt. 
Praeterea  sublata  cognitione  et  scientia  tollitur  om- 
nis  ratio  et  vitae  degendae  et  rerum  gerendarum.  " 
Sic  e  physicis  et  fortitudo  sumitui'  contra  mortis 
timorem  et  constantia  contra  metiim  religionis  et 
sedatjo  animi,  omnium  rerum  occultarum  ignoratione 
Kublata,  et  moderatio,  natura  cupiditatum  generi- 
busque  earum  explicatis,  et,  ut  modo  docai,  cogni- 
tionis  regula  et  ludicio  ab  eodein  illo  constitute  veri 
a  falso  distinctio  traditur. 

6.'>  XX.  Restat  locus  huic  disputationi  vel  n 
necessarius,  de  amicitia,  quam  sj  volupta^ 
sit  bonum  alfirmatis  nuUam  omnino  fore;  de  qua 
Epicurus  quidem  ita  dicit,  omnium  rerum  quas  ad 
beate  vivenduni  sapientia  coraparaverit  niliit  esse 
maius  amicitia,  nihil  uberius,  nihil  iucundius.  Nee 
•  vero  hoc  oratioiie  solum  sed  multo  magis  vita  et 
factis  et  moribus  comprobavit.  Quod  quam  magnum 
sit  fictae  veterum  fabulae  declarant,  in  quibus  tarn 
multis  tamque  variis,  ab  ultima  antiquitate  repetitis, 
tria  viK  amicorum  paria  reperiuntur,  ut  ad  Orestem 
pervenias  profectus  a  Theseo.  At  vero  Epicurus  una 
in  domo,  et  ea  quidem  angusta,  quam  magnos  quun- 
taque  amoris  conspiratione  consenlientes  tenuit  ami- 
corum greges!  qtiod  fit  etiam  nunc  ab  Epicureis. 
Sed  ad  rem  redeamus;  de  hominibus  dici  non  ne- 

66  cesse  est.     Tribus  igitur  modis  video  esse  a  nostris 
de  amicitia  disputatum.     Alii,  cum  eas  voluptates 

HOOK  I.  xix-KX 
the  evidence  of  tlie  senses,  are  iiiiabli?  even  to  ex- 
pound their  own  argument.  Besides,  by  abolishing 
knowledge  and  science  the;  alralish  all  possibility  of 
rational  life  and  action.  Tims  Natural  Philosophy 
supplies  courage  to  face  the  fear  of  death ;  resolution 
to  resist  the  terrors  of  religion ;  peace  of  mind,  for 
it  removes  all  ignorance  of  the  mysteries  of  nature; 
self-control,  for  it  explains  llie  nature  of  the  desires 
and  distiDguishes  their  diiferent  kinds ;  and,  as 
I  showed  just  now,  the  Canon  or  Criterion  of  Know- 
ledge, which  Epicunis  also  establishedjgives  a  method 
of  discerning  truth  from  falsehood. 

55       XX.  "There  remains  a  topic  that  is  pre-eminently  Friends^ 
germane  to  this  discussion,  I  mean  the  subject  of  imoiki  i 
Friendship,     Your  school  maintains  that  if  pleasure  b£I^o[ 
be  the  Chief  Good,  friendship  will  cease  to  exist,  uiiitiy 
Now  Epicuriis's  pronouncement  about  iriendship  is 
that  of  all  the  means  to  happiness  that  wisdom  has 
devised,  none  is  greater,  none  more  fruitful,  none 
more  delightful  than  this.     Nor  did  he  only  com- 
mend this  doctrine  by  his  eloquence,  hut  far  more   ■ 
by  the  example  of  his  life  and  conduct.  How  great  a 
thing  such  friendship  is,  is  shown  by  the  mythical 
stories  of  antiquity.  Review  the  legends  from  the  re- 
motest ages,  and,  copious  and  varied  as  they  are,  you 
will  barely  find  in  them  three  paii-s  of  friends,  beginning 
witli  Theseus  and  ending  with  Orestes.    Yet  Epicurus 
in  a  single  house  and  that  a  small  one  maintained  a 
whole    company  of  friends,  united   by  the  closest 
sympathy  and  affection;  and  this  still  goes  on  in  the 
Epicurean  school.     But  to  return  to  our  subject,  for 

36  there  is  no  need  of  personal  instances :  I  notice  Three 
that  the  topic  of  friendship  has  been  treated  by  ^""'' 
Epicureans  in  three  ways,     (l)  Some  have  denied 


quae  ad  amieos  pertinerent  negarent  ease  per  se  ip- 
sa3  tain  ex]ietendas  quam  nostras  expeteremus,  quo 
loco  videtur  quibusdam  stabilitas  amicitiae  vacillare, 
tucntur  tameii  eum  locum  seque  facile,  ut  milii  vide- 
tur, expedinnt.  Ut  enini  virtotes,  de  quibus  ante 
dictum  est,  sic  amicitiam  negant  posse  a  voluptate 
discedere.  Nam  cum  solitudo  et  vita  sine  amicis 
insidiamm  et  metus  plena  sit,  ratio  ipsa  monet  ami- 
citias  comparare,  quibus  partis  conlirmatur  animus  et 
a  spe  pariendaruiij  voluptalum  seiungi  non  potest. 

fi7  Atque  ut  odia,  invidiae,  despicationes  adversantur 
voluptatibus,  sic  amicitiae  non  modo  fautrices  fidelis- 
simae  sed  etiam  effectrices  sunt  voluptatum  tam 
amicis  quam  sibi ;  quibus  non  solum  praesentibus 
fruuntur  sed  etiam  spe  eriguntur  consequentis  ac  po- 
ster! temporis.  Quod  quia  nullo  modo  sine  amicitia 
firmam  et  perpetuam  iucunditatem  vitae  tenere  pos- 
sumus  neque  vera  ipsam  amicitiam  tucri  nisi  aeque 
amieos  et  nosmet  ipsosdiI{gamu£,tdcircD  et  hoc  ipsum 
eflicitur  in  amicitia  etamicitia  cum  voluptate  connecti- 
tur.    Nam  et  laetamur  amicorum  laetitia  aeque  atque 

68  nostra  et  pariter  dolemus  angoribus.  Quocirca  eodem 
modo  sapiens  eritaffectusergaamieum  quoin  seipsum, 
quosque  labores  propter  suam  voluptatem  susciperet, 
eosdem  suscipiet  propter  amici  voluptatem.  Quae- 
que  de  virtutibus  dicta  sunt,  queraadmodum  eae 
semper  voluptatibus  inhaererent,  eadem  de  amicitia 
dicenda  stmt.  Praectare  enim  Epicurus  Ills  paene  ver- 
bis: Eadem,'  inquit,  sententia  conlirmavit  a 
ne  quod  aut  seroipitemum  aut  diuturnum  timeret  n 

^^Rat  I 


»t  pleasures  affecting  our  friends  are  in  them- 
selves to  be  desired  b;  us  in  tlie  sflnie  degree  as  we 
desire  our  own  pleasures.  'Ihis  doctrine  is  thought 
by  some  critics  to  undermine  the  foundations  of  friend- 
ship; however,  its  supporters  defend  their  position, 
and  in  my  opinion  have  no  difficulty  in  making  good 
their  case.  They  argue  that  friendship  can  no  more 
be  sundered  from  pleasure  than  can  the  virtues, 
which  we  have  discussed  already.  A  solitary,  friend- 
less hfe  must  be  beset  by  secret  dangers  and  alarms. 
Hence  reason  itself  advises  tJie  acquisition  of 
friends;   their  possession   gives   confidence,  and   a 

67  firmly  rooted  hope  of  winning  pleasure.  And  just 
as  hatred,  jealousy  and  contempt  are  hindrances  to 
pleasure,  so  friendship  is  the  most  trustworthy  pre- 
server and  also  creator  of  pleasure  alike  for  our 
friends  and  for  ourselves.  It  affords  us  enjoyment 
ill  the  present,  and  it  inspires  us  with  hopes  for  the 
near  and  distant  future.  Thus  it  is  not  possible  to 
secure  uninterrupted  gratification  in  life  without 
friendship,  nor  yet  to  preseire  friendship  itself  un- 
less we  love  our  friends  as  much  as  ourselves.  Hence 
this  unselfishneBS  does  oecur  in  friendship,  while  also 
friendship  is  closely  linked  with  pleasure.  For  we 
rejoice  in  our  friends'  joy  as  much  as  in  our  own, 

8  and  are  equally  pained  by  their  sorrows.  Therefore 
the  Wise  Man  will  feel  exactly  the  same  towards  his 
friend  as  he  does  towards  himself,  and  will  exert 
himself  as  much  for  his  friend's  pleasure  as  he  would 
for  his  own.  All  that  has  been  said  about  the  essen- 
tial connexion  of  the  virtues  with  pleasure  must  be 
repeated  about  friendship.  Epicurus  well  said  (I 
give  almost  his  exact  words):  'The  same  creed  that 
has  given  us  courage  to  overcome  all  fear  of  ever- 




.nnoij  quae  perspexit  in  hoc  ipso  vitae  spatio  amicitiae 

9  praesidium  esse  firmissimum.'  Sunt  autem  quidam 
Epicurei  timidiores  pauIo  contra  vestra  conviria  sed 
tamen  satis  acutij  qui  verentur  ne,  si  amicitjam  pro- 
pter nostram  voluptatem  expetendam  putemus,  tota 
amicitia  quasi  claudicare  videatur.  Itaque  primes 
congressus  copulationesque  et  consuetudinum  insti- 
tuendarum  vo!untates  fieri  propter  voluptatenij  cum 
autem  usus  progrediens  familiaritatem  effecerit,  turn 
araorem  efflorescere  tantum  ut,  etiamsi  nulla  sit 
utilitas  ex  amicitia,  tamen  ipsi  amici  propter  se  ipsos 
amentur.  Etenim  si  loca,  si  faua,  si  urbes,  si  gym- 
nasia, si  campum,  si  canes,  si  equos,  si  ludicra  exer- 
cendi  aut  venandi,  consuetudine  adamare  snieiaus, 
quanto   id   in    hominiim   consuetudine   facilius    fieri 

3  poterit'  et  iustius?  Sunt  autem  qui  dicant  foedus 
esse  quoddam  sapientimn  ut  ne  mitms  amicos  quam 
se  ipsos  diligant.  Quod  et  posse  fieri  intellegimus 
et  saepe  evenire^  videmus,  et  perspiciium  est  nihil  ad 
iucuiide  vivendumreperiri  posse  quod  coniuiictione  tali 
sit  aptius. 

Quibus  ex  omnibus  iudicari  potest  non  modo  non 
impediri  rationem  aniicitiae  si  suramum  bononi  in 
voluptate  ponatur,  sed  sine  hoc  institutionem  omnino 
amicitiae  non  posse  reperiri. 

I  XXI.  Quapropter  si  ea  quae  dixi  sole  ipso  illu- 
striora  et  clariora  sunt,  si  omnia  liausta^  e  fonte 
naturae,  si    tota    oratio   nostra   omnem   sibi    fidem 


n  Md' 

vilh  MSS. 
dixi  bracketed  by  Mdv. 


BOOK  I.  xx-xxi 
lasting  or  long-enduring  evil  hereafter,  has  discerned 

fig  that  friendship  is  our  strongest  safeguard  in  this 
present  term  of  life.' — (2)Other  Epicureans  though  by 
no  means  lacking  in  insight  are  a  little  less  courage- 
ous in  defying  the  opprobrious  criticisms  of  the 
Academy.  They  fear  that  if  we  hold  friendship  to 
be  desirable  only  for  the  pleasure  that  it  affords  to 
ourselves,  it  will  be  thought  that  it  is  crippled  alto- 
gether. They  therefore  say  that  the  first  advances 
and  overtures,  and  the  original  inclination  to  form  an 
attachment,  are  prompted  by  the  desire  for  pleasure, 
but  that  when  the  progress  of  intercourse  has  led  to 
intimacy,  the  relationship  blossoms  into  an  affection 
strong  enough  to  make  ns  love  our  friends  for  their 
own  sake,  even  though  no  practical  advantage  accrues 
from  their  friendship.  Does  not  familiarity  endear  to 
us  localities,  temples,  cities,  gymnasia  and  playing- 
pounds,  horses  and  hounds,  games  and  field-sports? 
Then  how  much  more  natural  and  reasonable  that  it 
should  have  the  same  result  in  the  case  of  our  inter- 

70  course  with  our  fellow-men  !^3)  The  third  view  is 
that  wise  men  have  made  a  sort  of  compact  to  love 
their  friends  no  less  than  themselves.  We  can  under- 
stand the  possibility  of  this,  and  indeed  we  often  see 
it  happen.  Clearly  no  more  effective  means  to  happi- 
ness could  be  found  than  such  an  alliance. 

All  these  considerations  go  to  prove  not  only  that 
the  rationale  of  friendship  is  not  impaired  by  the 
identification  of  the  Chief  Good  with  pleasure,  but 
also  that  without  this  no  foundation  for  friendsliip 
whatsoever  can  be  found. 

n        XXI.       If  then  the  theory  I  have  set  forth  is  Pcton 

clearer  and  more  luminous  than  daylight  itself;  ifgreaiVai^vt 
it  is  derived  entirely  from  Nature's  source;  if  my  manwnii. 

sensibus  confirmat,  id  est  incorruptis  atque  integris 
testibus,  si  infantes  pueri,  mutae  etiam  bestiac  paene 
loquuntur,  magistra  nc  duce  nature,  nihil  esse  pro- 
sperum  nisi  voluptatem,  nihil  asperuin  nisi  dolorem, 
de  quibus  neque  depravate  iudicant  neque  corrupts, 
nonne  ei  maximam  gratiam  habere  debemus  qui  hac 
exaudita  quasi  voce  naturae  sie  earn  firrae  graviterque 
comprehenderit  ut  omnes  bene  sanos  in  viain  placa- 
tae,  tranquillae,  quietae,  beatae  vitae  deduceretf 
Qui  quod  tibi  parum  videtur  eruditus,  ea  causa  est 
quod  nullam  eruditionem  esse  duxit  nisi  quae  beatae 
72  vitae  disciplinam  iuvaret.  An  ille  tempus  aut  in 
poetis  evolvMidis,  ut  ego  et  Triarius  te  hortatore 
facimus,  consumeret,  in  quibus  nulla  solida  utilitas 
omnisque  puerilis  est  deltctatio,  aut  se,  ut  Plato,  in 
musicia,  geometria,  numeris,  astris  contereret,  quae 
et  a  falsis  initiis  profecta  vera  esse  non  possunt  et  si 
essent  vera  nihil  afferrent  quo  iucundius,  id  est  quo 
melius  viveremus ;  —  eas  ergo  artes  persequeretur, 
Vivendi  artem  tantam  tamque  operosum  et  perinde 
fructuosam  relinqueret?  Non  ergo  Epicurus  ineru- 
ditus,  sed  ii  indocti  qui  quae  pueros  non  didicisse 
turpe  est  ea  putant  usque  ad  senectuteni  esse  di- 
scenda."  Quae  cum  dixisset,  ExpHcavi,"  inquit, 
sententiam  meam  et  eo  quidem  consilio,  tuum 
iudicium  ut  cognoscerem,  quae  mihi  facultas,  ut  id 
>  arbitratu  facerera,  ante  hoc  tempos  numquam 

est  data." 


BOOK  I.  xxi 

whole  discourse  relies  throughout  for  confirmation 
on  the  unbiased  and  unimpeachable  evidence  of  the 
senses;  if  lisping  infants^  nay  even  dumb  animals^ 
prompted  by  Nature's  teaching,  almost  find  voice  to 
proclaim  that  there  is  no  welfare  but  pleasure,  no 
hardship  but  pain — and  their  judgment  in  these 
matters  is  neither  sophisticated  nor  biased — ought 
we  not  to  feel  the  -greatest  gratitude  to  him  who 
listened  to  this  utterance  of  Nature's  voice,  and 
grasped  its  import  so  firmly  and  so  fully  that  he  has 
guided  all  sane-minded  men  into  the  paths  of  peace 
and  happiness,  calmness  and  repose?  You  are 
pleased  to  think  him  uneducated.  The  reason  is 
that  he  refused  to  consider  any  education  worth  the 
name  that  did  not  help  to  school  us  in  happiness. 
72  Was  he  to  spend  his  time,  as  you  encourage  Triarius 
and  me  to  do,  in  perusing  poets,  who  give  us  nothing 
solid  and  useful,  but  merely  childish  amusement? 
Was  he  to  occupy  himself  like  Plato  with  music  and 
geometry,  arithmetic  and  astronomy,  which  starting 
from  false  premises  cannot  be  true,  and  which  more- 
over if  they  were  true  would  contribute  nothing  to 
•  make  our  lives  pleasanter  and  therefore  better? 
Was  he,  I  say,  to  study  arts  like  these,  and  neglect 
the  master  art,  so  difficult  and  correspondingly  so 
fruitful,  the  art  of  living?  No!  Epicurus  was  not 
uneducated :  the  real  philistines  are  those  who  ask 
us  to  go  on  studying  till  old  age  the  subjects  that 
we  ought  to  be  ashamed  not  to  have  learnt  in 
boyhood/'  Thus  concluding,  he  added:  I  have 
explained  my  own  view,  but  solely  with  the  object 
of  learning  what  your  verdict  is.  I  have  never 
hitherto  had  a  satisfactory  opportunity  of  hearing 







1  I.  Hie  cum  uter^uiiejiie  intueretur  sesegue  ad  audi- 
endum    significarent    paratos^      Primum/*    inquam^ 

deprecor  ne  me  tamquam  philosophum  putetis 
seholam  vobis  aliquam  explieaturum^  quod  ne  in  ipsis 
quidem  philosophis  magno  opere  umquam  probavi. 
Quando  enim  Socrates,  qui  parens  philosophiae  iure 
dici  potest,  quidquam  tale  fecit?  Eorum  erat  iste 
mos  qui  turn  sophistae  nominabantur ;  quorum  e 
numero  primus  est  ausus  Leontinus  Gorgias  in  con- 
ventu  poscere  quaestionem,'  id  est  iubere  dicere 
qua  de  re  quis  vellet  audire.  Audax  negotium,  dice- 
rem  impudens,  nisi  hoc  institutum  postea  translatum 

2  ad  nostros  philosophos  esset.  Sed  et  ilium  quem  no- 
minavi  et  ceteros  sophistas,  ut  e  Platone  intellegi 
potest,  lusos  videmus  a  Socrate.  Is  enim  percontando 
atque  interrogando  elicere  solebat  eorum  opiniones 
quibuscum  disserebat,  ut  ad  ea  quae  ii  respondissent 
si  quid  videretur  diceret.  Qui  mos  cum  a  posteriori- 
bus  non  esset  retentus,  Arcesilas  eum  revocavit  insti- 
tuitque  ut  ii  qui  se  audire  vellent  non  de  se  quaere- 
rent  sed  ipsi  dicerent  quid  sentirent;  quod  cum 
dixissent,  ille  contra.    Sed  eum  qui  audiebant  quoad, 

poterant  defend ebant  sententiam  suam ;  apud  ceteros 

78  ^^ 



.  Upon  this  they  both  looked  at  me,  and  signified  Rnfutiii 
ir  readiness  to  hearme.  Sol  began:  "First  of  all,  I  ^^    c^ 
5  of  you  not  to  imagine  tliat  I  am  going  to  deliver  «plying 
you  a  formal  lecture,  like  a  professional  philosopher,  piopoies 
That  is  a  procedure  which  even  in  the  case  of  philo-  l^'JJ 
sophers  I  have  never  very  much  approved,    Socrates,  mc 
who  is  entitled  to  be  styled  the  father  of  philosophy, 
never  did  anything  of  the  sort.  It  was  the  method  of 
his  contemporaries  the  Sophists,  as  they  were  called. 
It  was  one  of  the  Sophists,  Gurgias  of  Leontini,  who 
first  ventured  in  an  assembly  to    invite  a  question,' 
that  is,  to  ask  anyone  to  state  what  subject  he  desired 
to  hear  discussed.     A  bold  undertaking,  indeed,  I 
should  call  it  a  piece  of  effrontery,  had  not  this  cus- 
2  torn  later  on  passed  over  into  our  own  school.      But 
we  see  that    Socrates  made    fun  of  the  aforesaid 
Gorgias  and  the  rest  of  the   Sophists  also,  as  we 
can  learn  from  Plato.     His  own  way  was  to  ques- 
tion  liis   interlocutors    and    by   a   process  of  cross- 
examination  to  elicit  their  opinions,  so  that  he  might 
express  his  own  views  by  way  of  r^oinder  to  their 
answers.     This  practice  was  abandoned  by  liis  suc- 
cessors, but  was  afterwards  revived  by  Arcesilas,  who 
made  it  a  rule  that  those  who  wished  to  hear  him 
should  not  him  questions  but  should  state  their 
own  opinions ;  and  when  they  liad  done  so  he  argued 
against  them.  But  whereas  the  pupils  of  Arcesilas  did 

r  defend  their  own  position,  with  the  rest  of 
hers  the  student  who  has  put  a  question 

autem  pliilosophos  qui  quaesivit  aliquid  tacet;  quod 
(jiiidein  iam  fit  etiani  in  Aeadeniin.  I  Ubi  enim  is  qui 
audire  viilt  ita  dixit;  Voluptas  niihi  videtur  esse 
summuni  bonuni,"  perpetua  oratione  contra  disputa- 
tur,  ut  facile  intellegi  possit  eos  qui  aliquid  sibi  videri 
dicant  non  ipsos  in  ea  sententia  esse  sed  audire  velle 

3  contraria.  Noa  commodius  agimus.  Non  enim 
solum  Torquatus  dixit  quid  sentiret  sed  ctiam  cur. 
Ego  autem  arbitror,  quaniquam  admodum  delectatus 
sum  eius  oratione  perpetua,  tamen  commodius,  cum 
in  rebus  singulis  insistas  et  intellegaa  quid  quisque 
concedat,  quid  abnuat,  ex  rebus  concessis  concludi 
quod  velis  et  ad  exitum  perveniri.  Cum  enim  fertur 
quasi  torrens  oratio,  quamvis  multa  euiusquemodi 
rapiat,  nihil  tamen  teneas,  nihil  reprehendas,^  nus- 
quam  oration  em  rapidam  coerceas. 

Omnis  autem  in  quaerendo  quae  via  quadam  et 
ratione  liahetur  oratio  praeseribere  primum  debet,  ut 
quibusdam  in  formulis:  ea  aea  aqetub,  ut  inter  quos 
disseritur  conveniat  quid   sit  id  de   quo   disseratur. 

i  II.  Hoc  positum  in  Phaedro  a  Platone  proliavit  Epi- 
curus sensitque  in  omni  disputatione  id  fieri  oportere. 
Sed  quod  proximum  fuit  non  vidit.  Negat  enim 
definiri  rem  placere,  sine  quo  fieri  interdum  non 

'  reprekendas  Mdv.  with  B  ;  Other  MSS.  apprekendas. 
^Phaedrus  237  B. 

BOOK  II.  i-ii 

is  then  silent;  and  indeed  this  is  nowadays  tlie  cus- 
tom ill  the  Academy  too.  The  would-lM;  learner  says, 
for  example,  The  Cliief  Good  in  my  opinion  is 
pleasure,'  and  the  contrary  is  then  maintained  in  a 
formal  discourse;  so  that  it  is  not  hard  to  realize  that 
those  who  say  they  are  of  a  certain  opinion  do  not 
actually  hold  the  Tiew  they  profess,  but  want  to  hear 

3  what  ean  be  argued  against  it.  We  are  adopting  a 
more  profitable  mode  of  procedure,  for  Torquatus  has 
not  only  told  us  his  own  opinion  but  also 
for  holding  it.  Still,  for  my  part,  though  1  enjoyed  his. 
long  discourse  very  mucli,  I  believe  all  the  same  that 
it  is  better  to  stop  at  point  after  point,  and  make  out 
what  each  person  is  willing  to  admit  and  what  he 
denies,  and  then  to  draw  such  inferences  as  one 
desires  from  these  admissions  and  so  arr 
conclusion.  When  the  exposition  goes  rushing  on 
like  a  mountain  stream  in  spate,  it  carries  along 
with  it  a  vast  amount  of  miscellaneous  material,  but 
there  is  nothing  one  can  take  hold  of  or  rescue  from 
the  flood;  there  is  no  point  at  which  one  can  stem 
the  torrent  of  oratory. 

However,  in  philosophical  investigation  a  metho-  Epicuio*,  neg- 
dical  and  systematic  discourse  must  always  begin  by  [^Jf^oMimmdei 
formulating  a  preamble  like  that  which  occurs  in  '>"  ""'E^,^ 
certain  forms  of  process  at  law,  'This  shall  be  the  ■pleasure'; 
point  at  issue';  so  that  the  parties  to  the  debate 
may  be  agreed  as  to  what  the  subject  is  about  which 

!■  they  are  debating.  II.  This  rule  is  laid  down  by 
Plato  in  the  Phaednis,"  and  it  was  approved  by 
Epicurus,  who  realized  that  it  ought  to  be  followed 
in  every  discussion.  But  he  failed  to  see  what  this 
involved.  For  he  says  that  he  does  not  hold  with 
giving  a  definition  of  the  thing  in  question;  yet 
□  81 

potest  ut  inter  eos  qui  ambigunt  conveniat  quid 
id  de  quo  agatur;  velut  in  hoc  ipso  de  quo  nunc  di^ 
putamus.     Quaerimus  enim  finem  bonorum;  possUI 

sne  hoc  scire  quale  sit,  nisi  contulerimus  inter 
D  fmem  bonorum  djxeriinus,  quid  finis,  quid  etif 
1-5  sit  ipsum  bonum  ?  Atqui  haec  patefactio  quasi  rcrum 
opertarum,  cum  quid  quidque  sit  aperitur,  definitio 
£st;  qua  tu  etiani  imprudens  utebare  nonnuiuquaiu. 
Nam  hunc  ipsum  sive  finem  sive  estremum  sive  ulti- 
m  definiebas  id  esse  quo  omnia  quae  recte  fierent 
referrentur  neque  id  ipsum  usquam  referretur.  Prae- 
clare  hoc  quidem.  Bunum  ipsum  etiam  quid  esset 
fortasse  si  opus  fuisset  definisses  aut  quod  esset  natura 
appetendum,  aut  quod  prodesset,  aut  quod  iuvaret, 
aut  quod  liberet  modo.  Nunc  idem,  nisi  molestuni 
est,  quoniam  tibi  non  onmino  displicet  definire  et  id 
s  cum  vis,  vetim  definias  quid  sit  voluptas,  de  quo 
iiis  haec  quaestio  est."  Quis,  quaeso,"  inquit, 
est  qui  quid  sit  voluptas  uesciat  aut  qui  quo  magis 
intellegat  definitionem  aliquanj  desideret?"  Me 
ipsum  esse  dicerem,"  inquam,  "nisi  mihi  videref^ 
habere  bene  cognitam  voluptatcm  et  satis  ill 
ceptam  animo  atque  comprensam.  Nunc  autem  dii 
ipsum  Epicurum  nescire  et  in  eo  nutare,  eumque  qui 
crebro  dicat  diligenter  oportere  exprimi  quae    *is 




without  this  it  is  sometimes  impossible  for  the  dis- 
putants to  agree  what  the  subject  under  discussion 
is ;  as,  for  esample,  in  the  case  of  the  very  question 
we  are  now  debating.  We  are  trying  to  discover  the 
End  of  Goods ;  but  how  can  we  possibly  know  what  the 
nature  of  this  is,  without  comparing  notes  as  to  what 
we  mean,  in  the  phrase  '  End  of  Goods,'  by  the  term 

5  End'  and  also  by  the  term  Gcwid'  itself?  Now  this 
process  of  disclosiiig  latent  meiuiuigs,  of  revealing 
what  a  particular  thing  is,  is  the  process  of  definition ; 
and  you  yourself  now  and  then  unconsciously  em- 
ployed it.  For  you  repeatedly  defined  this  very 
conception  of  the  End  or  final  or  ultimate  aim  as 

that  to  which  all  right  actions  are  a  means  while  it 
is  not  itself  a  means  to  anything  else.'  Excellent  so 
far.  Very  likely  had  occasion  arisen  you  would 
have  defined  the  Good  itself,  either  as  the  naturally 
desirable,'  or  the  beneficial,'  or  the  delightful,'  or 
just  that  whicli  we  like.'  Well  then,  if  you  don't 
mind,  as  you  do  not  entirely  disapprove  of  definition, 
and  indeed  practise  it  when  it  suits  your  purpose,  I 
should  be  glad  if  you  would  now  define  pleasure,  the 
thing  which  is  the  subject  of  the  whole  of  our  pre- 

6  sent  inquiry."  Dear  me,"  cried  Torquatus,  'who 
is  there  who  does  not  know  what  pleasure  is  ?  Who 
needs  a  definition  to  assist  him  to  understand 
it?"  I  should  say  that  1  myself  was  such  a  per- 
son," I  replied,  "did  I  not  beUeve  that  as  a  matter 
of  fact  1  do  fully  understand  the  nature  of  pleasure, 
and  possess  a  well-founded  conception  and  compre- 
hension of  it.  As  it  is,  I  venture  to  assert  that 
Epicurus  himself  does  not  know  what  pleasure  is, 
but  is  in  two  minds  about  it.     He  is  always  harping 

isity  of  carefully  sifting  out  the  meaning 



subiecta  sit  vocibus,  non  intellegere  interdunn  quid 
sonet  haec  vox  voluptiktis,  id  est  quae  res  huic  voci 

[11.  Turn  illeridens:  Hoc  vero,"  inquit,  opti- 
m,  ut  is  qui  finein  reruni  expetendaruni  volupta- 
tem  esse  dicat,  id  extremum,  id  ultimuin  bonorum, 
id  ipsum  quid  et  quale  sit  nesciat!"  Atqui,"  in- 
quauij  aut  Epicurus  quid  sit  voluptaR  aut  omnes 
mortales  qui  ubique  sunt  neseiunt."  ''Quonam,'' 
inquit,  modo?"  Quia  voluptatem  banc  esse  sen- 
tiunt  onuies  quam  sensus  accipiens  movetur  ct  iucun- 
7  ditate  quadam  perfunditur."  Quid  ergo?  istam 
voluptatem,"  inquit,  Epicurus  ignorat?"  Non 
semper,"  inquam ;  nam  interdum  nimis  etiam 
novit,  quippe  qui  testificetur  ne  intellegere  quidem 
se  posse  ubi  sit  aut  quod  sit  ullum  bonum  praeter 
illud  quod  cibo  et  potione  et  aurium  delectatione  et 
obsceiia  voluptate  capiatur.  An  haec  ab  eo  non  di- 
cuntur?"  Quasi  vero  me  pudeat,"  inquit,  isto- 
n  aut  non  possim  quemadmodum  ea  dicantur 
ostendere!"  'Ego  vero  nondubito,"  inquam,  quin 
facile  possis,  nee  est  quod  te  pudeat  sapienti  assentiri 
qui  se  unus.  quod  sciam,  sapientem  proUteri  sit  ausus. 
m  Metrudonim  non  puto  ipsum  professum,  sed, 
n  appellarctur  ab  Epicuro,  repudiare  tantum  bene- 


Liid  yet  he  occa-         ^^^| 
is  the  import  of  ^^H 

s  the  tiling  that  ^^| 

underlying  the  terms  we  employ,  i 
sionally  fails  to  understand  whiit 
the  word  'pleasure/  that  is,  what  ; 
underlies  the  word." 

III.  I'orquatus  laughed.        Come,  that  is  a  good  vEi.  pleasure 
joke,"  he  said,  '  that  the  author  of  the  doctrine  «n'^'an^i'ab^ 
that  pleasure  is  the  End  of  things  desirable,  the '«"«of  P^in. 
final  and  ultimate  Good,  should  actually  not  know  distinci  [lom' 
what  maimer  of  thing  pleasure  itself  is  !  "     "  Well,"  P'='^'"=- 
I  replied,      either  Epicurus  does  not  know  what 
pleasure  is,  or  the  rest  of  mankind  all  the  world  o' 
do  not."        How  80?"  he  asked.        Because  the 
universal    opinion    is  that  pleasure   is   a   sensation 
actively  stimulating  the  percipient  sense  and  diffus- 
7  ing  over  it  a  certain  agreea.ble  feeling."        Wliat 
then?"  he  replied;      does  not  Epicurus  recognixe 
pleasure  in  your  sense?"     '  Not  always,"  said  I; 
now  and  then,  1  admit,  he  is  only  too  well  ac- 
quainted with  it ;  for  he  solemnly  avows  that  he 
cannot  even  understand  what  Good  there  can  be  or 
where  it  can  be  found,  apart  from  that  which  is 
derived  from  food  and  drink,  the  delight  of  the  ei 
and  the  grosser  forms  of  gratification.     Do  I  mis- 
represent his  words  ?  "     '  Just  as  if  I  were  ashamed 
of  all  that,"  he  cried,  "  or  unable  to  explai 
in  which  it  is  spoken  !  "     "  Oh,"  said  I,  "  I  haven't 
the  least  doubt  you  can  explain  it  with  ease.     And 
you  have  no  reason  to  be  ashamed  of  sharing  the 
opinions  of  a  Wise  Man — who  stands  alone,  so  far 
as  1  am  aware,  in  venturing  to  arrogate  to  himself 
that  title.     For  I  do  not  suppose  that  MetrodoruG 
himself  claimed  to  be  a  Wise  Man,  though  he  did 
not  care  to  refuse  the  compliment  wher 
was  bestowed  upon  him    by  Epicurus;    while   the 


um  noluisse;  septem  autem  illi  non  suo  sed  popu- 
8  lorum  suflragio  omnium  nominati  sunt  Venim  hoc 
loco  sumo  verbis  his  eandem  certe  vim  voluptatia 
Epicunim  nosse  quam  ceteros.  Omnes  enim  iucun- 
dum  motum  quo  sensus  hilaretur  Graece  7)Sov^v, 
Latine  voluptatem  vocant."  "Quid  est  igitur,"  in- 
quitj  quod  requiras?"  Dicam,"  iiiquam,  etqui- 
dem  discendi  causa  niagis  quam  quo  te  aut  Epicunim 
repreasum  velim."         Ego  qooque,"   inqoit,      didi- 

im  libentius  si  quid  attuleris  quam  te  reprende- 

I.''         Tenesne    igitur,"    inquani,       Hieronymus 
Rhodius  quid  dicat  esse  summum  bonum,  quo  putet 

nia  referri  oportere?"        Teneo,"  inquit,     linem 
illi  videri  nihil  dotere."        Quid?  idem  iste,"   in- 
)  quam,     de  voluptate  quid  sentit?"        Negat  esse 

ti,"  inquit,  propter  se  expetendam."  Aliud 
igitur  esse  ceiiset  gaudere,  aliud  non  dolere."  Et 
quidem,"  inquit,  vehementer  errat;  nam,  ut  paulo 
ante  docui,  augendae  voluptatis  finis  est  doloris  omnis 
amotio."  Non  dolere,"  inquam,  "istud  quam  vim 
habeat  postea  videro ;  aliam  vero  vim  voluptatis  esse, 
aliam  nihil  dolendi,  nisi  valde  pcrtinax  fueris,  con- 
3edas  necesse  est."  Atqui  reperies,"  inqnit, 
lioc    quidetn   pertinacem ;    dici    enim   nihil    potest 

ius."        Estne,  quaeso,"  inquam,     sitienti 


^P  BOOK   II. 

Seven  Wise  Meii  of  old  received  their  appellation 
not  by  their  own  votes,  but  by  the  universal  suffrages 
fi  of  mankind.  StiU,  for  the  present  1  take  it  for 
granted  that  in  the  utterance  in  question  Epicurus 
undoubtedly  recognizes  the  same  meaning  of  plea> 
sure'  as  everybody  else.  Every  one  uses  the  Greek 
word  kedonr  and  the  Latin  votiiptas  to  mean  an  agree- 
able and  exhilarating   stimulation    of  the   sense." 

Well  then,"  he  asked,     what  more  do  you  want  f " 

I  will  tell  you,"  I  said,  though  more  for  the  sake 
of  ascertaining  the  truth  than  from  any  desire  to 
criticize  yourself  or  Epicurus."        I  also,"  he  replied, 

would  much  rather  learn  aiij^hing  you  may  have 
to  contribute,  than  criticize  your  views,"  Do  you 
remember,  then,"  I  said,  what  Hieronymus  of 
Rhodes  pronounces  to  be  the  Chief  Good,  tlie  stan- 
dard as  he  conceives  it  to  which  all  other  things 
should  be  referred  ?  "  I  remember,"  said  he,  that 
he  considers  the  End  to  be  freedom  from  pain," 

Well,"  said  I,  what  is  the  same  philosopher's 
9  view  about  pleasure  ?  "  He  thinks  that  pleasure 
is  not  desirable  in  itself."  Then  in  his  opinion  to 
feel  pleasure  is  a  different  thing  from  not  feeling 
pain  ?  "  Yes,"  he  said,  and  there  he  is  seriously 
mistaken,  since,  as  1  have  just  shown,  the  complete 
removal  of  pain  is  the  limit  of  the  increase  of 
pleasure."      "  Oh,"    I    said,       as   for   the    formula 

freedom  from  pain,'  I  will  consider  its  meaning 
later  on  ;  but  unless  you  are  extraordinarily  obstinate 
you  are  bound  to  admit  that  freedom  from  pain ' 
does  not  mean  the  same  as  'pleasure.'"  "Well, 
but  on  this  point  you  will  find  me  obstinate,"  said 
he;  "for  it  is  as  true  as  any  proposition  can  be." 
"  ftay,"  said  I,  "  when  a  man  is  thirsty,  is  there  any 

bendo  voluptas  ? "  Quis  istud  possit,"  inqiiit, 
negnre  ? ' '  Eademne  quae  restincta  siti  ? ' '  Immo 
alio  genere.  Restincta  enim  sitis  stabilitatem 
voluptatis  liabet,  ilia  autem  voluptas  ipsius  restin- 
ctionis  ill  niotu  est,"     "Cur  igitur,"  inquani,      res 

10  taiii  dissimiles  eodem  nomine  appellas?"  Quid 
paulo  ante,"  inquit,  dixerim  nonne  meministij  cum 
omnis  dolor  detraetus  esset,  variitri,  non  augeri  volu- 
ptatem  ?  "  Memini  vero,"  inquam  ;  scd  tu  istuc 
dixti  bene  Latin  e,  parum  plane.  Van  etas  enim 
Latinum  verbum  est,  idque  proprie  quidem  in  dis- 
paribus  coloribus  dicitur,  sed  transfertiir  in  multa 
dlsporia :  varium  poenia,  varia  oratio,  varii  mores, 
varia  fortunn,  voluptas  etiam  varia  dici  solet,  rum 
percipitur  e  multis  dissimilibus  rebus  dissimiles  efE- 
cientibus  voiuptates.  Earn  si  varietatem  diceres,  iu- 
tellegerem,  ut  etiam  non  dicente  te  intelleffo ;  ista 
varietas  quae  sit  non  satis  perspioio,  quod  uis  cum 
dolore  careamus  turn  in  summa  voluptate  nos  esse, 
cum  autem  vescamur  lis  rebus  quae  dulcem  motum 
afferant  sensibus,  tarn  esse  in  motu  voluptatem,  quae^ 
facial  varietatem  voluptatum,  sed  non  augeri  illara 
non  dolendi  voluptatem,  quara  cur  voluptatem  ap- 
pelles  nescio." 

1 1  IV.      An    potest,"  inquit   ille,'  "quidquam    esse 


BOOK  II.  iii-iv 
pltasnre  in  the  act  of  drinking  ?  "  "  That  is  unde- 
niable," he  answered.  '  Is  it  the  same  pleasure  as 
the  pleasure  of  having  quenched  one's  thirst  ? " 
"No,  it  is  a  different  kind  of  pleasure.  For  the 
pleasure  of  having  quenched  one's  thirst  is  a  stainc  ' 
pleasure,  but  the  pleasure  of  actually  quenching  it  is 
a  kinetic'  pleasure."  Why  then,"  1  asked,  do 
you  call  two  such  different  things  by  the  same 
)  name?"        Do   you    not   remember."    he    replied, 

'  what  I  said  just  now,  that  when  all  pain  has  been 
removed,  pleasure  may  vary  in  kind  but  cannot  be 
increased  in  degree?"  "Oh,  yes,  I  remember," 
said  I ;  but  though  your  language  was  quite  correct 
in  form,  your  meaning  was  far  from  clear.  Varia- 
tion '  is  a  good  Latin  term ;  we  use  it  strictly  of 
different  colours,  but  it  is  applied  metaphorically  to 
a  number  of  things  that  differ  :  we  speak  of  a  varied 
poem,  a  varied  speech,  a  varied  character,  varied 
fortunes.  Pleasure  too  can  be  termed  varied  when 
it  is  derived  from  a  number  of  unlike  things  pro- 
ducing milike  feelings  of  pleasure.  If  this  were  the 
variation  you  spoke  of,  I  could  understand  the  term, 
just  as  I  understand  it  even  without  your  speaking 
of  it.     But  I  cannot  quite  grasp  what  you  mean  by 

variation'  when  you  say  that  when  we  are  free  from 
pain  we  experience  tlic  highest  pleasure,  and  that 
when  we  are  enjoying  things  that  excite  a  pleasant 
activity  of  the  senses,  we  then  experience  an  active 
or  kinetic '  pleasure  that  causes  a  variation  of  our 
pleasant  sensations,  but  no  increase  in  the  former 
pleasure  that  consists  in  absence  of  pain — although 
why  you  should  call  this    pleasure'  I  cannot  make 

1         IV.   "Well,"   he   asked,   "can  anything   be   more 


s  quam  nihil  dolere?"  Immo  sit  sane  nihil 
melius,"  inquam,  "(nondum  enim  id  qnaero),  nuiupro- 
pterea  idem  voluptas  est  quod,  ut  ita  dicam,  indolen- 
tia?"  Plane  idem,"  inquit,  et  maxima  quidem, 
qua  fieri  nulla  maior  potest."  Quid  dubitas  igitur," 
iiiquam,  summo  bono  a  te  ita  constitute  ut  id  totum 
in  non  dolendo  sit,  id  tenere  unum,  id  tueri,  id 
12  defendere?  Quid  enim  necesse  est,  'tamquam 
meretricem  in  matronanim  coetum,  sic  voluptatem 
in  virtutum  concilium  adducere?  Invidiosuni  nomen 
est,  infame,  suspectum.  Itaque  hoc  frequenter  dici 
solet  a  vobis,  non  inteiiegere  nos  quam  dicat  Epicurus 
voluptatem.  Quod  quidem  mihi  si  quando  dictum 
est  (est  autem  dictum  non  parum  saepe),  etsi  satis 
clemens  sum  in  disputando,  tamen  interdum  soleo 
subirasci.  Egone  non  intellego,  quid  sit  I'lSoinj 
Graece,  Latine  'voluptas'?  utram  tandem  linguam 
nescio^  Deinde  qui  fit,  ut  ego  nesciam,  seiant 
omnes  quicumqtie  Epicurei  esse  voluerint  ?  Quod 
vestri  quidem  vel  optime  disputant,  nihil  opus  esse 
eum  qui  futurus  sit  philosophus  scire  litteras.  Itaque 
ut  maiores  nostri  ab  aratro  adduxerunt^  Cincinnatum 
ilium  ut  dictator  esset,  sic  vos  de  pagis  omnibus 
colligitis  bonos  iilos  quidem  viros  sed  certe  t 


.  BOOK  !I.  iv 
pleasant  than  freedom  from  pain  ?"  Still,"  I  Thfreiii» 
replied,  '  granting  there  is  nothing  better  (that  I[^d«iSndir 
point  1  waive  for  tlie  moment),  surely  it  does  not  ^JopyJ 
therefore  follow  that  what  I  may  call  the  negation  ^raMUi"^  b) 
of  pain  is  the  same  thing  as  pleasure?"  "Absolutely  ,'"J^^"'", 
the  same,"  said  lie,  indeed  the  negation  of  pain  is 
a  very  intense  pleasure,  the  most  intense  pleasure 
possible,"  If  then,"  said  I,  according  to  your 
account  the  Chief  Good  consists  entirely  in  feeling 
no  pain,  why  do  you  not  keep  to  this  without  waver- 
ing? Wily  do  you  not  fiimly  maintain  this  concep- 
12  tion  of  the  Good  and  no  other?  What  need  is  there 
to  introduce  so  aliandoned  a  character  as  Mistress 
Pleasure  into  the  company  of  those  respectable  ladies 
the  Virtues?  Her  veiy  name  is  suspeet,  and  lies 
under  a  cloud  of  disrepute — so  mtfth  so  that  you 
Epicureans  are  fond  of  telling  us  that  we  do  not 
understand  what  Epicurus  njeans  by  pleasure.  1 
am  a  reasonably  good-tempered  disputant,  but  for 
my  own  part  when  I  hear  this  assertion  (and  I 
have  encountered  it  fairly  often),  I  am  sometimes 
inclined  to  be  a  little  irritated.  Do  I  not  understand 
the  meaning  of  the  Greek  word  kedone,  the  Latin 
voluplas?  Pray  which  of  these  two  languages  is 
it  that  I  am  not  acquainted  with  ?  Moreover  how 
comes  it  that  1  do  not  know  what  the  word  means, 
while  all  and  sundry  who  have  elected  to  be  Epicu- 
reans do?  As  for  that,  your  sect  argues  very 
plausibly  that  there  is  no  need  for  the  aspirant  to 
philosophy  to  be  a  scholar  at  all.  And  you  are  as 
good  as  your  word.  Our  ancestors  brought  old  Cin- 
cinnatu.s  from  tlie  plough  to  be  dicbitor.  You  ran- 
sack the  country  villages  for  your  assemblage  of 
doubtless  respectable  but  certainly  not  very  learned 

1 8  eruditos.  Ergo  illi  intellegunt  quid  Epicurus  dicnt, 
egonon  intellego?  Ut  sciasme  intellegere, primum 
idem  esse  dico  '  voluptatem/  quod  ille  -qSovi'iv.  Et 
quidem  saepe  quaerimus  verbum  Latinum  par  Graeco 
et  quod  idem  valeat ;  hie  nihil  fuit  quod  quaereremiis. 
Nullum  iiiveniri  verbum  potest  quod  magis  idem 
declarct  Latine  quod  Ciraeccj  quam  declarat  vo1u- 
ptas.'  Huic  verbo  omnes  qui  ubique  sunt  qui  Latine 
Gciunt  duas  res  subiciunt,  laetitiani  in  animo,  coiu- 
motionem  suavem  iucunditatis  in  corpore.  Nam  et 
ille  apud  Trabeam  'voluptatem  anirai  nimiam'  lae- 
titiam  dicit,  eandem  quam  ille  Caecilianus  quia  omni- 
bus laetitiis  laetum '  esse  se  narrat.  Sed  hoc  interest, 
quod  voluptas '  dicitur  etiam  in  animo  (vitiosa  res,  ut 
Stoici  putant,  qui  earn  sic  definiunt :  sublationem 
animi  sine  ratione  opinnntis  se  magno  bono  frui'), 
i  non  dicitur  laetitia'  nee  'gaudium'  in  corpore.  In 
eo  autem  voluptas  omnium  Latine  loquentium  more 
ponitur,  cum  percipitur  ea  quae  sensum  aliquem 
moveat  iucunditas.  Haiic  quoque  iucunditatem,' 
si  vis,  transfer  in  animum  ('iuvare'  enim  in  utroque 
dicitur  ex  eoque  iucundum'),  modo  intellegas  inter 
ilium  qui  dicat 

Tanta  laetitia  auctus  sum  ut  nihil  constet," 

'esse  Mdv.  bracketa,  but  cp.  II  77, 

'ul  nihil  nms/tl . 

Ill   : 

inf.  MSS.  ui  mthi  non  n 

9.    I  (where   he  also  refers  to  th 
Caecilius  Slatlu^i):  it  appears  to  II 

4.  35  and  ad  Fam.  », 

lowing  phrase  from 
run  ■  effo  voluplalL-m 


BOOK  11.  iv 

IS  adherents.  Well,  if  these  gentlemen  can  under- 
stand what  Epicurus  means,  eaniiot  If  I  will  prove 
to  you  that  I  do.  In  the  first  place,  I  mean  the 
same  by  pleasure '  as  he  does  by  kedaiie.  One  often 
has  some  trouble  to  discover  a  Latin  word  that  shall 
be  the  precise  equivalent  of  a  Greek  one  ;  but  in 
this  case  no  search  was  necessary.  No  instance  can 
be  found  of  a  Latin  word  that  more  exactly  con- 
veys the  same  meaning  as  the  corresponding  Greek 
word  than  does  the  word  voliiplas.  Every  person  in 
the  world  who  knows  Latin  attaches  to  this  word 
two  ideas — that  of  gladness  of  mind,  and  that  of  a 
deliglitftil  excitation  of  agreeable  feeling  in  the 
body.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  character  in 
Trabea  who  speaks  of  «tcesaive  pleasure  of  the 
mind,'"  meaning  gladness,  the  same  feeling  as  is  in- 
tended by  the  person  in  Caecilius  who  describes  him- 
self as  being  glad  with  every  sort  of  gladness.'  But 
there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  pleasure'  can 
denote  a  mental  as  well  as  a  bodily  feeling  (the 
former  a  vicious  emotion,  iu  the  opinion  of  the  Stoics, 
whodefineitas  elationof  the  mind  under  an  irrational 
conviction  that  it  is  eiyoying  some  great  good'), 
whereas   joy'  and    gladness'  are  not  used  of  bodily 

1 4  sensation.  However  pleasure  according  to  the 
usage  of  all  who  speak  good  Latin  consists  in  the 
enjoyment  of  a  delightful  stimulation  of  one  of  the 
senses.  The  term  delight"  also  you  may  apply  if 
you  like  to  the  mind  ('to  delight'  is  said  of  both 
mind  and  body,  and  from  it  the  adjective  delight- 
ful '  is  derived),  so  long  as  you  understand  that 
between  the  man  who  says 

LSo  full  am  I  of  gladness 
That  I  am  all  confusion. 


et  e 

Nunc  denium  mihi  animus  a; 
quorum  alter  laetitia  gestiat,  alter  dolore  crucietur, 
esse  ilium  medium : 

Quamquani  haec  inter  nos  nuper  iiotitia  admodum  est, 
qui  nee  laeteturnecangatur;  itenique  inter  eum  qui 
potiatur  corporis  eitpetitis  voluplatibus  et  eum  qui 
excrucietur  sumiais  doloribus  esse  eum  qui  utroque 

>  V.  Satiane  igitur  videor  vim  verborum  tenere,  an 
sum  etiam  nunc  vel  Graece  loqui  vel  Latine  doceu- 
dus?  Et  tanien  vide  iie,  si  ego  non  intellegam  quid 
Epicurus  loquatur,  cum  Graece  ut  videor  luculenter 
sciam,  sit  aliqua  culpa  eius  qui  ita  loquatur  ut  non 
intellegatur.  Quod  duobus  modis  sine  reprensione 
fitj  si  aut  de  industria  facias,  ut  Heraclitus,  cogno- 
mento  qui  irKintiyoi  perhibetur,'  quia  de  natura 
aimis  obscure  menioravit,"  aut  cum  renmi  obscuritas, 
non  verborum,  facit  ul  non  intellegatur  oratio,  qualis 
est  ill  Timaeo  Platonis.  Epicurus  autem,  ut  opinor, 
nee  non  vult  si  possit  plane  et  aperte  loqui,  nee  de 
re  obseura,  ut  pliysiei,  aut  artificiosa,  ut  mathemattci, 
sed  de  illustri  et  taeili  et  iam  in  vulgus  pervagata 
loquitur.  Quumquam  non  negatis  nos  intellegere 
quid  sit  voluptas,  sed  quid  ille  dicat;  e  quo  efiic-itur 

"The  first  quQlalion  is  from  an  unknown  comic  wriler; 
(he  second  from  CaeciUus  Slalius,  who  makes  a  'heavy 
I'alher'  say  '  Nunc  enim  dcmum  mihi  animus  ardel,  nunc 
meum  cor  ciimulaltir  ira  '  (quoted  in  full  by  Cicero  fire  Cnel. 
37)j  Ihe  third  is  from  Terence.  Heariloalim.,].  i,  c(.  IS3 
above  :  Chremes'  mild  interest  in  his  new  neighbour,  Ihe 
Self-Tonnentor,  is  rather  oddly  instanced  asan  illustration 
of  the  neutral  slate  of  emotion  intermediate  between  mental 


1"  The  que 

is  possibly  from  Luc 

■^  BOOK   II.  iv-v 

and  liim  who  says 

Now,  now  my  soul  with  anger  burns, 
one  of  whom  is  transported  witli  gladness  and  the 
other  tormented  with  painful  emotion,  there  is  the 
intermediate  state : 

Though  our  acquaintances!  lip  is  but  quite  recent," 
where  the  speaker  feels  neither  gladness  nor  sor- 
row ;  and  that  similarly  between  tlie  enjoyment  of 
the  most  desirable  bodily  pleasures  and  the  endurance 
of  the  most  excruciating  pains  there  is  the  neutral 
state  devoid  of  either. 

j  V.  "VVell.areyousatisfiedthatlhavegraspedthe 
meaning  of  the  terms,  or  do  I  still  require  lessons  in 
the  use  of  either  Greek  or  Latin  ?  And  even  supposing 
that  1  do  not  understand  what  Epicurus  says,  still  I 
believe  I  really  have  a  very  clear  knowledge  of  Greek, 
so  that  perhaps  it  is  partly  his  fault  for  using  such 
unintelligible  language.  Obscurity  is  excusable  on 
two  grounds :  it  may  be  deliberately  adopted,  as  in 
the  case  of  Heraclitus, 

^^      The  surname  of  the  Obscure  who  bore, 

^K       So  dark  his  philosophic  lore   , 

■W  the  obscurity  may  be  due  to  the  abstruseness  of 
the  subject  and  not  of  the  style — an  instance  of 
this  is  Plato's  Timaeui.  But  Epicurus,  in  my  opinion, 
has  no  intention  of  not  speaking  plainly  and  clearly 
if  he  can,  nor  is  He  discussing  a  recondite  subject 
like  natural  pliilosophy,  nor  a  technical  subject  such 
as  mathematics,  but  a  lucid  and  easy  topic,  and  one 
that  is  generally  familiar  already.  And  yet  you 
Epicureans  do  not  deny  that  we  understand  what 
pleasure  t'*,  but  what  he  means  by  it;  which  proves 

CICERO  DE  FlNlllUS  ^| 

not!  ut  nos  noil  iiitellegamus  quae  vis  sit  istius  verbi, 
sed  ut  ille  suo  more  loquatur,  nostrum  ncglegat. 

1 6  Si  enim  idem  dicit  quod  Hieronymus,  qui  censet 
summum  bonum  esse  sine  uHa  molestia  vivere,  cur 
mavult  dicere  voluptatem  quam  vacuitutem  dotoris, 
ut  ille  fjicit,  qui  quid  dicat  intellegit?  sin  autem 
voluptatem  putat  adiungeiidam  earn  quae  sit  in  motu 
(sic  enim  appellat  banc  dulcein,  iu  motu,'  illam 
nihil  dolentis,  'in  stabilitate Oi  quid  tendit?  cum 
efflcere  non  possit  ut  cuiquam  qui  ipse  sibi  notus  sit, 
hoc  est  qui  suam  naturam  secisumque  perspeserit, 
vacuitas  doloris  et  voluptas  idem  esse  videatur.  Hoc 
est  vim  afferre,  Torquate,  sensibus,  extorquere  ex 
aniniis  cognitiones  verborum  quibus  imbuti  sumus. 
Quis  est  enim  qui  non  videat  haec  esse  in  natura 
rerum  tria?  unum  cum  in  voluptate  sumus,  alterum 
cum  in  dolore,  tertium  hoc  in  quo  nunc  equidem 
sum,  credo  item  vos,  nee  in  dolore  nee  in  voluptate ; 
ut  in  voluptate  sit  qui  epuletur,  in  dolore  qui  tor- 
queatur:  tu  autem  uiter  haec  tantam  multitudi- 
nem  hominum  interiectam  non  vides  nee  laetantium 

17  nee  dolentium?"  Non  prorsus,"  inquit,  omnesque 
qui  sine  dolore  sint  in  voluptate,  et  ea  quidem  sum- 
ma,  esse  dico."     "  Ergo  in  eadem  voluptate  eum  qui 

BOOK  ir.  V 

not  that  we  do  not  understand  the  real  meaning  of 
the  word,  but  thut  Epicurus  is  speaking  an  idiom  of 

1 6  his  own  and  ignoring  our  accepted  terminology.  For  if  Abseooo  o/  p»i 
he  means  the  same  as  Hieronymus,  who  holds  that  «/le  bdh«en 
the  Chief  Good  is  a  life  entirely  devoid  of  trouble,  pi"»suro  md 
why  does  he  insist  on  using  tlie  term  pleasure,  and 

not  ratlier   freedom  from  pain,'  as  does  Hieronymus,  

who  understands  his  own  meaning  ?  Whereas  if  his 
view  is  that  the  End  must  include  kinetic  pleasure 
(for  so  he  describes  this  vivid  sort  of  pleasure,  calling 
it  'kinetic'  iu  contrast  with  the  pleasure  of  freedom 
from  pain,  which  is  static '  pleasure),  what  is  he 
really  aiming  at?  For  he  cannot  possibly  convince 
any  person  who  knows  Aimse(/'^— anyone  who  has 
studied  his  own  nature  and  sensations — that  freedom 
from  pain  is  the  same  thing  as  pleasure.  To  identify 
them,  Torquatus,  is  to  do  violence  to  the  senses ;  it 
is  uprooting  from  our  minds  the  knowledge  of  the 
meaning  of  words  imbedded  in  them.  Who  is  not 
aware  that  the  world  of  experience  contains  these 
three  states  of  feeling:  first,  the  enjoyment  of 
pleasure;  second,  the  sensation  of  pain;  and  third, 
which  is  my  own  condition  and  doubtless  also  yours 
at  the  present  moment,  the  absence  of  both  pleasure 
^^^jid  pain  f  Pleasure  is  the  feeling  of  a  man  eating  I 
^^^  good  dinner,  pain  that  of  one  being  broken  c 
^^■lie  rack  ;  but  do  you  really  not  see  that  inter-  I 
^Htoediate  between  tliose  two  extremes  lies  a  vast  ] 
multitude  of  persons  who  are  feeling  neitlier  gratifi'  , 

17  cation  nor  pain?"  "l  certainly  do  not,"  said  he ; 
"  I  maintain  that  all  who  are  without  pain  are 
enjoying  pleasure,  and  what  is  more  the  highest 

Kof  pleasure."     "Then  you  think  that  a  man 
,  not  being  himself  thirsty,  mixes  a  drink  for 


alteri  misceat  mulsum  ipse  non  sitiens,  et  eum  qui 
illud  sitiens  bibjif?" 

VI.  Turn  ille :  Fiiiem,  liiquit,  interrogandi,  si 
videtur;  quod  quidem  ego  a.  priiicipio  ita  me  malle 
dixeram,  lioc  ipsum  providens,  dialecticas  captiones." 

Rhetorice  igitur,"  inquam,  nos  mavis  quam  diale- 
etice  disputare?"  "Quasi  vero,"  inquit,  perpetua 
oratio  rhetoruni  solum,  non  etiam  philosophorum  sit." 

Zenonis  est,"  iiiquum,  hoe  Stolci;  omnem  vim 
loquendi,  ut  iam  ante  Aristoteles,  in  duas  tributam 
esse  partes,  rhetoricam  palmae,  dialecticam  pugni 
similem  essediecbat,  quod  latius  loquerentur  rhelorea, 
dialectici  autem  conipressius.  Obsequar  igitur  voliin- 
tati  tuae  dicamque  si  potero  rhetorice,  sed  hac  rhe- 
torica  philosophorum,  non  nostra  ilia  forensi,  quam 
necesse  est,  eum  popuhiriter  loquatur,  esse  iiiterdum 
i  paulo  hebetiorem.  Sed  dum  dialecticam,  Torquate, 
contemnit  Epicurus,  quae  una  continet  omnem  et 
perspieiendi  quid  in  quaque  re  sit  scientiam  et 
iudicandi  quale  quidque  sit  et  ratione  ac  via  dispu- 
tandi,  ruit  iji  dicendo,  ut  mihi  quidem  videtur,  nefifl 
eu  quae  docere  vult  ulla  arte  distinguit;  ut  liaec  ipsa  ' 
quae  modo  loquebamm*.  Summum  a  vobis  bonum 
voluptas  dicitur.     Aperiendum  est   igitur  quid  sit 




IlPther,  feels  the  same  pleasure  as  the  tlursty  man 
bo  drinks  it?" 
'  VI.  At  this  Torqiiatus  exclaimed ;    A  truce  to  ques-  Torsnaius 
bn  and  answer,  if  you  do  not  tnind.     I  told  you  iher  qusti 
from    the   beginning  that    I    preferred    continuous  eJ^t'^M'S 
speeches.     I  foresaw  exactly  what  would  happen;  I 
knew  we  should  come  to  logic-chopping  and  quib- 
bling."       Then,"  said   I,      would    you   sooner  we 
adopted  the  rhetorical  and  not  the  dialectical  mode 
of  debate?"     "Why,"  he  cried,  "just  as  if  continuous 
discourse  were  proper  for  orators  only,  and  not  for 
philosophers  as  well!"        That  is  the  view  of  Zeno 
the  Stoic,"   I  rejoined ;      he  used  to  say  that  the 
faculty  of  speech  in  general  falls  into  two  depart- 
ments, as  Aristotle  had  already  laid  down;  and  that 
Rhetoric  was  like  the  palm  of  the  hand,  Dialectic 
like  the  closed  fist;  because  rhetoricians  employ  an 

Bpansive  style,  and  dialecticians  one  that  is  more 
mpressed.     So  I  will  defer  to  your  wish,  and  will 
eak  if  I  can  in  the  rhetorical  manner,  but  with  the 
etoric  of  the  philosophers,  not  with  the  sort  which 
we  use  in  the  law-courts.     The  latter  being  addressed 
tothe  public  ear  must  necessarily  sometimes  beahttle 
18  lacking  in  subtlety.     Epicurus  however,  Torquatus,  Epicunaiho 
in  his  contempt  for  dialectic,  which  comprises  at  once  j^flnd'oii 
the   entire   science   of  discerning    tlie    essence    of  sure  piiu ' 
tilings,  of  judging  their  qualities,  and  of  conducting  *   '"'""  v 
a  systematic  and  logical  argument, — Epicurus,  1  say, 
makes  havoc  of  his  exposition.     He  entirely  fails, 
my  opinion  at  all  events,  to  impart  scientific  precision 
to  the  doctrines  he  desires  to  convey.     Take  f 
example  the  particular  tenet  that  we  have  just  b 
[fliscussing.     The  Chief  Good  is  pleasu 
Well  then. you  must  explai 

C  tails,  m  ^_ 

precision  ^^H 

Take  for  ^^H 

just  been  ^^^ 

you  Epi-  ^^1 

:  pleasure  ^H 

99  ^M 

voluptas ;    aliter    enim     explicari    quod    qiiaeritur 
non  potest.     Quani  si  explicavisset,  non  t 
taret;    aut    enim    eaui    voluptatein    tueretur  quam 
AristippoSj   id   est   qua   sensus  dulciter   ac   iucunde 
movetiir,  quoni  ettam  pecudes  si  loqui  possent  apel- 
lorent  voluptatem;  aut,  si  magis  placeret  suo  1 
loqui  quam  ut 

Omnes  Danai  atque  Mycenenses, 
Attica  pubes, 
reliquique  Graeci  qui  hoc  anapaesto  titantur, 
nun  dolere  solum  voluptatis  nomine  appellaret,  illud 
Aristippeum  fontemneret ;  aut,  si  uteumque  probaret, 
ut  probat,  coiiiungeret  doloris  vacuitatem  cum  volu- 
|l9  ptate  et  duobus  ultimis  iiteretur.  Multi  enim  ct 
magni  pliilosophi  haec  ultima  bonorum  iuncta  fece- 
ruut;  ut  Aristoteles^  virtutis  osum  cum  vitae  perfe- 
ctae  prosperitate  coniunxit,  Callipho  adiunxit  ad 
honestatem  voluptatem,  Diddorus  ad  eandcm  hone- 
statem  addidit  vacuitatem  doloris.  Idem  fecisset 
Epicurus,  si  sententiam  banc,  quae  nunc  Hieronymi 
est,  coniunxisset  cum  Aristippi  vetcre  sententia.  Il!i 
enim  inter  se  dissentiunt ;  propterea  singulis  finibus 
utuntur,  et,  cum  uterque  Graeee  egregie  loquatur,  nee 
Aristippus,  qui  voluptatem  summum  bonum  dicit,  in 
voluptate  ponit  non  dolere,  neque  Hieronymus,  qui 
^  „/ Aris/fMes;  inf.  MSS.  ut  Arisloleles  , 


HOOK    li.  ^^ 

e  it  is  impossible  to  make  clear  the  sub- 
ject under  investigalion.  Had  Epicurus  cleared  up 
the  meaning  of  pleasure,  he  would  not  have  fallen 
into  such  coiifusion.  £itber  be  would  have  upheld 
pleasure  in  the  sune  sense  as  Aristippus,  that  is,  an 
agreeable  and  deliglitful  excitation  of  the  sense,  which 

I  what  even  dumb  cattle,  if  they  could  speak,  would 
11  pleasure;  or,  if  ho' preferred  to  use  an  idiom  of 
i  owHj  instead  of  spe^ir^  the  language  of  the 
Danaans  one  and  all,  men  of  Mycenae, 
Scions  of  Athens,' 
d  the  rest  of  the  Greeks  invoked  in  these  anapaests, 
might  have  confined  the  name  of  plcjisgre  to  this 
state  of  freedom  from  pain,  and  despised  picture  as 
Aristippus  understands  it ;  or  else,  if  he  approv^  of 
both  sorts  of  pleasure,  as  in  fact  he  does,  iJien  .he 
ought  to  combine  together  pleasure  and  abserict' of 
19  pain,  and  profess  tfpo  ultimate  Goods.  Many  fli.j^" ' 
tinguished  philosophers  have  as  a  matter  of  fact  thus 
interpreted  the  ultimate  Good  as  composite.  For 
instance,  Aristotle  combined  the  exercise  of  virtue 
with  well-being  lasting  throughout  a  complete  life- 
time; Callipho  united  pleasure  with  moral  worth; 
Diodorus  to  moral  worth  added  freedom  from  pain. 
Epicurus  would  have  followed  their  example,  had  he 
coupled  the  view  we  are  discussing,  which  as  it  is 
belongs  to  Hieronynius,  with  the  old  doctrine  of 
Aristippus.  For  there  is  a  real  difference  of  opinion 
between  them,  and  accordingly  each  sets  up  his  own 
separate  End;  and  as  both  speak  unimpeachable 
£reek,  Aristippus,  who  calls  pleasure  the  Chief 
not  count  absence  of  pain  as  pleasure, 
Hieronymus,   who   makes    the    Chief  Good 


suminuin  bonum  statuit  non  dolere,  voluptatis  nominel 
umquam  utitur  pro  ilia  mdolentia,  quippe  qui  n 
expetendis  quidem  rebus  numeret  voluptatem. 
I  20       VII.      Duae  sunt  enim  res  quoque,  ne  tu  verba  I 
solum  putes.     Unum  est  sireB_  ijolore  esse,  alteram  j 
cum  Toluptate ;  vos  ex  bis.-tiun  dlssimilibus  rebus  n 
modo  nomen  unum  (itan)   id  facilius  paterer),  sed 
etiam  rem  unara  ,es  d'uabus  facere  conamini,  quod  I 
fieri  nullo  modo  poiest.     Hie,  qui  utrumque  probat, 
ambobus  debuit!uti,  sicut  facit  re  neque  tamen  divi- 
dit  verbis;     Cum  enim  earn  ipsam  voluptatem  quam 
eodeiii  nomine  omnes  appellaraus  laudnt  locis  pluri- 
.□ulj.a^idet  dicere  ne  suspicari  quidem  se  uUum  bonum. 
'^iilnctum  ab  illo  Aristippco  genere  voluptatis;  atr  I 
que  ibi  hoc  dicit  ubi  omnis  eius  est  oratio  de  summa  ' 
bono.     In  alio  vero  libro,  in  quo  breviter  compre- 
hensis  gravissimis  sententiis  quasi  oracuta  edidisse 
sapientiae  dicitur,  scribit  his  verbis,  quae  nota  tibi 
profectp,  Torquate,  sunt  (quis  enim  vestrum  non  edi-   i 
dicit  Epicuri  Kvpia^  &I^as,  id  est  quasi  maxime  ratas, 
quia  gravi.ssimae   sint   ad   beate   vivendum   breviter    ' 
enuntiatae  sententiae  ?)  animadverte  igitur,  rectene    | 
;1  banc   sententiam    interpreter :     '  Si    ea   quae   sunt    , 
efficientia  voluptatum  liberarent  eos  deo-  1 
I   et   mortis    et   doloris   metu    docerentquc   qui  ^ 


ipt  does  ^^H 

at  ^1 

absence  of  pain,  never  employs  the  name  plea 
to  denote  this  negation  of  pain,  and  in  fact  d 
not  reckon  pleasure  among  things  desirable  a 

}       Vn.     For  you  must  not  suppose  it  is  merely  a  ButuEifeba 
verbal  distinction  ■  the  things  themselves  are  differ-  J^^^J^ 
ent.      To    be   without    pain    is    one    thing,   to   feel  on*;  to[(ii 
pleasure  another;  yet  you  Epicureans  try  to  combine  dcicD^^wn- 
these  quite  dissimilar  feelings — not  merely  under  a  ^'^^^^  j( 
single  name  (for  that  I  could  more  easily  tolerate),  be  «mioiuiiiwi 
but  as  actually  being  a  single  thing,  instead  of  really 
two;    which    is    absolutely   impossible.       Epicurus, 
approving  Iwth  sorts  of  pleasure,  ought  to  have  re- 
cognized   both    sorts ;    as    he    really    does    in    fact, 
though  he  does  not  distinguish  them  in  words.     In 
a  number  of  passages  where  he  is  commending  that 
real  pleasure  which  all  of  us  call  by  the  same  name, 
he  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  be  cannot  even  imagine 
any  Good  that  is  not  connected  with  pleasure  of  the 
kind  intended  by  Aristippus.     This  is  the  language 
that  he  holds  in  the  discourse  dealing  solely  with 
the  topic  of  the  Chief  Good.     Then  there  is  an- 
other tre.itise  containing  his  most  important  doc- 
trines   in   a   compendious  form,  in   which    we    are 
told  he  ottered  the  very  oracles  of  Wisdom.     Here 
he  writes    the    following  words,  with  which    you, 
Torquatus,  are   of  course   fanailiar   (for   every  good 
Epicurean  has  got  by  heart  the  master's  Kuriai  Doxai 
or  Autlioritative  Doctrines,  since  these  brief  aphor- 
isms or  maxims  are  held  to  be  of  sovereign  efficacy 
for  happiness).     So  I  wUl  ask  you  kindly  to  notice 

I  whether  I  translate  this  maxim  correctly  ;  If  the 
things  in  which  sensualists  find  pleasure  could  deliver 
them  from  the  fear  of  the  gods  and  of  death  and 
pain,  and  could  teach  them  to  set  bounds  to  their 

CBSent  fines  cupiditatum,  niliil  haberemus  quod  re- 
prehenderemus,'  cum  undique  complerentur  vnlupta.- 
tibus  nee  haberent  ulla  ex  parte  aUquid  aut  dolens 
aut  aegmm,  id  est  autem  malum.'" 

Hoc  loco  tenereseTmrmsnonpotuit.  "Obseero," 
iiiquit]  Torquate,  haec  dicit  Epicurus?"  (quod  mihi 
quidem  visus  est,  cum  sciret,  velle  tamen  confitentem 
audire  Torquatum).  At  ille  iion  perttmuit  saneque 
fidenter:  Istis  quidem  ipsis  verbis,"  tnquit;  sed 
quid  sentiat  nou  videtis."  Si  alia  sentit,"  inquatn, 
alia  loquitur,  numquam  intellegam  quid  seiitiat ; 
sed  plane  dicit  quod  intellegit.  Idque  si  ita  dicit, 
non  esse  reprendendos  luxuriosos  si  sapientes  sint, 
dicit  absurde,  similiter  et  si  dicat  non  reprendendos 
parricidas  si  nee  cupidi  sint  nee  dcos  metuant  nee 
mortem  nee  dolorem.  Et  tamen  quid  attinet  Iuku- 
riosis  ullam  exceptionem  dari  aut  fingere  aliquos  qui, 
cum  luxuriose  viverent,  a  aummo  philosopho  non  re- 
prenderentur  eo  nomine  dumtaxat,  cetera  caverent? 
[  22  Sed  tanien  nonne  reprenderes.  Epicure,  luxuriosos 
ob  earn  ipsam  causam  quod  ita  viverent  ut  perse- 
querentur  cuiusquemodi  voluptates,  cum  esset  prae- 
sertim,  ut  ais  tu,  summa  voluptas  nihil  dolere  ? 
Atqui  reperiemus  asotos  primum  ita  non  religiosos 
ut  edint  de  patella,'  deinde  ita  mortem  non  ti- 
mentes  ut  iltud  in  ore  babeant  ex  Hymnide : 

;  yiiod  reptehenilereinus 

■  Apparently  proverbial  for  shameless  g'Jultony.  The 
fia/elia  was  ustd  for  offerings  of  food  made  to  the  house- 
hold ({ods. 

bA  comedy  by  Caecilius  Slalios,   Iranslaled   from  the 
Greek  of  Menander. 

BOOK  II,  rii 
desires,  we  should  have  no  reason  to  hlame  them, 
since  on  every  hand  tliey  would  be  abundantly  sup- 
plied with  pleasures,  and  on  no  side  would  be  exposed 
to  any  pain  or  grief,  which  are  the  sole  evil.*" 

At  this  point  Triarius  could  contain  himself  no 
longer.  Seriously  now,  Torquatus,"  he  broke  out, 
"does  Epicurus  really  say  that?"  (For  my  own 
part,  I  believe  that  he  knew  it  to  be  true,  but 
wanted  to  hear  Torquatus  admit  it.)  Torquatus, 
nothing  daunted,  answered  with  complete  assurance : 

Certainly,  those  are  his  very  words.  But  you 
don't  understand  his  meaning."      '  Oh,"  I  retorted, 

if  he  means  one  thing  and  says  another,  I  never 
shall  understand  his  meaning.  But  he  does  not; 
he  states  the  case  eleariy  as  he  understands  it.  If 
his  meaning  is  that  sensualists  are  not  to  be  blamed 
provided  they  are  wise  men,  he  is  talking  nonsense. 
He  might  as  well  say  that  parricides  are  not  to  be 
blamed  provided  they  «re  free  from  avarice  arid 
from  fear  of  the  gods,  of  death  and  of  pain.  Even 
so,  what  is  the  point  of  granting  the  sensual  any 
saving  clause?  Why  imagine  certain  fictitious  per- 
sons who,  though  living  sensually,  would  not  be 
blamed  by  the  wisest  of  philosophers,  at  all  events 
for  their  sensuality,  and  who  avoided  other  faults  ? 
22  All  the  same,  Epicurus,  would  not  you  blame  sen- 
sualists for  the  very  reason  that  their  one  object  in 
life  is  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  of  any  and  every  sort, 
especially  as  according  to  you  the  highest  pleasure 
is  to  feel  no  pain  ?  Yet  we  shall  find  profligates  in 
the  first  place  so  devoid  of  religious  scruples  that 
they  will  eat  the  food  on  the  paten,' "  and  secondly 
so  fearless  of  death  as  to  be  always  quoting  the  lines 
from  the  HymnU^: 

Mihi  sex  menses  satis  sunt  vitae :  septimum  Oreo 

lam  doloris  medicamenta  ilia  Epiciirea  tamquam  de 
narthecio  plomcnt:  Si  gravis,  brevis:  si  longus, 
levis.'  Unum  nescio,  quomodo  possit,  si  liiKurioBus 
sit,  finitas  cupiditates  habere. 
1  VIII.  Quid  ergo  attinet  dicere:  'Nihil  haberem 
quod  rcprenderem,  si  finitas  cupiditates  haberent?' 
Hoc  est  dicere ;  Non  reprenderem  asotos  si  non 
essent  asoti.'  Isto  modo  ne  improbos  quidem  si  es- 
sent  boni  viri.  Hie  homo  severus  luxuriani  ipsam 
per  Be  reprendendam  non  putat.  Et  herculc,  Tor- 
quate,  ut  verum  loquamur,  si  summum  bonum  volu- 
ptas  est,  rectissiTne  non  putat.  Nolim  enim  mihi 
fingere  asotos,  ut  soletis,  qui  in  raensam  vomant  et 
qui  de  convivlis  auferantur  crudique  postridie  se 
rursus  ingurgitent,  qui  solem,  ut  aiunt,  nee  oceiden- 
tem  umquam  viderint  nee  orientem,  qui  consumptis 
patrimoniis  egeant.  Nemo  nostrum  istius  generis 
asotos  iucunde  putat  vivere.  Mundos,  elegantes, 
optimis  cocis,  pistoribus,  piscatu,  aueupio,  venatione, 
bis  omnibus  exquisitis,  vitantes  eruditatem,  quibus 
'  vinum  defiisum  e  pleno  sit,  t  hirsizon '  (ut  ait  Luci- 
lius)  cui  nihil  dum  sit  vis  et  SAceulus  abstulerit,'  ad- 

^hirsieon,  hirsyphon  or  the  like,  MSS.;  and  for  dum  sit 
some  have  dempsit,  dempseril.  No  plausible  reconstruction 
has  been  auggresltid;  but  the  reference  seemi  to  be  to  the 
process  of  straining  wine  to  remove  the  lees  and  get  rid  of 
vis,  harshness  of  flavour. 

^Cf.  I  840. 

BOOK  II.  vii-viii 
Enough  for  me  six  months  of  life,  the  seventh  to 
Hell  I  pledge  1 
Or  if  they  want  an  antidote  to  pain,  out  comes  from 
their  medicine-chest  the  great  Epicurean  panacea, 
Short  if  it's  strong,  light  if  it's  long.''  Only  one 
point  I  can't  make  out:  how  can  a  man  at  once  be 
a  sensualist  and  keep  his  desires  within  bounds? 
3  VIII.  "  What  then  is  the  point  of  saying  '  I  should 
have  no  fault  to  find  with  them  if  they  kept  their 
desires  within  bounds '  ?  That  is  tantamount  to 
saying  'l  should  not  blame  the  profligate  if  they 
were  not  profligate.'  On  tliat  principle  you  would 
not  blame  the  dishonest  either,  if  tiiey  were  upright 
men.  Here  is  a  rigid  moralist,  who  tliinks  that 
sensuality  is  not  in  itself  blameworthy !  And  I 
profess,  Torquatus,  on  the  hypothesis  that  pleasure 
is  the  Chief  Good  he  is  perfectly  justified  in  think- 
ing so.  1  had  rather  not  draw  disgusting  pictures, 
as  you  are  so  fond  of  doing,  of  debauchees  who  are 
sick  at  table,  have  to  be  carried  home  from  dinner- 
parties, and  next  day  gorge  themselves  again  before 
they  have  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  night 
before ;  men  who,  as  the  saying  goes,  have  never  seen 
either  sunset  or  sunrise;  men  who  run  through  their 
inheritance  and  sink  into  penury.  None  of  us  sup- 
poses that  profligates  of  that  description  live  plea- 
santly. No,  but  fastidious  gourmets,  with  first-rate 
chefs  and  confectioners,  fish,  birds,  game,  and  all  of 
the  very  best;  careful  of  their  digestion  ;  with 
Wine  in  flask 
Decanted  from  a  new-hroach'd  cask,  .  .  . 
as  Lucilius  has  it, 

I  Wine  of  tang  bereft, 

All  harshness  in  the  strainer  left; 
■      : 


hibentes  ludos  et  quae  sequuntur,  ilia  quibiis  detractis 
clamat  Epicurus  se  nescire  quid  sit  Ixinuni;  adsint 
etiam  formosi  pueri  qui  miiiiatreiit ;  respondeat  his 
vestis,  argentum,  Corinthium,  locus  ipse,  acdificium  ; 
—  iios  ergo  asotos  bene  quidem  vivere  aut  beate 
24  numquaui  diserim.  Ex  quo  efficitur  noii  ut  voluptas 
ne  sit  voluptas,  sed  ut  voluptas  non  sit  sumnium 
bonum.  Nee  ille  qui  Diogenem  Stoicum  adulescens, 
post  aotem  Paiiaetium  audierat,  Laelius  eo  dictus  est 
sapiens  quod  non  intellegeret  quid  suavissimum  essct 
(nee  enim  sequitur  ut  cui  cor  sapiat  ei  non  sapiat 
palatus),  sed  quia  parvi  id  dueeret. 

O  lapathe,  ut  iactare  nee  es  satis  cognitus  qui  sis '. 
In  quo  Laelius  clamores  ct<h^i)$  ille  solebat         _*^| 
Edere,  compellans  gumias  ex  ordine  nostros.    ^^H 

Praeclare  laelius,  et  recte  o-ot^os,  illudque  vere :    ^^ 

O  Puhli,  o  giirges,  Galloni,  es  homo  raiser,'  inquit. 
Cenasti  in  vita  numquani  bene,  eura  omnia  in  ista 
Consumis  squilla  atque  acipensere  cum  decimano.' 

Is  haee  loquitur  qui  in  voluptate  nihil  ponens  negat 
eum  bene  cenare  qui  omnia  ponat  in  voluptate;  et 

a  This  passage  of  Luoilius  is  alluded  to  by  Horace  Sat. 
2.  1.  46,  wliere  it  appears  llial  Gallonius  was  an  auctioneer, 
notorious  for  having-  inlroduced  acipenser  (sturgeon  ?)  to 
Roman  tables. 

^r  BOOK   11.  viii 

fth  the  acponipaninient  of  dramatic  perfor 

id  their  usual    sequel,  the  pleasures  apart  from 

tiich  Epicurus,  as  he  loudly  proclaims,  does  not 

LOW  what  Good  is;    give  them  also  beautiful  boys 

wait  upon  them,  with  drapery,  silver,  Corinthian 
onzea,  and  the  scene  of  the  feast,  the  banqueting- 
om,  all  in  keeping;  take  profligates  of  this  sort; 
at  these  live  well  or  enjoy  happiness  I  v 
low.  The  conclusion  is,  not  that  pleasure  is  not 
easure  but  that  pleasure  is  not  the  Chief  Good. 
le  famous  Laelius,  who  had  been  a  pupil  of  Dio- 
■nes  the  Stoic  In  his  youth  and  later  of  Panaetius,  y,treaii» 
IS  not  called  'the  Wise'  because  he  was  no  judge  "„0"^™°" 

good  eating  (for  a  wise  mind  is  not  necessarily  hms; 


tamen  non  negat  libenter  uraquam  cenasse  Gallo- 
nium  (mcntiretur  enim),  sed  bene.  Ita  graviter  et 
severe  voluptatem  secemit  a  bono.  Es  quo  illud 
efficitur,  qui  bene  ceuent  omnes  libenter  cenare,  qui 
libenter,  non  continue  bene.  Semper  Laelius  bene. 
25  Quid  bene?     Dicet  Lucilius: 

sed  cedo  caput  cenae : 

sennone  bono, 
quid  ex  eo? 

;i  quaeris,  libenter; 

iebat  t 

1  ad  • 


1  ut  animo  quieto  satiaret 
Recte  ergo  is  negat  uniiiuam 
,  recte  miserum,  cum  prae- 
sertim  in  eo  omne  studium  consumeret.  Quern 
libenter  cenasse  nemo  negat.  Cur  igitur  non  bene? 
Quia  quod  bene,  id  recte,  frugaliter,  honeste ;  ille 
porro  prave,^  nequiter,  turpiter  cenabat ;  non 
i^tur  bene."  Ncc  lapathi  suavitatcni  acipenseri 
Gallon!  Laelius  anteponebat,  sed  suavitatem  ipsani 
neglegebat;  quod  non  faeeret  si  in  voluptate  sum- 
mum  bonum  poneret. 
)  IX.  Semovenda  est  igitur  voluptas  non  solum  ut 
recta   sequamini    sed   etiatn   ut   loqui  deceat  fruga- 

'porro  male  prove  MSS.;  male  Mdv.  brackets. 
^bene  inserted  by  Mdv. 

'— -   -^ 


BOOK  II.  viii-ix 
say  Gallonius  never  dined  pleasantly  (which  would 
be  untrue),  but  never  well.  So  strict  and  severe  is 
the  distinction  he  draws  between  pleasure  and  good. 
The  conclusion  is  that  tliough  all  who  dine  well  dine 
pleasantly,  yet  he  who  dines  pleasantly  does  not 
necessarily  dine  well.  Laelius  always  dined  well. 
35  What  does    well'  mean?     Lucilius  shall  say: 

Well-cook 'd,  well-season' d, 

ah,  but  now  the  principal  dish  t 

Of  honest  talk, 
and  the  result : 

a  pleasant  meal ; 
for  he  came  to  dinner  tliat  with  mind  at  ease  he 
niig'iit  satisfy  the  wants  of  Nature.  Laelius  is 
right  therefore  in  denying  that  Gallonius  ever 
dined  well,  right  in  calling  him  unhappy,  and  that 
too  althougli  all  his  thoughts  were  centred  on  the 
pleasures  of  the  table.  No  one  will  deny  that  he 
dined  pleasantly.  Then  why  not  well"?  Because 
weir  implies  rightly,  respectably,  worthily ;  whereas 
Gallonius  diued  wrongly,  disreputably,  basely ;  there- 
fore he  did  not  dine  welL  It  was  not  that  I^elius 
thouglit  his  'dinner  of  herbs'  more  palatable  than 
Gallonius's  sturgeon,  but  that  he  disregarded  the 
pleasures  of  the  palate  altogether ;  and  this  he  could 
not  have  done,  had  he  made  the  Chief  Good  consist  .^ 

K..  "Consequently  you  are  bound  to  discard  plea-    i 
,  not  merely  if  you  are  to  guide  your  conduct    I 
Ight,  but  even  if  you  are  to  be  able  consistently  to 
:  the  language  (Of  respectable  people.     Can  we    i 

liter.  Possiunusne  ergo  in  vita  summum  bonum  di- 
cere  quod  ne  in  cena'  quideni  posse  videamur? 
Quomodo  autem  philoaophiis  loquitur  ?  Tria  genera 
cupiditatura,  naturales  et  necessariae,  naturales  et 
non  necessariae,  nee  naturales  nee  necessariae.' 
Primum  divisit  ineleganter  ;  duo  enim  genera  quae 
erant,  fecit  tria.  Hctc  est  non  dividere  sed  frangere. 
Qui  haec  didicerunt  quae  ille  contemnit,  sie  solent ; 
Duo  genera  cupiditatum,  naturales  et  inanes : 
naturalium  duo,  necessariae  et  non  necessariae.' 
Confect.1  res  esset.  Vitiosum  est  enim  in  dividendo 
27  partem  in  genere  numerare.  Sed  hoc  sane  conce- 
damus.  Contemnit  disserendi  elegantiam ;  confuse 
loquitur ;  gerendus  est  mos,  modo  recte  sentiat. 
Equideui  illud  ipsum  non  niniium  probo  et  tantum 
patior,  pbilosophum  loqui  de  cupiditatibus  liniendis. 
An  potest  cupiditas  finiri  ?  Tollcnda  est  atque  ex- 
trabenda  radicitus.  Quis  est  enim  in  quo  sit  cupi- 
ditas, quin  recte  cupidus  dici  possit  ?  Ergo  et  avams 
erit,  sed  finite,  et  adulter,  verum  habebit  modum,  et 
luxuriosus,  eoilcm  modo.  Qualis  ista  philusopliia  est 
quae  non  interitum  afferat  pravitatis  sed  sit  contenta 
mediocritate  vitioi'uni?  Quaniqiiam  in  hac  divisione 
rem  ipsam  prorsus  probo,  elegantiam  desidero.  Ap- 
pellet  baec  desideria  naturae;  cupiditutis  nomen 
servet  alio,  ut  earn  cum  de  avaritia,  cum  de  intem- 

fl  Thos.  Benlley ; 



■  BOOK  II.  ix  ■ 

Imssibly  therefore  rail  a  tiling  the  Chief  Good  with 
regard  to  livuig,  w)ieii  we  feel  we  cannot  call  it  so 
even  in  regard  to  dining  ?     But  how  sajs  our  philo-  and  man: 
sopher?       The  desires  are  of  three  kinds,  natural  ^||^j^"", 
and  necessary,  natural  but  not  neeessary,  neither  S"'?".'' 
natural    nor   necessary.'     To   begin  with,  this  is  a  misitadin 
clumsy  division  ;  it  makes  three  classes  when  there 
are   really    only  two.      This    is   not   dividing    but 
hacking  in  pieces.     Thinkers  trained  in  the  si^ience 
which  Epicurus  despised  usually  put  it  thus:    The 
desires  are  of  two  kinds,  natural  and  imaginary*; 
natural    desires   again    fall    Into    two    subdivisions, 
necessary  and  not  necessary.'     That  would    have 
rounded  it  off  properly.     It  is  a  fault  in  division  to 

7  reckon  a  species  as  a  genus.     Still,  do  not  let  us 
stickle  about  form.     Epicurus  despises  the  niceties 
of  dialectic ;  he  affects  a  careless  style ;  we  must 
humour  him  in  this,  provided  that  his  meaning  is 
correct.  But  for  my  own  part  I  eannotcordially  approve, 
I  inerely  tolerate,  a  philosoplier  who  talks  of  setting 
bounds  to  the  desires.     Is  it  possible  for  desire  to 
be  kept  within  bounds?    It  ought  to  be  destroyed, 
uprooted  altogether.     On  your  principle  there  is  no 
form  of  desire  whose  possessor  could  not  be  morally 
approved.     He  will  be  a  miser-^within  limits ;  an 
adulterer— in    moderation  ;     a    sensualist — to    the  I 
same  extent.     What  sort  of  a  philosophy  is  this,  I 
that  instead   of  dealing  wickedness  its  death-bloi 
is    satisfied   with   moderating-   our  vices?     Albeit   ij 
quite  approve  the  substance  of  this  classifi cation ; 
is  the  form  of  it  to  which  I  take  exception.     Let 
him   speak    of    the    first   class   as     the    needs    of 
,'  and    keep   the   term     desire '  for  another 
in,  to  be  put  on  trial  for  its  life  when  he 


pernntia,  cum  de  maximis  vitiis  loquetur  tamquam 
capitis  occuset. 

Sed  haec  quidem  liberius  ab  eo  dicuntur  et 
saepius.  Quod  equidein  non  reprendo ;  est  eniin 
tanti  pliilo3ophi  tamque  iiobilis  audacter  sua  de- 
creta  defendere.  Sed  tamen  ex  eo  quod  earn  vol»- 
ptatem  quam  omnes  {feiites  hoc  nomine  appellant 
vidt'tur  ample xari  saepe  vehementius,  iii  magnis 
interdom  versatur  angustjis,  ut  hominum  conscientia 
remota  nihil  tam  turpe  sit  quod  voluptatis  causa  non 
videatur  esse  facturus.  Delude  ubi  erubuit  (vis 
enim  est  perraagna  naturae),  confugit  illuc  ut  neget 
accedere  quidquam  posse  ad  voluptatem  nihil  dolen- 
tis.  At  iste  non  dolendi  status  non  vocatur  voluptas. 
Non  laboro,  inquit,  de  nomine. — Quid  quod  res  alia 
tota  est  ? — Reperiam  multos  vel  miiumerabiles  potius 
non  tam  curiosos  nee  tam  molestos  quam  voa  estis, 
quibus  quidquid  velim  facile  persuadeam. — Quid 
ergo  dubitamas  quin,  si  non  dolere  voluptas  sit 
sumnia,  non  esse  in  voluptate  dolor  sit  maximus  ? 
cur  id  non  ita  fit? — Quia  dolori  non  voluptas  con- 
trarla  est  sed  doloris  privatio. 

^oc  vero  non  videre,  maximo  argumento  esse 
voluptatem  iltam,  qua  sublutu  neget  se  intellegere 
omnino  quid  sit  bonum  (earn  autem  ita  perscquitur  : 
quae  palato  percipiatur,  quae  auribus, — cetera  addit. 

BOOK   II.  ix-x 
comes  tn  deal  with  Avarice,  Intemperance,  and  all 
the  major  vices. 

I  "This  classification  of  the  desires  is  then  a  subject  (2)wii 
on  which  Epicurus  is  fond  of  enlarging.  Not  that  back  q 
I  find  fault  with  him  for  that ;  we  expect  so  gi-eat  and  q^I^\ 
famous  a  philosopher  to  maintain  his  dogmas  boldly. 
But  he  often  seems  unduly  eager  to  approve  of  plea- 
sure in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  term,  for  this 
occasionally  lands  him  in  a  very  awkward  position.  < 
It  conveys  the  impression  that  there  is  no  action  so 
base  but  that  he  would  be  ready  to  commit  it  for 
tlie  sake  of  pleasure,  provided  he  were  guaranteed 
against  detection.  Afterwards,  put  to  the  blush  by 
this  conclusion  (for  the  force  of  natural  instinct  after 
all  is  overwhelming),  he  turns  for  refuge  to  the 
assertion  that  nothing  can  enhance  the  pleasure  of 
freedom  from  pain.  Oh  but,'  we  urge,  your  stalif 
condition  of  feeling  no  pain  is  not  what  is  termed 
pleasure  at  all.' —  I  don't  trouble  about  the  name,' 
lie  replies,—  Well,  but  the  thing  itself  is  abso- 
lutely different.' —  Oh,  I  can  find  Jiundreds  and 
thousands  of  people  less  precise  and  tiresome  than 
yourselves,  who  will  be  glad  to  accept  as  true  any- 
thing I  like  to  teach  tlieiii.' — '  Then  why  do  we  not 
go  a  step  further  and  argue  that,  if  not  to  feel  pain 
is  the  highest  pleasure,  therefore  not  to  feel  pleasure 
is  the  greatest  pain  ?  Wliy  does  not  this  hold  good  ?  ' 
—  Because  the  opposite  of  pain  is  not  pleasure  but 
absence  of  pain.' 

)       X.     But  fancy  his  failing  to  see  how  strong  a  proof  n  n-  bi 
it  is  that  the  sort  of  pleasure,  without  which  he  „°„"f. 
declares  he  has  no  idea  at  all  what  Good  means  (and 
he  defines  it  in  detail  as  the  pleasure  of  the  palate; 
of    tlie    ears,    and    subjoins    the    other    kind; 



quae  Hi  appellos,  lionos  praefandiis  sit)— hoc  igitui 
quod  solum  bonuiu  severus  et  gravis  pliilosophus  no 
vit,  idem 
quod  earn 
|30  contraria  1 

in  videt  ne  expetendum  quidem  esse, 
iluptjitem  hoc  codem  auelore  non  desi- 
in  dulore  careamus !  Qunm  liaec  sunt 
Hie  si  definire,  si  dividere  didicisset,  si 
I,  si  denique  consuetudiiiem  verborum 
tcneret,  numquam  in  tantas  salebras  incidisset.  Nunc 
vides  quid  fuciat.  Quam  nemo  umquam  voluptatem 
appellavit,  appellat ;  quae  duo  sunt,  unum  faeit,  Hanc 
in  motu  voluptateni  (sic  enira  has  suaves  et  quasi 
dulces  voluptates  appellat)  interdum  ita  extenuat  ut 
M'.  Curium  putes  loqui,  interdum  ita  laiidat  ut  quid 
praeterea  sit  bonuni  neget  se  posse  ne  suspicari  qui- 
dem. Quae  iam  oratio  non  a  pliiloaoplio  aliquo  sed  a 
eensore  opprimenda  est ;  non  pst  enim  vitium  in  ora- 
tione  solum  sed  etiam  in  moribus,  Luyuriam  non 
reprendit,  modo  sit  vacua  intinita  cupiditate  et  timore. 
Hoe  loco  discipulos  quaerere  videtur,  ut  qui  asoti  esse 
velint  philosoptii  ante  Rant. 

A  primo,  ut  opinor,  animantium  ortu  pctitur  origo 
summi  boni.  Siniul  atque  natum  animal  est,  gaudet 
voluptate  et  earn  appetit  ut  bonum,  aspeniatur 
dolorem  ut  malum.  De  malis  autem  et  bonis  ab 
iis  animalilius  quae  nondum  depravata  sint  ait  opti- 
me  iudicnri.  Haec  et  tu  ita  posuisti  et  verba 

lug  la 

BOOK  n.  X 

pleasure,  which  cannot  he  specified  without  an 
apology), — he  fails,  I  say.  to  see  that  this,  the  sole 
Good  with  which  our  strict  and  serious  philosopher 
is  acquainted,  is  actually  not  even  desirable,  in- 
asmuch as  on  his  own  showing  we  feel  no  need  of 
this  sort  of  pleasure,  so  long  as  we  are  free  from 
?0  pain  I  How  inconsistent  this  is  !  If  only  Epicurus  ti 
had  studied  Definition  and  Division,  if  he  understood  "I 
the  meaning  of  Predication  or  even  the  customary  "" 
uses  of  terms,  lie  would  never  have  fallen  into  such  a 
quandary.  As  it  is,  you  see  what  he  does.  He 
»^Is  a  thing  pleasure  that  no  one  ever  called  by  that 
name  before  ;  he  confounds  two  things  that  are  dis- 
tinct. The  '  kinetic '  sort  of  pleasure  (for  so  he 
terms  the  delightful  and  so  to  speak  sweet-flavoured 
pleasures  we  are  considering)  at  one  moment  he  so 
disparages  that  you  would  tliink  you  were  listening 
to  Manius  Curius,  while  at  another  moment  he  so 
extols  it  that  he  tells  us  he  is  incapable  even  of 
imagining  what  other  good  there  can  be.  Now  that 
is  language  that  does  not  call  for  a  philosopher  to 
answer  it, — it  ought  to  be  put  down  by  the  police. 
His  morality  is  at  fault,  and  not  only  his  logic.  He 
does  not  censure  proHigaey,  provided  it  be  free 
from  unbridled  desire,  and  ftom  fear  of  conse- 
quences. Here  he  seems  to  be  making  a  bid  for 
disciples :  the  would-be  roue  need  only  turn  philo- 

3 1  For  the  origin  of  the  Chief  Good  he  goes  back,  I  Again,  If 

understand,  to  the  birth  of  living  things.  As  soon  as  sctirepii^asure 
an  animal  is  bom,  it  delights  in  pleasure  and  seeks  it  p^^ng'  jj^ 
as  a  sood,  but  shuns  pain  as  an  evil.    Creatures  as  yet  Chiol  Good. 

ETjpted  are  accoi-ding  to  him  the  best  judges    "  "^^ 


vestra  sunt.  Quam  multa  vitiosa !  Summnm  enim 
bonuin  et  malum  vagiens  puer  utra  voluptate 
diiudicabit,  stnnte  an  movente  ?  qiioniam,  si  dis 
placet,  ab  Epicuro  loqui  discimiis.  Si  stante,  hoc 
natura  videlicet  vult,  salvaiji  esse  se,  quod  concedi- 
mus ;  si  movente,  quod  tamen  didtis,  nulla  turpis 
voluptas  erit  quae  praetemiittenda  sit,  et  siniul  non 
proHciscitur  animal  illud  modo  natum  a  sumnin  vo- 

2  luptate,  quae  est  a  te  posita  in  non  dolendo.  Nee 
tamen  ai'guraentum  hoc  Epicurus  a  parvis  petivit  aut 
etiam  a  bestiis,  quae  putat  esse  speculu  naturae,  ut 
diceret  ab  iis  duce  natura  banc  voluptatem  expeti 
nihil  dolendi.  Neque  enim  haec  movere  potest  ap- 
petitum  animi,  nee  ullum  habet  ictum  quo  pellat 
animmn  status  hie  non  dolendi  (itaque  in  hoc  eodem 
peccat  Hieronymus),  at  ilie  pellit  qui  perniuleet  sen- 
sum  voluptate.  Itaque  Epicurus  semper  iioc  utitur 
ut  probet  voluptatem  natura  expeti,  quod  ea  volu- 
ptas quae  in  motu  sit  et  parvos  ad  se  alliciat  et  bestias, 
non  ilia  stabilia  in  qua  tantum  inest  nihil  dolere. 
Qui  igitur  convenit  ab  alia  voluptate  dicerc  naturam 
proticisci,  in  alia  summum  bonum  ponere  ? 

i  XI.  "  Bestiarumvero  nullum  iudiciumputo.Quam- 
vis  enim  depravatae  non  sint,  pravae  tamen  esse  pos- 
sunt.  Ut  bacillum  aliud  est  inflexom  et  incurvatum 
de  industria,  aliud  ita  natum,  sic  ferarum  natura  non 

^■^  BOOK   II.  x-xi 

pounded  it  and  as  it  is  expressed  in  the  phraseology  of 
your  school.  What  a  mass  of  fallacies  !  Which  kind 
of  pleasure  will  it  be  that  guides  a  mewling  infant 
to  distinguish  between  the  Chief  Good  and  Evil, 

static  '  pleasure  or  kinetic '  ?— since  we  leam  our 
language,  heaven  help  us  I  from   Epicurus.     If  the 

static '  kind,  the  natural  instinct  is  clearly  towards 
self-preservation,  as  we  agree  ;  but  if  the  'kineticj' 
and  this  is  what  neverthuless  you  maintain,  then  no 
pleasure  will  be  loo  liase  to  be  accepted ;  and  also 
our  new-bom  animal  in  this  case  does  not  find  its 
earliest  motive  in  the  highest  form  of  pleasure,  since 
this  on  your  showing  consists  in  absence  of  pain. 

32  For  this  latter  doctrine,  however,  Epicurus  cannot 
have  gone  to  children  nor  yet  to  animals,  which  ac- 
cording to  liim  give  a  true  reflection  of  nature  ;  he 
could  hardly  say  that  natural  instinct  guides  the 
young  to  desire  tlie  pleasure  of  freedom  from  pain, 
Tiiis  cannot  excite  appetition;  the  static'  condition 
of  feeling  no  pain  exerts  no  driving-power,  supplies 
no  impulse  to  the  will  (so  that  Hieronymus  also  is 
wrong  here)  ;  it  is  the  positive  sensation  of  pleasure 
and  delight  that  fumislies  a  motive.  Accordingly 
Epicurus's  standing  argument  to  prove  that  pleasure 
is  naturally  desired  is  that  infants  and  animals  are 
attracted  by  the    kinetic '  sort  of  pleasure,  not  the 

static '  kind  which  consists  merely  in  freedom  from 
pain.  Surely  then  it  is  inconsistent  to  say  that 
natural  instinct  starts  from  one  sort  of  pleasure,  but 
that  the  Chief  Good  is  found  in  another. 

33  XI.  "As  for  the  lower  animals,  I  set  no  value  on  :„ 
their  verdict.  Their  instincts  may  be  wrong,  although  '■^^ 
we  catmot  say  they  are  perverted.  One  stick  has  sm 
been  bent  and  twisted  on  purpose,  another  has  grown  ^ 

est  ilia,  quidem  depravata  mala  disciplina,  sed  natura 
sua.  Nee  ^ero  «t  voluptatem  expetat  natura  iiiovet 
infantem,  sed  tantum  lit  se  ipse  diligat,  ut  integrum 
se  salvumque  velit.  Omne  enini  animal,  simul  est 
tirtum/  et  se  ipsum  et  omnes  partes  suas  diligit,  du- 
asque  quae  maximae  sunt  in  primis  amplectitiir,  ani- 
mum  et  corpus,  deiiide  utriusque  partes.  Nam  sunt 
et  in  aiiimo  praecipua  quaedam  et  in  corpore,  quae 
cum  ]eviter  agnovit,  tum  discemere  incipit,  ut  ea 
quae  prima  data  sint  natura  appctat  asperneturque 
34  contraria.  In  his  primis  naturalibus  voluptas  insit 
iiecne,  magna  quaestio  est;  nihil  vero  putare  esse 
praeter  voluptatem,  non  membra,  non  sensus,  non 
ingeni  motum,  non  integritatem  corporis,  non  vale- 
tudinem,  summae  mihi  videtur  inscitiae.  Atque  ab 
isto  capite  fluere  necesse  est  omnera  rationem  bono- 
rum  et  malorura.  Polemoni  et  iam  ante  Aristoteli 
ea  prima  visa  sunt  quae  paulo  ante  dixi.  Ergo  nata 
est  sententia  veterum  Academicorum  et  Peripateti- 
corum  ut  iinem  bonorutn  dicerent  secundum  naturam 
vivere,  id  est  virtute  adbibita  frui  piimis  a  natura 
datis.  Callipho  ad  virtutem  nihil  adiunxit  nbi  volupta~ 
tem;  Diodorus  vacuitatem  doloris.  . .  .  '  His  omnibus 
quos  dixi  consequent«3  sunt  fines  bonorum :  Aristippo 
simplex  voluptas;  Stoicis  consentire  naturae,  quod 
esse  votunt  e  virtute,  id  est  honeste  vivere,  quod  ita 

'  siatiil  est  ortnm  a  coiijectiire  of  Mdv.,  who  prinia  simitl 
\ct\  orlum  esl  with  MSS. 

'Mdv.  nmrks  a  lacuna.     A  sentence  has  been  lost  iudi- 
ing  the  '  primary  objects  of  desire  *  of  the  philosophers 

BOOK  II.  xi 
crooked ;  similarly  the  nature  of  wild  animals,  though 
not  indeed  corrupted  by  bad  education,  is  corru])t  of 
its  own  nature.  Again  in  the  infant  the.  iiaturaljn- ■ 
atinct  is  not  to  seek  pleasure ;  its  instinct  is  meycly 
to^Srspt^Fe^BCIsiilEipresetviRon  and  proteetjon. 
from  injury,  Every  living  creature,  from  the  moment 
of  birtliTToves  itself  and  all  its  members ;  primarUy 
this  setf-regard  embraces  the  two  main  divisions  of 
mind  and  body,  and  subsequently  the  parts  of  each 
of  these.  Both  mind  and  body  have  certain  excel- 
lences; of  these  the  young  animal  grows  vaguely 
conscious,  and  later  begins  to  discriminate,  and  to 
seek  for  the  primary  endowments  of  Nature  and  shun 
3+  their  opposites.  Whether  the  list  of  these  primary  i 
natural  objects  of  desire  includes  pleasure  or  not  is  a  f 
much  debated  question ;  but  to  hold  that  it  includes 
nothing  else  but  pleasure,  neither  the  limbs,  nor  the.i 
senses,'  nor  mental  activity,  nor  bodily  integrity  nor  ] 
health,  seems  to  me  to  be  the  height  of  stupidity. 
And  on  one's  view  as  to  the  objects  of  instinctive 
desire  must  depend  one's  whole  theory  of  Goods  and 
Evils.  Polemo,  and  also,  before  him  Aristotle,  held  that 
the  primary  objects  were  the  ones  1  have  just  men- 
tioned. Thus  arose  the  doctrine  of  the  Old  Academy 
and  of  the  Peripatetics,  maintaining  that  the  End  of 
Goods  is  to  live  in  accordance  with  Nature,  that  is,  to 
enjoy  the  primary  gifts  of  Nature's  bestowal  with  the 
accompaniment  of  virtue.  Callipho  coupled  with  virtue 
pleasure  alone ;  Diodorus  freedom  from  pain. ,  . . 
In  the  case  of  all  the  philosophers  mentioned,  their 
End  of  Goods  logically  follows ;  with  Aristippus 
it  is  pleasure  pure  and  simple ;  with  the  Stoics, 
harmony  with  Nature,  which  they  interpret 
ing  virtuous  or  morally  good  life,  and  further  expl; 


inlerpretantur,  vivere  cum  intellegentia  rerum  earum 

quae  natura  evenireiit,  eligeotem   ea  quae  essent 

35  secundum  naturam  reicientemque  contraria.     Ita  tres 

sunt  fines  expertes  honestatis,  unus  Aristippi  vel 
Epicuri,  alter  Hieronymi,  Cameadi  tertius;  tres  in' 
quibus  honestas  cum  aliqua  accessione,  Polemonis, 
Calliphontis,  Dioilori ;  uiia  simplex,  cuius  Zeno  auctor, 
posita  in  decore  tota,  id  est  in  honestatc.  (Nam 
Pyrrho,  Aristo,  Erillus  iam  diu  abiecti.)  Reliqui  sibi 
constiterunt,  ut  extrema  cum  initiis  convenirent,  ut 
Aristippo  voluptas,  Hieronymo  doloris  vaeuitas,  Car- 
neadi  frui  principiis  naturalibus  esset  extremum ; 
XII.  Epicurus  autem  cum  in  prima  commeiidatione 
voluptatem  dixiaset,  si  earn  quam  Aristippus,  idem 
tenere  debuit  ultimum  bonorum  quod  Ule ;  sin  eam 
quam  Hieronymus,  fecisset  idem  ut  voluptatem  itlam 
Aristippi  in  prima  commendatione  poneret?' 

36  Nam  quod  ait  sensibus  tpsis  iudicari  voluptatem 
bonum  esse,  dolorem  malum,  plus  tribuit  sensibus 
quam  nobis  leges  permittunt  cum^  privatarum  litium 
iudices  sumus.  Nihil  enim  possumus  iudicare  nisi 
quod  est  nosti-i  iudici ;  in  quo  frustra  iudices  soleiit, 
cum  sejitentiam  pronuntiant,  addere :     si  quid  mei 

^Aristipfii.  .  .  ponerclPs6.i[Arislippi\. 


f.  Mdv„ 

erted  here  by  Mdv.  >  afler  lill 

BOOK   II.  xi-xii 
this  as  meaning  to  live  with  an  understanding  of  the 
natural  course  of  events,  selecting  things  that  are  in 
accordance  with  Nature  and  rejecting  the  opposite. 

S.i  Thus  there   are   three    Ends  that  do  not  include 
moral  worth,  one  that  of  Aristippus  or  Epicurus,  the 
second  that  of  Hieronymus,  and  the  third  that  of 
Cameades;  three  that  comprise  moral  goodness  to- 
gether with  some  additional  element,  those  of  Poli 
Callipho  and  Diodorus ;  andone  theory  that  is  simple, 
of  which  Zeno  was  the  author,  and  which  is  based 
entirely  on  propriety,  that  is,  on  moral  worth.     (As 
for  Pyrrho,  Aristo  and  Erillus,  they  have  long  ago 
been  exploded.)     All  of  these  but  Epicurus 
consistent,  and  made  their  final  Ends  agree  with  their 
first  principles,— Aristippus  holding  tile  End  to  be 
Pleasure,  Hieronymas  freedom  from  pain,  Cameades 
the    enjoyment   of    the     primary    natural     objects, 
XII.  WhercHS  Epicurus,  if  in  saying  that  pli 
was   the    primary   object   of  attraction,  he  meant 
pleasure  in  the  sense  of  Aristippus,  ought  to  have  gjj 
maintained  the  same  ultimate  Good  as  Aristippus ;  fm 
or  if  he  made  pleasure  in  the  sense  of  Hieronymus  his  fa 
Chief  Good,  should  he  at  the  same  time  have  allowed  ^'"x^.- 
himself  to  make  the  former  kind  of  pleasure,  that  of 
Aristippus,  the  primary  attraction? 

S6         The  fact  is  that  when  he  says  that  the  verdict  of  N'oi  ihe 
the  senses  themselves  decides  pleasure  to  be  good  and  nHu    -  ' 
pain  evil,  he  assigns  more  authority  to  the  senses  than  ^^^ 
the  law  allows  to  us  when  we  sit  as  judges  in  private  Viii 
suits.      We  cannot  decide  any  issue  not  within  our 
jurisdiction  ;  and  there  is  not  really  any  point  in  the 
proviso  which  judges  are  fond  of  adding  to  their  ver- 
dicts: 'if  it  be  a  matter  within  my  jurisdiction,'  for 
if  it  were  not  within  their  jurisdiction,  the  verdict 

oughl  oc 

iudici  est ';  si  enim  noii  fuit  eoruni  iudici,  niliilo 
magis  hoc  non  addito  illud  est  iudicatutn.  Quid 
iudicant'  aensus?  Dulce,  amarum,  leve,  asperum, 
propCj  longCj  stare,  niovere,  quadratum,  rotundum. 

37  Aequam'  igitur  pronuntiabit  sententiaiu  ratio,  ad- 
hibita  primiun  divinarum  liumanarumque  rerum 
scientia,  quae  potest  appellari  rite  sapientia,  deinde 
adiunctis  virtutibus,  quas  ratio  rerum  omnium  do- 
minas,  tu  voluptatum  satellites  et  miiiistraa  esse 
voluisti;  quarum  adeo  omnium  es  sententia  pro- 
nuntiabit primum  de  voluptate,  nihil  esse  ei  loci,, 
non  modo  ut  sola  ponatur  in  sununi  boni  sede  quam 
quaerimus,  sed  ne  illn  quidem  modo  ut  ad  honesta- 
tem  applicetur.     De  vacuitate  doloris   eadem  sen- 

88  tentia  erit.  Reioietur  etiani  Carneades,  uec  ulla  de 
summo  bono  ratio  aut  voluptatis  non  dolendive  par- 
ticeps  aut  honestatis  expers  probabitur.  Ita  rehn- 
quet  durts,  de  quibus  etiam  atque  etiam  consideret. 
Aut  enim  statuet  nihil  esse  bonum  nisi  lionestum, 
nihil  malum  nisi  turpe,  cetera  aut  omiiino  niliil 
habere  momenti  aut  tantum  ut  nee  expetenda  nee 
fugieuda  sed  eligenda  modo  aut  reicienda  sint;  aut 
^nteponet  eam  quam  cum  honestate  ornatissimam, 
turn  etiam  ipsis  initiis  naturae  et  totius  perfectione 
vitae  locupletatam  videbit,     Quod  eo  liquidius  faciet, 

'aequam  Mdv.,  guuiu  MSS. 

^^  HOOK   II,   xii 

Would  be  equally  invalid  were  the  proviso  omitted. 
What  does  coiue  under  tlie  verdict  of  the  senses? 
Sweetness,  sourness,  smoothness,  roughness,  proxi- 
mity, distance ;  whether  an  object  is  stationary  or 

37  moving,  square  or  round.  A  just  decision  can  there- 
fore only  be  delivered  by  Reason,  with  the  aid  in 
the  first  place  of  that  knowledge  of  things  human 
and  divine,  which  may  rightly  claim  the  title  of 
Wisdom ;  and  secondly  with  the  assistance  of  the 
Virtues,  which  Reason  would  have  to  be  the  mistresses 
of  all  thinjifs,  but  you  considered  as  the  handmaids 
and  subordinates  of  the  pleasures.  After  calling  all 
of  these  into  council,  she  will  pronounce  first  us  to 
Pleasure,  that  she  has  no  claim,  not  merely  to  be 
enthroned  alone  in  the  seat  of  that  Chief  Good 
which  we  are  seeking,  but  even  to  be  admitted  as 
the  associate  of  Moral  Worth.     As  regai'ds  (reedom 

38  from  pain  her  decision  will  be  the  same.  For  Car- 
neades  will  be  put  out  of  court,  and  no  theory  of 
the  Chief  Good  will  be  approved  that  either  includes 
pleasure  or  absence  of  pain,  or  does  not  include 
moral  worth.  Two  views  will  thus  be  left.  After  , 
prolonged  consideration  of  these,  either  her  final 
verdict  will  be  that  jhere_i_s_no_QotMLljut_moral  | 
worth  and  no  Evil  but  moral  baseness,,  ajj   other   , 

THTngsjjeing  eitKer~enture1y  uiiiihportant  or  oF  so 
HttteTinportance  that  they  are  not~ff^3rable  or  to  be 
avoided,  but  only  to  be  selected  or  rejected  ;  or  else  \ 
she  will  prefer  the  theory  which  she  will  recognizee 
as  including  the" full  beauty  of  moral  worth,  enriched 
l)y~tfre  addition  of  the  primary  natural  objects  and 
of  a  life.  coraDleteiJ  (9.  its.  perieot-sp««H.    ~Ka&  her 

Cill  lie  all  the  clearer,  if  she  can  first  of  all 
her   the   dispute    between    these   rival 


si  perspexerit  reriim  inter  eas  verbonimne  sit  con- 

I  59  XIII.  Huiuseg'o nunc auctoritatemsequens  idem 
faciam.  Quantum  enim  potero,  minuam  contentiones 
omnesque  sententias  simplices  eorum  in  quibus  nulla 
putabo, — primum  Aristippi  Cyrenaicorumque  om- 
niuin,  quos  non  est  verituni  in  ea  voluptate  quae 
maxima  dulcedine  seiisuni  tuuveret  suiiimum  bonum 

WiO  ponere,  contemnentes  istam  vacuitateiu  doloris.  Hi 
non  vidertint,  ut  ad  cursum  equum,  ad  aranduni 
bovem,  ad  indagandum  caoem,  sic  hominem  ad  duas 
res,  at  ait  Aristoteles,  ad  intelleRendum  et  ad '  agen- 
dum esse  natum,  quasi  mortalem  deum,  contraque  ut 
tardara  aliquam  et  languidam  pecudem  ad  pastum  et 
ad  procreandi  voluptatein  hoc  divinuni  animal  ortum 
I  esse  voluerunt,  quo  nihil  mihi  videtur  absurdius. 
Atque  haec  contra  Aristippum,  qui  earn  voluptatem 
non  modo  Bummam  sed  solam  etiam  ducit,  quam  omnes 
unam  appellamus  voluptatem.  Aliter  auteni  vobis 
placet.  Sed  ille,  ut  dixi.  vitiose.  Nee  enim  figura 
corporis  neo  ratio  excellens  ingeni  liumani  significat 
ad  unam  hanc  rem  natum  hominem  ut  frueretur 
voluptatibus.  Nee  vero  audiendus  Hieronymus,  cui 
summum  bonum  est  idem  quod  vos  Interdum  vel 
potius  nimium  saepe  dicitis,  nihil  dolere.  Non  enim, 
si  malum  est  dolor,  cavere  eo  nialo  satis  est  ad  bene 

'  at/  siippiifd  bv  Mdv. 

^V  BOOK  II.  xii-xiJi 

theories  is  one  of  fact,  or  turns  on  verbal  differences 

(9  XIII.  "Guided  by  the  autboritj  of  Reason  I  will 
now  adopt  a  similar  procedure  niyself.  As  far  as 
possible  I  will  narrow  the  issue,  and  will  assume 
that  all  those  theories  of  the  simple  type,  that  in- 
clude no  admixture  of  virtue,  are  to  be  eliminated 
from  philosophy  altogether.  First  among  these 
comes  the  system  of  Aristippus  and  the  Cyrenaic 
school  in  general,  who  did  not  shrink  from  finding 
their  Chief  Good  in  pleasure  of  the  sort  that  excites 
the  highest  amount  of  actively  agreeable  sensation, 

K)  and  who  despised  your  freedom  from  pain.  They 
failed  to  sec  that  just  as  the  hurse  is  designed  by 
nature  for  running,  the  ox  for  ploughing,  and  the  dog 
for  hunting,  so  man,  as  Aristotle  obseiiv^Sris-borwibr. 
^w^  piiiTvigfgi  tt'ouglit^nd_action :  he 
mortal  God.  The  Cy renal cs~  held  on  the  contrary 
that  this  godlike  animal  came  into  being,  like  some 
dull,  hnlf-witted  sheep,  in  order  to  feed  and  to  enjoy 
tbe  pleasure  of  procreation,^a  view  that 

H  tlje  climax  of  absurdity.  So  much  in  answer  to  Aris- 
tippus, who  considers  pleasure  in  the  only 
which  we  all  of  us  employ  the  term  to  be  not  merely 
the  highest  but  the  sole  pleasure  that  exists.  Your 
school  holds  a  different  view.  However,  as  I  said, 
Aristippus  is  wrong.  Neither  man's  bodily  c 
formation  nor  his  surpassing  mental  faculty  of  reason 
indicates  that  he  was  bora  for  the  sole  purpose  of  en- 
joying pleasure.  Nor  yet  can  we  listen  to  Hierony- 
mus,  whose  Chief  Good  is  the  same  as  is  occasionally, 
or  rather  only  too  frequently,  upheld  by  yourselves, 
I  from  pain.  If  pain  is  an  evil,  to  be  without 
s  not  enough  to  constitute  the  Good  Life. 



vivendiim.     Hoc  dixerit  potiiis  Eiinius  : 

Nimium  boni  est  cui  »ihjl  est  muli 
nos  beatam  vitam  aon  depulsione  mali  sed  ftdeptione 
boni  iudicemus,  nee  earn  cessaiido,  sive  gatideiitena, 
ut  Aristippus,  sive  non  dolenteni,  ut  hie,  sed  agendo 
aliquid  con sideran dove  quaeramus. 

42  Quae  possunt  eadem  contra  Carneadeuni  illud 
summuni  bonum  dici,  quod  is  non  tam  ut  probaret  pro- 
talit.  quain  ut  Stoicis  quibuscum  bellum  gerebat  oppo- 
neret ;  id  autem  eiusmodi  est  ut  additum  ad  virtutem 
auctoritatemvideaturhabiturumet  expleturum  cumu- 
late vitam  beatam,  de  quo  oninis  haec  quaestio  est. 
Nam  qui  ad  virtutem  adlungunt  vel  voluptatem,  quam 
unam  virtus  niiiiimi  facit,  vel  vacuitatem  doloris,  quae 
etiamsi  malo  caret  tamen  non  est  siiramum  bonum, 
accessione  utunlur  non  ita  probabili,  nee  tamen  cur  id 
tam  parce  tamque  restricte  faoiant  intellego.  Quasi 
enim  emendum  eis  sit  quod  addant  ad  virtutem,  pri- 
mum  vilissimaa  res  addunt,  deinde  singulaa  potius 
quam  omnia  quae  prima  natura  approbavisset  ea  cum. 

43  honestate  coniungerent.  Quae  quod'  Aristoni  et 
Pyrrhoni  omnino  visa  sunt  pro  nihilo,  ut  inter  optime 
valere  et  gravissime  aegrotare  niliil  prorsus  dicerent 
interesse,  recte  lam  pridem  contra  eos  desitum  est 
disputari.     Dum  cnim  in  una  virtute  sic  omnia  esse 



BOOK  II.  xiit 
Ennius  say  if  he  likes  that 
3  ill  ;' 

!,  of  good 

but  let  us  reckon  happiness  not  hy  the  avoidance  of 
evil  but  by  the  attainment  of  good.  Let  us  seek  it 
not  in  the  idle  acceptance  whether  of  positive  delights, 
like  Aristippus,  or  of  freedom  from  pain,  like  Hier- 


i,  but  in  a  life  of  action  or  of  study. 

The  same  arguments  can  be  urged  against  the  Chief 
Good  of  Cameades,  wliich  he  advanced  less  from  a 
desire  to  prove  it  true  than  to  use  it  as  a  weapon  in 
his  battle  with  the  Stoics;  though  it  is  such  that  if 
added  to  Virtue  it  may  be  thought  to  be  of  import- 
ance and  to  be  likely  to  augment  the  sum  total  of 
Happiness,  which  is  the  one  subject  of  our  inquiry. 
Whereas  those  who  join  with  Virtue  either  pleat 
the  one  thing  she  values  least,  or  freedom  from  pain, 
which  even  though  it  is  devoid  of  evil  yet  is  not  the 
Chief  Good,  make  a  less  satisfactory  combination ; 
nor  yet  can  I  undci-stand  why  they  go  to  work  in  so 
cautious  and  niggardly  a  fashion.  You  would  think 
they  had  to  purchase  the  commodity  which  is  to  be 
added  to  virtue.  To  begin  with  they 
cheapest  things  they  can  find  to  add,  and  then  they 
each  dole  out  one  only,  instead  of  coupling  with  moral 
13  worth  all  the  things  initially  approved  by  Nature. 
Aristo  and  Pyirho  thought  all  these  things  utterly 
worthless,  and  said,  for  example,  that  there  was  abso- 
lutely nothing  to  choose  between  the  most  perfect 
health  and  the  most  grievous  sickness ;  and  conse- 
quently men  have  long  ago  quite  rightly  given  up 
arguing  against  them.  For  in  insisting  upon  the 
unique   importance  of  virtue  in  such 




^I'unt  ut  earn  renim  selectione  exspoliareiit,!) 

.  II ec  quo  vita 
1  pridem 
lie  est  di 

quidquam  aut  uiide  oriretur  darent  aut  ubi  niteretur, 

virtuteni    ipsam    quain    amplexabantur   sustuleruiit. 

Erillus   aottni   ad    scientiam   omnia 

quoddam  bonuni  vidit,  sed  iiec  optir 

gubernari  possit.     Itaque  hie  ipse 

reiectus;  post  enim  Clirysippum  no 


XIV,  Restatis  igitur  vos ;  nam  cum  Academi 
eerta  luctatio  est,  qui  nihil  affirmant  et  quasi  desperata 
cognitione  certi  id  sequi  volunt  quodcumque  veri 
I  simile  videatur.  Cum  Epicuru  auteni  hoc  plus  eat 
negoti  quod  e  duplici  genere  voluptatis  coniunctus 
est,  quodque  et  ipstr  et  amici  eius  et  miilti  postea  de- 
fensores  eius  sententiae  fueruiit,  et  nescio  quomodo, 
is  qui  auctoritatem  minimam  habet,  maximani  vim, 
populus  cum  iUis  fadt.  Quos  nisi  redarguinius,  om- 
nis  virtus,  omue  decus,  omnis  vera  laus  deserenda 
est.  Ita  cetei-orum  sententiis  scmotis,  relinquitur 
non  mihi  eum  Torquato  sed  virtiiti  cum  volaotaJie;^ 
certatio.  Quam  quidem  cei'tationem  homo  et  ueutus 
et  diligens,  Chrysippus,  non  contemnit,  totumque 
discrimen  summi  boni  in  earuni  comparatione  posi- 
tum  putat.  Ego  autem  existimo,  si  honestum  esse 
aliqutd  ostendero  quod  sit  ipsum  sua  vi  propter  seque 
expetenduni,  iacere  vestra  omnia.  Ituque  eo  quale 
sit  breviter  ut  tempus  postulat  constitute,  accedam 

roll  it  nt'  any  power  of  clioice  amoag  external  things 
and  to  deny  it  any  starting-point  or  basis,  they 
destroyed  the  very  virtue  they  desired  to  cherish. 
Again,  ErOlus,  in  basing  everything  on  knowledge, 
fixed  his  eyes  on  one  definite  Good,  but  this  not  the 
greatest  Good,  nor  one  that  could  serve  as  the  guide 
of  life.  Accordingly  Erillus  himself  has  long  ago 
been  set  aside ;  since  Chrysippus  no  one  has  even 
troubled  to  refute  him. 

XIV,  Accordingly  your  seliool  remains ;  for  there 
is  no  coining  to  grips  with  the  Acadi 
affii-m  nothing  positively,  and  despairing  of  a  know- 
ledge of  certain  truth,  make  up  their  minds  to  take 
t+  apparent  probability  as  their  guide.  Epicurus  how- 
ever is  a  more  troublesome  opponent,  because  he  is  a 
combination  of  two  different  sorts  of  pleasure,  and 
because  besides  himself  and  his  friends  there  have 
been  so  many  later  champions  of  his  theory,  which 
somehow  or  other  enlists  the  support  of  that  least 
competent  but  most  powerful  adherent,  the  general 
public.  Unless  we  refute  these  adversaries,  all  virtue, 
all  honour,  all  true  merit  must  be  abandoned.  Thus, 
when  all  the  other  systems  have  been  discarded, 
there  remains  a  duel  in  which  ttie-^pmbatants  are. 
not  myself  and  Torquatus,  but  Virtue!  an;!  Pleasure. 
This  contest  is  by  no  means  ignored4»y«t>  penetrating 
and  so  industrious  a  writer  as  Chrysiripus,  who  con- 
siders that  the  rivalry  between  pleasure  and  virtue  is 
the  cardinal  issue  in  the  whole  question  of  the  Chief 
Good.  My  own  view  is  that,  if  I  dan  succeed  in 
proving  the  existence  of  Moral  Worth  as  a  thing 
essentially  and  for  itself  desirable,  you^  entire  system 
at  once  collapses.  Accordingly  I  wilt  begin  by  de- 
fining, with  such  brevity  as  the  occasion  demands, 

Vi  'J«iS->- -  ^°S 

forte    d»-   I 

omniit    fua,  Torquate.   n 

Honestum  igltur  id  iiiteliegimus  quod  tale  est  u 
detracts  omni  utilitate  sine  ullis  praemiis  finictibusvif 
per  se  ipsum  possit  Sure  laudari.     Quod  quale 

1  tain  definitione,  qua  sum  usus,  intellegi  potes 
(quamquam  aliquantum  potest)  quam  comuiuni  om 

m  iudicio  et  optimi  cuiusque  studiis  atqiie  factis,1 
qui   pemiulta   ob    earn    imam   causa m   faciunt   quia 
decet,  quia  rectum,  quia  honestum  est,  etsi  nullum 
consecuturum      cmolumentum      vident.        Homines 

Ti,  etsi  aliis  multis,  tamen  hoc  uno  plurimum 
a  bestiis  differunt  quod  rationem  liabent  a  natura 
datam  nientemque  acrem  et  vigentem  celer- 
rimeque  multa  simul  agitantem  et,  ut  ita  dicam, 
sagacem,  quae  et  causas  reruin  et  consecutiones 
videat  et  similitudines  transferat  et  disiuncta  con- 
iungat  et  cum  praesentibus  futura  copulet  om- 
nemque  complectatur  vitae  conseqiientis  statum. 
Eademque  ratio  fecit  hominem  homtnum  appeten- 
tem  cumque  lis  natura  et  sermone  et  usu  congruen- 
tem,  ut  profectus  a  caritate  domesticorum  ac  suorum 
-serpat  longius  et  se  implicet  primum  civium,  deinde 

lium  mortalium  societate  atque,  ut  ad  Archytam 
scripsit  Plato,  non  sibi  se  soli  natum  meminerit  sed 
patriae,  sed  suis.  ut  perexigua  pars  ipsi  relinquatur. 

^  BOOK  n.  xiv  -,-   '  , 

tile  nature  of  Moral  Worth  ;  aiid  tlieu,  I'oKluutiis,  I 
will  proceed  to  deal  with  each  of  your  points,  unless 
my  memory  should  liappen  to  fail  mc. 

■t.,5  ■'  By  Moral  Worth  then,  we  understand  that  Moral 
wl^ch  is'STsm-'h  a  nature  thatj^tliougli  devoid_pf  all  jn  En 
utility,  it  can  jusfly  be  corMuendcd  in  and  for  itself^'l^^i 
apart 'from  any  profit  or  reward.  A  formal  definition  and  h. 
stieh"as"TTiive  given  may  do  something  to  indicate  ™tfit\ 

its  nature;    but  this  is  •n}ftTf  i,',]parljf  fxplained  hy  the     , 

general^ierdict.of  mankind  at  large,  and  by  tile  aims 
and  actions  of  all  persons  of  high  character.  Good 
men  do  a  great  many  things  from  which  they  antici- 
pate no  advantage,  solely  fro™  the  motive  of  pro- 
priety, _naoralitj;_Mid  fright.  For  among  the  many 
points  of  diifference  between  man  and  the  lower  ani- 
mals, the  greatest  difference  is  that  Nature  has 
bestowed  on  man  the  gift  of_Reasoij,  of  an  active, 
vigorous  intelligence,  able  to  prosecute  several  trains 
of  thought  with  great  swiftness  at  the  same  time, 
and  having,  so  to  speak,  a  keen  scent  to  discern  the 
sequence  of  causes  and  effects,  to  draw  analogies, 
combine  things  separate,  connect  the  ftiture  with 
the  present,  and  survey  the  entire  field  of  the  sub- 
sequent course  of  life.  It  is  Reason  moreover  that 
has  inspired  man  with  a  relish  for  his  kind; 
she  has  produced  conformity  of  character,  of  lan- 
guage and  of  Iinbif ;  she  bus  prompted  the  indi-  . 
vi3nst;~EtaFting"  from  friendship  and  from  family  \ 
affection,  to  expand  his  interests,  forming  social 
ties  first  with  his  fellow- citizens  and  later  with  all 
mankind.  She  reminds  him  that,  as  Plato  puts  it  in 
his  letter  to  Archytas,'^  man  was  not  born  for  self 
alone,  but  for  country  and  for  kmdred,  claims  that 
i6  leave  but  a  small  part  of  him  for  himself.     Nature 

+6  Et  quoiiiam  eadem  natura  cupiditatem  ingenuit  ho- 
mjni  veri  videndi,  quod  facillime  apparet  cum  vatrui 
curis  etiam  quid  in  caelo  liat  sa'ire  avemus,  his  initiis 
inducti  omniii  vera  diligimus,  id  est  fidelia,  simplicia, 
constantia,  turn  vana,  falsa,  fallentia  odimus,  ut  frau- 
dem,  periurium,  malitiam,  iniuriam.  Eadejn  ratio 
habet  in  se  quiddum  ajiiplum  utque  tuagniRcum,  ad 
iinperanduni  iiiagis  quam  ad  parendum  accommoda- 
tum,  omnia  humaiia  iioii  tolerabilla  solum  sed  etiam 
levia  ducens,altum quiddam et  excelsum, nihil  timens, 
■il  nemini  eedens,  semper  invictum.  Atque  his  tribus 
Reneribus  honestoriun  notatis,  quartum  sequitur  et 
in  eadem  pulchritudine  et  aptuin  ex  illis  tribus,  in 
quo  inest  ordo  et  moderatio.  Cuius  similitudine 
perspecta  in  formarum  specie  ac  dignitate,  transitum 
est  ad  honestateiTi  dictorum  atque  factorura.  Nam 
ex  his  tribus  laudibus  (juas  ante  dixi,  et  temeritatem 
reiormidat  et  non  audet  puiquam  aut  dicto  protervo 
aut  facto  nocere,  vereturque  quidquam  aut  facere  aut 
eloqui  quod  pannn  virile  videatur. 
■VS  XV.  Habes  undique  expletara  et  perfectam,  Tor- 
quate,  fomiam  lionestalis,  quae  tota  quattuor  his  vir- 
tutibus  quae  a  te  quoque  commemoratae  sunt  conti- 
netiir.  Hanc  se  tuus  Epicurus  omniiioigiioraredicit 
quam  aut  qualem  esse  velint  ii  qui  honestate  summum 

^P  BOOK   II.  xiv-xv 

has  also  enffendercd  in  mankind  the  dfsirp  gf  mn-  (i 
templatms  triitli.     This  is  most  clearly  manifested 
in  our  hours  of  leisure;    when    our  minds  are  at 
ease  we  are  eager  to  acquire  knowledge  even  of 
the    movements    of    the    heavenly    bodies.      Thia 
primary  instinct  leads  us  on  tu  love  aU  truth  as  such,  («]  jni 
that  is,  all  that  is  trustworthy,  simple  and  consistent, 
;i)id  to  hate  things  insuicere,  false  and  deceptive,, 
such    as    cheating,    perjury,    malice   and    injustice. 
I'urther,  Reason  possesses  an  intrinsic  elenjent  ofC3)C( 
di^iity   and  grandeur,    suited    rather    to    reqaire 
obedience  than  to  render  it,  esteeming  all  the  a 
dents  of  human  fortunes  not  merely  as  endurable 
but  also  as  unimportant ;  a  quality  of  loftiness  and 
elevation,  fearing  nothing,  submitting  to  no  one, 

7  ever  unsubdued.  These  three  kinds  of  moral  good-  U)  Temp«rui« 
ness  being  noted,  there  follows  a  fourth  kind, 
possessed  of  equal  beauty,  and  indeed  combining  ii 
itself  the  other  three.  This  is  the  principle  of  order 
and  of  restraint  From  recognizing  something 
analogous  to  this  principle  in  the  beauty  and  dignity 
of  outward  forms,  we  pass  to  beauty  i: 
sphere  of  speech  and  conduct.  Each  of  the  three 
excellences  mentioned  before  contributes  something 
to  this  fourth  one:  it  dreads  rashness;  it  shrinks 
from  injuring  anyone  by  wanton  word  or  deed;  and 
it  fears  to  do  or  say  anything  that  may  appear 

fl       XV.     There,  Torquatus,  is  a  full,  detailed  a 

plete  account  of  Moral  Worth,  a  whole  of  which  these  f™^°SS^ 
four  virtues,  which  you  also  mentioned,  constitute  the  "' 
parts.     Yet  your  Epicurus  tells  us  that  he  is  uttetly 
at  a  loss  to  know  what  nature  or  qualities  are  assigned 
to  this  Morality  by  those  who  make  it  the  n 


i)  lemperinc. 


boDum  metinntur.     Si  enim  ad  honestatcm 

referantur  neque  in  ea  voluptatem  dicant  inesse,  nit 
aani  sonai'e  (his  enim  ipsis  verbis  utitur), 
neque  intellege  renecvideresubhancvocemhonestatis 
quae  sit  subicienda  sententia.  Ut  enim  consuetudo 
loquitur,  id  solum  dicitur  hoiiestum  quod  est  popular 
fama  gloriosum.  Quod,  iiiquit,  quamquam  voluptati- 
bus  quibusdam  est  saepe  iucundius,  tamen  expetitur 
1.49  propter  voluptatem.  Videsne  quam  sit  magna  dis- 
.0?  Philosophusnobilis,  aquonon  solum  Graecia 
et  Italia  sed  etiam  omiiis  barbaria  commota  est, 
honestum  quid  sit,  si  id  non  sit  in  voluptate,  negat 
intellegere,  nisi  forte  illud  quod  raultitudinis 
more  laudetur.  Ego  autem  hoc  etiam  turpe  esse 
saepe  iudico  et,  si  quando  turpe  non  sit,  turn  esse  non 
turpe  cum  id  a  multitudine  laudetur  quod  sit  ipsum 
per  se  rectum  atque  laudabile ;  tamen  non  ob  earn 
causam  illud  dici  esse  honestum  quia  laudetur  a 
multis,  sed  quia  tale  sit  ut,  vel  si  ignorarent  id  ho- 
si  obmutuissent,  sua  tamen  pulchritudine 
esset  specieque  laudabile.  Itaque  idem  natura  victuSi 
eui  obsisti  non  potest,  dicit  alio  loco  id  quod  a  te 
etiam  paulo  ante  dictum  est,  non  posse  iucunde  vin 
nisi  etiam  honeste.  Quid  nunc  honeste'  dicit? 
idemne    quod     iucunde  '  ?      Ergo   ita  :    non   posse 

elsewhere  no  iranslalion  can  convey  Ihe  double  1 
ling  of  the  word  honestum,  '  honourable,"  used  a! 
i!Tisa\6r,  '  lite  moralty  beautiful  org'ood.' 


ir).  1 

BOOK  11.  jiv 
of  the  Chief  Good.  For  if  Morality  be  tliestandarf 
to  which  all  things  are  referredj  while  yet  thej  will 
not  allow  that  pleasure  forms  any  parb  of  it,  he  de- 1 
clares  that  they  are  utterine  sounds  devoid  of  sfr*^" 
(those  are  his  actual  words),  and  that  he  has  no 
nation  or  perception  whatever  of  any  meaning 
that  this  term  Morality  cati  have  attached  to  it.  In 
common  parlance  '  mgraT  (honourable)'  means 
mpr^ly  tlipt  whif-h  rnnWrhlg.^Lin  PTulnr  psfi-Pin 
And  popular  esteensrsays  Epicuf aB,-tliQugh  often  m 
itself  mure-flgrp'''' hip  tlinn  r£rtnji|_fnmi^i_nrplpii';iirei 

t9  yet  iB-*li»niiinH  simply  ^g  ft  mgnns  to  pleasufeT  Do 
you  realize  how  vast  a  difference  of  opinion  this  is  ? 
Here  is  a  famous  philosopher,  whose  influence  has 
spread  not  only  over  (ireece  and  Italy  but  through- 
out all  barbarian  lands  as  well,  protesting  that  he  can- 
not understand  what  Moral  Worth  is,  if  it  does  not\ 
consist  in  pleasure  ;  unless  indeed  it  be  that  which  \ 
wins  the  approval  and  applause  of  the  multitude. 
For  my  part  I  hold  that  what  is  popular  is  often  poai-  | 
tively  base,  and  that,  if  ever  it  is  not  base,  this  is  only 
when  the  multitude  happens  to  applaud  somethuig 
that  is  right  and  praiseworthy  in  and  for  itself;  which  ■ 
even  so  is  not  called  '  moral '  (honourable)  because  ' 
it  is  widely  applauded,  but  because  It  is  of  such  a ' 
nature  that  even  if  men  were  unaware  of  its  eitist-  . 
ence,  or  never  spoke  of  it,  it  would  still  be  worthy  of  ' 
praise  for  its  own  beauty  and  loveliness.  Hence  ' 
Epicurus  is  compelled  by  the  irresistible  force  of  in- 
stinct to  say  in  another  passage  what  you  also  said 
just  now,  that  it  is  impossible  to  live  pleasantly  with- 

iO  out  also  living  morally  (honourably).     What  does  he 
mean  by    morally'  now?  The  same  as    pleasantly'? 
If  so,  does  it  amount  to  saying  that  it  is  impfossible 

honeate  vivi  nisi  honeste  vivatiir?  An  nisi  populnri 
famu?  Sine  ea  iKitur  tucunde  negat  posse  se  vivere^? 
Quid  tiirpius  quam  sapientis  vitam  ex  insipientiutn 
s<^rmone  pendere  ?  Quid  ergo  hoc  loco  intellegit 
boiiestiini  ?  Certe  nihil  nisi  quod  possit  ipsum  prop- 
ter Be  iure  luudari.  Nam  si  propter  voluptatem, 
(juae  est  ista  laus  quae  possit  e  inacelio  peti  ?  Non 
is  vir  est  ut,  eum  honeatatem  eo  loco  Iiabeat  ut  sine 
eu  iucunde  neget  posse  vivi,  illud  honestum  quod 
popuUre  sit  scntiat  et  sine  co  neget  iucunde  vivi 
posse,  aut  quidquam  aliud  honestum  intellegat  nisi 
quod  sit  rectum  ipsuniquc  per  se,  sua  vi,  sua  sponte, 
sua  natura  laudabih'. 
I  XVI.  'Ituque,  Torquate,  cum  diceres  elamare  Epi- 
eurnm  non  posse  iucunde  vivi  nisi  honeste  et  sapi- 
enteret  iuste  viveivtur,  tu  ipse  milii gloriari  videbare. 
Tiutta  vis  inerut  iu  verbis  propter  earuin  rerum  quae 
signitieabanliir  his  verbis  dignitatem,  nt  altior  fieres.. 
ut  interdum  insisleres,  ut  nos  intuens  quasi  testifica- 
rere  Inudari  honestatrui  et  iustitiaia  aliquando  ab 
Kpieura  Qiuun  te  decebtit  iis  verbis  uti  quibus  si 
philosoplii  iiiMi  uterentur.  philosophia  onmino  non 
(.'gereuuis.  Istorum  enim  verbonim  amorer  quae 
pemru  appeUantur  ab  Epicuro,  sapientiae.  fortitudi- 
nis,  institiae.  temperantiae,  praestantissimis  ingeniis 

^fiKai/srvirrivildv.  ^  fnsr  Pivi  OnUi :  passe  ^mtr  ilSS, 

^  BOOK  II.  xv-xvi 

to  live  morally  unless  you — livt  morally  ?  Orj  unles 
you  make  public  opinion  your  standard  ? 
then  that  he  cannot  live  pleasantly  without  tlie 
approval  of  public  opinion  ?  But  what  can  be  baser 
than  to  make  the  conduct  of  the  Wise  Man  depend 
upon  thp^oasip  of  tRiTfooItBt^  What  therefore  does 
he  understand  by  moral'  in  this  passage  ?  Clearly, 
nothing  but  that  which  can  be  rightly  praised  for  its 
own  sake.  For  if  it  be  praised  as  being  a  means  to 
pleasure,  what  is  there  creditable  about  this  ?  You 
can  get  pleasure  at  the  provision-dealer's.  Ho,— 
Epicurus,  who  esteems  Moral  Worth  so  highly  as  to 
say  that  it  is  impossible  to  live  pleasantly  without  it. 
is  not  the  man  to  identify 'moral'  (honourable)  with 
popular'  and  mumtain  that  it  is  impossible  to  live 
pleasantly  without  popular  esteem  ;  he  cannot  under- 
stand moral'  to  mean  anything  else  than  that 
which  is  right, — that  which  is  in  and  for  itself, 
independently,  intrinsically,  and  of  its  own  nature 

XVI.      This,  Torquatus,  accounts  for  the  glow  of  Si 
pride  with  which,  as  I  noticed,  you  iiifomied  us  how  ..g 
loudly  Epicurus  proclaims  the  impossibility  of  living  f' 
pleasantly  without  living  morally,  wisely  and  justly. 
Your  words  derived  potency  from  the  grandeur  of 
the  things  that  they  denoted  ;youdrewyourself  up  to 
your  full  height,  and  kept  stopping  and  lixing  us  with 
your  gaze,  and  solemnly  asseverating  tliat  Epicurus 
does  occasionally  commend    morality   and  justice. 
Were  those  names  never  mentioned  by  philosophers 
we  should  have  no  use  fo^hilosophy ;  how  well  they 
sounded  on  your  lips  I     Too  seldom  does  Epicurus 
speak  to  us  ofWisdom,  Courage,  Justice.  Temperance. 
Yet  it  is  the  love  that  those  great  nanies  inspire  wliich 

homines   se  ad    pliilosophiae   studium  contulerunt. 

,)2  Oculorum,  inquit  Plato,  est  in  nobia  sensus  acerriinus, 
quibus  sapientiam  nan  cemimua ;  quam  ilia  ardentes 
amores  encitaret  sui,  si  videretur'!  Cur  tandem?  an 
quod  ita  callida  est  ut  optime  possit  architectari  vo- 
luptates?  Cur  iustitia  laudatur?  aut  unde  est  hoc 
contritum  vetustate  proverbium :  'quicum  in  tene- 
bris'*?     Hoc,  dictum  in  una  re,  latissime  patet,  ut 

53  in  omnibus  factis  re,  non  teste  moveaniur.  Sunt  enim 
levia  ct  perinfirma  quae  dicebantur  a  te,  animi  con- 
seientia  improbos  esi-ruciari,  turn  etiam  poenae  timore 
qua  aut  afficiantur  aut  semper  sint  in  metu  ne  affici- 
antur  aliquando.  Non  oportet  timidum  aut  imbecillo 
animo  fiii|^  non  bonuni  ilium  virum,  qui  quidquid 
fecerit  ipse  se  cruciet  omniaque  formidet,  sed  omnia 
calHde  referentem  ad  utilitatem,  acutum,  versutum, 
veteratorem,  facile  ut  excogitet  quomodo    occulte, 

5*  sine  teste,  sine  ullo  conscio  fallat.  An  tu  me  de 
L.  Tubulo  putas  dicere  ?  qui  cum  praetor  quaestionem 
inter  siearios  exercuisset,  ita  aperte  cepit  pecunias  ob 
rem  iudjcandam  ut  anno  pruximu  P.  Seaevola  tribunus 
plebis  ferret  ad  plebem,  vellentne  de  ea  re  quaeri. 
Quo  plebiscite  decreta  a  senatu  est  consul!  quaestio 
Cn.  Caepioni;  profectus  in  exsilium  Tubulus  statim 
nee  respondere  ausus  ;  erat  enim  res  aperta. 

'si  videretur  Mdv.  om.  with  A,  B,  E,  but  cp.  Plato, 
Phaedr.  250  D.  S^it  yd/)  Ti/ijy  i^irTAnt  -rHv  3id  rou  aiinaros 
fpXf^tiL  ata6Tj<riun',  ^  ^pdytj^it  oCx  opaTai.Seiifoi/i  yiip  &v  ra.peT\tr 
Ipurrtt,    tC  Ti   TQiaihov   ^aurfli    ^apyis    riiaXov    wapclxtro    ilt 

^guicum  in  lenebiis  micesXnt  MSS.  Cp. ,/«  O/I  3.  77,  cum 

tEnebris  mices  (sc.  digitis). 

^H  BOOK   II.   Mi 

Eas  lured  the  ablfKt  of  mankind  to  devote  themselves 
53  to  philosophical  studies.  The  sense  of  sight,  says 
Plato,  is  the  keenest  sense  we  possess,  yet  our  eyes 
cannot  behold  Wisdom ;  could  we  see  her,  what 
passionate  love  would  she  awaken !  And  why  is 
this  so  f  Is  it  because  of  her  supreme  ability  and 
cunning  in  the  art  of  contriving  pleasures  ?  Why  is 
Justice  commended  ?  What  gave  rise  to  the  old 
familiar  saying, '  Aman  with  whom  you  might  play  odd 
and  even  in  the  dark '  ?  This  proverb  strictly  applies 
to  the  particular  cose  of  honesty,  but  it  has  this 
general  application,  that  in  all  our  conduct  we  should 
be  influenced  by  the  character  of  the  action,  not  by 
yi  the  presence  or  absence  of  a  witness.  How  weak 
and  ineffectual  are  the  deterrents  you  put  forward, 
— -the  torture  of  a  guilty  conscience,  and 
fear  of  the  punishment  that  offenders  incur,  < 
all  events  stand  in  continual  dread  of  incurring  ii 
end  !  We  must  not  picture  our  unprincipled  man  as 
a  poor-spirited  coward,  tormenting  himself  about  his 
past  misdeeds,  and  afraid  of  everything ;  but  as 
shrewdly  calculating  profit  in  all  he  does,  sharp, 
dexterous,  a  practised  hand,  fertile  in  devices  for 
cheating  in  secret,  without  witness  or  accomplice. 
5-i  Don't  suppose  I  am  speaking  of  a  Lucius  Tubulus, 
who  when  he  sat  as  praetor  to  try  charges  of  murder 
made  so  little  concealment  of  taking  bribes  for  his 
verdict  that  nest  year  the  tribune  of  the  plebs, 
Publius  Scaevola,  moved  in  the  plebeian  assembly  for 
a  special  inquiry.  The  bill  passed  the  plebs,  and  the 
senate  commissioned  the  consul  Gnaeus  Caepio  to 
hold  the  investigation;  but  Tubulus  promptly  left 
the  country,  and  did  not  venture  to  stand  his  trial, 
so  open  was  his  guilt. 




XVII.  ■"'Nonigiturdeimpi-obosedde'  callido  im- 
probo  quaerimus,  quatis  Q.  Pompeiiis  in  foedere  Nu- 
raantino  infitiando  fuit,  iiec  vero  omnia  tiiuente  sed 
prinium  qui  animi  conscientiam  non  curet,  quam 
scilicet  eoiupiimere  nihil  est  negoti.  Is  enim  qui 
ocpultus  et  teetus  dicitur,  tantum  abest  ut  se  indicet, 
perficiet  etiam  ut  dolere  alterius  improbe  facto  vi- 
deatur;  quid  est  enim  atiud  esse  versutum? 
i  Meniiiii  me  adesse  P.  Sextilio  Rufo  cum  is  rem  ad 

aiuicos  ita  deferret,  se  esse  heredem  Q.  Fadio  Gallo, 
cuius  in  testamento  scriptum  esset  se  ab  eo  rogatum  ut 
omnis  hereditas  ad  filiam  perveniret.  Id  Sextilius 
factum  negabat ;  jxiterat  autem  impune  ;  quis  enim 
redargueret  ?  Nemo  nostrum  credebat,  eratque  veri 
similtus  huuc  meutiri,  cuius  iuteresset,  quam  ilium, 
qui  id  se  rogasse  scripsisset  quod  debuisaet  rogare. 
Addebat  etiam  se  in  legem  Voeoniam  iuratuni  contra 
earn  facere  non  audere,  nisi  aliter  amicis  videretur. 
Aderamus  nos  quidem  adulesceiites,  sed  multi  am* 
plissimi  viri,  quorum  nemo  censuit  plus  Fadiae  dan- 
dum  quam  posset  ad  earn  lege  Voconia  pervenire. 
Tenuit  permagnam  Sextilius  liereditatem  unde,  si 
secutus  esset  eorum  sentt^ntiam  qui  honesta  et  recta 
eniolumeiitis  timnibus  et  cominodia  anteponerent, 
'  de  inserted  by  Mdv. 

1  Presumably  a  reference  to  the  customary  oaih  to  main- 
tain the  laws,  taken  on  assuming  an  office  of  state.  The 
Vocoaian  law  prohibitEil  a  woman  from  being*  left  heir  to 
an  estate.     It  was  evaded  by  bequeathing  the  estate  lo  a 

end  who  had  promised  to  hand  it  on  to  the  intended 


b  The  Vol 

1  have  allov 

passed  to  the  '  here.s  *  proper, 
had  been  made  to  Kadia,  or  It 
get  nothing. 

)r  bequest 

V  BOOK   II.  wii 

XVII    "It  id  nut  therefore  a  question  uf  a  rascal  Poieaay&- 
merely,  but  of  a  crafty  rascal,  like  Quiutus  Pompeius  escape^Mm- 
wheii  he  disowned  the  treaty  he  had  made  with  the  ^°°''  ""^usii 
Numanttnes  :  nor  yet  of  a  timid,  cowardly  knave,  fits  some  rishii 
but  of  one  who  to  begin  with  is  deaf  to  the  voice  of  p^^fj^]^'  "* 
conscience,  which  it  is  assuredly  no  difficult  matter 
to  stifle.     The  man  we  call  stealthy  iind  secret,  so 
far  from  betraying  his  own  Ruilt,  will  actually  make 
believe  to  be  indignant  at  the  knavery  of  aiiotlicr ; 
that  ia  what  we  mean  by  a  cunning  old  hand. 

i  I   remember  assisting  at  a  consultation  which 

Publius  Sextilius  Rufus  held  with  his  friend  on  the 
following  matter.  He  Iiad  been  left  heir  to  Quintus 
Fadius  Gallus.  Fadius's  will  contained  a  statement 
that  he  had  requested  Sextilius  to  allow  the  whole  of 
the  estate  to  pass  to  his  daughter.  Sextilius  now  de- 
nied the  arrangement,  as  he  could  do  with  impunity, 
for  there  was  no  one  to  rebut  him.  Not  one  of  us 
believed  his  denial ;  it  was  more  probable  that  he 
should  be  lying,  as  his  imcket  was  concerned,  than 
the  testator,  who  had  left  it  in  writing  that  he  had 
made  a  request  which  it  had  been  his  duty  to  make. 
Sextilius  actually  went  on  to  say  that,  having  sworn 
to  maintain  the  Voeonian  law,''  he  would  not  venture 
to  break  it,  unless  his  friends  thought  he  ought  to 
do  so.  I  was  only  a  young  man,  but  many  of  the 
company  were  persons  of  high  consideration ;  and 
every  one  of  these  advised  him  not  to  give  Fadla 
more  than  she  was  entitled  to  get  under  the  Voeonian 
law.  Sestilius  kept  a  hand.'jome  property,  not  a 
penny  of  which  he  would  have  touched  had  he 
followed  the  advice  of  those  who  placed  honour  and 
right  above  all  considerations  of  profit  and  advantage. 
Do  you  therefore  suppose  that  he  was  afterwards 

nummum  niillum'  attigisset.  Num  igitur  eum  postea 
censes  anxio  animo  aut  suUicito  fuisse  ?  Nihil  minus, 
contraque  ilia  hereditate  dives  ob  eamque  rem  laetus. 
Magiii  enijn  aestimabat  pecuniam  non  modo  non 
contra  leges  sed  etiam  legibus  partam  ;  quae  quidem 
vel  cum  pcriculo  est  quaerenda  vobis ;  est  enim 
effectrix  multarum  et  mognarum  voluptatum. 

56  Ut  igitur  illis  qui,  recta  et  honesta  quae  sunt,  ea 

statuunt  per  ae  expeteiida,  adeunda  sunt  saepe  peri- 
cula  decgris  honestatisquc  causa,  sic  vestrls,  qui  omnia 
voluptate  metiuutur,  pericula  adeunda  sunt  ut  adipi- 
seantur  magnas  voluptates.  Si  magna  res,  magna 
hereditas  ag-ctur,  cum  pecunja  voluptates  pariantur 
plurimae,  idem  crit  Epicuro  veatro '  faciendum,  si 
suum  finem  bonorum  sequi  volet,  quod  Scipioni, 
magna  gloria  proposita  si  Hannibalem  in  Africam 
retraxisset,  Itaque  quantum  adiit  periculum  !  Ad 
honestatem  enim  ilium  omnem  conatum  suum  re- 
ferebat,  non  ad  voluptatem.  Sic  vester  sapiens, 
magno  aliquo  emolumento  commotus,  cum  causa,' 

S?  si  opus  erit,  dimicabit.  Occultum  facinua  esse  po- 
tuerit,  gaudebit ;  deprehensus  omnem  poenam  con- 
temiiet.  Erit  enim  instructus  ad  mortem  contemnen- 
dam,  ad  exiliura,  ad  ipsum  etiani  dolorem.  Quern 
quidem  vos  cum  improbis  poenam  proponitis  impe- 
tibilem  facitis,  cum  sapientem  semper  boni  plus 
habere  vultis  tolerabilem. 

XVIII.  "  Sed  finge  non  solum  callidum  eum  qui  ali- 

'  nummum  nullum  ;  some  inf.  MSS.  ne  nummum  guidem 
'mm  causa  Mdv.  marks  as  corrupt,  and  cortjeckires  cum 

BOOK  U.  xviUxviii 
troubled  by  remorse  ?  Not  a  bit  of  it.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  inheritance  made  him  a  rich  roan,  and  he 
was  thoroughly  pleased  with  himself  in  consequence. 
He  thought  he  had  scored  heavily  :  he  had  won  a 
fortune,  not  only  by  no  illegal  means,  but  actually 
by  the  aid  of  the  law.  And  according  to  your  school 
it  is  right  to  try  to  get  money  even  at  some  risk  ; 
for  money  procures  many  very  delightful  pleasures. 

56  Thereforejustas  those  who  hold  that  things  right 

and  honourable  are  desirable  for  their  own  sake  must 
often  take  risks  in  the  cause  of  honour  and  morality, 
so  Epicureans,  who  measure  all  Ihing.s  by  pleasure. 
may  properly  take  risks  in  order  to  obtain  consider- 
able pleasures.  If  a  large  sum  of  money  or  a  great 
inheritance  is  at  stake,  inasmuch  as  money  buys  a 
vast  number  of  pleasures,  your  Epicurus,  if  he  wishes 
to  attain  his  own  End  of  Goods,  will  have  to  act 
as  Scipio  did,  when  he  had  the  chance  of  winning 
great  renown  by  enticing  Hannibal  back  to  Africa. 
To  do  so,  he  risked  enormous  dangers.  For  honour 
and  not  pleasure  was  the  aim  of  that  great  enter- 
prise. Similarly,  your  Epicurean  Wise  Man,  when 
stirred  by  the  prospect  of  some  considerable  gain, 
will  fight  to  the  death,  if  need  be,  and  with  good 

51  reason.  Do  circumstances  allow  his  crime  to  go 
undetected,  so  much  the  better ;  but  if  found  out, 
he  will  make  light  of  every  penalty.  For  he  will 
have  been  schooled  to  make  Ught  of  death,  of  exile, 
even  of  pain  itself.  The  latter  indeed  you  make 
out  to  be  unendurable  when  you  are  enacting 
penalties  for  the  wicked,  but  easy  to  bear  when  , 
you  are  maintaining  that  the  WiSe  Man  will  always  ib 
eonainand  a  preponderance  of  Good.  ^ 

XVIII.  "But  suppose  that  our  evil-doer  is  not  only  " 

quid  improbe  tiaciat,  verutn  etiam-  praepotetitem,  ut 
M.  Crassus  fiiit, — qui  tamen  solebat  oti  suo  bono,— 
uthodie  est  noBter  Pompeius,  cui  recte  fac i en ti  gratia 
est  habenda ;  esse  enim  quam  vellet  iniquus  poterat 
impune.    Quam  multa  vero  iniuste  fieri  possunt  quae 

,'j8  nemo  possit  reprehendere !  Si  te  amicus  tuusmoriens 
rogaverit  ut  hereditatem  reddas  suae  filiae,  nee  us- 
quam  id  scrijiserit,  ut  scripsit  Fadius,  nee  cuiquun 
dixerit,  quid  fades?  Tu  quidem  reddes;  ipse  Epi- 
curus fortassc  redderet;  ut  Sex.  Peducaeus,  Sex.  F., 
is  qui  hunc  nostrum  reliquit  effigiem  et  bumanitatis 
et  probitntis  suae  (ilium,  cum  doctus,  turn  ommum 
vir  optimus  et  iustissimus,  cum  sciret  nemo  eum  ro- 
gatum  a  C,  Plotio,  equite  Romano  splendido,  Nur- 
sino,  ultro  ad  mulierem  veiiit  eique  nihil  opinanti  viri 
mandatum  exposuit  hereditatemque  reddidit.  Sed 
ego  ex  te  quaero,  quoniam  idem  tu  certe  fecisses, 
nonne  intellegas  eo  raaiorem  vim  esse  naturae  quod 
ipsi  vos,  qui  omnia  ad  vestrum  eommodum  et  ut  ipsi 
dicitis  ad  voluptatein  referatis,  tamen  ea  faciatis  e 
quibus  appareat  nun  voluptateui  ^'os  sed  oHieium  se- 
qui,  plusque  rectam  naturam  quam  rationem  pravain 

59  valere?  Si  scieris,  inquit  Carneades,  aspidem  occulte 
latere  uspiam  et  velle  atiquem  imprudentem  super 
earn  assidere  cuius  more  tibi  «mulunieiituni  futum  sit, 

B  BOOK  II.  Kviii 

**Wlever  but  also  supremely  iiuwerful,  as  was  Marcus 
Crassus,^who  however  was  mostly  content  to  rely 
on  his  private  resources;  or  like  our  friend  Poinpeius 
atthepresent  time,  who  deserves  our  gratitude  for  his 
upright  conduct,  since  he  might  be  as  unjust  as  he 
liked  with  impunity.  But  how  many  unrighteous 
acts  are  possible  which  no  one  would  be  in  a  position 

i  8  to  censure  !     If  a  friend  of  yours  requests  you  on  his 
death-bed  to  hand  over  his  estate  to  his  daughter, 
without  leaving  his  intention  anywhere  in  writing, 
!is  Tadiusdid,  or  speaking  of  it  to  anybody,  what  will 
you  do  ?     You  no  doubt  wiU  hand  over  the  money  ; 
perhaps  Epicurus  himself  would  have  done  the  same  ; 
as  did  Sextus  Peducaeus,  son  of  Sextus,  a  scholar  and 
a  gentleman  of  scrupulous  honour,  who  left  behind 
him  a  son,  our  friend  of  to-day,  to  recall  his  father's 
culture  and  integrity.      Ko  one  knew  that  a  similar 
request  bad  been  made  to  Sextus  by  a  distinguished 
Roman  knight  named  Gaius  Plotius,  of  Nursia  ;  but 
Sextus  of  his  own  accord  went  to  Plotius's  widow,  in- 
formed her,  much  to  her  surprise,  of  her  husband's 
commission,  and  handed  over  the  property  to  her. 
But  the  question  1  want  to  put  to  you  is  this  :  since 
you  yourself  would  undoubtedly  have  done  the  sa: 
do  you  not  see  the  force  of  natural  instinct  is  all  I 
the  more  firmly  established  by  the  fact  that  even  yon  l 
Epicureans,  who  profess  to  make  your  own  interest  ] 
and  pleasure  your  sole  standard,  nevertheless  perfor 
actions  that  prove  you  to  be  really  aiming  not  at  'J 
pleasure  but  at  duty  ;  prove,  I  say,  that  the  natural 
impulse  towards  right  is  more  powerful  than  corrupt 

.')9  reason  ?  Suppose,  says  Cameades,  you  should  know 
that  there  is  a  viper  lurking  somewhere,  and  that 
some  one,  by  whose  death  you  stiuid  to  profit,  is  about 

improbe  feceris  nisi  monueris  ne  asaidat.  Sed  im- 
punite  tnmen ;  scisse  enim  te  quis  coarguere  possit  ? 
Sed  nimis  multa.  Perspicuum  est  eniin,  nisi  aequitas, 
fidcSj  iustitia  proficiscantur  a  natura,  et  si  omnia  haec 
ad  utilitatem  referantur,  virum  boniim  non  posse  re- 
periri,  deque  Jiis  rebus  satis  multa  ill  nostris  de  re 
publica  libris  sunt  dicta  a  Laelio. 
)  XIX.  '  Transfer  idem  ad  modestiam  vel  temiwran- 
tiam,quac  est  moderatto  cupiditatum  rationi  obediens. 
Satiane  ergo  pudori  consulat  si  quis  sine  teste  libidini 
pareat?  An  est  aliquid  per  se  ipsum  flagitiosum, 
etiamsi  nulla  comitetur  infaijiia  ?  Quid  ?  fortes 
viri  voluptatuinne  calculis  subductis  proeliuin  ineunt, 
sanguinem  pro  patria  profundunt,  an  quodain  aninii 
ardore  atque  impetu  concitati  ?  U trum  tandem 
censes,  Torquate,  Imperiosum  ilium,  si  nostra  verba 
Audiret,  tuamne  de  se  omtionem  lilientius  auditurum 
fuisse  an  meani,  cum  ego  dicerem  nihil  eum  fecisse 
sua  causa  omiiiaque  rei  publicae,  tu  contra  nihil  nisi 
sua?     Si  vero  id  etiam  explanare  velles,  apertiusque 


61   modo  eum 

fecerit,  si 

sertim   vir 


ihil  eum  fecisse  nisi  voluptatis  causa,  quo- 
n  tandem  laturum  fuisse  existimas?  Esto; 
i  its  vis,  Torquatus  propter  suas  utilitates 
im  dicere  quara  voluptates,  in  tanto  prae- 
<);    num   etiam  eius  collega    P.    Decius. 

^P  BOOK  11.  xviii-Kix 

to  sit  ilown  on  it  uuawares :  then  you  will  do  a 
wicked  deed  if  you  do  not  warn  him  not  to  sit  down. 
But  still  your  wickedness  would  go  unpunished,  for 
who  could  possibly  prove  that  yoii  knew  ?  How- 
ever, I  labour  the  point  unnecessarily.  It  is  obvious 
that,  if  fair-dealing,  honesty  and  justice  have  not  their 
source  in  nature,  and  if  all  these  things  are  only 
valuable  for  their  utility,  no  good  nian  can  anywhere 
be  found.  The  subject  is  fully  discussed  by  Laelius 
in  my  volumes  On  the  Slate. 

3       XIX.      Apply  the  same  test  to  Temperanee  or  m 
Moderation,  which  means  the  control  of  the  appetites  ''  ^ 
in  obedience  to  the  reason.    *  Suppose  a,  man  yields  to  Coutige. 
vicious  impulses  in  secret, — is  that  no  offence  against  \  ^ 

purity?  Ori«-itiioXt^e_that  an  act  can  be  sinfiil  in  \  '  , 
itself,  even-thougb-ao  disgrace  attehdsjt?  And  again,  \  ■  ' 
does  a  brave  soldier  go  into  battle  and  shed  his  blood  ' 
I'or  his  country  upon  a  nice  calculation  of  the  balance 
of  pleasures,  or  in  liot  blood  and  under  the  stimulus 
of  impulse  ?  Come,  Torquatus,  if  the  great  Ini- 
periosus  were  listening  to  our  debate,  which  of  our 
two  speeches  about  himself  would  he  have  heard 
with  greater  satisfaction,  yours  or  mine  ?  Me  declar- 
ing that  no  deed  of  his  was  done  for  selfish  ends,  but 
all  from  motives  of  patriotism,  or  you  maintaining 
that  he  acted  solely  for  self  ?  And  suppose  you  had 
wanted  to  make  your  meaning  clearer,  and  had  said 
more  explicitly  that  all  his  actions  were  prompted  by 
desire  for  pleasure,  pray  how  do  you  imagine  he 
>1  would  have  taken  it?  But  grant  your  view;  assume 
if  you  like  that  Torquatus  acted  for  his  own  advan- 
tage (l  would  sooner  put  it  in  that  way  than  say  '  for 
his  own  pleasure,'  especially  in  the  case  of  so  great 
a  man),  Yet  what  about  his  colleague  Publius 

printeps  iu  ea  f&niJlJH.  consulatus,  cum  se  ilevovenit 
ctequofidimsBO  in  median)  acieniLatinorum  irruebat, 
aliquid  de  voluptAtibus  suia  cogitabat?  ubi  ut  earn 
caperet  aiit  quaiido?  cum  seiret  cunfestim  esse  mori- 
cndum,  eamque  mortem  ardentiore  studio  peteret 
quam  Epicurus  voluptatem  petendam  putat  Quod 
quidem  eius  factum  nisi  esset  iure  laudatum,  non 
esset  imitatus  quarto  consulatu  suo  lilius,  iieque  porro 
es  eo  natus  cum  Pyn'ho  bellum  gerens  consul  cecidis- 
set  in   proelio  seque   e    continenti  genere  tertiam 

62  victimam  rei  publicae  praebuisset.  Contineo  me  ab 
esemplis.  Graecis  hoc  modicum  est,  Leouidas, 
Epaminondas,  tres  aliqui  aut  quattuor :  ego  si  nostros 
coUigere  coepero,  perijciaro  illud  qiiidem  ut  se  vir- 
tuti  tradat  coiistringeudam  voluptas,  sed  dies  me 
delieiet,  et,  ut  A.  Varius,  qui  est  habitus  iudex  durior, 
dicere  eonsessori  tiolebat,  cum  datis  testibus  alii 
tamen  citarentur:  'Aut  hoc  testium  satis  est  aut 
iiescio  quid  satis  sit,'  sic  a  me  satis  datum  est  te- 
stium. Quid  enim  ?  te  ipsum,  diguissimum  niaiori- 
bus  tuis,  voluptasne  induxit  ut  adulescentulus  eripe- 
res  P.  Sullac  consulatum  ?  Quern  cum  ad  patrem 
tuum  rettulisses,  fortissimum  vinim,  quHlis  ille  vel 
consul  vel  civis  cum  semper,  turn  post  consulatum 
fuit!  Quo  quidem  auctore  nos  ipsi  ea  gessimus  ut 
omnibus  potius  quam  ipsis  nobis  consuluerimus. 

63  At  quam  pulchre  dicere  videbare,  cum  en  altera. 

BOOK  U.  xix 
Decius,  the  first  of  his  family  to  be  consul  ?  When 
Decius  vowed  liimself  to  death,  and  setting  spurs  to 
his  horse  was  eharging  into  the  thickest  of  the  Latin 
ranks,  surely  he  had  no  thought  of  personal  pleasure? 
Pleasure  where  to  be  enjoyed  or  when  ?  For  he 
knew  he  must  die  in  a  moment,  aye  and  he  courted 
death  with  more  passionate  ardour  than  Epicurus 
would  have  us  seek  pleasure.  Had  not  his  exploit 
earned  renown,  it  would  not  have  been  imitated  by 
his  son  in  his  fourth  consulship ;  nor  would  the 
letter's  son  again,  commanding  as  consul  in  the  war 
with  Pyrrhus,  have  also  fallen  in  battle,  third  in  suc- 
cession of  his  line  to  give  himself  a  victim  for  the 

[>2  state.  I  refrain  from  further  instances.  The  Greeks 
have  but  a  modest  liat, — Leonidas,  Epaminondas, 
some  three  or  four ;  but  were  1  to  begin  to  cite  the 
heroes  of  our  race,  I  should  doubtless  succeed  in 
making  Pleasure  yield  herself  prisoner  to  Virtue,  but 
— daylight  would  fail  before  1  had  done.  Aulus 
Varius,  noted  for  his  severity  as  a  judge,  used  to  say 
to  his  colleague  on  the  bench,  when  after  witnesses 
had  been  produced  still  further  witnesses  were 
called  ;  '  Either  we  have  evidence  enough  already, 
or  I  do  not  know  what  evidence  can  be  enough.' 
Well,  I  have  cited  witnesses  enough,  ^^'hy,  you 
yourself,  in  every  way  a  worthy  scion  of  your  stock, 
— was  pleasure  the  inducement  that  led  you,  a  mere 

■  youth,  to  wrest  the  consulship  from  Publius  Sulla  ? 
You  won  that  office  for  your  gallant  father ;  and  what 
a  consul  he  was!  What  a  patriot,  all  his  life  long 
and  more  especially  aCler  his  consulship !  It  was 
with  his  support  that  I  carried  through  an  affair, 
which  was  for  all  men's  interest  rather  than  my  o 

jS       "  But  how  well  you  thought  you  put  your 

parte  ponebascumulatum  aliqueni  plurimiset  maximis 
voluptatibus  nullo  nee  praeseiiti  nee  future  dolore, 
ex  altera  autem  cniciatibus  maximis  toto  corpore 
nulla  nee  adiuncta  nee  sperata  voluptate,  et  quaere- 
bas  quis  aut  hoc  miserior  aut  superiore  illo  beatior 
delude  concludebas  summum  malum  esse  doloi 
sum  mum  bonum  voluptatem  I 

XX.  "  L.  ThorJus  Balbus  fuit,  Lanuvinus,  qi 
meminisse  tu  non  potes  ;  is  ita  vivebat  ut  nulla 
exquisita  posset  inveniri  voluptas  qua  non  abundi 
Erat  et  cupidus  voluptatum  et  eius  generis  intelli 
gens  et  copiosus ;  ita  non  superstitiosus  ut  ilia  plurima 
in  sua  palria  sacrificia  et  fana  contemneret;  ita  non 
timidus  ad  mortem  ut  in  acie  sit  ob  rem  publicam 
i  interfectus.  Cupiditates  non  Epicuri  divisione  fiuie- 
bat  sed  sua  satietate.  Habebat  tamen  nitionem 
valetudinis;  utebatur  iis  exercitationibus  ut  ad 
cenam  et  sitiens  et  esuriens  veniret,  eo  cibo  qui  et 
suavissimus  esset  et  idem  facillimus  ad  concoquen- 
dum,  vino  et  ad  voluptatem  et  ne  noceret.  Cetera 
ilia  adhibebat,  quibus  demptis  negat  se  Epicurus 
intellegere  quid  sit  bonum.  Aberat  omnis  dolor; 
qui  si  adesset,  nee  molliter  ferret  et  tamen  medicis 
pluK  quam  philosophis  uteretur.  Color  egregius,  In- 
tegra valetudo,  sumina  gratia';  vita  deuique  conferta 


,  01  Vergiaini. 

BOOK   II.  xix-xx 
when  you  pictured  on  the  one  hand  a  person  loaded  The  voiuptn»r)> 
with  an  abundance  of  the  most  delightful  pleasures  f^pp^ 
and  free  from  all  pain  whether  present  or  in  pros-  ^ 
pectj  and  on  the  other  one  racked  throughout  liis 
frame  by  the  most  excruciating  pains,  unqualified  by 
any  pleasure  or  hope  of  pleasure  ;  then  proceede3  to 
ask  who  could  be  more  wretched  than  the  tatter  or 
more  happy  than  the  former  ;  and  finally  drew  the 
conclusion  that  pain  was  the  Chief  Evil  and  pleasure 
the  Chief  Good  I 

XX.  Well,  there  was  a  certain  Lucius  Thorius  of 
Lanuvium,  whom  you  cannot  remember ;  he  lived 
on  the  principle  of  enjoying  in  the  fullest  measure 
all  the  most  exquisite  pleasures  that  could  possibly 
be  found.  His  appetite  for  pleasures  was  only 
equalled  by  his  taste  and  ingenuity  in  devising  them. 
He  was  so  devoid  of  superstition  as  to  scoff  at  all  the 
gacriftees  and  shrines  for  which  his  native  place  is 
famous;  and  so  free  from  fear  of  death  that  he  died 
64  in  battle  for  his  country.  Epicurus's  classification 
of  the  desires  meant  nothing  to  him ;  he  knew  no 
limit  but  satiety.  At  the  same  time  he  was  care- 
ful of  his  health  :  took  sufheient  exercise  to  come 
hungry  and  thirsty  to  table ;  ate  what  was  at  once 
most  appetizing  and  most  digestible  ;  drank  enough 
wine  for  pleasure  and  not  too  much  for  health.  Nor 
did  he  forgo  those  other  indulgences  in  the  absence 
of  which  Epicurus  declares  that  he  cannot  under- 
stand what  Good  is.  Pain  he  never  experienced  at 
all ;  had  it  come  to  him,  he  would  have  borne  it 
with  fortitude,  yet  would  have  called  in  a  doctor 
sooner  than  a  philosopher.  He  had  excellent  health 
i^»ida  sound  constitution.  He  was  extremely  popular. 
^^Kl  short,  his  life  was  replete  with  pleasure  of  every 

r  fi,')  voluptatum  omnium  varietate.    Hunc  vos  beatum.— 

ratio  quidem  vestra  sic  cogit;  at  ego  quem  huic 
anteponam  non  audeo  dicere ;  dicet  pro  me  ipsa 
virtus,  nee  dubitabit  isti  vestro  beato  M-  Reguluni 
anteponere,  quem  quidem,  cum  sua  voluntatej  nulla. 
vi  coactus  praeter  lidem  quam  dederat  hosti,  ex 
patria  Carthaginem  revertisset,  tum  ipsum,  cum 
tigiliis  et  fame  cruciaretur,  claniat  virtiis  beatiorem 
fiiisse  quam  potantem  in  rosa  Thorium.  Bella  magna 
gesserat,  bis  consul  fuerat,  triunipharat,  nee  tamen 
sua  ilia  superiora  tarn  magna  neque  tam  praeclara 
ducelrat  quam  ilium  iiltimtim  casum  quem  propter 
fidem  constant iamque  susceperat ;  qui  nobis  misera- 
hilis  videtur  audientibus,  illi  perpetienti  erat  volu- 
ptarius.  Non  enim  hilaritate  nee  lascivia  nee  risu 
aut  ioco,  comite  levitatis,  saepe  etiam  tristes  firmi- 
\  66  tate  et  constantia  sunt  lieati.  Stuprata  per  vim 
Lucretia  a  regis  filio  testata  cives  se  ipsa  interemit. 
Hie  dolor  populi  Romani  duce  et  auctore  Bruto  causa 
civitati  libertatis  fuit,  ob  eiusque  mulieris  memoriam 
primo  anno  et  vir  et  pater  eius  consul  est  factus. 
Tenuis  L.  Verginius  unusque  de 
anno  post  libertatem  receptam  virginem  filiam 
manu  oecidit  potius  quam  ea  Ap.  Claudi  libidini. 
tum  erat  cum^  suramo  imperio,  dedereti 

filiam  SU^^H 
ibidini,  q^^^l 


at  least  svmr  ikim*  n^mt»  ymm  to  d»  a*.  Bat  I 
place  abam  fc^ — I  d»  mat  »ff  t.  Ib  atf  wk^m: 
Virtue  bcncif  ^aH  9eA  6r  me.  a^  ike  «9  Mot 
hesiUte  to  n^  SbRm  Bccdbs  t^Kr  Iba  Ok 

tj|ili  iillj  liini)  Ml»,  ai  J—  auMliI  i  illliw  Ecpalat, 
of  his  own  free  «fl  ^id  aad^  no  d^^fdoea  except 
that  m  a  pmHaae  gii<ui  to  an  tfoeTj  ictuiuea  &aM 
his  natiTc  had  to  C 

that  vbcB  be  bad  d 
tonuested  vitb  al 
caroo^ng  on  his  cmmJi  of  rvse*.  Bcgvlvs  had  faa^il 
great  van,  had  tviee  been  cansal,  had  eelebraled  a 
trinin[ifa  :  j*t  aD  his  earfier  exploits  be  counled  less 
givat  and  gfawuw»  than  thmk  final  disaster,  vhiefa  be 
ebosc  to  undeig*  foe  the  sake  of  hoooar  and  of 
lo3^t)* :  >  pitiahle  end,  aa  it  seems  to  ns  who  be«r 
of  it,  but  full  of  pleasore  foa-  faim  «ho  endured  >t 
Gaiety  and  tuerriment,  langfater  and  jesting,  those 
romnules  of  frivolitT,  are  not  the  <>n]}'  sigiis  of 
happiness :  often  in  sadness  those  are  happf  whose 
fit)  wills  are  strong  and  tme.  Lucretia  outraged  b.v 
the  royal  prince  called  on  her  fellow-ciliiens  lo 
witness  her  wrong  and  died  by  her  own  haiKJ.  The 
indignation  that  this  aroused  in  titc  RoDian  People, 
under  the  leadership  and  guidance  of  Brutus,  wo» 
freedom  for  the  state ;  and  in  gratitude  to  Lucretia'a 
memory  both  her  husband  ajid  her  father  were  made 
consuls  for  the  first  year  of  the  republic.  Sixty  years 
after  our  liberties  had  been  won,  Lucius  Verginius, 
a  poor  man  of  humble  station,  killed  his  mitideii 
daughter  with  his  own  hand  rather  than  surrender 
r  to  the  lust  of  Appius  Clnudiiis.  who  then  held 
e  highest  power  in  the  state. 


'  67  XXI.  '■  Aut  haec  tibi,  Torquate,  sunt  vituperanda 
aut putrocinium vohiptatis repudiandum.  Quodauteni 
patrocinium  aut  quae  ista  causa  est  voluptatis  quae 
nee  testes  uUos  e  claris  viris  nee  laudatores  poterit^ 
adhibere  ?  Ut  enim  nos  ex  aimalium  monumentis 
testas  exdtamus  eos  quorum  omnis  vita  consumpta 
est  in  laboribus  gloriosis,  qui  voluptatis  nomen  audire 
non  possent,  sic  in  vestris  dispiitationibus  historia 
muta  est.  Numquam  audivi  in  Epicuri  schola  LycuT- 
gam,  Solonem,  Miltiadem,  Themistoclem,  Epami- 
nondam  nominari,  qui  in  ore  sunt  celerorum  pliiloso^, 
phorum  omnium.  Nunc  vero,  quoniam  haec  no*) 
etiam  traetare  coepimus,  suppeditabit  nobis  Atticu»' 

68  noster  e  thesauris  suis  quos  et  quantos 
mehus  est  de  his  aliqoid  quam  tantis  voluniinibus  d« 
Tbemista  loqui  ?  Sint  ista  Graecorum  ;  quamquara 
ab  lis  philosophiam  et  omnes  ing'enuas  disciplinas 
habemus ;  sed  tamen  est  aliquid  quod  nobis  non 
liceat,  liceat  illis.  Pugnant  Stoici  eum  Peripateticis. 
Alteri  negant  quidquani  esse  bonum  nisi  quod  ho» 
nestum  sit,  alteri  plurimuni  se  et  longe  longeqae 
plurimiini  tribuece  honestati,  sed  tamen  et  in  corpore 
et  extra  esse  quaedam  bona.  Et  certamen  honestum 
et  disputatio  splendida  '.  Omnis  est  enim  de  virtutis 
dignitate  contentio.  At  cum  tuis  cum  diss  eras, 
multa  sunt  audienda  etiam  de  obscenis  voluptatibus, 

69  de  quibus  ab  Epicuro  saepissime  dicitur.     Non  potes 
ergo  ista  tueri,  Torquate,  mihi  crede,  si  te  ipse  et 


e  historical  and  biographical  m 

cellanksi'    ^^^ 

BOOK  11.  xxi 

67  XXI.      Ritlier,    Torquatus,   you    must   reprobate  Epfamsnbm 
these  actions,  or  you  must  give  up  your  championship  J^"  peaVSS 
of  Pleasure.      But  what  defence  can  Pleasure  offer,  of  hatory. 
what  case  can  you  make  out  for  her,  when  she  will 
be  able  to  produce  no  famous  men  as  her  witnesses 
or  supporters  ?     On  our  side  we  cite  in  evidence 
from  our  records  and  our  annals  men  who  spent  their 
whole  lives  in  glorious  toils,  men  who  would  not  have 
borne    to    hear  pleasure  so   mucli   as  named ;  but 
in  your  discourses  history  is  dumb.     In  the  school  of 

■Spicurus  I  never  beard  one  mention  of  Lycurgus, 
Solon,  MiltiadeS]  Themistocles,  Epaminondas,  who 
DC  always  on  the  lips  of  tbe  other  philosophers.  And 
bofw  that  we  Romans  too  have  begun  to  treat  of  these 
themes,  what  a  marvellous  roll  of  great  men  will  our 
friend  Atticus  supply  to  us  from  his  store-houses  of 

68  learning!"  Would  it  not  be  better  to  talk  of  these  than 
^^^  to  devote  those  bulky  volumes  to  Th  emista  ?  Let  us 
^^■geave  that  sort  of  thing  to  the  Greeks.  True  we  owe 
^^■e  ibem  philosophy  and  all  tlie  liberal  sciences  :  yet 
-^^^Wiere  are  topics  not  permitted  to  us,  that  are  allow- 
^^^rt)le  for  them.     Battle  rages  between  the  Stoics  and 

the  Peripatetics.  One.  school  declares  that  nothing 
is  good  but  Moral  Worth,  the  other  that,  while  it 
assigns  the  greatest,  and  by  far  the  greatest,  value 
to  Morality,  yet  still  some  bodily  and  external  things 
ate  good.  Here  is  an  honourable  quarrel,  fought  out 
in  high  debate  !  For  the  whole  dispute  turns  on  the 
true  worth  of  virtue.  But  when  one  argues  with 
your  friends,  one  has  to  listen  to  a  great  deal  about 
even  the  grosser  forms   of   pleasure !     Epifurus  is 

69  always  harping  upon  them  !     Believe  me  then.  Tor-  it  painu  the 

Kitus,  if  you  will  but  look  within,  and  study  your  ha'^d^ld.'S 
n    thoughts    and   inclinations,   you    cannot    con-  p'""""- 


tuas  cogitationes  et  studia  perspexeris ;  piidebit 
inquam,  Ulius  tabulae  qiiam  Cleanthes  sane  com^l 
mode  verbis  depingere  solebat.  lubebat 
aiidiebant  secum  ipsos  cogitare  pictam  in  tabula 
voluptatem  puleherrimo  vestitu  et  omatii  regali  in 
solio  sedentem ;  praesto  esse  virtutcs  nt  ancillolas, 
quae  nihil  aliud  agerent,  nullum  suum  offidum  duce- 
rent  nisi  ut  voluptati  ministrarent,  et  earn  tantum  ad 
aurem  admonerent  (si  modo  id  pietura  intellegi  pos- 
set) ut  caveret  ne  quid  faceret  imprudens  quod  offen- 
deret  animos  hominunij  aut  quidquam  e  quo  orireti 
aliquis  dolor.  Nos  quidem  virtutes  sic  natae 
ut  tibi  serviremus  ;  aliud  negoti  nihil  habemu 

D  XXII.  At  negat  Epicurus  (hoc  enim  vestruni 
lumen  est)  quemquam  qui  honeste  non  vivat  iucunde 
posse  vivere.  Quasi  ego  id  curem  quid  ille  aiat  aut 
neget;  illud  quaero,  quid  et  qui  in  voluptate  sum- 
mum  bonum  ponat  consentaneuni  sit  dicere,  Qi 
affers  cur  Tliorius,  cur  Chius  Postumi 
nium  horum  magister,  Orata,  non  iucundissime 
xerit?  Ipse  negat,  ut  ante  dixi,  luxuriosorum  vitam^ 
reprendendam  nisi  plane  fatui  sint,  id  est  nisi  aut 
cnpiant  aut  metuant.  Quaruni  anibarum  rerum  cum 
niedicinam  pollicelur,  luxuriae  liceiitiam  pollicetur. 
His  enim  rebus  detractis  negat  se  reperire  in  asoto- 

l  rum  vita  quod  reprcudat.  Non  igitur  potestig  volu- 
ptate omnia  dirigentes  aut  tueri  aut  re tinere  virtu tem. 
Nam  iiec  vir  bonus  ac  iustus  haberi  debet  qui  n^i 

Mnf.  MSS.  have  Posiumius  cur  Cliius.  \ 
a  coTTiiptioii,  suspect ingr  tliat  three  persons 
tneraled  before  cur  emnium  horum:  perhaps 
(an  epicure  mcnlioned  by  X'arro  and  Pliny  the  Eldrrl,  t 




BOOK  II.  xxi-xxii 
tinue  to  del'eiid  the  doctrines  you  profess.  Yon 
will  be  put  to  tlie  blush,  I  say,  by  tile  picture  that 
Cleanthes  used  to  draw  so  cleverly  in  his  lectures. 
He  would  tell  liis  audience  to  imagine  a  paint- 
ing representing  Pleasure,  decked  as  a  queen,  «nd 
gorgeously  apparelled,  seated  on  a  throne  ;  nt  lier 
side  should  stand  the  Virtues  as  her  handmaids, 
who  should  make  it  their  sole  object  and  duty  to 
minister  to  Pleasure,  merely  whispering  in  her  ear 
the  warning  (provided  this  could  be  conveyed  by  the 
painter's  art)  to  beware  of  unwittingly  doing  aught 
to  offend' public  opinion,  or  anything  from  which  pain 
might  result.  As  for  us  Virtues,  we  were  born  to 
be  your  slaves ;  that  is  our  one  and  only  business.' 

70  XXn,  "But,  you  will  tell  me,  your  great  luminary  inji 
Epicurus  denies  that   anyone  who   does   not    live  oX 
morally  can  live  pleasantly.     As  if  I  cared  what  '^ 
Epicurus  says  or  denies  !     What  I  ask  is,  what  is  it     | 
consistent  for  a  man  to  say  who  places  the  Chief 
Good  in  pleasure?      What  reason   can  you  give  for 
thinking  that  Thorius,  or  Postumius  of  Chios,  or  the     ', 
master  of  them  all,  Orata,  did  not  live  extremely 
pleasant  lives  ?     Epicurus  himself  says  that  the  life 

of  sensualists  is  blameless,  if  they  are  not  utter 
fools— for  that  is  what  his  proviso,  if  tliey  are  free 
from  fear  and  from  desire,"  amounts  to.  And,  as  he 
offers  an  antidote  for  both  desire  and  fear,  he  vir- 
tually offers  free  indulgence  for  sensuality.  Eliminate 
those  passions,  he  says,  and  he  cannot  find  anything 

7 1  to  blame  in  a  life  of  proHigacy.  Consequently  you 
Epicureans,  by  taking  pleasure  as  the  sole  guide, 
make  it  impossible  for  yourselves  either  to  uphold 
or  to  retain  virtue.  For  a  man  is  not  to  be  thought 
good  and  just  who  refrains  from  doing  wrong  to 


malum  habeat  abstinet  se  ab  iniuria;  m 

Nemo  pius  est  qui  pietatem — ; 
;  putes  quidquam  esse  verius.     Nee 


metuit  iustus  est,  et  certe  si  metuere  destiterit  non 
erit;  non  metuet  autem  sive  celnre  poterit  sive 
opibus  magnis  quidquid  fecerit  obtinere,  certeque 
malet  existimari  vir  bonus  ut  non  sit,  quam  esse  ut 
non  putetur.  Itaj  quod  certissimum  est,'  pro  vera 
certaque  iustitia  siiuulationcm  nobis  iustitiae  traditis 
praecipitisque  quodam  modo  ut  nostram-stabilem 
conscientiam  contemnamus,  aliorum  errantem  opi- 
nionem  aucupemur.  Quae  dici  eiidem  de  ceteris 
virtutibus  possunt,  quarum  omnia  fundamenta  vos  in 
voluptate  tamquam  in  aqua  ponitis.  Quid  enim  ? 
fortenme  possumus  dicere  eundem  ilium  Torqua- 
tum  ?  —  delector  enim,  quamquam  te  non  possum, 
ut  ais,  comimpere,  delector,  inquam,  et  familia  vestra 
et  nomine ;  et  hercule  mllii  vir  optimus  nostrique 
amantissimus,  A.  Torquatus,  versatur  ante  octilos, 
cuius  quantum  studium  et  qnam  insigne  fuerit  erga 
me  temporibus  illis  quae  nota  sunt  omnibus,  scire 
necesse  est  utrumque  vestrum  ;  quae  mihi  ipsi,  qui 
volo  et  esse  et  haberi  gratus,  grata  non  essent  nisi 
eum  perspicerem  mea  causa  mihi  auiicum  fuisse,  non 
sua  ;  nisi  hoc  dieis,  sua,  quod  interest  omnium  recte 
facere.     Si  id  dicis,  vicimus  ;  id  enim  volumus,  id 

I  Mdv.  suspects 

«An  unknown  quolalion. 
^^ce  ended  with  mclu  coUt  oi 
liCp.  S  6j  above. 

>e  ""-^ 


avoid   incurring    harm ; 

I  doubt  yoii   know   the 

None  is  good,  whose  love  of  goodness  — ;" 

believe  me,  nothing  can  be  truer.  As  long  as  his 
motive  is  fear,  he  is  not  just,  and  assuredly  as  soon 
as  he  ceases  to  fear,  he  will  not  be  just ;  and  lie  will 
not  feel  fear,  if  he  can  conceal  his  wrong-doing,  or  is 
sufficientiy  powerful  to  brazen  it  out ;  and  he  will 
assuredly  prefer  the  reputation  without  the  reality 
of  goodness  to  the  reality  without  the  reputation.  So 
your  school  undoubtedly  preaches  the  pretence  of 
justice  instead  of  the  real  and  genuine  thing.  Its 
lesson  amounts  to  this — we  are  to  despise  the  trust- 
worthy voice  of  our  own  conscience,  and  to  run  after 
78  the  f^lible  imaginations  of  other  men.  The  same 
applies  in  the  case  of  the  other  virtues.  Basing  them 
entirely  on  pleasure  you  are  laying  their  foundations 
in  water.  Wliy,  take  the  great  Torquatus  again; 
can  he  really  be  called  brave  ?^for  I  delight,  albeit 
my  flattery,  as  you  put  it,  is  powerless  to  bribe 
you,  I  delight,  I  say,  in  your  name  and  lineage;  and 
indeed  I  have  personal  recollections  of  that  distin- 
guished man.  Aulus  Torquatus,  who  was  an  affec- 
tionate friend  of  my  own,  and  whose  signal  loyalty 
and  devotion  to  me  in  circumstances  that  are  within 
universal  knowledge^  must  be  familiar  to  you  both  ; 
yet  for  my  part,  anxious  as  I  am  to  feel  and  show  a 
proper  gratitude,  I  would  not  have  thanked  him  for 
his  friendship  had  I  not  known  that  it  was  dis- 
intereBted;  unless  you  choose  to  say  that  it  was  for 
his  own  interest  in  the  sense  that  it  is  to  every 
man's  interest  to  act  rightly.  If  you  do  say  so,  we 
have  won  our  case ;  for  our  one  principle,  our  one 
M  161 


73  contendimus,  ut  ofEcl  fi-uctus  ait  ipaum  ofScium.   Hoc 

ille  tuus  non  vult,  omiiibusque  ex  rebus  voluptatem 
quasi  mercedem  esigit.  Sed  ad  ilium  redeo ;  si  vo- 
luptatis  L'ausa  cum  Gallo  apud  Aniciiem  dcpugiiavit 
provocatus  et  ex  eius  spoliis  sibi  et  torquem  et  co- 
gnomen iuduit  ullam  aliam  ob  causam  nisi  quod  ei 
talia  facta  digna  viro  videbantur,  fortem  non  puto. 
lam  si  pudoFj  si  modestia,  si  pudicitia,  si  ano  verbo 
temperantia  poenae  aut  infamiae  metu  coercebuntur, 
non  sanctitate  sua  se  tuebuntur,  quod  adulterium, 
quod  stuprum,  quae  libido  non  se  proripiet  ac  proiciet 
aut   occultatione    pruposita  aut  impunitate  aut  li- 

i  Quid  i  illud,  Torquate,  quale  tandem  videtur, — te 

isto  nomine  ingenio  gloria,  quae  facis,  quae  cogitas, 
quae  contendis  quo  referas,  cuius  rei  causa  perficere 
quae  conaris  velis,  quid  optimum  denique  in  vita 
iudiees,  non  audere  in  conventu  dicere  ?  Quid  enim 
mereri  velis,  iam  cum  magistratum  inieris  et  in  con- 
tionem  ascenderis  (est  enim  tibi  edicendum  quae  sis 
observaturus  in  iure  ijicendo,  et  fortasse  etiam,  si  tibi 
erit  visum,  aliquid  de  maioribus  tuis  et  de  te  ipso  dices 
more  maiorum), — quid  mcrearis  igitur  ut  dicas  te  in 
eo  magistratu  omnia  voluptatis  causa  facturum  esse 
teque  nihil  fecisse  in  vita  nisi  voluptatis  causa  ? — 

BOOK   II.  xxii 

rS  contention  is,  that  duty  is  its  own  reward.  This 
your  great  master  does  not  allow ;  he  expects 
everything  to  pay — to  yield  its  quota  of  plet 
But  I  return  to  old  Torquatus.  If  it  was  to  win 
pleasure  that  he  accepted  the  Gallic  warrior's  chal- 
lenge to  single  combat  on  the  banks  of  the  Anio, 
and  if  he  despoOed  him  and  assumed  liis  necklet 
and  the  corresponding  surname  for  any  other  reason 
than  that  he  thought  such  deeds  became  a  i 
do  not  consider  him  brave.  Again,  if  modesty,  self- 
control,  chastity,  if  in  a  word  Temperance  is  to 
depend  for  its  sanction  on  the  fear  of  punishment  or 
of  disgrace,  and  not  to  maintain  itself  by  its  c 
intrinsic  sacrednt-ss,  what  form  of  adultery,  ' 
lust  will  not  break  loose  and  run  riot  when  it  is 
assured  of  concealment,  impunity  or  indulgence. 

74,  Or  what,  pray,  are  we  to  think  of  the  situation  if  ^0  nub 

you,  Torquatus,  bearing  the  name  you  do,  and  gifted  g""*  ■" 
and  distinguished  as  you  are,  dare  not  profess  before  a  , 
public  audience  tlie  real  object  of  all  your  actions,  1 
aims  and  endeavours,  the  motive  that  inspires  you 
to  accomplish  your  undertakings,  what  it  is  in  short 
that  you  consider  the  greatest  good  in  life?  In  re- 
turn for  what  payment  or  consideration,  when  not 
long  hence  you  have  attained  to  public  office  and 
come  forward  to  address  a  meeting  (for  you  will  have 
to  announce  the  rules  that  you  propose  to  observe  in 
administering  justice,  and  very  likely  also,  if  you 
think  good,  you  will  follow  the  time-honoured  custom 
of  making  some  reference  to  your  ancestors  and  to 
yourself), — for  what  consideration  then  would  you  con- 
sent to  declare  that  you  intend  in  office  to  guide  your 
conduct  solely  by  pleasure,  and  that  pleasure  has 
been  your  aim  in  every  action  of  your  life? —  Do  you 
M2  163 

All  me,'  inquis,  '  taxa  amentem  putas  ut  apud 
imperitos  isto  modo  loquar  ?  '^At  tu  eadem  ista  die 
in  iudicio  aut,  si  coronam  times,  die  in  senatu.  Num- 
quam  fades.  Cur,  nisi  quod  turpis  oratio  est  ?  Mene 
ergo  et  Triarium  digiios  existimas  apud  quos  turpiter 

75  XXIII.  Veruni  esto :  verbum  ipsum  voluptatia 
non  habet  dignitatem,  nee  nos  fortasse  intellegi- 
mus;  hoc  enim  identidem  dicitis,  non  intellegere  nos 
quam  dicatis  voluptatem.  Rem  videlicet  difficilem 
et  obscuram  !  Individua  cum  dicitis  et  intermundia, 
quae  nee  sunt  ulla  nee  possunt  esse,  intellegimus ; 
voluptas,  quae  passeribus  nota  est  omnibus,  a  nobis 
intellegi  non  potest  ?  Quid  si  efficio  ut  fateare  me 
non  modo  quid  sit  voluptas  scire  (est  enim  iucundus 
motus  in  sensu),  sed  etiam  quid  earn  tu  velis  esse? 
Turn  enim  eam  ipsam  vis  quam  modo  ego  dixi,  et 
nomen  imponis  in  raotu  ut  sit  et  faciat  aliquam  varie- 
tatem,  tum  aliam  quandam  sumniam  voluptatem  cui 
addi  nihil  possit ;  earn  tum  adesse  cum  dolor  omnis 

76  absit ;  eam  stabilem  appellas.  Sit  sane  ista.  voluptas. 
Die  in  quovis  conventu  te  omnia  facere  ne  doleas. 
Si  ne  hoc  quidem  satis  ample,  satis  honeste  dici 
putas,  die  te  omnia  et  in  isto  magistratu  et  in  omni 
vita  utilitatie  tuag  causa  facturum,  nihil  nisi  quod 



take  me  for  such  au  imbecile,'  you  exblaim,  as  < 
in  that  fashion  before  ignorant  people?' — Well, 
the  same  profession  in  a  law-court,  or  if  you  are 
of  the  public  there,  say  it  in  the  senate.    You 
never  do  it.    Why  not,  unless  because  sueh  language 
is  disgraceful?  Then  what  a  compliment  to  TwquiiliirLr^ 
and  myself,  to  use  it  in  our  presence!  ^ 

75  XXJII.  '  But  let  us  grant  your  position.  Theactual 
word  pleasure'  has  an  undignified  sound;  and  per- 
haps we  do  not  understand  its  significance :  you  are 
always  repeating  that  we  do  not  understand  what 
you  mean  by  pleasure.  As  though  it  were  a  difficult 
or  recondite  notion!  We  understand  you  when  you 
talk  of  indivisible  atoms'  and  cosmic  interspaces,' 
things  that  don't  exist  and  never  can  exist;  then  is 
our  intelligence  incapable  of  grasping  the  meaning 
of  pleasure,  a  feeling  known  to  every  sparrow  ?  What 
if  I  force  you  to  admit  that  I  do  know  not  only  what 
pleasure  really  is  (it  is  an  ajjxeeable  activity  ofthe 

jenseX  but  also  what  you  meanby  it  f  i-or  at  one 
moment  you  mean  by  it  the  feeling  that  I  have  just 
defined,  and  this  you  entitle  '  kinetic '  pleasure,  as 
producing  a  definite  change  of  feeling,  butat  anotlier 
nioment  you  say  it  is  quite  a  different  feeling,  which 
is  the  acme  and  climax  of  pleasure,  but  yet  consists 
merely  in  the  complete  absence  of  pain ;  this  you 

76  call  '  static '  pleasure.  Well,  grant  that  pleasure  is 
the  latter  sort  of  feeling.  Profess  in  any  public 
assembly  that  the  motive  of  all  your  actions  is  the 
desire  to  avoid  pain.  If  you  feel  that  this  too  does 
not  sound  sufficiently  dignified  and  respectable,  say 
that  you  intend  both  in  your  present  office  and  all 
your  life  long  to  act  solely  for  the  sake  of  your  own 
advantage, — to  do  nothing  but  what  will  pay,  nothing 


to  talk  ^^M 

afraid  ^^^ 

expediat,  nihil  deuique  nisi  tua  causa  ;  quetn  cla- 
morem  i^ontionis  aut  quam  spem  consutatus  eius  qui 
tibi  pai-atissimus  est  iiituram  putas  ?  Eamne  rationem 
igitiir  sequere*  qua  tecum  ipse  et  cum  tuis  utare,  pro- 
fiteri  et  in  medium  proferre  non  audeas  ?  At  vero 
ilia  quae  Peripiatetici,  quae  Stoici  dicunt,  semper  tibi 
in  ore  sunt  in  iudiciis,  in  senatu.  Oflicium,  aequi- 
tatem,  disnitatero,  fidem,  recta,  honesta,  digna  im- 
perio,  digna  populo  Romano,  omnia  perieula  pro  re 
publica,  niori  pro  patria, — liaec  cum  loqueris,  nos 
barones  stuperaus,  tu  videlicet  tecum  ipse  rides. 
'  Nam  inter  tsta  tarn  magnifica  verba  tamque  praeclara 
non  habet  nllum  voluptas  locum,  non  modo  ilia  quam 
in  motu  esse  dicitis,  quam  omnes  urbani,  rustici, 
omnes,  inquam,  qui  Latine  loquuntur,  voluptatem 
vocaiit,  sed  ne  haec  quidem  stabilis,  quam  praeter 
vos  nemo  appellat  voluptatem.  XXIV,  Vide  igitur 
□e  non  debeas  verbis  nostris  uti,  sententiis  tuis.  Quod 
si  vultum  tibi,  si  incessum  fingeres  quo  gravior  vide- 
rere,  non  esses  tui  siniilis  ;  verba  tu  fingas,  et  ea  dicas 
quae  non  sentias  ?  aut  etiam,  ut  vestitum,  sic  sen- 
tentiam  habeas  aliam  domesticam,  aliain  forensera, 
ut  in  fronte  ostentatio  sit,  intus  Veritas  occultetur  ? 
Vide,  quaeso,  rectumne  sit.  Mihi  quidem  eae  verae 
videntur  opiniones  quae  lionestae,  quae  laudabiles, 
quae  gloriosae,  quae  in  senatu,  quae  apud  populum, 
^sequere  A;  most  MSS.  stquare. 

BOOK  II.  xxiii-xxiv 
in  short  that  is  not  for  your  own  interest ;  imagine 
the  uproar  among  the  audience !  What  would  be- 
come of  your  chances  of  the  consulship,  which  as  it 
is  seems  to  be  a  certainty  for  you  in  the  near  future  ? 
Will  you  then  adopt  a  rule  of  life  which  you  can  ap- 
peal to  in  private  and  among  friends  but  which  you 
dare  not  openly  profess  or  parade  in  public  ?  All, 
but  it  is  the  vocabulary  of  the  Pt^ripatetics  and  the 
Stoics  that  is  always  on  your  lips,  in  the  law-courts 
and  the  senate.  Duty,  Faii'-dealuig,  Moral  Worth, 
Fidelity,  Uprightness,  Honour,  the  Dignity  of  office, 
the  Dignity  of  the  Roman  People,  Risk  all  for  the 
state.  Die  for  your  Country, — when  you  talk  in 
this  style,  we  simpletons  stand  gaping  in  admiration, 
77  — and  you  no  doubt  laugh  in  your  sleeve.  For  in  that 
glorious  array  of  high-sounding  words,  pleasure  finds 
no  place,  not  only  what  your  school  calls  kinetic ' 
pleasure,  which  is  what  every  one,  polished  or  rustic, 
every  one,  I  say,  who  can  speak  Latin,  means  hy 
pleasure,  but  not  even  this  static '  pleasure,  which 
no  one  but  you  Epicureans  would  call  pleasure  at  all. 
XXIV.  Well  then,  are  you  sure  you  have  any  right 
to  employ  our  words  with  meanings  of  your  own  ?  If 
you  assumed  an  unnatural  expression  or  demeanour, 
in  order  to  look  more  important,  that  would  be  insin- 
cere. Are  you  then  to  affect  an  artificial  language, 
and  say  what  you  do  not  think  f  Or  are  you  to 
change  your  opinions  like  your  clothes,  and  Lave  one 
set  for  indoor  wear  and  another  when  you  walk 
abroad  ?  Outside,  all  show  and  pretence,  but  your 
genuine  self  concealed  within  ?  Reflect,  I  beg  of 
you,  is  this  honest  ?  In  my  view  those  opinions  are 
^■frne  which  are  honourable,  praiseworthy  and  noble 
^^Krwhich  can  be  openly  avowed  in  the  senate  and 
^B  167 


li  coetu  coiicilioque  profitendae  sint,  ne 
id  lion  pudeat  seiitire  quod  pudeat  dicere. 

\  Amicitiae  vero  locus  ubi  esse  potest  aut  quis 

amicus  esse  cuiquam  quern  nou  ipsum  amet  propter 
ipsum  ?  Quid  autem  est  aniare,  e  quo  nonien  du- 
ctum  amicitiae  est,  nisi  velle  bonis  aliquem  alRci  quam 
maximis  etiamsi  ad  se  ex  iis  nihil  redundet'  ?  Pro- 
dest,  inquit,  niihi  eo  esse  animo.  Immo  videri  for- 
tasse.  Esse  enim,  nisi  eris,  non  potes^;  qui  autem 
esse  poteris  nisi  te  amor  ipse  ceperit  ?  quod  non 
subducta  utilitatis  ratione  effici  solet,  sed  ipsum  a  se 
oritur  et  sua  sponte  nascitur.  At  enini  sequor 
utilitatem.'  Manebit  ergo  amicitia  tani  diu  quam 
diu  sequetur  otilitas,  et,  si  utilitas  constituet  amici- 

)  tiam,  toilet  eadeiQ.  Sed  quid  ag-es  tandem  si  utilitas 
a\)  amicitia,  ut  fit  saepe,  defecerit?  Relinquesne? 
quae  ista  amicitia  est  ?  Retinebia  ?  qui  convenit  ? 
quid  enim  de  amicitia  statueris  utilitatis  causa  expe- 
tenda  vides.  Ne  in  odium  veniam  si  amicum  de- 
stitero  toeri.'  Primiim  cur  ista  res  digna  odio  est 
nisi  quod  est  turpis  ?  Quod  si  ne  quo  incommodo 
afficiare  non  relinques  amicum,  tanicn,  ne  sine  fructu 
alligatus  sis,  ut  moriatur  optabis.  Quid  si  non 
modo  utUitatem  tibi  nuUam   afferet,  sed   iacturae 

'  redundet  Mdv.;  M5S.  rcdcunt  et,  redeat  et,  redeal  quid. 

■  For  the  suspicious  words  esse  enim,  nisi  eris,  non  potea, 
which  make  the  Following^  sentence  tautological,  Graser 
conjeclures  esse  enim,  nisi  videris,  non  prodest.  '"It  pays 
me  (you  say)  to  be  a  disinterested  friend.'  No,  to  seem  so 
perhaps  :  it  doesn't  pay  to  be  so  without  seeming  so.     But 


^P  BOOK  II.   \xiv 

the  popular  assembly,   and   in  every   company 
gathermg,  so  tlutt  one  need  not  be  ashamed  Ui  say 
what  one  is  not  ashamed  to  think. 

78  Again,  how  will  fHendsliip  be  possibli 
can  one  man  be  another  man's  friend,  if  he  does  not , 
love  him  in  and  for  himself?  What  is  the  meaning 
of  to  love ' — from  which  our  word  for  friendship  is 
derived — except  to  wish  some  one  to  receive  the 
greatest  possible  benefits  even  though  one  gleans 
no  advantage  therefrom  oneself?  It  pays  me,'  you 
say,  'to  be  a  disinterested  friend.'  No,  perhaps  it 
pays  you  to  seem  so.  Be  so  you  cannot,  unless  you 
really  are  ;  but  how  can  you  be  a  disinterested  friend 
unless  you  feel  genuine  affection  ?  Yet  affection 
does  not  commonly  result  from  any  calculation  of 
expediency.  It  is  a  spontaneous  growth  ;  it  springs 
up  of  itself.  But.'  you  will  say,  I  am  guided  by 
expediency,"  Tlien  your  friendship  will  last  just  so 
long  as  it  is  attended  by  expediency.     If  expediency 

79  creates  the  feehng  it  will  also  destroy  it.  But  what, 
pray,  will  you  do,  if,  as  often  happens,  expediency 
parts  company  with  friendship  ?  Will  you  throw 
your  friend  over  ?  What  sort  of  friendship  is  that  ? 
Will  you  keep  him  ?  How  does  that  square  with 
your  principles  ?  You  remember  your  pronounce- 
ment that  friendship  is  desirable  for  the  sake  of 
expediency.  1  might  become  unpopular  if  I  left 
a  friend  in  the  lurch.'  Well,  in  the  first  place,  why 
is  such  conduct  unpopular,  unless  because  it  is  base  ? 
And  if  you  refrain  from  deserting  a  friend  because 
to  do  so  will  have  inconvenient  consequences,  still 
you  will  long  for  his  death  to  release  you  from  an 
unprofitable  tie.  What  if  he  not  only  brings  you 
no  advantage,  but  causes  you  to  suffer  loss  of  pro- 



rei  familiaris  erunt  faciundae,  labores  suscipiendi, 
sdeundum  vitae  periculum  f  ne  turn  quidem  te  re- 
spicies  et  cogitabis  sibi  quemque  iiatuni  esse  et  suis 
voluptatibus  ?  Vadem  te  ad  mortem  tyranno  dabis 
pro  amico,  ut  Pytliagoreus  iile  Siculo  fecit  tyranno, 
aut  Pylades  cum  sis,  dices  te  esse  Oresten  ut  mo- 
riare  pro  amico,  aut  si  esses  Orestes,  Pyladem  refel- 
leres,  te  uidicares,  et  si  id  iion  probares,  quo  minus 
ambo  una  necaremini  non  deprecarere*  ? 

J  XXV.  Faceres  tu  quidem,  Torquate,  haec  omnia; 
nihil  enim  arbitror  magna  laude  dlgnum  esse  quod 
te  praetermissurum  credam  aut  mortis  aut  doloris 
metu.  Non  quaeritur  autem  quid  naturae  tuae  con- 
sentaneura  sit,  sed  quid  disciplinae.  Ratio  ista  quam 
defendis,  praecepta  quae  didicisti,  quae  probas,  fun- 
ditus  evertunt  amicitiam,  quamvis  earn  Epicurus,  ut 
facit,  in  caelum  efFerat  laudibus.  At  coluit  ipse 
amicitias.'  Quis,  quaeso,  ilium  negat  et  bonum 
virirni  et  comem  et  hiimanum  fuisse  ?  De  ingenio 
eius  in  his  disputation! bus,  non  de  moribus  quaeritur. 
Sit  ista  in  Graecorum  levitate  perversitas,  qui  raale- 
dictis  insectantur  eos  a  quibus  de  veritate  dissenti- 
unt.  Sed  quamvis  comls  in  amicis  tuendis  fuerit, 
tamenj  si  haec  vera  sunt  (nihil  enim  affirmo),  non 

I  satis  acutus  fuit.  At  multis  se  probavit.'  Et  qui- 
dem iure  fortasse  ;  sed  tamen  non  gravissimum  est 
testimonium  multitudinis.     In  omni  enim  arte  vel 

'deflrtcarereedd.;precaren  Mdv.  with  the  MSS. 

■  Phintias,  plea  ding  for  his  friend  Damoii  before  Dionysius, 
'tyrant'  of  Syracuse;  Dionysius  pardoned  them  both  and 
beerged  to  become  a  third  insucb  afriendahip.  Cf.  0^.3.45. 

6Cr.  V.  63.  Cicero  refers  to  a  scene  in  the  DulorcsUs  of 
Pacuvius,  where  Thoas  King  of  the  Tauri  wished  to  kill 
■whichever  of  the   two  captives   brought   before  him   was 

J  70 

^H  BOOK  II.  xxiv-xxv 

perty,  to  undergo  toil  and  trouble,  to  risk  your  Ij 
Will  you  not  even  then  take  interest  into  account,  and 
reflect  that  each  man  is  born  for  himself  and  for  his 
own  pleasure  ?  Will  you  go  bail  with  your  life  to  a 
tyrant  on  behalf  of  a  friend,  as  the  famous  Pytha- 
gorean' did  to  the  Sicilian  despot?  or  being  Pylades'' 
will  you  say  you  are  Orestes,  so  as  to  die  in  your 
friend's  stead  ?  or  supposing  you  were  Orestes, 
would  you  say  Pylades  was  lying  and  reveal  your 
identity,  and  if  they  would  not  believe  you,  would 
you  entreat  Uiat  you  both  might  die  together  ? 

jO  XXV.  'YeSjTorquatus,  you  personally  would  do  all  ^fJPJ 
these  tilings ;  for  I  do  not  believe  there  is  any  high  or  bciui 
Doble  action  which  fear  of  pain  or  death  could  induce  "™ 
you  to  forgo.  But  the  question  is  not  what  conduct  is 
consistent  with  your  character,  but  what  is  consis- 
tent with  your  tenets.  The  system  you  uphold, 
the  principles  you  have  studied  and  accept,  under- 
znine  the  very  foundations  of  friendship,  however 
much  Epicurus  may,  as  he  does,  praise  friendship  up 
to  the  skies.  But,'  you  tell  nie,  Epicurus  himself 
had  many  friends.'  Wlio  pray  denies  that  Epicurus  was 
a  good  man,  and  a  kind  and  humane  man  ?  In  these 
discussions  it  is  his  intellect  and  not  his  character 
that  is  in  question.  Let  us  leave  to  the  frivolous 
Greeks  the  wrong-headedhabitofattackingand  abus- 
ing the  persons  whose  views  of  truth  they  do  not 
share.  Epicurus  may  have  been  a  kind  and  faithful 
friend ;  but  if  what  I  say  is  true  (for  I  do  not  dog- 

Bl  matiae),  he  was  not  a  very  acute  thinker.  But  he 
won  many  disciples.'  Yes,  and  perhaps  he  deserved 
to  do  so  ;  but  still  the  witness  of  the  crowd  does  not 
carry  much  weight;  for  as  in  every  art  or  study  or 
of  any    kind,   so  in   right  conduct   itself, 

studio  vel  quavis  scientia,  vel  in  ipsa  virtutc,  optimum 
quidque  rarissimum  est  Ac  mihi  quidem,  quod  et 
ipse  bonus  vir  fuit  et  multi  Epicurei  et  fuerunt  et 
hodie  sunt  et  in  amieitiis  fideles  et  in  omni  vita  con- 
stanles  et  graves  iiec  voluptate  sed  officio  consilia 
moderantes,  hoc  videtur  maior  vis  honestatis  et 
minor  voluptatis.  Ita  enini  vivunt  quidam  ut  eorum 
vita  refetlatur  oratio.  Atque  ut  ccteri  dicere  existi- 
maiitur  melius  quam  facere,  sic  hi  mihi  videiitur  facere 
melius  quam  dicere. 

82  XXVI.  "  Sed  haec  nihil  sane  ad  rem ;  ilia  videamus 
quae  a  te  de  amicitia  dicta  sunt.  E  quibus  unum 
mihi  videbar  ab  ipso  Epicuro  dictum  cognoscere, 
amicitiam  a  voluptate  non  posse  divelli  ob  eamque 
rem  cglendam  esse  quod,  cum'  sine  ea  tuto  et  sine 
metu  vivi  non  posset,  ne  iucunde  quidem  posset. 
Satis  est  ad  hoc  responsum.  Attulisti  aliud  humanius 
liorum  recentiorum,  numquam  dictum  ab  ipso  illo, 
quod  sciara,  primo  utilitatis  causa  amicum  expeti, 
cum  autem  usus  accessisset,  turn  Ipsum  amari  per  se, 
etiam  omissa  spe  voluptatis.  Hoc  etsi  multis  modis 
reprendi  potest,  tamen  accipio  quod  dant;  mihi  enim 
satis  est,  ipsls  non  satis.  Nam  aliquaiido  posse  recte 
fieri  dicunt,  nulla  exspectata  nee  quaesit«  voluptate. 

83  Posuisti  etiam  dicere  alios  foedus  quoddam  inter  a 

ted  by  Mdv. 

1  mter  ji^^ 


^^  BOOK  n.  ssY-un 

sapreme  escellence  is  estremely  rare.     And  to  my 
mind  the  fact  that  Epicurus  himself  was  a  good  n 
and  that  many  Epicureans  both  have  been  and  to- 
day are  loyal  to  their  friends,  consistent  and  high- 
principled  throughout  their  lives,  niling  thei 
duct  by  duty  and  not  by  pleasure ,^-aIl  this  does  but 
enforce   the   value  of  moral  goodness  and  diminish 
that  of  pleasure.     The  fact  is  that  some  persons' 
lives  and  behaviour  refute  the  principles  they  pro-. 
fess.     Most  men's  words  are  thought  to  be  bettert, 
than  their  deeds ;  these  people's  deeds  on  the  con-| 
trary  seem  to  me  better  than  their  word? 

82  XXVI.  "  But  this  I  admit  is  a  digression.  Let  us  The  ii.t«  Epi. 
return  to  what  you  said  about  friendship.  In  one  of  ot  fTienibhip 
your  remarks  I  seemed  to  recognize  a  saying  of  Epi-  *^ "" 
curus  himselfj^that  friendship  cannot  be  divorced 
from  pleasure,  and  that  it  deserves  to  be  cultivated 
for  the  reason  that  without  it  we  cannot  liv( 
and  free  from  alarm,  and  therefore  cannot  live  agree- 
ably. Enough  has  been  said  in  answer  to  this  already. 
You  quoted  another  and  a  more  humane  dictum 
of  the  more  modem  Epicureans,  which  so  far  as  I 
know  was  never  uttered  by  the  master  himself  This 
was  to  the  effect  that,  although  at  the  outset  we 
desire  a  man's  friendship  for  utilitarian  reasons,  yet 
when  intimacy  has  grown  up  we  love  our  friend  for 
his  own  sake,  even  if  all  prospect  of  pleasure  be  left 
out  of  sight.  It  is  possible  to  take  exception  to  this 
position  on  several  grounds ;  still  I  welcome  tiieir 
concession,  as  it  is  sufiicient  for  my  case  and  not 
sufficient  for  theirs.  For  it  amounts  to  saying 
that  moral  action  is  occasionally  possible, — action 
prompted  by  no  anticipation  or  desire  of  plei 

83  You  further  alleged  that  other  thinkers  speak  of 


facere  sapientes  ut,  quemadmodum  sint  in  se  ipsos 
animati,  eodetn  modo  sint  erga  amicos ;  id  et  fieri 
posse  et  saepe  esse  factum  et  ad  volupta.tes  percipi- 
endas  maxime  pertinere.  Hoc  foedus  facefe  si 
potuerunt,  faciant  etiam  illud,  ut  aequitatem,  mode- 
atiam,  virtutes  onines  per  se  ipsas  gratis  diligant.  An 
vero  si  fructibus  et  emolumentis  et  utilitatibus 
amicitias  colemus,  si  nulla  caritas  erit  quae  facial 
amicitiam  ipsam  s»a  sponte,  vi  sua,  ex  se  et  propter 
se  expetendam,  dubium  est  quin  lundos  et  insulas 

^  amieis  anteponanius  ?  Licet  hie  rursus  ea  camme- 
mores  quae  optimis  verbis  ab  Epicuivj  de  laude  ami- 
citiae  dicta  sunt.  Non  quaero  quid  dicat,  sed  quid 
convenienter  possit  rationi  et  sententiae  suae  dicere. 
Utilitatis  causa  amicitia  est  quaesita.'  Num  igitur 
utiliorem  tibi  bunc  Triariuni  putas  esse  posse  quam 
si  tua  sint  Pubeolis  granaria?  Collige  omnia  quae 
soletis:  Praesidium  aniicorum.'  Satis  est  tibi  in 
te,  satis  in  legibus,  satis  in  mediocribus  amicitiis 
praesidi ;  iam  coutemni  non  poteris ;  odium  autem 
et  invidiam  facile  vitabis  :  ad  eas  enim  res  ab  Epi- 
curo  praecepta  dantur.  £t  tamen  tantls  vectigatibus 
ad  liberal itatem  utens,  etiam  sine  liac  Pyladea  amici- 
tia multoruni  te  benevolentia  praeclare  tuebere  et 

5  munies.  At  quicum  ioca  seria,  ut  dicitur,  (juicum 
arcana,  quicum  occulta  omnia  ?  Tecum  optime, 
deinde  etiam  cum  medtocri  amico.  Sed  fac  ista  esse 

^^tee   I 

BOOK   I[. 

:  making  a  sort  of  mutual  comp&<? 
to  entertain  the  same  sentiments  towards  their 
friends  as  they  feel  towards  themselves ;  this  (you 
said)  was  possible,  and  in  fact  had  often  occurred ; 
and  it  was  highly  conducive  to  the  attainment  of 
pleasure.  If  men  have  succeeded  in  making  this 
compact,  let  them  make  a  further  compact  to  love 
fair-dealing,  self-control,  and  all  the  virtues,  for  their 
own  sakes  and  without  reward.  If  on  the  other 
hand  we  are  to  cultivate  friendships  for  their  results, 
for  profit  and  utility ;  if  there  is  to  be  no  affection  to 
render  friendship  in  and  for  itself,  intrinsically  and 
spontaneously,  desirable ;  can  we  doubt  that  we  shall 
value  land  and  house -property  more  than  friends  ? 

!4  It  is  no  good  your  once  again  repeating  Epicurus'a 
admirable  remarks  in  praise  of  friendship.  I  am  not 
asking  what  Epicurus  actually  says,  but  what  he  can 
say  consistently  while  holding  the  theory  he  pro- 
fesses. Friendship  is  originally  sought  after  from 
motives  of  utility.'  Well,  but  surely  you  don't  reckon 
Triarius  here  a  more  valuable  asset  than  the  granaries 
at  Puteoli  would  be  if  they  belonged  to  you  ?  Cite 
all  the  stock  Epicurean  maxims.  '  Friends  are  a  pro- 
tection.' You  can  protect  yourself;  the  laws  will 
protect  you ;  ordinary  friendships  offer  protection 
enough ;  soon  you  will  be  too  powerful  to  be  des- 
pised ;  moreover  you  will  easily  avoid  hatred  and 
envy, — Epicurus  gives  rules  for  doing  so  1  And  even 
otherwise,  with  so  large  an  income  to  give  away,  you 
can  dispense  with  the  om  nt'  so  t  of  friendship 
that  we  have  in  mind    you  w  1   ha  e  plenty  of  well- 

B5  wishers  to  defend  you  qu  e  ff  e  y.  But  a  con- 
fidant, to  share  your  gra  e  ougl  or  gay  '  as  the 
saying  is,  all  your  sec  e  and  pn  a  affairs?  Your 


non  importuna  ;  quid  ad  utUitatem  tantae  pecimiae? 
Vides  igitur,  si  amicitiain  sua  caritate  metiare,  nihil 
esse  praes  tan  tins,  sin  emoliinieDto,  siiminos  familiari- 

I   fructuosorum    mercede    superari. 

mes  oportet,  non  mea 

tates   praediorui 
Me  igitur  ipsum 

XXVII.  Sed  in  rebus  apertiii 
flumus.  Perfecto  eiiim  et  concluso  neque  virtutil 
neque  amicitiis  usqiiam  locum  esse  si  ad  voluptatem 
omnia  teferantur,  niliil  praeterea  est  magno  opere 
dicendum.  Ac  tamen,  ne  cui  loco  non  videatur 
esse  responsum,  pauca  etiam  nunc  dicam  ad  reli- 
Ij6  quani  orationem  tuam.  Quoniam  igitur  omnis  sum- 
ma  philosophiae  ad  beate  vivendum  refertur,  idque 
unum  expetentes  homines  se  ad  hoc  studium  contu- 
leruntj  beate  autem  vivere  alii  in  aUo, 
luptate  ponitis,  item  contra 
dolore,  id  prinjiim  videamus,  beate 
quale  sit.  Atque  hoc  dabitiSj  ut  opinor,  si  modo  sit 
aliquid  esse  beatum,  id  oportere  totiun  poni  in  pote- 
state  sapientis.  Nam  si  amitti  vita  beata  potest, 
beatrt  esse  non  potest.  Quis  enim  confidit  semper 
sibi  ilhid  stabile  et  finniim  pennansurum  quod  fragile 

tib^H  I 

omnen.  i^ 

e  vestninl^^l 

bonorum  g 


Qui  autem   diffidit  perpetuitati 
timeat  necesse  est  ne  aliquando 

BOOK  II.  xxvi-ssvii 
best  confidant  is  yourself;  you  may  also  confide  in  & 
friend  of  the  average  type.  But  granting  that 
friendship  lias  the  conveniences  you  mention,  what 
are  they  compared  with  the  advantages  of  such  vast 
wealth  ?  You  see  then  that  although  if  you  measure 
friendship  by  the  test  of  its  own  charm  it  is  unsur- 
passed in  value,  by  the  standard  of  profit  the  most 
afiectionate  intimacy  is  outweighed  by  the  rents  of  a 
valuable  estate.  So  you  must  love  me  myself,  not 
my  possessions,  if  we  are  to  be  genuine  friends, 

XXVII.  But  we  dwell  too  long  upon  the  obvious,  khi 
For  when  it  has  been  conclusively  proved  that  'f  JJluatwanW 
pleasure  is  the  sole  standard  there  is  no  room  left  tappy,  if  plea- 
either  for  virtue  or  friendship,  there  is  no  great  need  cS^; '  ° 
to  say  anything  fiirther.  Still  1  do  not  want  you  to 
think  I  have  failed  to  answer  any  of  your  points,  so 
I  will  now  say  a  few  words  more  in  reply  to  the 
B6  remainder  of  your  discourse.  The  end  and  aim  of 
every  system  of  philosophy  is  the  attainment  of  hap- 
piness; and  desire  for  happiness  is  the  sole  motive 
that  has  led  men  to  engage  in  this  study.  But 
different  thinkers  make  happiness  consist  in  different 
things.  According  to  your  school  it  consists  in 
pleasure,  and  conversely  misery  consists  solely  in 
pain.  Let  us  then  begin  by  examining  what  sort  of 
thing  happiness  as  you  conceive  it  is.  You  will  grant, 
I  suppose,  that  if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  happiness, 
it  is  bound  to  be  attainable  in  its  entirety  by  the 
Wise  Man.  For  if  happiness  once  won  can  be  lost, 
a  happy  life  is  impossible.  Since  who  can  feel 
confident  of  permanently  and  securely  retaining  a 
possession  that  is  perishable  and  precarious  ?  yet 
one  who  is  not  sure  of  the  permanence  of  his  Goods, 
must  inevitably  fgar  that  a  time  may  come  when  he 
N  177 

ainissis  illis  sit  miser.      Beatus  autem  esse  in  maxi- 

J  marum  rerum  timore  nemo  potest.  Nemo  igitur 
esse  beatus  potest.  Neque  enim  in  aliqua  parte  sed 
in  perpetuitate  temporis  vita  beata  dici '  solet,  nee 
appellatur  omnino  vita  nisi  confecta  atque  absoluta, 
iiec  potest  quisquam  alias  beatus  esse,  alias  miser ; 
qui  enim  existimabit  posse  se  miserum  esse,  beatus 
non  erit.  Nam  cum  suscepta,  seme!  est  beata  vita, 
tarn  permanet  quam  ipsa  ilia  effectrix  bealae  vitae 
sapientia,  neque  exspectat  ultimum  tempus  aetatis, 
quod  Croeso  scribit  Herodotus  praeceptum  a  Soloue. 
At  enim,  quemaduiodum  tute  dicebas,  negat  Epi- 
curus ne  diutumitatem  quidem  temporis  ad  beate 
vivendum  aliquid  afFeiTe,  nee  rainorem  voluptatem 
percipi  in  brevitate  temporis  quam  si  iila  sit  sempi- 

)  tema.  Haec  dJcutitur  inconstantissime.  Cum  enim 
summum  bonum  in  voluptate  ponat,  negat  inlinito 
tempore  aetatis  voluptatem  fieri  maiorem  quam  finlto 
atque  modico.  Qui  bonum  orane  in  virtute  ponit, 
is  potest  dicere  perfici  beatam  vitam  perfectione  vlr- 
tutis:  negat  enim  summo  bono  afferre  incrementum 
diem ;  qui  autem  voluptate  vitam  effici  beatam  pu- 
tabit,  qui  sibi  is  conveniet  si  negabit  voluptatem 
crescere  longinquitnte  ?  Igitur  ne  dolorem  quidem. 
An  dolor  longissimus  quisque  miserrimus,  volupta- 
tem non  optabiliorem  diuturnitas  facit  ?  Quid  est 
igitur  cur  ita  semper  deum  Epicurus  beatum  appel- 
let  et  aeternum  ?  Dempta  enim  aeternitate  itiliilo 
beatior  luppiter  quam  Epicurus;  uterquc  e 


r  enim  suni^H 

BOOK   ri.  xxvii 
Doay  lose  them  and  so  be  miserable.      I 

1  can  be  happy  who  fears  utter  ruin.  Therefore  no 
one  can  be  happy  at  all.  For  we  usually  speak  of 
a  life  as  a  happy  one  not  in  reference  to  a  part 
of  it,  but  to  the  whole  of  a  Hfetime ;  indeed  a  life ' 
means  a  finished  and  complete  life  ;  nor  is  it  possible 
to  l>e  at  one  time  happy  and  at  another  miserable, 
since  he  who  thinks  that  he  may  be  miserable,  will 
not  be  happy.  For  when  happiness  has  once  been 
achieved,  it  is  as  permanent  as  Wisdom  itself,  which 
is  the  efficient  cause  of  happiness ;  it  does  not  wait 
for  the  end  of  our  mortal  term,  as  Croesus  in  Hero- 
dotus's  history  was  warned  by  Solon  to  do. 

It  may  be  rejoined  that  Epicurus,  as  you  your-  ; 
self  were  saying,  denies  that  long  duration  can  i 
add  anytfiing  to  happiness;  he  says  that  as  much' 
pleasure   is  enjoyed  in   a   brief  span   of  time   as  if 

I  pleasure  were  everlasting.  In  saying  this  lie  is 
grossly  inconsistent.  He  places  the  Chief  Good 
in  pleasure,  and  yet  he  says  that  no  greater  plei 
would  result  from  a  lifetime  of  endless  duration  than 
from  a  limited  and  moderate  period.  If  a  person 
finds  the  sole  Good  in  Virtue,  it  is  open  to  him  to 
say  that  the  happy  life  is  consummated  by  the  con- 
summation of  Virtue ;  for  his  position  is  that  the 
Chief  Good  is  not  increased  by  lapse  of  time.  But 
if  one  thinks  that  happiness  is  produced  by  pli 
how  can  he  consistently  deny  that  pleasure  is  in- 
creased by  duration  ?  If  it  is  not,  pain  is  not  either. 
Or  if  pain  is  worse  the  longer  it  lasts,  is  not  pleasure 
rendered  more  desirable  by  continuance.'  Epicurus 
always  speaks  of  the  Deity  as  happy  and  everlasting ; 
but  on  what  ground  ?  Take  away  his  everlasting 
life,  and  Jove  is  no  happier  than  Epicurus;  each  of 
nS  179 


mo  bono  fruitur,  id  est  volnpt&te.       At  enhn  hic 

etiam   dolorel'      At  eum  nihili  facit;  ait  enim  se, 

)  si  uratur,  Quam  hoc  suave '. '  dicturum.  Qua  igitur 
re  a  deo  vincitur  si  aeternitate  non  vincitur  ?  In 
qua  quid  est  boni  praeter  sumitiam  voluptatem  et 
earn  sempitemam  ?  Quid  ergo  attiuet  gloriose  loqui 
nisi  constanter  loquare  ?  In  voluptate  corporis 
(addam.  si  vis,  atiimi,  dum  ea  ipsa,  ut  vultis,  sit  e 
corpore)  situm  est  vivere  beate.  Quid  ?  istam  vo- 
luptatem perpetuam  quis  potest  praestare  sapienti  ? 
Nam  quibus  rebus  efficiuntur  voluptates,  eae  non 
sunt  in  potestate  sapientis.  Non  enim  in  ipsa  sa- 
pientia  positum  est  beatum  esse,  sed  in  lis  rebus 
quas  sapientia  eomparat  ad  voluptatem.  Totum 
autem  id  extemiim  est,  et  quod  externum,  id  in 
casu  est.  Ita  fit  beatae  vitae  domina  fortuna,  quam 
Epicurus  ait  exiguam  intervenire  sapienti. 

i  XXVIII,  '  Age,' inquies,  ista  parva  sunt.  Sapi- 
entem  locupletat  ipsa  natura,  cuius  divitias  Epicurus 
parabiJes  esse  docuit.' — Haec  bene  dicuntur,  nee 
ego  repugno ;  sed  inter  sese  pugnant.  Negat 
enim  tenuisstmo  victu,  id  est  contcmptissirais  escis 
et  potionibus,  minorem  voluptatem  percipi  quam 
rebus  esquisitissimis  ad  epulandum.  Huic  ego,  si 
negaret  quidquam  interesse  ad  beate  vivendum  quali 
uteretur  victu,  concederem;  laudarem  etiam; 

a  I.e. 

n  the  brazen  bull  of  Phalaiis,  qf.  V.  80,  85, 


BOOK   II.   X 

them  eigoys  the  Chief  Good,  that  is  to  say,  pleasure. 
Ah  but,'  you  say,  Epicurus  is  liable  to  pain  as  well.' 
Yes,  but  he  thinks  nothing  of  pain  ;  for  he  tells  us 
that  if  he  were  being  burnt  to  death*  he  would 

99  esclaim,  '  How  delightfiil  this  is  I '  Wherein  then 
is  he  inferior  to  God,  except  that  God  lives  for  e 
But  what  good  has  everlasting  life  to  offer  beside 
supreme  and  never-ending  pleasure  ?  What  then  is 
the  use  of  your  high-fiowii  language,  if  it  be  not 
consistent  ?  Physical  pleasure  (and  I  will  add  if  you 
like  mental  pleasure,  so  long  as  this,  as  yoii  hold,  is 
understood  to  have  its  source  in  the  body)  consti- 
tutes happiness.  Well,  who  can  guarantee  this 
pleasure  for  the  Wise  Man  in  perpetuity  ?  For  the 
things  that  produce  pleasure  are  not  in  the  Wise 
Man's  control;  since  happiness  does  not  consist  in 
wisdom  itself,  but  in  the  means  to  pleasure  which 
wisdom  can  procure.  Butall  the  apparatus  of  plet 
is  ekternal,  and  what  is  external  must  depend  on 
chance.  Consequently  happiness  becomes  the  slave 
of  fortune ;  yet  Epicurus  says  that  fortune  inter- 
feres with  the  Wise  Man  but  little! 

30  XXVIII.  "  'Come,'  you  will  say,  'these  are  trivial  e. 
objections.  The  Wise  Man  is  endowed  with  Nature's  ^ 
own  riches,  and  these,  as  Epicurus  has  shown,  are  «» 
easy  of  attainment.'  This  is  excellently  said,  and  I  J, 
do  not  combat  it;  but  Epicurus's  own  statements  P' 
are  at  war  with  each  other.  He  tells  us  that  the 
simplest  fare,  that  is,  the  meanest  sorts  of  food  and 
drink,  afford  no  less  pleasure  than  a  banquet  of  the 
rarest  delicacies.  For  my  part,  if  he  said  that  it 
Diade  no  diiference  to  happiness  what  sort  of  food 

t.e,  I  should  agree,  and  what  is  more  I  should 
ud;    for   he   would   be  telling   the  truth.     I 


enini  diceret,  idque  Socratem,  qui  voluptateiu  nullo 
loco  niimerat,  audio  dicentem,  cibi  tondimentum 
esse  famem,  potiouis  sitim.  Sed  qui  ad  voluptatem 
omnia  referens  vivit  ut  Gallonius,  loquitur  ut  Frugi 
ille   Piso,  lion  audio,  nee  euni  quod   sentiat  dicere 

91  existimo.  Naturales  divitias  dixit  parabiles  esse 
quod  parvo  esset  iiatura  contenta.  Certe,  nisi  volu- 
ptatem tanti  aestimaretis.  Non  minor,  inquit,  volu- 
ptaspercipitur  ex  vilissimis  rebus  quara  ex  pretiosis- 
simis.  Hoc  est  non  raodo  cor  non  habere  aed  ne 
palatum  quidem.  Qui  enlm  voluptatem  ipsam  con- 
temnunt,  iis  licet  dicere  se  acipenserem  maenae  non 
antepoiiere ;  cui  ve 
est,  huic  omnia  sei 

93  eaque  die  en  da  opti 
esto ;  coiisequatur 
sed  per  me  nihilo,  si 
in  nasturcio  Olo  quo 
Xenophon,  quam  in  Syracusanis  mensis  quae  a  Platone 
graviter  vituperantur ;  sit,  inquam,  tarn  Tacilis  guam 
vultis comparatio  voluptatis;  quiddedoloredieemus? 
cuius  tantu  tormeuta  sunt  ut  in  iis  beata  vita,  si 
modo  dolor  summum  malum  est,  esse  non  possit. 
Ipse  enim  Mctrodorus,  paene  alter  Epicunis,  beatum 
esse  describit  liis  fere  verbis:  cum  corpus  bene  con- 
stitutum  sit  et  sit  exploratum  ita  futurum.  An  id 
esploratum  cuiquam  potest  esse,  quoniodo  se  hoc 
habituruui  sit  corpus  non  dico  ad  annum,  sed  ad 
veaperum  ?     Dolor  igitur,  id  est  summum   malum. 

,  non  rationc  sunt  iudicanda, 
quae  sunt  suavissima.  \"erum 
■oluptates  non  modo  parvOj 
potest;  sit  voluptas  non  minor 
vesci   Persas  esse  solitos 



BOOK  II.  xsviii 
will  listen  to  Socrates,  wiio  holds  pleasure  of  no 
account,  when  he  says  that  the  best  sauce  for  food 
is  hunger  and  the  best  fliivouring  for  drink  thirst. 
But  I  will  not  listen  to  one  who  makes  pleasure  the 
sole  standard,  when  while  living  like  Gallonius  be 
talks  like  Piso  the  Thrifty ;  I  refuse  to  believe  in  his 

91  sincerity.  He  said  that  natural  wealth  is  easUy  won, 
because  nature  is  satisfied  with  little.  Undoubtedly, 
— if  only  you  Epicureans  did  not  value  pleasure  so 
highly.  As  much  pleasure,  he  says,  is  derived  from 
the  cheapest  things  as  from  the  most  costly.  Dear 
me,  his  palate  must  be  as  dull  as  his  wits.  Persons 
who  despise  pleasure  in  itself  are  at  liberty  to  say  that 
they  value  a  sturgeon  no  higher  than  a  sprat ;  but  a 
man  whose  chief  good  consists  jn  pleasure  is  bound 
to  judge  everything  by  sensation,  not  by  reason, and 
to  call  those  things  the  best  which  are  the  pleasant- 

J2  est.  However,  let  us  grant  his  point:  let  him  get 
the  highest  pleasures  cheap,  or  for  all  I  care  for 
nothing,  if  he  can;  allow  that  there  is  as  much 
pleasure  to  be  found  in  the  cress  salad  which  accord- 
ing to  Xenophon^  formed  the  staple  diet  of  the 
Persians,  as  in  the  Syracusan  banquets  which  Plato'' 
takes  to  task  so  severely;  grant,  I  say,  that  pleasure 
is  as  easy  to  get  as  your  school  makes  out; — but 
what  are  we  to  say  of  pain?  Pain  can  inflict  such 
tortures  as  to  render  happiness  absolutely  impossible, 
that  is,  if  it  be  true  that  paui  is  the  Chief  Evil. 
Metrodorus  himself,  who  was  almost  a  second  Epi- 
curus, describes  happiness  (I  give  almost  his  actual 
words)  as  'sound  health,  and  an  assurance  of  its 
continuance.'  Can  anyone  have  an  assurance  of 
what  his  health  will  be,  I  don't  say  a  year  hence, 
but  this  evening?  It  follows  that  we  can  never  be 


metuetur  semper  etiajnsi  tion  aderit ;  iam  enim  adesse 
poterit.  Qui  potest  iffitur  habitare  in  beabi  vita  summi 

93  njali  ijietus?  Traditur,  inquit,  ab  Epicure  ratio  ne- 
glegendi  doloris,  lani  id  ipsuni  absurdum,  maximum 
malum    neglegi.      Sed   quae   tandem  ista  ratio   est? 

Maximus  dolor,'  ijiquit,  brevis  est.'  Primum  quid 
tu  dicis  breve?  deinde  dolorem  queni  ) 
Quid  enim  ?  Summus  dolor  plures  dies  n 
potest?  Vide  ne  etiam  menses!  Nisi  forte  eum 
dicis  qui  simul  atque  arripuit  interficit.  Quis  istum 
dolorem  timet  ?  lUum  mallem  levares  quo  optimum 
atque  humanissimum  virum,  Cn.  Octavium,  M.  F., 
familiarem  meum,  confici  vidi,  nee  vero  serael  nee  ad 
breve  tempus  sed  et  saepe  et  plane  diu.  Quos  Ule, 
di  immortales !  cum  omiies  artus  ardere  viderentur, 
cruciatus  perferebat '.  Nee  tamen  miser  esse,  quia 
suiumuni  id  malum  not)  erat,  tantummodo  laboriosus 
videbatur.  At  miser,  si  in  fiagitiosa  atque  vitiosa  vita 
afflueret  voluptatibus. 

94  XXIX.  Quod  autem  magnum  doiorem  brevem, 
longinquum  levem  esse  dicitis,  id  nou  tntellcgo  quale 
sit.  Video  enim  et  magnos  et  cosdem  bene  longin- 
quos  dolores ;  quorum,  alia  toleratio  est  verior,  qua 
uti  VDS  non  potestis  qui  honestatem  ipsam.  per  se 
non  amatis.  Fortitudini(>  quaedam  praecepta  sunt 
ac  paene  leges,  quae  effeminari  virum  vetant  in 
dolore.     Quamobrem  turpe  putandum  est,  non  dico 


BOOK  II.  KKViii-x: 
freefromtheappreheijsionofpain,  which  is  the  Chief 
Evil,  even  when  it  is  absent,  for  at  any  moment  it 
may  be  upon  us.    How  then  can  life  be  happy  when 

93  haunted  by  fear  of  the  greatest  Evil?  Ah  but,'  he 
rejoins,  Epicurus  teaches  a  method  for  disregarding 
pain.'  To  begin  with,  the  mere  idea  of  disregard- 
ing that  which  is  the  greatest  of  evils  is  absurd.  But 
what  is  this  method,  pray?  The  severest  pain,'  says 
he,  'is  brief.'  First  of  all,  what  do  you  mean  by 
brief?  and  secondly,  what  do  you  mean  by  the 
severest  pain?  Why,  cannot  the  most  intense  pain 
last  for  several  days?  You  may  find  it  last  for 
months!  Unless  indeed  you  mean  a  seizure  tliat 
instantaneously  kills  you.  But  no  one  is  aA-aid  of 
such  a  pain  as  that.  I  want  you  rather  to  alleviate 
such  agony  as  I  have  seen  afflicting  my  excellent 
and  amiable  friend,  Gnaeus  Octavius,  son  of  Marcus ; 
and .  that  not  once  only  or  for  a  short  time,  but 
repeatedly  and  for  very  long  periods.  Great  heavens, 
what  torments  he  used  to  suffer!  All  his  joints  felt 
as  if  on  Rre.  And  yet  one  did  not  think  of  him 
as  miserable,  because  such  pain  was  not  the  greatest 
evil, — ^only  as  afflicted.  Mi.serahie  he  would  have 
been  if  he  had  lived  a  life  of  profligacy  and  vice  sur- 
rounded by  every  pleasure. 

9+  XXIX.  As  for  your  maxim  that  severe  pain  is 
short  and  prolonged  pain  light,  I  cannot  make  out  what 
it  may  mean.  For  I  see  paius  that  are  at  ouce  severe 
and  considerably  prolonged;  and  the  truer  way 
endure  them  is  that  other  method,  which  you  whi 
not  love  moral  wortli  for  its  own  sake  are  not  able 
to  employ.  Courage  has  its  precepts  and  its  rules, 
i  of  constraining  force,  that  forbid  a 
V  womanish  weakness  in  pain.     Hence  it  must 



'  to  ^H 

ido    .  ^H 


dolere  (nam  id  quidem  est  tnterdum  necease),  sed 
saxum  illud  Lemniuni '  clamore  Philocteteo    fiine- 

Quod  eiulatu,  questu,  gemltu,  fiemitibus 
Resonando  mutum  flebiles  voces  refert. 
Huic  Epicurus  praeceiitet,  si  potest,  cui 


Sic  Epicurus ; '  Philocteta,  si  gravis  dolor,  brevis.'  *  At 
iam  decimum  annum  in  spelunca  iacet.      Si  longus, 

95  levis;  dat  enim  intervalla  et  relaxat.'  Primum  non 
saepe,  deinde  quae  est  ista  relaxatio,  cum  et  praeter- 
iti  doloris  menioria  recens  est  et  fiituri  atque  im- 
pendentis  torquet  timor?  Moriatur,  inquit.  Fortasse 
id  optimum, sed  ubi  illud:  Plus  semper  voluptatis?' 
Si  enim  ila  est,  vide  ne  facinus  facias  cum  mori 
Euadeas.  Potius  ergo  ilia  dicantur,  turpe  esse,  viri 
non  esse  debilitari  dolore,  frangi,  succumbere.  Nam 
ista  vestra ;  Si  gravis,  brevis ;  si  longus,  levis'  dictata 
sunt.  Virtutis,  magnitudinis  animi,  patientiae,  for- 
titudinis  fomentis  dolor  mitigari  solet. 

96  XXX.  Audi,  ne  longe  abeam,  nioriens  quid  dicat 
Epicurus,  ut  iiitellegas  facta  eius  cum  dictis  disere- 
pare:  Epicurus  Hermarcho  S.  Cum  ageremus,'  inquit, 

'£  inserted  by  Baiter. 

'5i  (or  sit)  gravis  dolor,  brevis  inf.  MSS. ;  si  brevis  dolor, 
U'nis  A.  B,  E.— Mdv.  ^Philocteta,  st!  Brevis  dohir.'  But  cp, 

a  Quoted  probably  from  the  Fhilocteles  of  Atti 


I  considered  a  disgrace,  I  do  not  say  to  feel  pain 
lat  is  sometimes  inevitable),  but  that  rock  of 
mnos  to  outrage ' '  with  the  cries  of  a  Philoctetes, 
t  Ep 


Till  the  dumb  stones  utter  a  voice  of  weeping. 
Echoing  his  wails  and  plaints,  his  sighs  and 

^t  Epicurus  soothe  with  his  spells,  if  he  can,  the 
n  whose 



I_    then, 

Veins  and  vitals,  from  the  viper's  fang 
Envenom' d,  throb  witli  pangs  of  anguish  dire. 
Thus  Epicurus:    Philocletes'    If  piin  is  severe,  it  is 
short.'    Oh,  but  he  has  been  languishing  in  his  cave 
these  ten  years  past.     'If  it  is  long  it  m  light:  for 
it  grants  intervals  of  respite       In  the  first  place, 
few  and  far  between    and  secondly,  what 
the  good  of  a  respite  embittered  bj  retent  pain 
fresh  in  memory,  and  tormented  by  Jear  of  pain 
kpending  in  the  future?     Let  liim  die  sajs  Epicu- 
Perhaps  that  were  the  best  tourse  but  what 
les  of  the  maxim  about    a  tonstant  preponder- 
ofplea-sure'?    If  that  be  true,  are  you  not  guilty 
crime  in  advising  him  to  end  his  life?     Well 
then,  let  us  rather  tell  him  that  it  is  base  and  un- 
ly  to  be  enfeebled,  crushed  and  overpowered  by 
As  for  the  formula  of  your  sect.    Short  if 
strong,  light  if  it's  long,'  it  is  a  tag  for  copy- 
books.    Virtue,  magnanimity,  endurance,  courage, 
■it  is  these  that  have  balm  to  assuage  pain. 
XXX.   "But  I  must  not  digress  too  far.      Let  me  fi 
repeat  the  dying  words  of  Epicurus,  to  prove  to  you  JJ^'own^^' 
^e  discrepancy  between  his  practice  and  his  prin-  w— '--■— 
Iples  :  '  Epicurus  to  Hermarchus,  greeting.  I  write 


vitae  beatum  et  eundem  supremiim  diem,  scribe- 
bamus  haec.  Tanti  aderant  vesicae  et  torminum 
morbi  ut  nihil  ad  eorum  magnitiidinem  posset  acce- 
dere.'  Miserum  hominetii!  Si  dulor  summum  malum 
est,   dici  aliter  noti  potest.     Sed  audiamus  ipsum. 

Compensabatur/  inquit,  tamen  cum  Ills  omnibus 
animi  laetitia  quam  capiebam  memoria  rationum  in- 
ventonjmque  nostrorum.  Sedtu,  ut  dignum  est  tua 
erga  me  et  pliilosophiam  voluntate  ab  aduleseentulo 
'  97  suscepta,  fac  ut  Metrodori  tueare  liberos.'  Non  ego 
iam  Epaminondae,  non  Leonidae  mortem  huius 
morti  antepono ;  quorum  alter  cum  vicisset  Lacedae- 
monios  apud  Mantineam  atque  ipse  gravi  vulnere 
exanimari  se  videret,  ut  primum  dispexit,  quaesivit 
salvusne  esset  clipeus.  Cum  salvum  esse  tlentes  sui 
respundisseiit,  rogavit  essentne  fusi  hostes.  Cum  id 
quoque  ut  cupiebat  audivisset,  evelli  iussit  earn  qua 
erat  transfixus  hastam.  Ita  multo  sanguine  profuso 
in  laetitia  et  victoria  est  mortuus.  Leonidas  autem, 
rex  Lacedaemoniorum  se  in  Thermopylis  trecen- 
tosque  eos  quos  eduxerat  Sparta,  cum  esset  proposita 
aut  fuga  turpis  aut  gloriosa  mors,  opposuit  hostibus. 
Praeclarae  uiortes  sunt  imperatoriae ;  philosophi 
autem  in  suis  lectulis  plerum.que  moriuntur.  Refert 
tamen  quomodo.  Beatus  sibi  videtur  esse  moriens. 
Magna  laus.^  Compensabatur,'  inquit,  cum  sum- 
)  mis  doloribus  laetitia,'  Audio  equidem  pliilosophi 
vocem.  Epicure ;  sed  quid  tibi  dicendum  sit  oblitus 
es.     Primura  enim,  si  vera  sunt  ea  quorum  recorda- 

BOOK  II.  ssK 

these  words,'  he  sajs,  'on  the  happiest,  and  the  Isat, 
day  of  my  life.  I  am  suffering  from  diseases  of  the 
bladder  and  intestines,  which  are  of  the  utmost 
possible  severity.'  Unhappy  creature  '.  If  pain  is 
the  Chief  Evil,  that  is  the  only  thing  to  be  said.  But 
let  us  hear  his  own  words.  Yet  nil  iny  sufferings," 
he  continues,  are  counterbalanced  by  the  joy  which 

■  derive  from  remembering  my  theories  and  dis- 
Bveries.  I  charge  you,  by  the  devotion  which  from 
Our  youth  up  you  have  displayed  towards  nayself 
nd  towards  philosophy,  to  protect  the  children  of 

97  Metrodorus.'  When  I  read  this  I  rank  the  death- 
scene  of  Epicurus  on  a  level  with  those  of  Epami- 
nondas  and  of  Leonidas.    Epaminondas  had  defeated 

_the  Lacedemonians  at  Mantinea,  and  perceived  him- 

lelf  to  be  mortally  wounded.     As  soon  as  he  regained 

mess  he  inquired  if  his  shield  were  safe. 

I  weeping  followers  told  him  that  it  was.     He 

■ere  the  enemy  routed.     Satisfied  on  this 

int  also,  he  bade  them  pluck  out  the  spear  that 

lerced  his  side.     A  rush  of  blood  followed,  and  so 

1  the  hour  of  joy  and  victory  he  died.     Leonidas, 

king  of  the  Lacedemonians,  had  to  choose  between 

dishonourable  Hight  and  a  glorious  death  ;  with  the 

three  hundred  warriors  that  he  had  brought  fi-om 

^^^Spsrta  he  confronted  the  foe  at  Thermopylae.    It  is 

^^nrlorious  to  fall  when  leading  an  army ;  but  philoso- 

^^^pbers  mostly  die  in  their  beds.     Still  the  manner  of 

^^  their  death  makes  a  difference.      Epicurus  counts 

himself  happy  in  his  last  moments,     A11  honour  to 

him.        My  joy,'  he    writes,     counterbalances   the 

98  acverest  pain."     There,  Epicurus,  it  is  true,  I  hear 
of  a  philosopher;  but  you  forget  what  you 

gically  ought  to  say.    In  the  first  place,  if  tlie  thing 

tione  te  gaudere  dicis,  hoc  est  si  vera  sui 
et  invents,  gaudere  non  potes  ;  nihil  er 
quod  ad  corpus  referas ;  est  autem  a  te  semper 
ctum  nee  gaudere  quemquam  nisi  propter  corpus  nee 
dolere.  Praeteritis,  inquit,  gaudeo,  Quihusnam 
praeteritis?  si  ad  corpus  pertinentibus,  rationes 
tuas  te  video  compensare  cum  istis  doloribus, 
memoriam  corpore  perceptarum  voluptatum 
autem  ad  animuni,  falsum  est  quod  iiegas  t 
nllum  esse  gaudium  quod  non  referatur  ad  corpus. 
Cur  deinde  Metrodori  liberos  commendas  ?  quid  in 
istoegregio  tuo  officio  et  tantafide  (sic  enim existimo) 
ad  corpus  refers  ? 

)  XXXI.  "  Hue  etiltuc,Torquate,vosversetis  licet; 
nihil  in  hac  praeclara  epistola  scriptum  ab  Epicuro 
congruens  et  conveniens  decretis  eius  reperietis.  Ita 
redarguitur  ipse  a  sese,  convincunturque  scripta  eius 
probitate  ipsius  ac  moribus.  Nam  ista  commendatio 
puerorum,  memoria  et  caritas  amicitiae,  summorum 
officiorum  in  estremo  spiritu  conservatio  indicat  in- 
natam  esse  liomini  probitatem  gratuitam,  non  invita- 
tam  voluptatibus  nee  praemiorummereedibusevoca- 
tam.  Quod  enim  testimonium  maius  quaerimus,  quae 
honesta   et  recta  sint,   ipsa  esse  optabilia  per  sese, 

)  cum  videamus  tanta  oflicia  morientis  ?     Sed  ut  epi~ 
stulam  laudandam  arbitror  earn  quam  raodo  totidem 
fere  verbis  interpretatus  sum,  quamquum  ea.  < 
summa  eius  philosophia  nullo  niodo  congruebat, 



'  MSS,  t 

St  cdd. 

le  prepos 

;  Mdv. 


iiifur^uc  I1<.\v.  after  Davis 

BOOK  II.  xsx-xxxi 
in  the  recollection  of  which  you  profess  to  find  plea- 
sure, I  mean  jnur  writings  and  your  theories,  are 
true,  you  cannot  really  he  feeling  pleasure.  All 
feelings  referable  to  the  body  are  over  for  you  ;  yet 
you  have  always  maintained  that  no  one  feels  either 
pleasure  or  pain  except  on  account  of  the  body.  He 
says  I  take  pleasure  in  my  past  feelings."  What 
past  feelings  ?  If  you  mean  bodily  feelings,  I  notice 
that  it  is  not  the  memory  of  hodily  delights,  but  your 
philosophical  theories,  that  counterbalance  for  you 
your  present  pains  ;  if  mental  feelings,  your  doctrine 
that  there  is  no  delight  of  the  mind  not  ultimately 
referable  to  the  body  is  an  error.  And  secondly, 
why  do  you  provide  for  the  children  of  Metrodorus? 
What  standard  of  bodily  pleasure  are  you  following 
in  this  signal  act  (for  so  I  esteem  it)  of  loyalty  and 

)  XXXI.  ''  Vea,  Torquatus,  you  people  may  turn  and 
twist  as  you  like,  but  you  will  not  find  a  line  in  this 
famous  letter  of  Epicurus  that  is  not  inconsistent  and 
incompatible  with  his  teachings.  Hence  he  is  his 
own  refutation ;  his  writings  are  disproved  by  the 
uprightness  of  his  character.  That  provision  for 
the  care  of  the  children,  that  loyalty  to  friend- 
ship and  affection,  that  observance  of  these  solemn  i 
dutieswithhislatestbreathjprovethat  there  was  innate 
in  the  man  a  disinterested  uprightness,  not  evoked  by 
pleasure  nor  elicited  by  prices  and  rewards.  Seeing 
so  strong  a  sense  of  duty  in  a  dying  man,  what  clearer 
evidence  do  we   want  that  morality  and   rectitude 

)   are  desirable  for  their  own  sakes  ?    But  while  I  think  'j"[^'''"|l°J' 
that  the  letter  I  have  just  translated  almost  word  (or  ihe  pos- 
for  word  is  most  admirable,  although  entirely  incon-  bta^ud '"h'! 
sistent  with  the  general  tenor  of  his  philosophy,  yet  binbday. 


eiusdera  testamentum  non  solum  a  philosophi  gravi- 
tate sed  etiam  ab  ipsius  sententia  iuHico  discrepare. 
Scripsit  enini  et  multis  saepe  verbis  et  breviter  aper- 
teque  in  eo  libro  quern  modo  nominavi,  mortem 
nihU  ad  nos  pertinere ;  quod  enim  dissolutum  sit,  id 
esse  sine  sensu;  quod  autem  sine  sensu  sit,  id  nihil 
ad  nos  pertinere  omnino.'  Hoc  ipsiiin  elegantius 
poni  meliusque  potuit.  Nam  quod  ita  positum  est, 
quod  dissolutum  sit,  id  esse  sine  sensu,'  id  eiusmodi 

I  est  ut  non  satis  plane  dicat  quid  sit  dissolutum.  Sed 
tamen  intellego  quid  velit.  Quaere  autem  quid  sit 
quod,  cum  dissolutione,  id  est  morte  sensus  omnis  ex- 
stinguatur,  et  cum  reliqui  nihil  sit  omnino  quod  per- 
tineat  ad  nos,  tamaecurate  tamque  diligenter  caveat 
et  sanciat  ut  Amynomachus  et  Timocrates,  heredes 
sui,  de  Hermarchi  sententia  dent  quod  satis  sit  ad 
diem  agendum  natalem  suum  quotinnis  mense  Game- 
Hone,  itemque  omnibus  mensibus  vicesimo  die  lunae 
dent  ad   eorum   epolas  qui  una  secum  phllosophati 

i  sint,  utet  sui  et  Metrodori  memoria  colatur.'  Haec 
ego  non  possum  dicere  non  esse  hominis  quamvis  et 
belli  et  humani,  sapientis  vero  nullo  modo,  physici 
praesertim,  quem  se  ille  esse  vult,  putare  uUum  esae 
cuiusquam  diem  natalem.  Quid?  idemne  potest  esse 
dies  saepius  qui  serael  fuit?  Certe  non  potest.  An 
eiusdemmodi?  Ne  id  quidem,  nisi  multa  onnorum 
intercesserint  milia,  ut  omnium  siderum  eodem  unde 

HOOK  II.  x\xi 
I  eoiisider  his  will  to  bt  quite  out  of  harmony  not 
only  with  the  dignity  of  a  philosopher  but  also  with 
his  own  pronouncement.  For. he  repeatedly  argued 
at  length,  and  also  stated  briefly  and  plainly  in  the 
book  I  have  just  mentioned,  that  death  does  not 
aKect  us  at  all ;  for  a  thing  that  has  experienced  dis- 
solution must  be  devoid  of  sensation  ;  and  that  which 
is  devoid  of  sensation  cannot  affect  us  in  any  degree 
whatsoever,'  The  maxim  such  as  it  is  might  have 
been  better  and  more  neatly  put.  For  the  phrase, 
'  what  has  experienced  dissolution  must  be  devoid  of 
sensation,'  does  not  make  clear  what  it  is  that  has 

01  experienced  dissolution.  However  in  spite  of  this 
1  understand  the  meaning  intended.  What  I  want 
to  know  is  this  :  if  all  sensation  is  annihilated  by  dis- 
solution, that  is,  by  death,  and  if  nothing  whatever 
that  can  affect  us  remains,  why  is  it  that  he  makes 
such  precise  and  careful  provision  and  stipulation 

that  his  heirs,  Amynochiis  and  Timocrates,  shall 
after  consultation  with  Hermarchus  assign  a  sufficient 
sum  to  celebrate  his  birthday  every  year  in  the 
month  of  Gamelion,  and  also  on  the  twentieth  day 
of  every  month  shall  assign  a  sum  for  a  banquet  to 
his  fellow-studenta  in  philosophy,  in  order  to  keep 
alive  the  memory  of  himself  and  of  Metrodorus"  ? 

02  That  these  are  the  words  of  as  amiable  and  kindly  a 
man  iis  you  like,  I  cannot  deny  ;  but  what  business 
has  a  philosopher,  and  especially  a  natural  philoso- 
pherj  which  Epicurus. claims  to  be,  to  think  that  any 
day  can  be  anybody's  birthdaj'  ?  Why,  can  the 
identical  day  that  has  once  occurred  recur  again  and 
again  ?  Assuredly  it  is  impossible.  Or  can  a  similar 
day  recur?  This  too  is  impossible,  except  afler  an 
interval  of  many  thousands  of  years,  when  all  the 

o  193 

profeeta  sint  fiat  ad  unum  tempus  reversio.  Nullus 
est  igitur  euiusqiiam  dies  natalis.  At  habetur.'  Et 
ego  id  scilicet  ne.sciebam  I  Scd  ut  sit,  etiamne  post 
mortem  coletur?  idque  testamento  cavebit  is  qui 
nobis  quasi  oraculum  ediderlt  lulijl  post  mortem  ad 
nos  perlinere?  Haec  non  erant  eius  qui  innumera- 
biles  mundos  infinitasque  regiones,  quarum  nulla 
esset  ora,  nulla  extremitas,  mente  peragravisset.' 
Num  quid  tale  Democritus  ?  (L't  alios  omittam,  hunc 

S  appello  quem  ille  unum  secutus  est.)  Quod  si  dies 
notandus  fuit,  eumne  potius  quo  natus,  an  eum  quo 
sapiens  factus  est  ?  Non  potuit,'  inquies,  fieri 
sapiens  nisi  natus  esset.'  Isto  raodo  ne  si  avia  qui- 
dem  eius  nata  non  esset.  Res  tota,  Torquate,  non 
doctorum  hominum,  velle  post  mortem  epulis  cele- 
brari  memoriam  sui  nominis.  Quos  quldem  dies 
quemadmodum  agatis  et  in  quantam  hominum  face- 
torum  urbaiiitatem  incurratis,  non  dico ;  nihil  opus 
est  litibus  ;  tantum  dico  magis  fuisse  vestrum  agere 
Epicuri  diem  natalem  quam  illius  testamento  cavere 
ut  agere  tur. 

1  XXXII.  Sed  ut  ad  propositum  revertamur  (,de 
dolore  enini  cum  diceremus,  ad  istani  epistulam  de- 
lati  sum  us),  nunc  totum  illud  concludi  sic  licet :  Qui  in 


is  found  in  Plal 

mmensuiri    peragravi 


heavenly  bodies  simultaneously  achieve  their  return 
to  the  point  from  which  they  started.'  It  follows 
liiat  there  is  no  sueh  thing  as  anybody's  birthday. 
'  All  the  same,  people  do  keep  birthdays.'  Much 
obliged,  I  am  sure,  for  the  information  !  But  even 
granting  birthdays,  is  a  person's  birthday  to  be 
observed  when  he  is  dead  ?  And  to  provide  for 
this  by  will — is  this  appropriate  for  a  man  who 
told  us  in  oracular  tones  that  nothing  can  affect  us 
after  death  ?  Such  a  provision  ill  became  one  whose 
'  intellect  had  r()anied '  over  unnumbered  worlds  and 
realms  of  infinite  space,  unbounded  and  unending. 
Did  Democritus  do  anything  of  the  kind?  (To 
omit  others,  I  cite  the  case  of  the  philosopher  who 

i  was  Epicurus's  only  master.)  And  if  a  special 
day  was  to  be  kept,  did  he  do  well  to  tHke  the  day 
on  which  he  was  bom,  and  not  rather  that  on  which 
he  became  a  Wise  Man  ?  You  will  object  that  he 
could  not  have  become  a  Wise  Man  if  he  had  not 
first  of  all  been  born.  You  might  equally  well  say, 
if  his  grandmother  had  not  been  bom  either.  The 
entire  notion  of  wishing  one's  name  and  memory  to 
be  celebrated  by  a  banquet  after  one's  death  is  alien 
to  a  man  of  learning.  I  won't  refer  to  your  mode  of 
keeping  these  anniversaries,  or  to  the  ridicule  you 
bring  upon  yourselves  from  persons  with  a  sense  of 
humour.  We  do  not  want  to  quarrel.  I  only  remark 
that  it  was  more  your  business  to  keep  Epicurus's 
birthday  than  his  business  to  provide  by  will  for  its 

t       XXXn.  "But  to  return  to  our  subject  {for  we  were  u 

discussing  the  question  of  pain,  when  we  digressed  [j| 

to  the  letter  of  Epicurus).     The  whole  matter  may 

now  be  put  In  the  following  syllogism :  A  man  un- 

u2  195 


o  malo  est,  is  turn  cum  in  eo  est  non  est  beatuG ; 
sapiens  autem  semper  beatus  est  et  est  aliquando  in 
(lolore ;  non  est  igittir  sumnmm  malum  dolor.  lam 
iliud  quale  tandem  est,  bona  praeterita  non  elfluere 
Siipienti,  mnla  meminisse  non  oportcre?  Primum  in 
nostrane  est  pott-state  quid  meuiinerimus?  Tliemi- 
stocles  quidtm,  cum  ei  Siiuonides  an  quis  alius  artem 
memoriae  polliceretur,  'Oblivionis,'  inquit,  'mnllein; 
nam  memini  etiam  quae  nolo,  oblivisci  non  possum 
'•  quae  volo.'  Ma^no  hie  iiigenio;  sed  res  se  tamen 
sic  habet  ut  nimis  imperiosi  pliilosophi  sit  vetare 
meminisse.  Vide  ue  isla  sint  Manliana  vestra  aut 
maiora  etiam,  si  imperes  quod  faeere  non  possim. 
Quid  si  etiam  iucunda  memoria  est  praeteritorum 
malorum?  ut  proverbia  nonnulla  veriora  sint  quam 
vestra  dogmata,  Vulgo  enim  dicitur:  lucundi  acti 
labores' ;  nee  male  Euripides  (concludam,  si  potero, 
Latine;  Graecum  enim  bunc  versum  nostis  omnes): 

Suavis  laborum  est  praeteritorum  memoria. 
Sed  ad  bona  proeterita  redeamus.  Quae  si  a  vobis 
talia  dicerentur  qualibus  C.  Marios  uti  poterat,  ut 
expulsus,  fgens,  in  palude  demersus  tropaeorum  re- 
cordatione  levaret  dolorem  siium,  audirem  et  plane 
probarem.     Nee  enim  absolri    beata  vita  sapientfs 


BOOK  II.  xKxii 
ilCTgoiiig  tlie  supreme  Evil  is  not  for  tbe  time  bein;; 
happy ;  but  tlie  Wise  Man  is  always  happy,  and  some- 
times undergoes  pain ;  therefore  pain  is  not  the 
supreme  Evil,  And  again,  what  is  the  sense  of  the 
maxim  that  the  Wise  Man  will  not  let  past  blessings 
fade  from  memory,  and  that  it  is  a  duty  to  forget 
past  misfortunes?  Toliegin  with,  have  we  the  power 
to  ehoose  what  we  shall  remember?  Themistocles 
at  all  events,  when  Simonides  or  some  one  offered  to 
teacb  bim  the  art  of  memory,  replied  that  he  would 
prefer  the  art  of  forgetting;  for  I  remember,'  said 
he,  even  things  1  do  not  wish  to  remember,  but  I 
O.i  cannot  forget  things  I  wish  to  forget.'  Epieurus 
was  a  very  able  man ;  but  still  the  faet  of  the  matter 
is  that  a  philosopher  who  forbids  iis  to  remember 
lays  too  heavy  a  charge  upon  us.  Why,  you  are  as 
great  a  martinet  as  your  ancestor  Manlius,'  or 
greater,  if  you  order  me  to  do  what  is  beyond 
my  power.  What  if  the  memory  of  past  evils  be 
actually  pleasant?  proving  certain  proverbs  truer 
than  the  tenets  of  your  school.  There  is  a  popular 
saying  to  the  effect  that  'Toil  is  pleasant  when  'tis 
over';  and  Euripides  well  writes  (l  will  attempt  a 
verse  translation:  the  Greek  line  is  known  to  you 

Sweet  is  the  memory  of  sorrows  past. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  question  of  past  blessings. 
[f  your  school  meant  by  these  the  sort  of  successes 
that  Gaius  Marius  could  fall  back  on,  enabling-  him 
when  a  penniless  exile^up  to  his  chin  in  a  swamp  to 
lighten  his  sufferings  by  recollecting  his  former 
victories,  I  would  listen  to  you,  and  would  unreserv- 
edly assent.     Indeed  it  would  be  impossible  for  the 

ne^ue  ad  exitum  perduci  potent,  si  prima  quaeque 
bene  ab  eo  coiisulta  atque  facta  ipsius  oblivione  ob- 
I  106  rueiitur.  Sed  vobis  voluptatimi  pcrceptarum  reeor- 
datio  vitam  beatam  fa'cit,  et  quidem  corpore  percc- 
ptarum ;  nam  si  quae  sunt  aliae,  falsum  est  omnes 
aniini  voluptates  esse  e  corporis  societate.  Corporis 
autem  voluptas  si  etiam  praeterita  delectat,  non 
Intel  lego  eiir  Aristoteles  Sardanapalli  epigramma 
taiito  opere  derideat,  in  quo  ille  rex  Syriae  glorietur 
se  omiies  secura  abstulisse  libidinum  voluptates.  Quod 
eniiu  ne  vivus  quidem,  inquit,  diutius  sentirc  poterat 
quaut  duiii  fruebatur,  quomodo  id  mortuo  potuit  per- 
uianere?  Fluit  igitur  voluptas  coi-poris  et  prima 
quaeque  avolat,  saepiusque  relinquit  eausam  paeni- 
teiidi  quam  recordandi.  Itaqiie  beatJor  Africanus 
cum  pati'ia  illo  modo  loqucns :  ^h 

Desine,  Roma,  tuos  hostes —  ^^M 

reliquaque  praeclare :  ^^M 

Nam  tibi  moenimenta  mei  peperere  labores.  ^^ 
Laboribus  hie  praeteritis  gaudet,  tu  iubes  volupt&ti- 
bus;  et  hie  se  ad  ea  revocat  e  quibus  nihil  umquam 
rettulerit  ad  corpus,  tu  totus  haeres  in  corpore. 
'  XXXIII.  Illud  autem  ipsum  qui  obtiiieri  potest, 
quod  dicitis  omnes  animi  et  voluptates  et  dolores  ad 
corporis  voluptates  ac  dolores  pertinere?  Nihilne 
te  delectat  umquam  (video  quicum  loquar),  te  igitur, 

a  III  a  work  now  lost.  Tlip  lines  referred  tn 
San'  t^yor  «bJ  iijiippian  «ai  >il<r  tpm-i.  riprv  lrxt6 
tal  BX^in  Tip™  U\vFrai.     (ap,    Alhen.    336a.) 

''Apparently  from  the  Annals  of  Ennius. 

^V  BOOK  II.  xx^ii  xxxiii 

luppiness  of  the  Wise  Man  to  attain  its  final  and 
ultimate  perfectiou,  if  all  his  previous  wise  designs 
and  achievements  were  to  be  erased  from  his  memory. 

06  But  with  jou  it  is  the  recollection  of  pleasures 
enjoyed  that  gives  happiness;  and  those  must  be 
bodily  pleasures, — for  if  it  be  any  others,  it  ceases  to 
be  true  that  mental  pleasures  all  arise  from  the 
connection  of  the  mind  with  the  body.  Yet 
if  bodily  pleasure  eve»  when  past  can  give 
delight,  I  do  not  see  why  Aristotle"  should  l>e  so 
contemptuous  of  the  epitaph  of  Sardanapaliis.  The 
famous  Syrian  monarch  boasts  that  he  has  taken 
with  him  all  the  sensual  pleasures  that  he  has 
enjoyed.  How,  asks  Aristotle,  could  a.  dead  man 
continue  to  experience  a  feeling  which  even  while 
alive  he  could  only  be  conscious  of  so  long  as  he  was 
actually  enjoying  it?  So  that  bodily  pleasures  are 
transient;  each  in  turn  evaporates, leaving  cause  for 
regrets  more  often  than  fur  recollection.  Accordingly 
Africanus  must  be  counted  happier  than  Sardanapa- 
lus,  when  he  addresses  his  country  with  the  words : 

Cease,  Rome,  thy  foes — 
and  the  glorious  conclusion : 

My  toils  have  won  thee  battlements  secure.'' 
His  past  toils  are  wliat  he  delights  in,  whereas  you 
bid  us  dwell  upon  our  past  pleasures;  he  recalls  e.t- 
periences  that  never  had  any  connection  with  bodily 
enjoyment,  but  you  never  rise  above  the  body. 

07  XXXIII,  '  Again  how  can  you  possibly  defend  the  ut 
dictum  of  your  school,  that  all  mental  pleasures  and  ™ 
pains  alike  are  based  on  pleasures  and  pains  of  the  '"' 

IjrF     Do  you,  Torquatus  (for  I  bethink  me  who  it 
am  addressing) — do  you  personally  never  experi- 

Torquate,  ipsuni  perse  nihil  deleotat?  Ooiitto  digni- 
talem,  honestatcm,  speciem  ipsani  virtutum,  de  qui- 
bus  ante  dictum  est;  haec  leviora  poniim:  poeraa, 
oratianem  ctmi  aut  scribis  aut  legis,  cum  omnium 
rBctonim,cum.regioniimconquiris  liistoriam,  signum. 
tabula,  locus  amoenus,  ludi,  vemitio,  villa  Luculli 
{nam  si  tuum  dicerem,  latebram  habcres;  iid  corpus 
diceres  pertinere)^ — sed  ea  quae  dixi  nd  corpusne  re- 
fers? an  est  aliquid  quod  te  sua  sponte  delectet? 
Aut  pertinacissimus  fueris  si  perstiteris  ad  corpus  ea 
quae  dixi  referre,  aut  deseruerls  totain  Epicuri  volu- 
ptatem  si  negaveris. 
S  '  Quod  vero  a  te  disputatum  est  maiores  esse  vo- 
luptates  et  dolores  animi  quam  corporis,  quia  trium 
temporum  particeps  animus  sit,  eorpore  autem  prne- 
sentia  solum  sentiaiitur,  qui  id  proliari^  potest  ut  is 
qui  propter  me  aliquid  gaudeat  plus  quam  ego  ipse 
gaudeat  ?  [Anirao  voUiplas  oritur  propter  voluptatem 
corporis,  et  maior  est  animi  voluptas  quam  corporis; 
ita  fit  ut  gratulator  laetior  sit  quam  is  cui  gratulatur.'] 
Sed  duni  efticere  vultis  beatum  sapientcm  eum  masi- 
mas  aninio  voluptates  percipiat  omnibusque  partibus 
maiores  quam  eorpore,  quid  occurrat  non  videtis. 
Animi  enim  dolores  quoque  percipiet  omnibus  parti- 
lius  maiores  quam  corporis.  Ita  miser  sit  aliquando 
neeesse  est  is  quern  vos  beatum  semper  vultis  esse; 

i  id  probari  H  !  quid  id  proh.    E  :  quid  prohari,   giii 
■'  irMSS. 

•  —eratvlofiir  rejected  by  edii.  as  a  not 
explaining  The  simile  in  the  form  of  «hich  ibc  . 
nduclio  ad  absurdum  is  expressed — bodv  :  mind  ::  hf^ 
person  :  sympathiiinp  friend. 

^  BOOK  II.   \xKJii 

eiice  delifflit  in  some  tiling  for  its  own  sake?  i 
pass  over  moral  worth  .and  goodness,  and  the  hi- 
Iruisic  beauty  of  the  virtues,  of  whieh  we  spoke  be- 
fore, I  will  suggest  less  serious  matters,  reading  or 
writing  a  poem  or  a  speechj  the  study  of  history  or 
geography,  statues,  pictures,  beautiful  scenery: 
sport,  hunting,  I.ucullus's  country  house  (I  ' 
mention  your  own,  for  that  would  give  you  ii  loop- 
hole of  escape ;  you  would  say  it  is  a  source  of  Iwdilj' 
enjoj-ment);  but  take  the  things  1  have  mentioned,— 
do  you  connect  them  with  bodily  sensation  ?  Is  there 
nothing  which  of  itself  affords  you  delight  ?  Persist 
in  tracing  back  the  pleastires  1  have  instanced  to  the 
body — and  you  show  yourself  impervious  to  argu- 
ment; reeant^and  you  abandon  Rpicunis's  concep- 
tion of  pleasure  altogether. 

"As  for  your  contention  that  mental  pleasures  anil  '"'< 
isaregreater  than  bodily,  because  the  mind  appro-  gutu 
'  i  all  three  periods  of  time,  whereas  the  body  '''''* 
inly  present  sensations,  surely  it  is  absurd 
J  say  that  a  man  who  rejoices  in  sympathy  with 
my  pleasure  feels  more  joy  than  I  feel  myself. 
[Pleasure  of  the  mind  arises  out  of  sympathy  with 
that  of  the  body,  and  pleasure  of  the  mind  is  greater 
than  that  of  the  body  ;  thus  it  comes  about  that  one 
>  offers  congratulations  feels  more  delight  than 
!  person  congratulated.]  But  when  you  try  to 
;  the  Wise  Man  happy  on  the  ground  that  he 
s  the  greatest  mental  pleasures,  atid  that  these 
^  infinitely  greater  than  bodily  pleasures,  you  do 
not  see  the  difficulty  that  meets  you.  For  it  follows 
that  the  mental  pains  which  he  experiences  will  also 

K  infinitely  greater  than  the  bodily  ones.     Hence 
whom  you  maintain  to  be  always  happy  would 

my  r 

that  ( 


nee  vero  id  dum  omnia  ad  voluptatem  doloremque 

3  referetis  efficietis  umqunni.  Quarc  aliud  aliquod, 
Torqiiate,  liominis  sum  mil  in  bonum  reperiendum 
est;  voluptatem  bestiis  concedamus,  quibus  vos  de 
sunimo  bono  testibns  uti  soletis.  Quid  si  etiam 
bestiae  inulta  faciunt,  diice  sua  quaeque  natura,  par- 
tim  indulgenter  vel  cum  labore,  ut  in  gignendo,  in 
educando,  perfacile  ot'  apparent  aliud  quiddam  iis 
propositiim,  non  voluptatem?  partim  cursu  et  pera- 
gratione  laetantiir;  congregatione  aliae  coetum  quo- 

)  dam  modo  civitatis  imitantur;  videmus  in  quodam 
volucrium  genere  notmulla  indicia  pietatis,  co- 
gnitionem,  niemoriam ;  in  multis  etiam  desideria  vide- 
mus :  ergo  in  bestiis  erunt  secreta  a  voluptate 
humiuiarum  quaedani  simulacra  virtutum,  iu  ipsis 
hominibus  virtus  nisi  vuluptatis  causa  nulla  erit?  Et 
boniini,  qui  ceteris  aniniantibus  plurimum  praestat, 
praecipui  a  natura  nibil  datum  esse  dicemus? 

XXXIV.  Nos  vero,  si  quidem  in  voluptate  sunt 
omnia,  loiige  multumque  superamur  a  bestiis,  quibus 
ipsa  terra  fundit  ex  sese  pastus  varios  atque  abun- 
dantes  nihil  laborantibus ;  nobis  autem  aut  vis  aut 
ne  viK  quidem  suppetunt  multo  labore  quaerentibus. 
Nee  tanien  uljo  niodo  summum  pecudis  bonum  et 
liominis  idem  mihi  videri  potest.  Quid  enim  tanto 
opus  est  instrumento  in  optimis  artibus  comparandis, 
quid  tanto  con  cursu  honestissimorum  studiorum,  tanto 

supplied  by  Miiller. 


HOOK   II,  wxi 

fact  will  ^H 

tandard.       -^^^f 

inevitaljly  be  sometimes  miserable ;  nor  in  fact  r 

you  ever  prove  hiui  to  be  invariably  happy, . 

as  you  make  pleasure  and  pain  the  sole  standard. 

09  Therefore  we  are  bound,  Torquatus,  to  find  some  Even 
other  Chief  Good  for  man.      Let  us  leave  pleasure  \l 
to  the  lower  animals,  to  whose  evidence  on  this  <i< 
question  of  the  Chief  Good  your  school  is  fond  of 
appealing.     But  what  if  even  auimals  are  prompted 
by  their  several  natures  to  do  many  actions  conclu- 
sively proving  that  they  have  some  other  End  hi  view 
than  pleasure  ?  Some  of  them  show  kindness  even  al 
the  cost  of  trouble,  as  for  instance  in  giving  birth  to 
and  rearing  their  offspring ;  some  delight  in  running 
and  roaming  about ;  others  are  gregarious,  and  create 

1 0  something  resembling  a  social  polity  ;  in  a  certain 
class  of  birds  we  see  some  traces  of  affection  for 
human  lieings.  recognition,  recollection ;  and  in  many 
we  even  notice  regret  for  a  lost  friend.  If  animals 
therefore  possess  some  semblance  of  the  human 
virtues  unconnected  with  pleasure,  are  men  them- 
selves to  display  no  virtue  except  as  a  means  to 
pleasure?  And  shal^we  say  that  man,  who  so  far 
surpasses  all  other  living  creatures,  has  been 
gifted  by  nature  with  no  exceptional  endowment? 

.  1         XXXIV.      As  a  matter  of  fact  if  pleasure  be  all  in  Pc. 

all,  the  lower  animals  are  far  and  away  superior  to  loi^uhTT'* 

ourselves.     The    Earth   herself  without    labour   of  ^' 

theirs  lavishes  on  them  food  from  her  stores  in  great 
variety  and  abundance;  whereas  we  with  the  most 
laborious  efforts  can  scarcely  if  at  all  supply  our 
needs.  Yet  I  cannot  think  that  the  Chief  Good  can 
possibly  be  the  same  for  a  brute  beast  and  for  a  man. 
What  is  the  use  of  all  our  vast  machinery  of  cul- 
ture, of  the  great  company  of  libera]  studies,  of  the 


virtutum  coraitatii,  si  ea  nullam  ad  aliam  rem  nisi  ad 
2  voluptatem  coiiquinintur  ?  Ut,  ai  Xerxes,  ciiiii  tantis 
classibus  tantisqiie  equestribus  et  pedestribus  copiis, 
Hellespoiito  iinicto,  Athone  perfosso,  mari  ambula- 
visset,  terra'  navigavisset,  si,  dim  tanto  impetu  in 
Graeciam  venisset,  caiisam  qiiis  ex  eo  quaereret  tan- 
tarum  copiarum  tantique  belli,  inel  se  auferre  ex 
Hymetto  voluisse  diceret,  certe  sine  causa  vide- 
retur  tanta  conatus,  sic  nos  sapientem,  plurimis  et 
gravissunis  artibus  atque  virtiitibus  instructum  et 
omatum,  non,  ut  ilium,  maria  pedibtis  pern^rantem, 
classibus  montes,  sed  omne  caelum  totanique  cum 
universo  mari  terram  mente  complexum,  voluptatem 
petere  si  dicemus,  mellis  causa  dicemus  tanta  moli- 

i  "Ad  altiora  quaedaui  ct  inagiiiticentiora,  itiillj 
crede,  1'nrquate,  iiati  siimus;  nee  id  ex  aiiimi  solum 
partibus,  ill  quibus  inest  luemnria  rerum  innumera- 
bilium,  in  te  qiiidem  infiiiiti,  iHest  coniectura  conse- 
quentium  non  multum  a  divinatione  diHerens,  inest 

.  moderator  cupiditatis  pudor,  iiiest  ad  liumananf 
societatem'iustitiaefidaciistodia,  inest  in  perpetieadl 
laboribufi  adeundisque  periculis  fiima  et 
doloris  mortisque  conteniptio; — ergo  baec  ii 
til  autem  etiam  membra  ipsa  sensusque  consi 
tibi.utreliquae  corporis  partes, non  comites  solni 

BOOK  II.  ^xxiv 

goodly  fellowsltip  of  the  virtues,  jt  »11  thew.-  thtnvi  : 
are  sought    after  solely  for  the  ukv  of  plcMurc? 

13  Suppose  when  Xerxes  led  forth  liik  liuffe  ttnrU 
and  armies  of  horse  and  foot,  bHdf{i-d  the  HrN'**' 
pont,  cut  through  Athos,  marehed  ovt-r  «ra  hih) 
sailed  over  land — suppose  on  his  reBetilnff  Oftmtv 
with  his  great  anijada  some  one  uked  litni  tW 
reason  for  all  this  enormous  apparatu»  irf  w«rbr«. 
and  be  were  to  reply  that  he  had  wanted  ii>  jrr'M'iir*- 
Kome  honey  fi-om  Hymettusl  mrcly  hf  wiruld 
he  thought  to  have  had  no  luleqtinti-  nirrtlvt<  tin 
so  vast  an  undertaking.  So  with  mir  WIm-  M«m, 
equipped  and  adorned  with  nil  the  nulihul  lu/tmn' 
plishuieuts  and  virtues,  not  like  Xerx-»  tr«vrritiiiK 
the  seas  on  foot  and  the  mountain»  un  tliljfliiHtrd,  ln«l 
nientaliy  embracing  sky  ami  earth  and  «i-n  In  \,\uf\t 
entirety^ — to  say  that  tliis  nian's  nlni  i«  ptrakure  U  In 
say  that  all  his  high  endeavour  In  fur  the  aalte  of  a 
little  honey. 

1 3  "  No.  Torquatus,  believ-  nm.  wc  .utm  l-.^i  J].[ 
loftier  and  more  splendid  jiurpose».  Nor  1«  tJilk  ~ 
evidenced  by  the  raentAl  fileuliifK  nlo'ne,  includinK 
as  they  do  a  memory  for  countlcui  factu,  in  your 
case  indeed  a  memory  of  unlimited  ranije;  a  power 
of  forecasting  the  future  little  short  of  divination ; 
the  sense  of  modesty  to  curb  the  aiipetites ;  love  of 
justice,  the  faithful  guardian  of  human  society ;  con- 
tempt of  pain  and  death,  remaining  firm  and  stead- 
fast when  toil  is  to  be  endured  and  dajiger  under- 
gone. Tliese  are  our  mental  endownunts.  But  I 
would  also  have  you  consider  our  bodilv  frame,  and 
our  organs  of  sensation,  which  Intter  like  the  other 
parts  of  the  body  yon  for  your  part  will  esteem  riol 
iis  the  comrades  merely  Iml  lutiiully  aathe  servantnoi 

1 1  i  tutiun  sed  ministri  etiam  videbuntur.  Quod  si  in  ipso 
corpore  multa  voluptati  prsepoiienda  sunt,  ut  vires, 
valetudo,  velocitas,  puk-hrituilo,  quid  tandem  in 
animis  censes  ?  in  qtiibus  doctissimi  ilU  veteres  inesse 
quiddam  caeleste  et  divinum  putaverunt.  Quod  si 
esset  in  voluptate  summum .  bonum,  ut  dicitis, 
optabile  esset  in  maxima  voluptate  nullo  inter- 
vallo  interiecto  dies  noctesque  versari,  cum  omnes 
sensuE  dulcedine  omni  quasi  perfusi  niovertntur. 
Quis  est  auteni  dignus  nomine  honiinis  qui  unum 
diem  totum  velit  esse  in  genere  isto  voluplatis? 
CjTcnaici  quidem  non  recusant ;  vestri  haec  vere- 
(l  1 5  candius,  illi  fortassc  constantius.  Sed  lustremus 
animo  non  has  maximas  artes  quibus  qui  carebant 
incites  a  maioribus  nominabantur,  sed  quaero  num 
existimes,  non  dico  Homerum,  Archilochum,  Pinda- 
runi,  sed  Phidian,  Polyclitum,  Zeuxim  ad  voluptatem 
artes  suas  direxisse.  Ergo  opifex  plus  sibi  proponet 
ad  formarum  quam  civis  excellens  ad  factorum  pul- 
chritudinem?  Quae  autem  est  alia  causa  erroris 
tanti,  tarn  longe  latetjue  diflusi,  nisi  quod  is  qui 
voluptatem  summum  bonum  esse  decemit  non  cum 
ea  parte  animi  in  qua  inest  ratio  atque  consilium, 
sed  cum  cupiditate,  id  est  cum  animi  levissima  parte 
deliberat?  Quaero  enim  de  te,  si  sunt  di,  ut  vos 
etiam  putatis,  qui  possint  esse  beati  cum  voluptates 
corpore  percipere  non  posstnt,  aut  si  sine  eo  genere 
voluptatis  beati  sunt,  cur  similem  animi  usura 
sapiente  esse  nolitis. 


urn  ^H 

BOOK  II.  x>\iv 
\l  the  virtues.   But  if  even  the  body  has  many  attributel^, 

of  higher  value  than  pleasurejSuch_4a.slreagth,healthL 
beauty,  speed  of  foot,  what  pray  think  you  of  ttit^ ' 
.-■mini!  ?  Tti  e  wisest  ssga  of  antiquity  believed  that  the 
mind  contains  an  element  of  the  celestial  and  divins. 
Whereas  if  the  Chief  Good  consisted  in  pleasure  as 
your  school  avers,  the  ideal  of  happiness  would  be 
to  pass  days  and  nights  in  the  enjoyment  of  the 
keenest  pleasure,  without  a  moment's  intermission, 
every  sense  drenched  and  stimulated  with  every  sort 
of  delight,  But  who  that  is  worthy  to  he  called  a 
liuman  being  would  choose  to  pass  a  single  entire 
day  in  pleasure  of  that  description?  The  Cyrenaics, 
it  is  true,  do  not  repudiate  it;  on  this  point  your 
friends  are  more  decent,  but  the  Cyrenaics  perhaps 
1 5  more  consistent.  But  let  us  pass  in  review  not  these 
arts'  of  first  importajice,  a  lack  of  which  with  our 
ancestors  gave  a  man  the  name  of  inert'  or  good- 
for-nolhing,  but  I  ask  you  whether  you  believe  that, 
I  do  not  say  Homer,  Archilochus  or  Pindar,  but 
Phidias,  Polychtus  and  Zeuxls  regarded  the  purpose 
of  their  art  as  pleasure.  Then  shall  a  craftsman 
have  a  higher  ideal  of  external  than  a  distinguished 
citizen  of  moral  beauty?  But  what  else  is  the 
cause  of  an  error  so  i>rofound  and  so  very  widely 
diffused,  than  the  fact  tliat  he  who  decides  that 
pleasure  is  the  Chief  Good  judges  the  question  not 
-with  the  rational  and  deliberative  part  of  his  mind, 
but  with  its  lowest  part,  the  faculty  of  desire?  For 
I  ask  you,  if  gods  exist,  as  your  school  too  believes, 
how  can  they  be  happy,  seeing  that  they  cannot 
enjoy  bodily  pleasures?  or,  if  they  are  happy  without 
that  kind  of  pleasure,  why  do  you  deny  that  the  Wise 
Man  is  capable  of  a  like  purely  mental  activity? 

i  XXXV.  "Lege  laudationes,  Torquate,  non  eorum 
qui  suiit  lib  Homero  laudati,  non  Cyri,  non  Agesilai, 
non  Aristidi  aut  I'hemiBtocli,  non  Pbilippi  aut  Ale- 
xandri;  lege  nostrorum  honiinum,  lege  vestrae  fanii- 
liae ;  neniinem  videbis  ita  laudatum  lit  artifex  (.■n.llidus 
comparandamm  voluptatuni  diceretur.  Non  elogia 
monumentorum  id  significant,  velut  hoc  ad  portam : 


■  MARIUM  FUI8SB  viKuM.  Idnc  consensisse  de  Calatino 
plurimas  gentes  arbitramiir,  primarium  popiili  fuisse 
quod  praestantissimus  fuisset  in  conficiendis  volupta- 
tibus?  Ergo  in  iis  adulescentibus  bonam  spem  esse 
dicemus  et  magnain  iiidoleni  quos  suis  commodis  in- 
servituros  et  quidquid  ipsis  expediat  facturos  arbitra- 
bimur  ?  Noiine  videmus  quanta  perturbatio  reruni 
omnium  consequatur,  quanta  confusio?  Tollitur 
benefitium,  tollitur  gratia,  quae  aunt  vincla  concor- 
diae.  Nee  enim  cum  tua  causa  cui  commodes  bene- 
ficium  illud  habendum  est,  sed  feneratio,  nee  gratia 
deberi  videtur  ei  qui  sua  causa  commodaverit. 
Maximas  vero  virtutes  lacere  omnes  iiecesse  est 
s'oluptate  dominante ;  sunt  etiam  tuipitudines  plu- 
rimae  quae,  nisi  honestas  natura  phirinium  valetit. 
cur  non  cadant  in  sapientem  non  est  facile  defen- 
I  1 1  H  dcre.  Ac  ne  plura  coinplectur  (sunt  enim  Inn 
rabilia),  bene  laudata  virtus  voluptatis  nditus  i 

BOOK  II.  \xiv 

6  XXXV.  ''  Read  tlie  panegyrics.  TorqualuK.  not  of 
the  heroes  praised  by  Homer,  not  of  Cyrus  or  Agesi- 
laiis,  Aristides  or  Themistocles.  Philip  or  Alexander ; 
but  read  those  delivered  upon  our  own  great  men, 
read  those  of  your  own  family,  Yoii  will  not  find 
anyone  extolled  for  his  skill  and  punning  in  procuring 
pleasures.  This  is  not  the  purport  of  laudatory  epi- 
taphs, likf  that  one  near  the  city  gate; 

Rome's  first  asd  greatest  citizen  to  be. 

7  Do  we  suppose  that  all  ni.inkind  agreed  that  n 
Calatinus  was  Rome's  greatest  citizen  because  of  his  '" 
surpassing  eminence  in  the  acquisition  of  pleasures  ? 
Then  are  we  lo  say  that  a  youth  is  a  young  man  ol 
great  promise  and  high  character,  when  we  judge 
liim  hkcly  to  study  his,.«Wir"^it€rests  and  to  do, 
whatever  will  be  for  hi^  personal  ;i^ vantage  ?  Do  j 
we  not  see  what  a  iinirerSl-iipbeiifHl  and  confusio:u4 
would_result^^om_siich  ajrinciple  ?  It  does  away, 
with  generosity  and  with  gratitude,  tlieilxinaj  of 
mutual  harmony.  If  you  lend  a  man  liiBney'  for 
jour  own  advantage,  this  cannot  be  considered  an 
act  of  generosity^! t  is  usury;  no  gratitude  is  owing 
to  a  man  who  lends  money  for  gain.  In  fact  if 
pleasure  usurps  the  sovereignty,  all  the  cardinal 
virtues  must  inevitably  be  dethroned ;  and  indeed 
there  are  a  number  of  morally  base  actions  which 
can  «*ith  difficulty  be  proved  inconsistent  with  the 
character  of  the  Wise  Man,  unless  it  be  a  law  of 

18  nature  that  moral  goodness  should  be  supreme.  Not  p, 

to  bring  forward  further  arguments  (for  they  are  " 

countless    in    number)  any   honest    panegyric    of 

\'irtue  must  needs  keep  Pleasure  at  arm's  length. 

p  809 



oludat  necesse  est.  Quod  iam  a  me  esspectare  noli ; 
tute  introspice  in  mentem  tuam  ipse  eamque  omni 
cogitation e  pertractans  percoiitare  ipse  te,  per- 
petuisiie  malis  voluptatibus  perfruens  in  ea  quam 
saepe  usurpabas  tranquillitate  degere  omnem  acta- 
tem  sine  do]ore,assuinpto  etiam  Uloquod  vos  quidem 
adiungere  soletis  sed  &exi  non  potest,  sine  doloris 
nielu,  an,  cum  de  omnibus  gentibus  optime  mere- 
rere,  cum  opem  indigentibus  salutemque  ferres,  vel 
Herculis  perpeti  aerumnas.  Sic  enim  maiores  nostri 
labores  non  fugiendos  tristiasimo  tamen  verbo  aerum- 
)  nas  etiam  in  deo  nominaverunt.  Elicerpm'  ex  te 
cogeremque  ut  responderes,  nisi  vererer  ne  Hercu- 
lem  ipsuni  ea  quae  pro  salute  gentium  sumnio  lubore 
gessisset  voluptatis  causa  gessisse  diceres." 

Quae  cum  dixissem,     Habeo,"  inquit  Torquatus, 

ad  quos  ista  referam,  et,  qoamquam  aliquid  ipse 
poteram,  tamen  invenire  malo  paratiores."  Fami- 
liares  nostros,  credo,  Sironem  dicis  et  Philodemum, 
cum    optimos    viros,    turn    homines    doctissimos." 

Recte/'  inquit,  intellegis."  Age  sane,"  in- 
quam ;  sed  erat  aequius  Triarium  aliquid  de  dis- 
sensione  nostra  iudicare."        Eiuro,"  inquit  anidens, 

iniquum,  liac  quidem  de  re  ;  tu  enim  ista  leiiius,  hie 
Stoicorom  more  nos  vexat."  Turn Triarius :     Posthac 


"  inquit,     and  at 

c  ipsa  mihi  ei^^^ 


Do  not  expect  me  further  to  argue  the  pouit;  look 
within^  study  your  own  consciousness.  Then  after 
full  and  careful  introspection^  ask  yourself  the  ques- 
tion^ would  you  prefer  to  pass  your  whole  life  in 
that  state  of  calm  which  you  spoke  of  so  often^ 
amidst  the  enjojnnent  of  unceasing  pleasures^  free 
from  all  pain^  and  even  (an  addition  which  your 
school  is  fond  of  postulating  but  which  is  really  im- 
possible) free  from  all  fear  of  pain^  or  to  be  a  bene- 
factor of  the  entire  human  race,  and  to  bring  succour 
and  safety  to  the  distressed,  even  at  the  cost  of 
enduring  the  agonies  of  a  Hercules  ?  Agonies — that 
was  indeed  the  sad  and  gloomy  name  which  our 
ancestors  bestowed,  even  in  the  case  of  a  god,  upon 
9  labours  which  yet  were  not  to  be  evaded.  I  would 
press  my  question  and  drag  an  answer  from  you, 
were  I  not  afraid  lest  you  should  say  that  Hercules 
himself  in  the  toils  and  labours  that  he  wrought  for 
the  preservation  of  mankind  was  acting  for  the  sake 
of  pleasure!** 

Here  I  concluded.  I  am  at  no  loss  for  authori- 
ties,** said  Topquatus,  to  whom  to  refer  your  argu- 
ments. I  might  be  able  to  do  some  execution  myself, 
but  I  prefer  to  find  better  equipped  champions.** 
No  doubt  you  allude  to  our  excellent  and  learned 
friends  Siro  and  Philodemus.**  You  are  right,*'  he 
replied.  Pray  appeal  to  them,"  said  I;  "but  it 
would  be  fairer  to  let  Triarius  pronounce  some  ver- 
dict on  our  dispute.**  I  formally  object  to  him  as 
prejudiced,'*  he  rejoined  with  a  smile,  "at  all  events 
on  this  issue.  You  have  shown  us  some  mercv,  but 
Triarius  lays  about  him  like  a  true  Stoic.**  Oh,** 
interposed  Triarius,  I'll  fight  more  boldly  still  next 
time,  for  I  shall  have  the  arguments  I  have  just 
p2  211 


in  promptu  quae  modo  audivi;  nee  ante  aggrediar 
quam  te  ab  istis  qiios  dicis  instructum  videro.'*  Quae 
cum  essent  dicta,  finem  fecimus  et  ambulandi  et  dis- 



heard  ready  to  my  hand^  though  I  won't  attack  you 
till  I  see  you  have  been  armed  by  the  instructors 
whom  you  mention.'*  And  with  these  words  we 
brought  our  promenade  and  our  discussion  to  an  end 







1  I.  Voluptatem  quidem^  Brute,  si  ipsa  pro  se  lo- 
quatur.  nee  tarn  pertinaees  habeat  patronos,  conces- 
suram  arbitror,  convietam  superiore  libro,  dignitati. 
Etenim  sit  impudens  si  virtuti  diutius  repugnet  aiit 
si  honestis  iucunda  anteponat  autpluris  esse  contendat 
dulcedinem  corporis  ex  eave  natam  laetitiam  quam 
gravitatem  animi  atque  constantiam.  Quare  illam 
quidem  dimittamus  et  suis  se  finibus  tenere  iubeainus, 
ne  blanditiis  eius  illecebrisque  impediatur  disputandi 

2  severitas.  Quaerendum  est  enim  ubi  sit  illud  sum- 
mum  bonum  quod  reperire  volumus,  quoniam  et 
voluptas  ab  eo  remota  est  et  eadem  fere  contra  eos 
dici  possunt  qui  vacuitatem  doloris  finem  bonorum 
esse  voluerunt;  nee  vero  ullum  probetur  oportet^ 
summum  bonum  quod  virtute  careat,  qua  nihil  possit  ^ 
esse  praestantius. 

Itaque  quamquam  in  eo  sermone  qui  cum  Tor- 
quato  est  habitus  non  remissi  fuimus,  tamen  haec 
acrior  est  cum  Stoicis  parata  contentio.  Quae 
enim  de  voluptate  dicuntur,  ea  nee  acutissime 
nee   abscondite  disseruntur;   neque  enim  qui  de- 

'  oportet  Mailer ;  «/  A,  B,  E ;  other  MSS.  omit;  Mdv.  {nt\ 
^possit  B  and  inf.  MSS.  ;  posset  A,  E ;  potest  Mdv. 



I,],  My  dear  Brutl's. — Were  Pleasure  to  speak  for 
herself,  iii  default  of  sueh  redoubtable  advocates  as 
she  now  has  to  defend  her,  my  beUef  is  that  she 
would  own  defeat.  Vanquished  by  tlie  arguments 
of  our  preceding  Book,  she  would  yield  the  victory 
to  true  Worth.  Indeed  she  would  be  lost  to  shame 
if  she  persisted  any  longer  in  the  battle  against 
Virtue,  and  rated  what  is  pleasant  above  what  is 
morally  good,  or  maintained  that  bodily  enjoyment 
or  the  mental  gratification  which  springs  from  it  is 
of  higher  value  thanlirraness  and  dignity  of  character. 
Let  us  then  give  Pleasure  her  dismissal,  and  bid  her 
keep  within  her  own  domains,  lest  her  charms  and 
blandishments  put  snares  in  the  way  of  strict  plnlo- 
i  sophical  debate.  The  question  before  us  is,  where  is 
that  Chief  Good,  whicii  is  the  object  of  oiir  inquiry', 
to  be  found?  Pleasure  we  have  eliminated;  the 
doctrine  that  the  End  of  Goods  consists  in  freedom 
from  pain  is  open  to  almost  identical  objections ;  and 
in  fact  no  Chief  Good  can  be  accepted  that  is  with- 
out the  element  of  Virtue,  the  most  excellent  thing 
that  can  exist. 

Hence  although  in  our  debate  with  Torquatus 
we  did  not  spare  our  strength,  nevertheless  a  keener 
struggle  now  awaits  us  with  the  Stoics.    For  pleasure 

n  topic  that  does  not  lend  itself  to  very  subtle  or 
mfouiid  discussion ;  its  champions  are  little  skilled  in 


lurclFT  lacomba 
ana  EpicuMBn. 


fendunt  eatn  versuti  in   diaserendo   suiit   nee    qui 

S  contra  dicunt  csusam  difficilem  repellunt.  Ipse  etiani 
dicit  Epicurus  ne  argumentanduni  quidem  esse  de 
voluptate,  quod  sit  positum  judicium  eius  in  sensibus, 
ut  commoiieri  nos  satis  sit,  nihil  attineat  doceri. 
Quare  ilia  nobis  simplex  fuit  in  utramque  partem 
disputatio.  Nee  enim  in  Torquati  sermone  quidquam 
implicatum  aut  tortuosum  ftiit,  nostraque,  ut  mihi 
videtur,  dilucida  oratio.  Stoicorurn  autem  non 
ignoras  quani  sit  subtile  vel  spiuosum  potius  disse- 
rendi  genus,  idqiie  cuai  Graccis,  turn  magis  nobis 
quibua  etiam  verba  parienda  sunt  imponendaque 
nova  rebus  novis  nomina.  Quod  quidem  nemo 
mediocriter  doetus  mirabitur,  cogitans  in  omni  arte 
cuius  usus  vulgaris  communisque  non  sit  multani 
novitatem  nomtnum  esse  cum  constituantur  earum 
rerom    vocabula    quae    in    quaque   arte    versentur. 

4  Itaque  et  dialeetici  et  physici  verbis  utuntur  iis  quae 
ipsi  Graeciae  nota  non  sint,'  geometrae  vero  et 
musici,  grammatici  etiam,  more  quodam  loquuntur 
suo;  ipsae  rhetorum  artes,  quae  sunt  totae  f'orenses 
atque  populares,  verbis  tamen  in  docendo  quasi 
privatis  utuntur  ac  suis. 

II.  Atque  ut  omittam  has  artes  elegantes  et  io- 
genuas,  ne  opifices  quidem  tueri  suaartificia  possent 
nisi  voeabulis  uterenlur  nobis  incognilis,  usitatis  sibi. 
Quin  etiam  agri  cultura,  quae  abliorret  ab  unmi 
politiort  elegantia,  tamen  eas  res  in 
' sinl  Mdv.t  iunt  MSS. 


aibus  versabj^H 

BOOK  III.  i-ii 
dial ei:tic,  and  tlicir  adversaries  havp  no  difficult  case  to 

3  refute.  InfactEpicurushimselfdeclares  that  there  is 
no  occasion  to  argue  about  pleasure  at  al! :  its  criterion 
resides  in  the  senses,  so  that  proof  is  entirely  super- 
fluous; a  reminder  of  the  facts  is  all  that  is  needed. 
Therefore  our  preceding  debate  consisted  of  a  simple 
statement  of  the  case  on  either  side.  There  wa-s 
nothing  abstruse  or  intricate  in  the  discourse  of 
Torquatus,  and  my  own  exposition  was,  1  believe,  as 
clear  as  daylight.  But  the  Stoics,  as  you  are  aware, 
affect  an  exceedingly  subtle  or  rather  crabbed  style 
of  argument ;  and  if  the  Greeks  find  it  so,  still  more 
must  we,  who  have  actually  to  create  a  vocabulary, 
and  to  invent  new  terms  to  convey  new  ideas.  This 
necessity  will  cause  no  suiprise  to  anyone  of  moderate 
learning,  when  he  reflects  that  in  every  branch  oi 
science  lying  outside  the  range  of  common  everyday 
practice  there  must  always  be  a  large  degree  of 
novelty  in  the  vocabulary,  when  it  comes  to  fixing  a 
terminology  to  denote  the  conceptions  with  which 

4.  the  science  in  question  deals.  Thus  Logic  and  Natural 
Philosophy  alike  make  use  of  terms  unfamiliar  even 
to  Greece ;  Geometry,  Music,  Grammar  also,  have  an 
idiom  of  their  own.  Even  the  manuals  of  Rhetoric, 
which  belong  entirely  to  the  practical  sphere  and  to 
the  life  of  the  world,  nevertheless  employ  for  pur- 
poses of  instruction  a  sort  of  private  and  peculiar 

11.  And  to  leave  out  of  account  these  liberal  arts 
and  accomplishments,  even  artisans  would  be  unable 
to  preserve  the  tradition  of  their  crafts  if  they  did 
not  make  use  of  words  unknown  to  us  though 
familiar  to  themselves.  Nay,  agriculture  itself,  a  sub- 
ject entirely  unsusceptible  of  literary  refinement,  has 


nomiliibus  notavit  novis.  Quo  mngis  hoc  philosopho 
faciendum  est;  ars  est  enim  philosophia  vitHe,  de 
qua  dis5erens  arripere   verba  de  foro  non  potest. 

5  Quamquani  ex  omnibus  philosophis  Stoici  plurims 
novaverunl,  Zenoque  eorum  princeps  noii  tam  reruni 
inventor  fiiit  quam  verborum  novorum.  Quod  si  in 
ea  lingua  quam  plerique  uberiorem  putant  concessum 
est  ut  doctissimi  liomines  de  rebus  non  peri'agatis 
inusitatis  verbis  iiterentur,  quanto  id  nobis  magis 
est  coneedendum  qui  ea  imnc  primum  audemus 
attingere?  Et  quoniam  sacpe  diximiis,  et  quidem 
cum  aliqua  querela  non  Graecorum  modo,  sed  eorum 
etiani  qui  se  Graecos  magis  quam  nostros  haberi 
volunt,  nos  non  modo  non  vinci  a  Graecis  verborum 
copia  sed  esse  in  ea  etiam  superiores,  elaborandum 
est  ut  hoc  non  in  nostris  solum  artibus  sed  etiam  in 
illorum  ipsorum  assequamur.  Quamquam  ea  verba 
quibus  instituto  veterum  utimur  pro  Latinis,  ut  ipsa 
philosophia,  ut  rhetorica,  dialect! ca,  grammatics, 
g'eometria,  musiea,  quamquam  I^atine  ea  dici  pote- 
rant,  tamen  quoniam  usu  percepta  sunt  nostra  du< 
mus.     Atque  haec  quidem  de  rerum  nominil 

6  De  ipsis  rebus  auteni  saepenumero,  Brute, 
ne  reprehendar,  cum  haec  ad  te  scribam,  qui  cm 
in  philosopliia,  tum  hi  optimo  genere  pliilosophiac 
tantum  processeris.     Quod  si  facerem  quasi  te  eru- 


BOOK  in.  ii 

yet  bad  to  coin  tecIinicHi  terms  ta  denote  the  things 
with  which  it  is  occupied.  All  the  more  is  the 
philosopher  compelled  to  do  likewise ;  for  philosophy 
is  the  Science  of  Life,  and  cannot  be  discussed  in 

i  language  taken  at  random  from  tlie  street.  Still  of 
all  the  philosopliers  the  Stoics  hnve  been  tlie  greatest 
innovators  in  this  respect,  and  Zeno  their  founder 
was  rather  an  inventor  of  new  terms  than  a  dis- 
coverer of  new  ideas.  But  if  men  so  learned,  using 
a  language  generally  supposed  to  be  more  copious 
than  our  own,  were  allowed  in  handling  recondite 
subjects  to  employ  unfamiliar  terms,  how  much 
more  right  have  we  to  claim  this  licence  who  are 
venturing  now  to  approach  these  topics  for  the  first 
time?  Moreover  we  have  often  declared,  and  this 
under  some  protest  not  from  Greeks  only  but  also  from 
persons  who  would  rather  be  considered  Greeks  than 
Romans,'  that  in  fullness  of  vocabulary  we  are  not 
merely  not  surpassed  by  the  Greeks  but  are  actually 
their  superiors.  We  are  therefore  bound  to  do  our 
utmost  to  make  good  this  claim  not  in  our  native 
arts  only  but  also  in  those  that  belong  to  the  Greeks 
themselves.  However,  words  which  the  practice  of 
past  generations  permits  us  to  employ  as  Latin,  e.g. 
the  term  philosophy'  itself,  or  rhetoric,'  logic,' 
grammar,'  geometry,"  music  '  we  may  consider  as 
l>eing  our  own :  the  ideas  might  it  is  true  have  been 
translated  into  Latin,  but  the  Greek  terms  have  been 
naturalized  by  use.     So  much  for  terminology. 

i  As  regards  my  subject,  I  often  fear,  Brutus,  that  1  and  for  ded 
shall  meet  with  censure  for  writing  upon  this  topic  to  ^"  o^*^^, 
you,  who  are  yourself  so  great  an  adept  in  pliilosophy,  phiiowphy. 
andinthehighestbranchof  philosophy."  Did  I  assume 
the  attitude  of  an  instructor,  such  censure  would  be 


diens,   iure    reprehenderer.     Sed  ab  eo  plurimnm 

fthsum  iieque  ut  eii  cogiioscas  quae   tibi  iiotissima 
sunt  ad  te  mitto,  sed  qnia  facillime  in  nomine  tuo 
acquiesce  et  quia  le  habeo  aequissimum  eorum  studio- 
rum  quae  mihi  communia  tecum  sunt  existimatorem 
tt  iudioem.     Attendes  igitur   ut  soles    diligenter, 
eamque   controversiam    diiudicabis   quae  mihi  ftiit 
cum  avuncuto  tuo,  divino  ac  singulari  viro. 
'       Nam  in  Tusculano  cum  essem  vellemque  e  biblio- 
theca  pueri  Luculli  quibusdam  libris  ubi,  veni  in  eius 
villam  ut  eos  ipse  ut  solebam  depromereni.    Quo  cum 
venissem,  M.  Catonem  quem  ibi  esse  nescieram  vidi  in 
bibliotheca  sedentem,  multis  circumfusum  Stoicorura 
libris.     Erat  enim  ut  scis  in  eo  aviditas  legeiidi,  nee 
satiari  poterat;  quippe  qui  ne  leprensionem  quidem 
viilgi  inanem  reformidans  in  ipsa  curia  soleretlegere 
saepe  dum  senatus  cogeretur,  nihil  operae  rei  publicae 
detrahens;  quo  magis  turn  in  sumrao  otio  raaximaque 
copia  quasi  helluari  hbris,  si  hoc  verbo  in  tarn  clara 
t  re  utcndum  est,  videbatur.     Quod  cum  accidisset, 
ut  alter  alterum  necopinato  videremuSi  surrexit  sla- 
tim.     Deinde  prima  ilia  quae  in  congressu  solemus: 
Quid  tu,"  inquit,     hue?  a  villa  enim  credo;"  ct: 
Si    ibi    te    esse    scissem,    ad    te    ipse    venisst 
Heri,"  inquam,     ludis  commissis  ex  urbe  profe 


BOOK  111.  ii 
deserved.  But  nothing  could  be  farther  from  me. 
I  dedicate  my  work  to  you,  not  to  teacli  you  what 
you  know  extremely  well  already,  but  because  your 
name  gives  me  a  very  comforting  sense  of  support, 
and  because  I  find  in  you  a  most  impartial  judge  and 
critic  of  the  studies  which  I  share  with  yourself. 
You  will  tlierefore  grant  me,  as  always,  your  closest 
attention,  and  act  as  umpire  of  the  debate  which  I 
held  with  that  remarkable  man  of  g-eiiius,  your  uncle. 

7  I  was  down  at  my  place  at  Tusculum,  and  wanted  Si 
to  consult  some  books  from  the  library  of  the  young  „ 
Lucullus ;  so  1  went  to  his  country-house,  as  I  was  in 
the  habit  of  doing,  to  help  myself  to  the  volumes  I 
needed.  On  my  arrival,  seated  in  the  library  I 
found  Marcus  Cato;  I  had  not  known  he  was  there. 
He  was  surrounded  by  piles  of  books  on  Stoicism; 
for  he  possessed,  as  you  are  aware,  a  voracious  appe- 
tite for  reading,  and  could  never  have  enough  of  it; 
indeed  it  was  often  his  practice  actually  to  brave  the 
idle  censure  of  the  mob  by  reading  in  the  senate- 
house  itself,  while  waiting  for  the  senate  to  assemble, 
— he  did  not  steal  any  attention  from  pubHc  business. 
So  it  may  well  be  believed  that  when  1  found  him 
taking  a  complete  holiday,  with  a  vast  supply  of 
books  at  command,  he  had  the  air  of  indulging  in  a 
literary  debauch,  if  the  term  may  be  applied  to  so 

8  honourable  an  occupation.  Upon  tliis  chance  en- 
counter, each  of  us  being  equally  surprised  to  see 
the  other,  he  at  once  rose^unil  we  began  to  exchange 
the  usual  greetings,  What  brings  you  here?"  cried 
he ;  You  are  from  your  country-seat,  I  suppose.  Had 
1  known  you  were  there,"  he  continued,  I  should 
have  anticipated  you-  with  a  visit"  Yes,"  I 
answered,     the  games  began  yesterday,  so  1  came 


veni  ad  vespemm.  Causa  auteni  full  hue  veniendi 
lit  quosdnm  Iiinc  Hbro8  promerem.  Et  quidem,  Cato, 
hanc  totam  copiam  iam  Lucullo  nostro  notam  esse 
oportebit;  nam  his  Hbris  eum  malo  quam  reliquo 
omatu  villae  delectari.  Est  eiiim  mihi  niagnae  curae 
(quamquHiii  hoc  quidem  propriiim  tuuin  luunus  est) 
ut  ita  erudiatur  ut  et  patri  et  Caepioni  nostro  et  tibi 
tarn  propinquo  respondeat.  Laboro  nutem  non  Hint 
causa ;  nam  et  avi  eius  menioria  moveor  (nee  enini 
ignoras  quanti  fecerim  Caepionem,  qui,  ut  opinio 
mea  fert,  in  principibus  iam  esset  si  vivcret)  et* 
Lucullus  niihi  versatur  ante  oculos,  vir  cum  omnibus* 
excellens,  turn  mecum  et  amicitia  et  onmi  voluntate 
9  sententiaquc  coniunctus."  Praeclare,"  inquit,  facis 
cum  et  eorum  meinoriam  tenes  quorum  uterque  tibi 
testamento  liberos  suos  conimendavit,  et  puerum 
diligis.  Quod  autem  meiim  muiius  dicis  non  equidem 
recuso,  sed  te  adiungo  socium.  Addo  etiam  ilhid, 
tnulta  iam  niilii  dare  signa  puerum  et  pudoris  et 
ingeni;  sed  aetatem  vides."  "Video  equidem," 
inquam ;  '  sed  tamen  iam  inHei  debet  iis  artibus  quas 
si  dum  est  tener  combiberit,  ad  maiora  veniet  para- 
tior."  Sic;  et  quidem  diligeiitius  saepiusque  ista 
loqueinur  inter  nos  agemusque  comm.uniter.  Sed 
residamus,"  inquit,     si  placet."     Itaque  lecimua. 

'  Halm  conj.  L.  Lucullus, 
'  Baiter  conj.  omnibus  vMulibus. 
^  The  yawng  Lucullus's  grandfalher,  Q.  Servilius  Caepio, 
was  quaestor  100  B.C.  anil  died  go  B.C.  when  Cicero  waa  16. 
But  the  following'  words  Seem  lo  refer  to  a  Caepio  who,  bad 
he  not  died  prematurely,  would  be  in  ibc  prime  of  life  when 
Cicero  writes.  This  must  mean  the  Caepio  of  the  pre- 
ceiling  sentence,  Lucullus's  uncle,  who  may  well  have  left 
Cicero  as  Ihe  guardian  of  his  son,  as  is  stated  below.  Wc 
mav  assume  that  aW  is  a  slip,  Mlher  of  Cicero's  or  of  a 
coti'yist'a,  for  avuiinili  (Schnli). 

BOOK  III.  ii 
out  of  town,  ami  arrived  late  in  the  afternoon.  My 
reason  for  coining  on  here  was  to  get  some  book» 
from  the  library.  By  the  way,  Cato,  it  will  soon  be 
time  for  our  friend  I.ucullus  to  make  acquaintance 
with  this  fine  collection;  for  I  hope  he  will  take 
more  pleasure  in  his  library  than  in  all  the  other 
appointments  of  his  country-house.  1  am  extremely 
anxious  {though  of  course  the  responsibility  belongs 
especially  to  you)  that  he  should  have  the  kind  of 
education  that  will  turn  him  out  after  the  same 
pattern  as  his  father  and  our  dear  Caepto,  and  also 
yourself,  to  whom  he  is  so  closely  related.  And  I 
have  every  motive  for  my  interest  in  him.  I  cherish 
the  memory  of  his  grandfather'  (and  you  are  aware 
howhighlyl  esteemedCaepio,whoinmy  belief  would 
to-day  be  in  the  front  rank,  were  he  still  alive).  And 
also  I.ucullus  is  always  present  to  my  mind;  he  was 
a  man  of  surpassing  eminence,  united  to  me  in  senti- 
9  ment  and  opinion  as  well  as  by  (Viendship,"  I  com- 
mend yoii,"  rejoined  Cato,  for  your  loyalty  to  the 
memory  of  men  who  both  bequeathed  their  children 
to  your  care,  as  well  as  for  your  affectionate  interest 
in  the  lad.  My  own  responsibility,  as  you  call  it,  I 
by  no  means  disown,  but  I  enlist  you  to  share  it 
with  me.  Moreover  I  may  say  that  the  youth 
already  seems  to  me  to  show  many  signs  both  of 
modesty  and  talent ;  but  you  know  how  young  he 
is."  I  do,"  said  I,  'but  all  the  same  it  is  time  for  him 
to  be  dipping  into  studies  which,  if  allowed  to  soak 
in  at  this  impressionable  age.  Mill  render  him  better 
equipped  when  he  comes  to  the  business  of  life." 
True,  and  we  will  discuss  this  matter  again  several 
times  more  fully  and  takecommon  action.  But  let  us  be 
seated,"  he  said,    if  agreeable  to  you."  So  we  sat  down. 


I  III.  Turn  ille:  "Tu  autem  cum  ipse  tantum libro- 
rum  habeas,  quos  hie  tandem  requiris?"  Commen- 
tarios  quosdani,"  inquam,  AristotcHos,  quos  ]iic 
sciebam  esse,  veni  ut  auferrem,  quos  legerein  dura 
essem  otiosus;  quod  quidem  nobis  non  saepe  con- 
tingit."  "  Quam  velleiu,"  inquit,  te  ad  Stoicos 
inclinavisses !  Erat  enim,  si  cuiusquaai,  certe  tuum 
nihil  praeter  virtutem  in  bonis  dueere."  Vide  ne 
magis,  inquam,  tuum  fuerit,  cum  re  idem  tibi  quod 
mihi  videretur,  non  nova  te  rebus  nomina  imponere. 
Ratio  enim  nostra  consentit,  pugnat  oratio,"  Mi- 
nime  vero,"  inquit  ille,  "consentit.  Quidquid  enim 
praeter  id  quod  honestum  sit  espctendum  esse  dixe- 
ris  in  boiiisque  numeraveiis,  et  houestum  ipsutn, 
quasi  virtutis  lumen,  exstinKeris  ct  virtutem  penitus 

I  everteris."  Dicuntur  ista,  Cato,  magnifice,"  in- 
quam; sed  videsne  verborum  gloriam  tibi  cum 
Pyrrhone  et  cum  Aristone,  qui  omnia  exaequant, 
essecommunem?  de  quibus  cupio  scire  quid  sentias." 
"Egone  quaeris,"  inquit,  "quid  sentiam?  quos  bonos 
viros,  fortes,  iustos,  moderates  nut  aiidivimus  in  re 
publica  fiijsse  aut  ipsi  vidimus,  qui  sine  ulla  doctrina, 
naturam  ipsara  secuti,  multa.  laudabilia  fecerunt,  eos 
melius  a  natura  institutos  fuisse  quam  institui  potuis- 
sent  a  philosophia,  si  ullam  aliam  probavissent  praeter 
earn  quae  nihil  aliud  in  bonis  haberet  nisi  honestum, 
nihil  nisiturpeiiimaLs;  oeterae  philosophorum  disci- 

BOOK  III.  iii 

10  III.  Cato  then  resumed:  "  But  what  pray  are  tJie-ftdiminMy 
books  tliat  you  must  come  here  for,  when  you  have  so  ctS™3nj- 
large  a  librarj'  of  your  own?"  "l  have  come  tojai^'wwSn 
fetch  some  commentaries  on  Aristotle,"  I  replied,  desirable,  VMiii 
"  wliich  I  knew  were  here.  I  wanted  to  read  them  n«^ u bt' 
during  my  holiday;  I  do  not  often  get  any  leisure."  ^^^J'^J,"" 
How  1  wish,"  said  he,  'that  you  had  thrown  in  always  bappj- 
your  lot  with  the  Stoics!  You  of  all  men  might 
liave  been  expected  to  reckon  virtue  as*the  only 
good."  "Perhaps  you  might  rather  have  been  ex- 
pected," I  answered,  "to  refrain  from  adopting  a 
new  terminology,  when  in  substance  you  think  as  I 
do.  Our  principles  agree ;  it  is  our  language  that  is 
at  variance."  '  Indeed,"  he  rejoined,  '  they  do  not 
agree  in  the  least.  Once  pronounce  anything  to  be 
desirable,  once  reekon*ttiything  asagood,other-than~ 
Mbral  Worth,  and  you  have  extinguished  the  very"  i 
light  of  virtue.  Moral  Worth  itself,  and  overthrown 

[]  virtue  entirely."  That  all  sounds  very  fine,  Cato," 
I  replied,  but  are  you  aware  that  you  sliare  your 
lofty  pretensions  with  Pyrrho  and  with  Aristo,  who 
make  all  things  equal  in  value  ?  I  should  like  to  know 
what  your  opinion  is  of  them."  My  opinion  ?  "  he 
said.  You  ask  what  my  opinion  is  F  That  those 
good,  brave,  just  and  temperate  men,  of  whom  we 
have  heard  as  having  lived  in  our  state,  or  whom  we 
have  ourselves  seen,  who  under  the  guidance  of 
Nature  herself,  without  the  aid  of  any  learning,  did 
many  glorious  deeds,^that  these  men  were  better 
educated  by  nature  than  they  could  possibly  have 
been  by  philosophy  had  they  accepted  any  other 
system  of  philosophy  than  the  one  that  counts 
Mc^lW^orth  the  only  good  and  Moral  Basenessthe 
onlyevir.  Att-otliet^hilosophlCal  sysleins — in  vary- 

only  e 



0  alia  niagis  alia,  sed  tamen  omnes  quae 
rem  ullam  virtutis  expertem  ant  in  bonis  aut  in  malis 
numerent,  eas  non  modo  nihil  adiuvare  arbitror  neque 
afferre^  quo  meliores  simus,  sed  ipsain  dcpravare  natu- 
ram-Nam  nisi  hoc  obtineatur,  id  solum  bonum  esse  quod 
honestum  sit,  nullo  modo  probari  possit  beatam  vi- 
tam  virtute  effici ;  quod  si  ita  sitj  cur  opera  philoso- 
phiae  sit  dlinda,  nescio.  Si  enim  sapiens  aliquis  raiser 
esse  possit,  ne  ego  istam  gloriosam  memorabilemque 
virtutem  non  magno  aestiraandam  putem." 

i  IV.  "  Quae  adbuc,  Cato,  a  te  dicta  sunt,  eadem," 
inquam,  dicerc  posses  si  seqiicrere  Pyrrhonem  aut 
Aristonem.  Nee  enim  ignoras  iis  istud  honestum 
non  summum  modo  sed  etiam  ut  tu  vis  solum  bonum 
videri ;  quod  si  ita  est,  sequitur  id  ipsum  quod  te 
velie  video,  omnes  semper  beatos  esse  sapientes. 
Hosne  igitur  laudas  et  haiic  eorum,"  inquam,  sen- 
tentiam  sequi  nos  censes  oportere ?  "  Miiiime  vero 
istorum  quidem,"  inquit ;  cum  enim  virtutis  hoc 
proprium  sit,  carum  rerum  quae  secundum  iiaturam 
sint  habere  delectum,  qui  omnia  sic  exaeq  nave  runt 
lit  in  utramque  partem  ita  paria  redderent  uti  nulla 
selectione  uterentur,  hi  virtutem  ipsam  sustulemnt." 

i  Istiid  quidem,"  inquam,  optime  dicis ;  sed  quaere, 
nonne  tibi  faciendum  idem  sit  nihil  dicenti  bonuin 
quod  uon  rectum  houestumque  sit,  reliquarum  rerum 
discrimeu    omiie    toUenti."     "Si    quidem,"    inquit, 

I      tollerem;  sed  relinquo."        Quo 

'  a^erre  cdd.;  affirmare  MSS.,  and  Mdv.   with  r 

do.'      ffi^_ 


BOOK  in.  iii-iv 
ing  degrees  no  doabt,  but  still  all,— which  reckon 
anything  of  which  virtue  is  not  an  element  either  as 
a  good  or  an  evil,  do  not  merely,  as  I  hold,  give  us  no 
assistance  or  support  towards  becoming  better 
but  are  actually  corrupting  to  the  character.  Either 
this  point  must  be  firmly  maintained,  that  Moral 
Worth  is  the  sole  good,  or  it  is  absolutely  impos- 
sible to  prove  that  virtue  conslntutes  happiness.  And 
in  that  case  I  do  not  see  why  we  should  trouble  to 
study  philosophy.  For  if  a  Wise  Man  could  be 
miserable,  I  should  not  set  much  value  on  your 
vaunted  and  belauded  virtue." 

1 2  IV.     What  you  have  said  so  far,  Cato,"  I  answered, 
might  equally  well  be  said  by  a  follower  of  Pyrrho 

or  of  Aristo.  They,  us  you  are  aware,  think  as  you 
do,  that  this  Moral  Worth  you  speak  of  is  not  merely 
the  chief  but  the  only  Good ;  and  from  this  of 
necessity  fallows  the  proposition  that  I  notice  you 
maintain,  namely,  that  the  Wise  are  always  happy. 
Do  you  then,"  I  asked,  commend  these  philosophers, 
andthink  that  weoughttoadopt  this  view  of  theirs?" 
I  certainly  would  not  have  you  adopt  Iheir  view,"  he| 
said ;  for  it  is  of  tlie  essence  of  virtue  to  exercise 
choice  among  the  things  in  accordance  with  natuie; 
so  that  philosophei's  who  make  all  things  absolutely! 
equal,  rendering  thera  indistinguishable  either  as 
better  or  worse,  and  leaving  no  room  for  selection 

13  among  them,  have  abolished  virtue  itself."  Excel- 
lently put,"  I  rejoined;  but  pray  are  not  you 
committed  to  the  same  position,  if  you  say  that  only 
what  is  right  and  moral  is  good,  and  abolish  all  dis' 
tinction  between  everything  else  ?  "  Quite  so," 
said  he,  "  if  I  did  abolish  all  distinction,  but  I  do 

14  not."    "How  so?'*T  said,  "if  only  virtue,  only  that 

Pytrlio  ?  They 

quam.  Si  una  virtus,  unum  istud  quod  honestuni 
appellas,  rectum,  laudabile,  decorum  (erit  enim 
notius  quale  sit  pluribtis  notatum  vocabiilis  idem 
declarantibus),  id  igitur,  inquam,  si  solum  est  bonum, 
quid  Iiubebis  praeterea  quod  sequare?  aut,  si  nihil 
malum  niai  quod  turpe,  inhonestum,  indecorum,  pra- 
rum,  flag-itiosum,  foedum  (ut  hoc  quoqiie  pluribus 
nominibus  insigne  faciamus),  quid praetereadices ease 
fugiendum?"  Non  ignoranti  tibi,"  inquit,  quid 
sim  dicturus,  sed  aliquid,  ut  ego  suspicor,  ex:  mea 
brevi  responsione  arripere  cupienti  non  respondebo 
ad  singula;  explicabo  potius,  quouiam  otiosi  sumus, 
nisialienum  putas,  totam  Zenonis  Stoicorumque  sen- 
tentiam."  Miiiime  id  quidem,"  inqnum,  atienum, 
multumque  ad  ea  quae  quaerimus  explicatio  tua 
15  ista  profecerit."  Experiamur  igitur,"  inquit;  etsi 
habet  haec  Stoicorum  ratio  difKcilius  quiddam  et 
obscurius.  Nam  cum  in  Graeco  sermone  haec  ipsa 
quondam  renim  nomina  novarum  .  .  .^  non  videban- 
tur,  quae  nunc  consuetude  diutuma  trivit ;  quid 
censes' in  Latino  foref"  Facillimum  id  quidem 
est,"  inquam.  "Si  enim  Zenoni  lieuit,  cum  rem 
aliqiiam  invenissct  inusitatam,  inauditum  quoque  ei 
rei  nomen  imponere,  cur  non  Uceat  Catoni?  Nee 
tamen  exprimi  verbum  e  verbo  necesse  erit,  ut  inter- 
pretes  indiserti  solent,  cum  sit  verbum  quod  idem 
declaret  magis  usltatuni ;  eqiiideni  soleo  etiam,  quod 
uno    Graeci,  si    aliter  non  possum,  idem    pli 

'  Mdv.   marks  lacuna,  and  corijqclurc; 
rmvt firenda  non  vi'drbantiir. 


BOOK  III.  iv 
one  thing  which  you  call  moral,  right,  praiseworthy, 
becoming  (for  its  nature  will  be  better  understood  if 
it  is  denoted  by  a  number  of  synonyms),  if  then,  I 
say,  this  is  the  sole  good,  what  other  object  of  pur- 
suit will  you  have  beside  it?  or,  if  there-be  nothing 
bad    but   what  is  base,  dishonourable,  disgraceful, 
evil,  sinful,  foul  {to  make  this  clear  also  by  using  a 
variety  of  terms),  what   else    will   you    pronounce 
worthy  to  be  avoided  ?  "    "  You  know  quite  well,"  he 
retorted,     what  I  am  going  to  say ;  but  I  suspect  you  caio  pcoposo 
want  to  catch  np  something  in  ray  answer  if  I  put  it  st^ic'Mdral'" 
shortly.     So  I  won't  answer  you  point  by  point,  Phiiosophj', 
Instead  of  that,  as  we  are  at  leisure,  I  will  expound, 
unless  you  think  it  out  of  place,  the  whole  system  of 
Zeno  and  the  Stoics."      'Out  of  place?"  I  cried. 
"  By  no  means.     Your  exposition  will  be  of  great  ^/  ^i^n 
assistance  towards  solving  the  questions  we  are  ask-    -    _  - 
>  ing."     "Then  let  us  make  the  attempt,"  said  he, 
"  albeit  there  is  a  considerable  element  of  difficulty  Apology  (or  i 
and  obscurity  in  this  Stoic  system.     For  at  one  time  """■""'oW' 
even  the  terms  employed  in  Greek  for  its  novel 
conceptions  seemed  unendurable,  when  they  were 
novel,  though  now  daily  use  has  made  them  familiar; 
what  then  do  you  think  will  be  the  case  in  Latin?" 
"  Do  not  feel  the  least  difficulty  on  that  score,"  said 
I.     "  If  when  Zeno  invented  some  novel  idea  he 
was  permitted  to  denote  it  by  an  equally  unheard-of 
word,  why  should  not  Cato  be  permitted  to  do  so 
too  ?    Though  all  the  same  it  need  not  be  a  hard 
and  fast  rule  that  every  word  shall  be  represented 
by   its    exact  counterpart,  when    there    is  a  more 
familiar  word  conveying  the  same  meaning.     That 
is  the  way  of  a  clonisy  translator.      Indeed  my  own 
practice  is  to  use  several  words  to  give  what  is  ex- 

verbis  exponere.  Et  tamen  puto  concedi  nobis 
oportere  ut  Graeco  verbo  iitamur,  si  quando  minus 
occurret  Lfttinum,  ne  hoc  epliippiis '  et  acralti- 
phoris  '  potius  quam  proegmenis '  et  apoproegme- 
nis '  concedatur.  Quamquam  Iiaec  quideni  praepo- 
)  site '  recte  et '  reiecta '  dicere  licebit"  "  Bene  facis," 
inquit,  quod  me  adiuvas;  et  istis  quidem  qune 
modo  dixisti  utar  potius  Latiitis;  in  ceteris  subvenies 
si  me  haerentem  videbis."  Sedulo,"  inquam  fa- 
ciam.  Sed  fortuna  fortes;  quare  conare,  quaeso. 
Quid  enim  possumus  hoe  agere  dii-inius?" 

V.  Placet  his,"  inquit,  quorum  ratiu  mihi  pro- 
batur,  simul  atque  natuni  sit  animal  (hinc  enim  est 
ordiendum),  ipsum  sibi  conciliari  et  commendari  ad 
se  conservandum  et  ad  suum  stetum  eaque  quae 
conservantia  sunt  eiiis  status  diligenda,  alienari 
autem  ab  interitu  iisque  rebus  quae  interitum  vi- 
deantur  afferre,  Id  ita  esse  sic  ppobant,  quod  ante 
qunm  voluptas  aut  dolor  attigerit,  saluteria  appetnnt 
parvi  aspernenturque  contraria,  quod  non  fieret  nisi 
stetum  suum  diligerent,  interitum  timerent.  Fieri 
autem  non  posset  ut  appeterent  nliquid  nisi  sensura 
haberent  sui  eoque  se  diligerent.  Ex  quointellegi 


pressed  in  Greek  by  one,  if  J  cannot  convey  the 
sense  otherwise.  And  at  the  same  time  1  hold  that  we 
may  fairly  claim  the  licence  to  employ  a  Greek  word 
when  no  Latin  word  is  readily  forthcoming.  Why 
should  this  licence  be  granted  to  epAippio  (saddles) 
and  acratopkara  (jars  for  neat  wine)  more  than  to 
prvcgmena  and  apoproegmenni  These  latter  however 
it  ia  true  may  be  correctly  translated '  preferred '  and 
3  'rejected.'"  "Tlianks  for  your  assistance,"  he  said. 
I  certainly  shall  use  for  choice  the  Latin  equiva- 
lents you  have  just  given;  and  in  other  cases  you  shall 
come  to  my  aid  if  you  see  me  in  difficulties."  I'll 
do  my  best,"  I  replied.  But  fortune  (avours  the 
bold ;  so  pray  make  the  venture.  What  sublimer 
occupation  could  we  find  ?  " 

V.  He  began:  It  is  the  view  of  those  whose 
system  I  adopt,  that  immediately  upon  birth  (fc 
that  is  the  proper  point  lo  start  ^ronij  a"  livin 
creature  feels  an  attachment  for  itself,  and  a 
impulse  to  preserve  itself  and  to  Teel  aflection  for 
itsowji  constitution  and  for  those  thmgs  which  teitd 
eivfi-lhateoiistitution ;  while  on  the  otlier  hand 

[i  antipathy  to  destruction  and  to  those 
things  which  appear  to  threaten  destruction.  In 
proof  of  this  opinion  they  urge  that  infants  desire 
things  conducive  to  their  health  and  reject  things 
that  are  the-  opposite  before  they  have  ever  felt 
pleasure  or  pain ;  this  would  not  be  the  case,  unless 
they  felt  an  aftection  for  their  own  constitution  and 
were  afraid  of  destruction.  But  it  would  be  impossible 
that  they  should  feel  desire  at  all  nnless  they  pos- 
sessed self-consciousness,  and  consequently  felt  affec- 
tion for  themselves.  This  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  is  love  of  self  which  supplies  the  primary 

SUtement  aod 
defence  alSlolo 

1.  TM  ^-itani 
ttio  Chief  Good. 
The  new-bom 
cnstnic  initlnc 
tlvely  seeki  eell 

Ihinp  con- 



17  debet  principium  ductum  ease  a  se  diligendo.  In 
principiis  autem  naturalibuK  jilerique  Stoid  non  pu- 
tant  voluptatem  esse  ponendam ;  quibus  ego  vehe- 
menter  assentior,  ne,  si  voluptatem  natura  posuisse 
in  lis  rebus  vidcatur  quae  primae  appetuntur,  multa 
turpia  sequantur.  Satis  esse  autcm  argugnenti  vide- 
tur  quamobreni  ilia  Quae  priiiiH  sunt  oscita  natura 
diligamus,  quod  est  nemo  quin,  cuci  utrtimvis  liceat, 
aptas  malit  et  integras  omnes  partes  corporis  quam 
eodem  usu  iinmiiiutas  aut  detortas  habere. 

"  Rerum  autem  cogmtiones  (quas  vel  comprebensi- 
ones  vel  perceptiones  vel,  si  liaec  verba  ant  minus  pla- 
cent  aut  minus  iiitelleguntur,  KinaK^ipeis  appellemus 
licet),  eas  igitur  ipsas  propter  se  asciscendas  arbitra- 
mur,  quod  babeant  quiddam  in  se  quasi  complexum  et 
continens  veritatem.  Id  autem  in  parvis  intellegi 
potest,  quos  delectari  videamus,  etiamsi  eorum  nihil 
1  a  intersit,  si  quid  ratione  per  se  ipsi  invenerint.  Art<s 
etiam  ipsas  propter  se  assumendas  putamus,  cum  quia 
sit  in  iis  aliquid  dignum  assumptione,  tum  quod  con- 
stent  ex  cognitionibus  et  contineant  quiddam  in  se 
ratione  constitutum  et  via.  A  falsa  autem  assensione 
magis  DOS  atienatos  esse  quam  a  ceteris  rebus  quae 
sint  contra  naturani,  arbitrantur. 

(lam  membrorum,  id  est,  partium  fflrporis  alia 
videiitur  propter  eorum  usum  a  uatura  esse  donat», 
ut  manus,  crura,  pedes,  ut  ea  quae  sunt  intus  in 
corpore,  quorum  utilitas  quanta  sit  a  medicis  et^^_ 

*  This  parenlhe^s  has  no  relevance  Id  the  contac^^^| 

BOOK   HI.  V 

7  inqwrisc  to  actipTt; — Pleasure  on  the  contrary,  aceord- 
ing  to  most  Stoics,  is  not  to  be  rt'ckontd  among 
the  prim»ry  objects  of  natural  impulse  ;  and  I  very 
strongly  agree  with  them,  for  fear  lest  many 
immorjil  consequences  would  follow  if  we  held  that 
nature  has  placed  pleasure  among  the  earliest  objects 
of  desire.  But  the  fact  of  our  affection  for  the 
objects  first  adopted  at  nature's  prompting  seems  to 
require  no  further  proof  than  this,  that  there  is  no  one 
who,  given  the  choice,  would  not  prefer  to  have  all 
the  parts  of  his  body  sound  and  whole,  rather  than 
maimed  or  distorted  although  equally  serviceable. 

'  '^ifP''"  '";^''  "*"  cognition  (which  we  may  term 
comprehensions  or  percept ibos,  or,  if  these  words  are 
distasteful  or  obscure.  Acta %ieisi  ^rr^ these- we-con? 
sider  meet  to  be  adopted  for  theirownjafce,  becausa 
they  possess  an  element  that  so  to  speak  embrace* 
and  contains  the  truth.  This  can  be  seen  in  th* 
case  of  children,  whom  we  may  observe  to  take 
pleasure  in  finding  something  out  for  themselves  by 
the  use  of  reason,  even  thougli  they  gain  nothing  bj' 

i  it.  The  sciences  also,  we  consider,  are  things  to  be 
chosen  for  their  own  sake,  partly  because  there  is  in 
them  something  worthy  of  choice,  partly  because 
they  consist  of  acts  of  cognition  and  contain  an 
element  of  fact  established  by  methodical  reasoning. 
The  mental  assent  to.  what  is  false,  as  the  Stoics 
believe,  isjnore  repugnant  to  us  than  all  the  other 
things  that  are  contrary  to  nature. 

(Again,'  of  the  members  or  parts  of  the  body, 
some  appear  to  have  been  bestowed  on  us  by  natwe 
for  the  sake  of  their  use,  for  example  the  hands, 
legs,  feet,  and  the  internal  organs,  as  to  the  degree 
of  whose  utility  even  physicians  are  not  agreed; 

disputstur,  alia  autem  uullam  ob  utilitatem  quasi 
Bd  quendam  omatunij  ut  Cauda  pavoni,  p]iiinae 
versicolores   columbis,  viris  mammae  atqtie  barba.) 

19  Haec  dicuntur  fortasse  ieiuniiis;  sunt  enim  quasi 
prima  elementa  naturae,  quibus  ubertas  orationis 
adliiberi  vix  potest ;  nee  equidem  earn  cogito  eonse- 
ctari ;  yerum  tamen  cum  de  rebus  grandioribus  dicas, 
ipsae  res  verba  rapiunt ;  itfl,  fit  cum  gravior,  turn 
etiam  splendldior  oratio."  Est  ut  dicis,"  inquam: 
"  sed  tamen  omne  quod  de  re  bona  dilucide  dicitur, 
mihi  praeclare  dici  videtur.  Istiusmodi  autem  res 
dicere  ornate  velle  puerile  est,  plane  autem  et 
perspicue  expedire  posse  docti  et  intellegentis  viri." 

'20  VI.  Pragrediaraur  igitur,qiioniam,"  inquit,  abhis 
priiicipiis  naturae  discessimus,  quibus  congruere  de- 
bent  quae  sequuntur.  Sequitur  autem  haec  prima 
divisio:  Aestimabile  esse  dicunt  (sic  enim,  ut  opinor, 
appellemus)  id  quod  aot  ipsum  secundum  naturam 
sit  HUt  tale  quid  efficiat,  ut  selectione  dignum  pro- 
pterea  sit  quod  aliquod  poiidus  babept'dignuii^  aesti- 
mattone,  quam  illi  aitav  vocant,  contraque  inaestima- 
bfle  quod  sit  superiori  contrarium.  Initiis  igitur  ita 
constitutis  ut  ea  quae  secundum  naturam  sunt  ipsa 
propter  se  sumenda  sint  contrariaque  item  reicienda, 



BOOK   in.  v-vi 
while  others  serve  no  useful  purpose,  but  appear  to 
be  intended  for  ornament ;  for  instance  the  pea- 
cock's tiil,  the  plumage  of  the  dove  with  its  shitting 
colours,  and  the  breasts  and  beard  of  the  male  human 

19  being.)  All  this  is  perhaps  somewhat  baldlf  ex- 
pressed; for  it  deals  with  what  may  be  called  the 
primary  elements  of  nature,  to  which  any  embelhsh- 
ment  of  style  can  scarcely  be  applied,  nor  am  I  for  my 
part  concerned  to  attempt  it.  On  tlie  other  hand, 
when  one  is  treating  of  more  majestic  topics  the  style 
instinctively  rises  with  the  subject,  and  the  brilliance 
of  the  language  increases  with  the  dignity  of  the 
theme."  'True,"  I  rejoined;  "but  to  my  mind, 
any  clear  statement  of  an  important  topic  iwssesses 
exeellence  of  style.  It  would  be  childish  to  desire 
an  ornate  style  in  subjects  of  tlie  kind  with  which 
you  are  dealing.  A  man  of  sense  and  education  will 
be  content  to  be  able  to  express  his  meaning  plainly 
and  clearly," 

;)  Vl.  To  proceed  then,"  he  continued,  for  we  have 
been  digressing  from  the  primary  impulses  of  nature ; 
and  with  these  the  later  stages  must  lie  in  harmony. 
The  next  step  is  the  following  fundamental  classifi- 
cation: That  which  is  in  itself  in  accordance  with 
nature,  or  whtcTi^  produces  something  else  that  is  so, 
and  wKTcli  Tliefefore  is  "ilgsefving  of  ctToice  as 
possessing   a   certain   amount    oi'  positive   vaLu^-r- 

' valuable'  (for  so  I  suppose  we  may  translate  it); 
and  on  the  other  hand  tiiat  which  is  the  contrary  of 
tlie  former  they  term  valueless.'  The  initial  prin- 
ciple being  thus  established  that  things  in  accordance 
with  nature  are  things  to  be  taken  '  for  their  own 
sake,  and  their  opposites  similarly  'things  to  be 




primum  est  otficium  (id  eniiu  appello  KudiiKov)  ut  se 
conservet  in  naturae  statu,  deinceps  ut  ea  teneat 
quae  secundum  naturam  sint  pellatque  contraria; 
qua  inventa  seleclione  et  item  reiectione,  sequitur 
deinceps  cum  oiiicio  selectio,  deiiide  ea  perpetua, 
turn  ad  extremum  constans  consent  aiieaque  niiturae, 
in  qua  primum  inesse  incipit  et  intellegi  quid  sit 
quod  vere  bonum  possit  did.  Prima  est  enim  con- 
ciliatio  hominis  ad  ea  quae  sunt  secundum  naturam ; 
simul  autcm  cepit  iiitellegentiam  vel  notionem  potius, 
quam  appellant  tiivoiav  illi,  viditque  rerum  agenda- 
rum  ordinem  et  ut  ita  dicam  concordiam,  multo  earn 
pluris  aestimavit  quam  omnia  ilia  quae  prima  dilexe- 
rat,  atque  ita  cognitlone  et  ratione  collEgit  ut  sUi> 
tueret  in  eo  collocatum  siimmum  illud  hominis  per 
se  laudandum  et  expetendum  bonum ;  quod  cum 
positum  sit  in  eo  quod  oiiokoyltn'  Stoici,  nos  appelle- 
mus  convenientiamj  si  placet,  —  cum  igitur  in  eo  sit 
id  bonum  quo  omnia  referenda  sunt,  lioneste  facta 
ipsumque  honestum,  quod  solum  in  bonis  ducitur, 
quamquam  post  oritur,  biraen  id  solum   vi  sua  et 

*  The  Latin  is  here  inadequate  ;  what  is  me 
rently  that  tlie  adult  deliberately  selects  the  tis 
which  as  a  child  he  pursued  instinctively,  i 
selection  is  now  an  offictKM.  If  however  cu-tH 
mark  oi  scUctio  at  this  later  stage,  Cicero  i 
above  when  he  applies  offirium  to  the  inst 
preservation  and  the  instinctive  choice  o'' 
On  the  other  hand  it  is  not  dear  why  the; 

nt  >s  appa- 

id  tliat  the 

hould  not  bs 
I '  or  q^n'wjfc— II 
le  account  ^^Hl 



BOOK    III.  vi 
rejected,'  the  first '  appropriate  act '  (fpyso  I  render!' Appro^ 
the  Greek  kalkvkon)  is  to  preserve  oneself  in  one's 
natural  eonstitulion;  the  next  is  to  retain  those  things      ' 
"wHich  are  in  accordMicejdth-uatUfejnd  -t»  tepel 
thoseJiat  are  theT5ntrary;  then  when  this  principle  ,-  ,!.•" 
of  choice  and  also  ot  rejection  lias  been  discovered^ 
there   follows    next    in    order    choice   conditioned  Laipt  we  ci 
by     appropriate   action';^    then,   such    choice    be- fy^iahin 
come    a    fixed    habit ;    and    finaljyj    choice    fully  SjJVj'"^ 

this  (m^stogeJhaTthejGQQanJtutL'^r^^ 

emerggs- and  comes  to  be.uiiderstooH  in  its  true  tfCWefai 
I   nature.     Man's  first  attraction  is  towards  tlie  tTiiugs 
in  accordance  with  nature;  but  as  soon  as  he  has 
attained  to  understanding,  or  rather  to  conscious  in-  „ 
telligence- — in  Stoic  phraseology  ennoia — and  has  die-  1 
cgQi£dJji£  order  and  so  to  speak  harmony  that  should 
fco^m  conduc"tJhe  then  Rst,epnifi  t.hifiTi^i-ififinY  frr 
fewie-faighLy  tnMJall  the  thingsfom^hich  he  originally  | 
fMtM^a^ctuTn,  and  by  exercise  of  ihtelligence  and 
reason  infers  the  conclusion  tl<at  in  1jhTs  oritur  jesideg 
the   Chief  flood   nf  man,  tlip.   thiny  fliiit   is   praise^ 
woHExJHid  desirable  for  its  own_5abe  ;  and  that  in- 
asmuch  as  this  consists  in  what  the  Stoics  term 
/lomologia  and  we  with  your  approval  may  call    con- 
formity'''— inasmuch  I  say  as  in  this  resides  that 
Good  which  is  the  End  to  which  all  else  is  a  meuis, 
moral  conduct  and  Moral  Worth  itself,  which  alone 
is  counted  as  a  good,  although  of  subsequent  develop- 
ment, is  nevertheless  the  sole  thing  that  is  for  its 

1"  To  live  conformably,'  i)i.o\oyoiiiiiyaii  ffu,  was  Zeno's 
formula  for  the  End;  ii  was  interpreted  as  meaning  "to 
live  on  one  harmonlouii  pla.ii. "  CleanLbes  added,  r-j  ijiiad, 
'to  live  in  conformity  with  nature.' 



dignitate  eJcpetendum  est,  eorum  autem  quae  sunt 
prima  naturae  propter  se  nihil  est  expetendum. 
22  Cum  vero  ilia  quae  oflicia  esse  dixi  proficiscantur  ab 
initiis  naturaej  necesse  est  ea  ad  haec  referri,  ut 
recte  dici  possit  omnia  oflicia  eo  referri  ut  adipisca- 
mur  principia  naturae,  nee  tamen  ut  hoc  sit  bonorum 
ultimiim,  propterea  quod  non  inest  in  primis  naturae 
conciliationibus  honesta  actio;  consequens  est  enim 
et  post  oritur,  ut  dixi.  Est  tamen  ea  secundum 
naturam  multoque  nos  ad  ae  espetendam  magis  hor- 
tatur  quam  superiora  omnia.  Sed  e\  hoc  primum 
error  tollendus  est,  ne  quis  seqiii  existimet  ut  duo 
sint  ultima  bononim.  Ut  enim  si  cui  propoaitum  sit 
collineare  hostora  aliquo  aut  sagittam,  sicut '  nos 
ultimum  in  bonis  didmus,  sic  illi  facere  omnia  quae 
possit  ut  collineet:  huic  in  eiusmodi  similitudine 
omnia  sint  facienda  ut  collineet,  et  tamen,  ut  omnia 
faciat  quo  propositum  assequatur,  sit*  hoc  quasi  ulti- 
mum quale  nos  summum  in  vita  bonum  dtcimus,  illud 
autem  ut  feriat,  quasi  seligendum,  non  espetendum. 
S  VII.  Cum  autem  omnia  oflicia  a  principiis  naturae 
proliciscantur,  ab  iisdem  necesse  est  proficisci  ipsam 
sapientiam.  Sed  quemadmodum  saepe  fit  ut  is  qui 
commendatus  sit  alieui  pluris  cum  faciat  cui  com- 
mendatus  quam  ilium  a  quo  sit,  sic  minime  mirum 
'sicui  MSS.;  JiVMdv,,  br-ncketine  sicilic—comitKl ;  the 
.seuCence  so  emended  may  be  rendered  "For  suppose  a 
man  were  to  set  himself  to  take  true  aim  at  a.  mark  with  a 
apear  or  an  arrow,  tliis  purpose  would  correspond  lo  the 
Ultimate  Good  as  we  define  it.  The  archer  in  this  illustra- 
tion would  have  to  do  all  he  could  to  aim  slraig-ht,  and  yet 
it  is  this  doing  all  he  could  to  attain  his  purpose  that  would 
constitute  his  Ultimate  End,  as  we  call  it,  answering  lo 
the  Chief  Good,  as  defined  by  us,  in  the  conduct  of  life ; 
the  actual  hitting-  of  the  mark  would  be,  in  our  phrase, 
'  to  be  chosen,'  not  '  lo  he  desired.'  "  ''sit  edd. ;  sic  MSS, 

to  da  all  lie  ca-H  *«'»■»  s^^ikti  the  HMn  in  ti»b 
ilU^tntion  «osld    ba*v   to  do  rrr-TTrthinit  to  aiw 
stniicht,  and  jet,  altboo^  he  did  cvrrirthinK  to 
attain  his  parpaee,  his  '  oltimate  Eih).'  $«  to  Kpndc, 
would  be  miat  correspofxied  to  what  wc  c«ll  lh< 
Chief  Good  Id  the  conduct  of  life,  whcrva^  thr  actual 
hitting  of  the  mark  «-ould  l>e  ia  our  phnur  'to  br 
choienZiml  not '  to  he  desired.' 
i       VII.  "  Again,  as  all  " ag^roiiriHlc  «rls'  nrv  l>*«cd  V' *] 
on  the  primary  impulses  of  luiturv,  it  follow»,  tlml.  dy., . 
WisdoinTtself  iVbased  on  them  ulso.     But  ns  it  .il>ci 
happens  that  a  man  who  is  hitrwhircd  to  miutlicr  ^l«ii 
values  this  new  friend  more  higlily  tUsii  he  diiei»  the 
person  who  gave  him  the  iiitroductiuii,  so  In  llkr 
R  »41 


est  primo  nos  sapientiae  com  mend  a  ri  ab  initiis 
naturae,  post  auteni  ipsam  siipieiitiam  nobis  cariorem 
fieri  quam  ilia  sint  a  quibus  ad  hanc  venerimus. 
Atque  ut  membra  nobis  ita  data  sunt  ut  ad  quandam 
rationem  vivendi  data  esse  appareant,  sic  appetitio 
animi,  quae  op/i^  Graeee  vocatur,  non  ad  quodvis 
genus  vitae  sed  ad  quandam  formam  vivendi  videtur 

2i  data,  itemque  et  ratio  et  perfecta  ratio.  Ut  enim 
histrioni  actio,  saltatori  motus  non  quivis  sed  certus 
quidam  est  datus,  sic  vita  agenda  est  certo  Renere 
quodam,  non  quolibet;  quod  genus  conveniens  con- 
sentaneumque  dicimus.  Nee  enim  gubemationi  aut 
niedicinae  similem  sapientiam  esse  arbitramur,  sed 
actioni  illi  potius  quam  modo  dixi  et  saltAtioni,  ut  in 
ipsa  insit,  non  tons  petatur  extremum,  id  est  artis 
effectio.  Et  tamen  est  etiam  alia  cum  his  ipsis 
artibus  sapientiae  dissimilitude,  propterea  quod  in 
illis  quae  recte  facta  sunt  non  continent  tamen 
omnes  partes  e  quibus  constant;  quae  autem  nos  aut 
recta  aut  recte  facta  dicamus,  si  placet,  illi  autem 
appellant  KaTopBw/iaTa,  omnes  numeros  virtutis  con- 
tinent Sola  enim  sapientia in  setotaconversaest,  quod 

35  idem  in  ceteris  artibus  non  fit.  Inscite  autem medicinae 
et  gubemationis  ultimum  cum  ultimo  sapientiae  com- 
paratur.     Sapientia    enim    et   animi  magnitudinem 

^  Effectio 

is  here 

Ukenase  ui- 

.-alent  1 


but  it 

might  b. 

rued  as  having  the 


'  In  Tusc  J.  : 

sense,  the 


t  of  ; 

in   art,  c 

tjvering  6oth  praxis,  the 

actual    exci 

rcise   of  the 

art,   whi 

rt,  and 


in  the  n 

r  sense,  "effcclua" 

e  extra 



'poieiic'   or  con- 

manner  it  b  br  do  means  sarpnaag  that  tboo^  we 

instucts,  afiemuds  WisdoDt  itself  becooKs  dCKCtlo.  I 
OS  than  are  the  instincts  &t>m  whid  we  cane  to  ber. 
And  jnat  as  our  limbs  are  $o  fashtotted  that  it  is  clear 
that  they  were  bestowed  upon  us  with  a  view  to  a 
certain  mode  of  life,  so  oar  faculty  of  appetition,  in 
Greek  karme,  was  obvionslT  designed  not  for  any  kind 
of  life  one  may  choose,  but  for  a  particular  mode  «rf 
living :  and  the  same  is  true  of  Reason  and  of  per- 
'i  fected  Reason.     For  just  as  an  actor  or  dancer  has  wi^tnl,». 

'°"i7"^  \-i  hil"  -"*  '-"T  '■"t  1  rf^P  parHmlar  part  ^"-t- 

OT^  dance,  so  life  has  to  be  conducted  in  a  E<;rt«in 
fiiett  way,  and  iiot  in  any  way  we~T^e.      This  fiied 
•^y  we  speak  of  as    conformable '  and  suitable.     In       ^^ 
fact  we  do  not  consider  Wisdom  to  be  like  seamanship        , 
or  medicine,  but  rather  like  the  arts  of  acting  and 
of  dancing  just    mentioned ;    its    End,    l>eiiig   the       | 

aetnal  fffrri^.p'  nf    tli^    art^jg_f-fiii^ainpj^  KJtliin    the  _   _. 

tiie  Wiine  limc  there  is  also  another  point  which 
marks  a  dissimilaritj"  betiveen  Wisdom  and  these 
same  arts.  In  the  latter  a  movement  perfectly 
executed  nevertheless  does  not  involve  all  the 
various  motions  which  together  constitute  the  sub- 
ject matter  of  the  art;  whereas  in  the  sphere  of 
conduct,  what  we  may  call,  if  you  approve,  right  'Righti 
actions,'  or  '  rigiitly  performed  actions,'  in  Stoic  Jp"]y^ 
phraseology  ioioriSSinafn .contain  all  the  categories  of  «upceii 
virtue.   For  Wisdom  alone  is  entirely  self-eontalned,  * 

i^  which  is  not  the 

erroneous,  however,  to  pla 
of  navigation  exactly  on 
Wisdom,     For  Wisdom  i 

ith  the  other  arts, 
ce  the  End  of  medicine  or 
a  par  with  the  End  of 
icludes  also  magnanimity 

complectitur  et  iustitiam  et  ut  omnia  quae  honiini 
ucddunt  infra  se  esse  iudicet,  quod  idem  ceteris  nrti- 
bus  non  coiitingit.  Teiiere  autem  virtutes  eas  ipsas 
quarum  modo  feci  mentionem  nemo  poterit  nisi 
statuerit  nihil  esse  quod  interstt  aut  diHerat:  aliud  ab 
alio  praeter  honesta  et  turpia.' 

'iG  Vide^mus  nunc  quani  sint  praeclare  ilia  his  quae 

iain  posui  const^queiitia.  Cum  enim  hoc  at'  extre- 
mum  (scntis  enim,  credo,  me  iam  diu  quod  teAm 
Graeci  dicunt  id  dicere  turn  extremu'm,  turn  ulti- 
mum,  tum  sunimum;  Hcebit  etiam  finem  pro  extreme 
aut  ultimo  dicere) — cum  igitur  hoc  sit  extremum, 
congruenter  naturae  coiiveiiienterque  vivei'c,  neces- 
sario  sequitur  omnes  sapientes  semper  feliciter,  abso- 
lute, fortunate  vivere,  nulla  re  impediri,  iiuUa  prohi- 
beri,  nulla  egere.  -Quod  autem  eoiitinet  non  magis 
earn  disciplinAm  de  qua  loquoi-  qunm  vitam  fortunas- 
que  nostras,  id  est  ut  quod  honestiim  sit  id  solum 
bonum  iiidiccmus,  potest  id  quidem  fuse  et  copiose 
et  omnibus  electissimis  verbjs  gravissimisque  sen- 
tentiis  rhetoi'ice  '  et  augeri  et  ornari;  sed  consectariA 
ine  Stoicorum  brevia  et  acuta  delectaiit. 

27  VIII  Concluduntur  igitur  eorum  arguments 
sir?:  Quod  est  bonum  omne  laudabile  e<it;  quod 
autem  laudibde  Lst  omne  est  hont.stum  boiiiun 
igitur  quod  tst,  Iioiiestimi  est  batisne  hoc  conolu- 
sum  videtur       Certe     quod  emm  efhciebatur  ex  iis 

duobus  quae  ernit  sumpta,  i 

ISC  coiw^^^ 


and  justice  and  a  sense  of  superiority  to  ull 
accidents  of  mans  estatej  but  this  is  not  the 
with  the  otlier  arts.     Again,  even  the  very  virtues 
have  just  mentioned  cannot  be  attained  by  anyone 
unless  lie  has  realizi^d  that  all  things  are  indifferent     - 
and  indistinguishable  except  moral  worth  and  base-    ' 

?6  We  may  now  ohserve  how  strikingly  the  prin-i  Hm 

ciples    I    have    established    support   the    following  tiapi 
corollaries.     Inasmuch  as  the  final  aim — (and  you 
have  observed,  no  douht,  that  I  hiive  all  along  heen 
translating  the  Greek  term  lelot  eithex  ljy    final '  or 
ultimate  aim,'  or    chief  Good,'  and  for     final  or 
ultimate  aim  '  we  may  also  substitute    End  O^inas- 
much  then  as  the  final  aim  is  to  live  in  agreement 
and    harmony  with    nature,    it   necessarily  follows 
that  all  wise  men  at  all  times  enjoy  a  happy,  perfect 
and  fortunate  life,  free  from  all  hindrance,  inter- 
ference or  want.    The  essential  principle  not  merely 
of  the  system  of  philosophy  I  am  discussing  but 
alsoof  our  life  and  fortunes  is,  that  we  should  beheve    -■ 
Moral  Worth  to  be  the  only  good.     This  principle  viri 
might  be  amplified  and  elaborated  in  the  rhetorical  Siji 
manner,  with  great  length  and  fullness  and  with 
all  the  resources  of  choice  diction  and  impressive      ' 
argument;  but  fur  nuy  own  part  1  like  the  terse  and 
pointed  syllogisms  of  the  Stoics. 

27        VIII.  ■*  They  put  their  arguments  in  the  follow- (Ut 
ing  syllogistic  form :    Whates-er  is  good  is  praise-  hom 
worthy :    but  whatever  is   praiseworthy  is  morally '""' 
honourable :  therefore  that  which  is  good  is  morally 
honourable.    Do  yon  think  this  is  a  valid  deduction  ? 
Undoubtedly  it  ta  so ;  you  can  see  that  the  conclusion 
rests  on  an  inference  logically  drawn  from  the  two 
9 1..'. 

11  the  ^H 

tues  I  ^^1 


If  Ihoinlr 



disputatur,  alia  autem  nullam  ob  utilitatem  quasi 
ad  quendam  omatum,  ut  cauda  pa  von  i,  plumae 
versicolores  coliimbis,  viris  mammae  atqiie  barba.) 

3  Haec  diciintur  forlasse  ieiiinius ;  sunt  enim  quasi 
prima  elementa  naturae,  qnibus  ubertas  oratlonis 
adhiberi  vix  potest;  nee  equidem  earn  cogito  conse- 
ctari;  verum  tamen  cum  de  rebus  grandioribus  dieas, 
ipsae  res  verba  rapiunt ;  ita  fit  cum  gravior,  turn 
etiam  splendidior  oratio."  Est  ut  dicis,"  inquam; 
sed  tamen  omne  quod  de  i-e  bona  dilucide  dicitur, 
raihi  praeclare  dici  videtur.  Istiusmodi  autem  res 
dicere  ornate  velie  puerile  est,  plane  autem  et 
perspicue  expedire  posse  docti  et  intellegentis  viri." 

J  VI,  "Progrediamurtgitur,quoniam,"inqiiit,  'abhis 
principiis  naturae  discessimu^,  quibus  eongruere  de- 
bent  quae  sequuntur.  Sequitur  autem  haec  prima 
divisio :  Aestimabile  esse  dieunt  (sic  enim,  ut  opitior, 
appellemus)  id  quod  aut  ipsum  secundum  iiaturam 
sit  aut  tale  quid  efticiat,  ut  selectione  dignum  pro- 
pterea  sit  quod  aliquod  pondus  habe^  digiiui^  aesti- 
matione,  qiiam  illi  d^iai/  vocant,  contraque  inaestima- 
bHe  quod  sit  superiori  contrarium.  Initiis  igitur  ita 
constitutis  ut  ea  quae  secundum  naturam  sunt  ipsa 
propter  se  sumenda  sint  contrariaque  item  reicienda, 

while  others  scire  no  useful  purpose,  but  appear  to 
be  intended  for  ornament:  for  instance  the  pea- 
cock's tailj  the  plumage  of  the  dove  with  its  shifting 
colours,  and  the  breasts  and  beard  of  the  male  human 

19  being.)  All  this  is  perhaps  somewhat  baldly  ex- 
pressed; for  it  deals  nith  what  may  be  called  the 
primary  elements  of  nature,  to  which  any  embellish- 
ment of  style  can  scarcely  be  applied,  nor  am  I  for  my 
part  concerned  to  attempt  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  one  is  treating  of  more  majestic  topics  the  stj'le 
instinctively  rises  with  the  subject,  and  the  brilliance 
of  the  language  increases  with  the  dignity  of  the 
theme."  True,"  I  rejoined;  but  to  my  mind, 
any  clear  statement  of  an  impmrtant  topic  possesses 
excellence  of  style-  It  would  be  childish  to  desire 
an  ornate  style  in  subjects  of  the  kind  with  which 
you  are  dealing.  A  man  of  sense  and  education  will 
be  content  to  be  able  to  express  his  meaning  plainly 
and  clearly." 

'20       VI.    To  proceed  then,"  he  continued,    for  we  have  Suci 
been  digressing  irom  the  primary  impulses  of  nature;  ■\q 
and  with  these  the  Liter  stages  must  be  in  harmony.  ""^ 
The  next  step  is  the  following  fundamental  classifi- 
cation: That  which  is  in  itself  ui  accordance  with 
nature,  or  which  produces  something  else  that  is  so", 
which  "therefore    is    degCfVlng" 

possessing   a   certain   amount    of"  positive  ^liie-^ 

aria  as  the  StoIffB 'ealt  tt^^.tiis  tfipv  prnnoiim-p  tn  1m- 

'valuable'  (for  so  I  suppose  we  may  translate  it); 
and  on  the  other  hand  that  which  is  the  contrary  of 
the  former  they  term  'valueless.'  The  initial  prin- 
ciple being  thus  established  that  things  in  accordance 
with  nature  are  '  things  to  be  taken  '  for  their  own 
sake,  and  their  opposites   similarly  'things  to  be 


magno  sit  animo  iitque  furti  omnia  quae  cadere  i 
hominem  possint  despicere  ac  pro  nihilo  putare. 
Quae  cum  ita  siiit,  etfectum  est  nihil  ease  malum 
quod  turpe  non  sit.  Atque  iste  vir  altus  et  excel- 
lena,  magno  animo,  vere  fortis,  infra  se  omnia  humana 
ducetis,  is,  inquam,  quern  efficere  volumus,  quem 
quaerinius,  certe  et  confidere  sibi  debet  ac  suae  vitae 
et  actae  et  consequent!  et  bene  de  sese  iudicare, 
statuens  nihil  posse  mali  incidere  sapienti.     Ex  quo 

1^—  intellegilur   idem   ilJud,   solum    bonum   esse    quod 

I       honestum  sit,  idque  esse  beate  vivere,  injneste,  id  est 

l__    cum  virtijte  vivere, 

SO  IX.  Nee  vero  ignoro,  vorias  philosophomm  fuisse 
sententias,  eorum  dico  qui  suminum  bonum,  quod 
ultimum  appello,  in  animo  ponerent.  Quae  quam- 
quam  vitiose  quidam  secuti  sunt,  tamen  nou  modo 
iis  tribus  qui  virtutem  a  summo  bono  scRregaverunt, 
cum  aut  voluptatem  ant  vacuitatem  doloris  aut  prima 
naturae  in  summis  bonis  ponerent,  sed  etiam  alteris 
tribus  qui  mancam  fore  putaverunt  sine  aliqua  acces- 
sione  virtutem  ob  eamque  rem  triura  earum  rerum 
quas  supra  dixi  singuli  singulas  addidcrunt,  his  tamen 
omnibus  eos  antepono,  cuicuimodi  simt,  qui  summum 
31  bonum  in  animo  atque  in  virtute  posuerunt  Sed 
sunt  tamen  perabsurdi  et  ii  qui  cum  scientia  vivere 
uhimum  bonorum,  et  qui  nullam  rerum  differentiam 
esse  dixcrunt  atque  ita  sapientem  beatum  fore, 
nihil  aliiid  alii  momento  ullo  antepouentem,  et  qui,' 

'  ei  qui  inserted  by  Mdv. 

^B  BOOK    III.   viiUix 

biifh-mi&ded  man  despises  and  holds  of  no  account 
all  the  accidents  to  which  mankind  is  liable.  The 
conclusion  follows  that  nothinif  is  evil  that  is  not  '. 
base.  Also,  your  lofty,  distinguished,  magnanimous 
and  truly  brave  man,  who  thinks  all  human  vicissi- 
tudes beneath  him,  I  mean,  the  character  we  des 
to  produce,  our  ideal  man,  must  unquestionably  have 
faith  in  himself  and  in  his  own  career  l»oth  past  and 
future,  and  think  well  of  himself,  holding  that  no  ill 
can  befall  the  wise  man,  Here  then  is  another  proof 
of  the  same  position,  that  Moral  Worth  alone  is  good, 
and  that  to  live  honourably,  that  is  virtuously,  is  to  " 
live  happily. 

)       IX.      I  am  well  aware,  it  Ls  true,  that  varieties  of  g.TiwSifflc 
opinion  have  existed  among  philosophers,  I  mean  5^^*'^'^^ 
among  those  of  them  who  have  placed  the  Chief  Good,  p»riann  «iiu 
the  ultimate  aim  as  I  call  it,  in  the  mind.     In  follow-  Thoughit 
ing  out  these  various  views  some  of  them  fell  into  ^i,\"j^'^nciud 
errors;  but  nevertheless  I  rank  all  those, of  whatever  other ihinssiiii 
type,  who  have  placed  the  Chief  Good  in  the  mind  jndudeKrtu», 
and  in  virtue,  not  merely  above  the  three  philoso-  iiwChwfGooa 
phers*  who  dissociated  the  Chief  Good  from  virtue  ^_ 

altogether  and  identified  it  either  with  pleasure  or  ^H 

freedom  fron)  pain  or  the  primary  impulses  of  nature,  ^H 

but  also  above  the  other  three,  who  held  that  virtue  ^H 

would  be  incomplete  without  some  enhancement, 
and  therefore  added  to  it  one  or  other  respectively 

1  of  the  three  things  I  have  just  enumerated.  But  still  yetuisaiwer 
those  thinkers  are  quite  beside  the- mark  who  pro- aii  dUim  thing! 
nounced  the  ultimate  Good  to  be  a  life  devoted  to  vi*S^™iieis 
knowledge;  and  those  who  declared  that  all  things "ighi choice 
are  indifferent,  and  that  the  Wise  Man  will  secure  """"^  """"' 
happiness  by  not  preferring  any  one  thing  i 
least  degree  to  any  other;  and  those  again  who  si 

in  the  ^m 

'ho  said,  ^^t 

ut  quidam  Acndemici  constituisse  dicuntur,extremuttt 

bonoriim  et  summuin  mtinus  esse  sapientis  obsistere 
visis  assensusque  suos  firme  sxistinere.  His  singulis 
eopiose  responderi  solet.  Sed  quae  perspicua  sunt 
longa  esse  non  dcbent ;  quid  auteni  apertius  quam, 
si  selectjo  nulla  sit  ab  iis  rebus  quae  contra  naturam 
sint  earuin  rerum  quae  sint  secundum  naturam, 
tollatur'  omnis  ea  quae  quaeratur  laudeturque  pru- 
dentia?  Circumscriptis  igitur  iis  sententiis  quas 
posui,  et  ii!<  si  quae  similes  eanun  sunt,  relinquitur 
ut  summum  bonum  sit  vivere  scientiam  adbibenteni 
earum  rerum  quae  natura  eveniant,  seligentera  quae 
secundum  Daturam  et  quae  contra  naturam  sint 
reicienteni,  id  est  con veni  enter  congruenterqae 
naturae  vivere. 
!  Sed  in  ceteris  artibus    cum    dicitur   artificiose, 

posterum  quodam  modo  et  consequens  putandum 
est,  quod  illi  «riytvnj/iaTiKoV  appellant;  com  autem 
in  quo  sapieiiter  dicimus,*  id  a  primo  rectissirae 
dicitur.  Quidquid  enim  a  sapient e  proficiscitur, 
id  continuo  debet  expletom  esse  orani!)us  suis 
partibus ;  in  eo  enim  positum  est  id  quod  dicimus 
esse  expetendum.  Nam  ut  peccatum  est  patriam 
prodere,  parentes  violare,  fana  depeculari,  quae  sunt 
in  effectu,  sic  timere,  sic  maerere,  sic  in  libidine  esse 
peccatum  est  etiam  sine  effectu.    Verum  ut  haec  noa 

^tollatur;  Mdv.  adds  a  mark  of  corrupil 
*  dicnntis  A  ooiiCs. 


BOOK  111.  is 
BS  some  members  of  the  Academy  are  said  to  have 
maintained,  that  the  final  Good  and  supreme  duty  of 
the  Wise  Man  is  to  resist  appearances  and  resolutely 
withhold  his  assent  to  the  reality  of  sense-impres- 
sions. It  is  customary  to  take  these  doctrines  seve- 
rally and  reply  to  them  at  length.  But  there  is 
really  no  need  to  labour  what  is  self-evident ;  and 
what  could  be  more  obvious  than  that,  if  we  can 
exercise  no  choice  as  between  things  consonant  with 
and  things  contrary  to  nature,  no  scope  is  left  at  all 
for  the  much-prized  and  belauded  virtue  of  Prudence  ? 
Eliminating  therefore  the  views  just  enumerated  and  R' 
any  others  that  resemble  them,we  are  left  with  the 
^conclusion  that  the  Chief  Good  consists  in  applying 
the  conduct  of  life  a  knowledge  of  the  working  of 
itural  causes,  choosing  what  is  in  accordance  with 
Iture  and  rejecting  what  is  contrary  to  it ;  in  other 
i,  the  Chief  Good  is  to  live  in  agreement  and  in 
harmony  with  nature. 

But  in   the'  other  arts  when   we  speak  of  an  Mc 

artistic'  performance,  this    quality  must   be  con- h,; 

sidered  as  in  a  sense  subsequent  to  and  a  result  of  ^"^ 

the  action ;  it  is  what  the  Stoics  term  epigennematikon 

(in  the  nature  of  an  after-growth).    Whereas  in  con- 

'  let,  when  we  speak  of  an  act  as  'wise,'  the  term  is  ,■ 

iplied  with  full  correctness  from  the  first  inception 

the  act.     For  every  action  that  the  Wise  Man 

Ltes  must  necessarily  be  complete  forthwith  in 

its  parts;  since  the  thing  desirable,  as  we  term 

consists  in  his  activity.     As  it  is  a  sin  to  betray 

s  country,  to  use  violence  to  one's  parents,  to 

a  temple,  where  the  offence  lies  in  the  result  of 

act,  so  the  passions  of  fear,  grief  and  lust  are 

,  even  when  no  extraneous  result  ensues.     The 


in  posteris  et  in  consequentibus,  set!  in  primis 
tinuo  peccata  sunt,  sic  ea  quae  proficiscuntor  a 
tute,  suseeptione  prima,  non  perf'ectione,  recta 

33  X.  "Bonum  aulem  quod  in  hoc  sermone  to 
usurpatum  est  id  etiam  definitione  explicatur. 
eorum  definitiones  pauliim  oppido  inter  se  differunt, 
et  tameii  codem  spectant.  Effo  assentior  Diogeni 
qui  bonum  definierit  id  quod  esset  natura  absolutum. 
Idautemsequensillud  etiam  quodprodesset((u<^A»jfio 
enini  sic  appellemus)  mo  turn  aut  statum  esse  dixit  e 
natura  abaoluto.  Cumque  rerum  notiones  in  animis 
fiant  si  aut  usii  aliquid  cognitum  sit  aut  coniunctione 
aut  similitudine  aut  collatioue  rationis,  hoc  quarto 
quod  extremum  poBui  boni  notitia  facta  est.  Cum 
enim  ab  iis  rebus  quae  sunt  secundum  naturam 
ascendit  animus  collatione  rationis,  turn  ad  notionem 

34  boni  pervenit.  Hoc  autem  ipsum  bonum  non  acces- 
sione  neque  crescendo  aut  cum  ceteris  ctimparaiido, 
sed  propria  vi  sua  et  seiitimus  et  appellamus  bonum. 
lit  enim  mel,  etsi  dulcissimum  est,  suo  tumen  pruprio 
genere  saporis,  non  comparatione  cum  uiiis  dulce 
esse  sentitur,  sic  l>onuni  hoc  de  quo  agimus  est  illud 
quid  em  plurimi  aestimandum,  sed  ea  aestimatio 
genere  valet,  non  magnitudine.  Nam  cum  aestimatio, 
quae  dji'a  dicitur,  neque  in  bonis  numerata  sit  nee 
rursus  in  malis,  quantumcumque  eo  addideris,  in  suo 

BOOK  in. 

latter  are  sins  not  in  their  subsequent  effects,  hxtt 
immediately  upon  their  inception;  similarly,  actions 
springing  from  virtue  are  to  be  judged  right  from 
their  first  inception,  ;md  not  in  their  successful 

SS  X.  Again,  the  term  Good,'  which  h(is  been  rvfii 
employed  so  frequently  in  this  discourse,  is  also  ex- 
plained by  definition.  The  Stoic  deliiiitions  do  in- 
deed differ  from  one  another  in  a  very  minute  degree, 
but  they  all  point  in  the  same  direction.  I'ersonally 
I  agree  with  Diogenes  in  defining  the  Good  as  that 
which  is  by  nature  perfect.  In  consonancewith  thishe 
pronomiced  the  '  beneficial '  (for  so  let  us  render  the 
Greek  ophelema)  to  be  ii  motion  or  state  in  accordance 
with  that  which  is  by  nature  perfect.  Now  notions 
of  things  are  produced  in  the  mind  when  something 
has  become  known  either  by  experiejice  or  by  com- 
bination of  ideas  or  by  likeness  or  by  analogy.  Tlie 
fourth-and.last  method_^in  this  list  is  the  one  that  haa 
given  «sthe  conception  of  the  Good,  Theinindasceads 
by  analogy  from  the  things  in  accordance  with  nature^ 

Ri  tilL  finally  it  arrives  at  the  notion  of  Good.  At  the 
same  time  Goodness  is  absolute,  and  is  not  n  ques- 
tion-of.  degree;  thc_GoojL  is_ r^'cogmKcd  mid  pro- 

and  not  by  comparison  with  other  things.  Just  as 
htifray,  tliuugll  txTremely  swe^,  IS'  'yei  perceived  to 
be  sweet  by  its  own  peculiar  kind  of  flavour  and  not 
by  being  compared  with  something  elxe,  so  this 
Good  which  we  are  discussing  is  superlatively  valu- 
•,  yet  the  value  iq  its  case  depends  on  kind  and 



genere  manebit.     Alia  est  igitur  propria  aestii 

virtutis,  quae 
i       "Nee  V. 



e  genere,  non  crescendo  valet, 
■o  perturbationes  animorum,  quae 
1  miseram  acerbamque  reddunt  (quas 
7  appellant,  poteram  ego  verbum  ipsum 
s  morbos  appellare,  sed  non  conveniret' 
nd  omnia;  quis  enim  miserieordlam  aut  ipsom 
cundiam  morbum  solet  dicere?  at  illi  dicunt  s-d 
sit  igitur  pertilrbatio,  quae  nomine  ipso  vitiosa 
clarari  videtur ;  nee  eae  perturbationes  vi  aliqua 
natural]  moventur*;  oninesque  eae  sunt  genere  quat- 
tuor,  parti  bus  plures,  aegritudo,  formido,  libido, 
quamque  Stoici  communi  nomine  corporis  et  aiiimi 
^Bov^v  appellant,  ego  malo  laetitiam  appellare,  quasi 
gestientis  animi  elationem  voluptariam :)  perturba- 
tiones autem  nulla  naturae  vi  commoventur.omniaque 
ea  sunt  opiniones  ac  iudicia  levitatis ;  itaque  his 
sapiens  semper  vaeabit. 
]  XL  Omne  autem  quod  honestum  sit  id  esse 
propter  se  expetendum,  commune  nobis  est  cum 
multorum  aliorum  philosophorum  sententiis.  Praeter 
enim  tres  disciplinas  quae  virtutem  a  summo  buna 
excludunt,  ceteris  omnibus  philosophis  bacc  est 
tuenda  sententia,  maxime  tnmen  his  qui'  nihil  aliud 
in  bonorum  numero  nisi  honestum  esse  voluerunt. 
Sed  haec  quidem  est  perfacilis  et  expedita  de- 
fensio.  Quis  est  enim  aut  quis  umquam  fuit  aut 
avaritia  tarn  ardenti  aut  tam  effrenatis  cupiditatibus. 

I  edd.  ; 

■(  MSS. 

'net — moventur  Mdv.  brackels, 
'Ail  gut  Mdv.;  his  Stoicis  qui  HSS. 

in  kind.  The  vJue._o£  Virtue  4s  therefore  peeuliar 
finrl  liitrtinrLLffjgpcnds  on  kind  and  not  on  descee^ 

)5  Moreover  the  emotions  of  the  mind,  which  harass  Thr  passioiii  not 

and  embitter  the  life  of  the  foolish  (the  Greek.tenn 
for  these  is  pathos,  and  I  might  have  rendered  this 
literally  and  styled  them  diseases,'  but  the  word 
disease'  would  not  suit  all  instances;  for  example, 
no  one  speaks  of  pity,  nor  yet  anger,  as  a  disease, 
though  the  Greeks  term  these  pathos.  Let  us  then 
accept  the  term  emotion,'  the  very  sound  of  which 
seems  to  denote  something  vicious,  and  these  emo- 
tions are  not  excited  by  any  natural  influence.  The 
list  of  the  emotions  is  divided  into  four  classes,  with 
numerous  subdivisions,  namelj^  sorro.^j'fear,^Ust,  and 
that  mental  emotion  which  the  Stoics  call  by  a  name 
that  also  denotes  a  bodily  feeling,  AS/on?""  pleasure,' 
but  which  I  prefer  to  style  'delight,'  meaning  the 
sensuous  elation  of  the  mind  when  in  a  state  of  ex- 
ultation), these  emotions,  1  say.  are  not  excited  by 
any  influence  of  nature ;  they  are  all  of  tliem  mere 
fancies  and  frivolous  opinions.  Therefore  the  Wise 
Man  will  always  be  free  from  them. 

i6       XI.  "The  view  that  all  Moral  Worth  is  intrinsi-  Morainy 
cally  desirable  is  one  that  we  hold  in  common  with  [romcu: 
many  other  systems  of  philosophy.  Excepting  three  ^^™J 
schools  that  shut  out  Virtue  from  the  Chief  Good 
altogether,  all  the  remaining  philosophers  are  com- 
mitted to  this  opinion,  and  most  of  all  the  Stoics, 
with  whom  we  are  now  concerned,  and  who  hold 
that  nothing  else  but  Moral  Worth  is  to  be  counted 
as  a  good  at  all.     But  this  position  is  one  that  is  ex- 
tremely simple  and  easy  to  defend.  For  who  is  there, 
or  who  ever  was  there,  of  avarice  so  consuming  and 
appetites  so  unbridled,  that,  even  though  willing  to 


ut  eaiidem  illam  rem  qunm  adipisci  scelere  quovis 
velit  non  multis  partibus  malit  ad  sese  etiam  omni 
impunitate  proposita  sine  facinore  quam  ilia  modo 
per  venire? 

:17  "Quam  vero  utilitatem  aut  quem  fructum  petentes 
scire  cupinius  ilia  quae  occulta  nobis  sunt,  quomodo 
nioveantur  quibusque  de  causis  ea  quae  versantur*  in 
caelo?  Quis  aiitem  tam  agrestibus  institutls  vivit 
aut  quis  contra  studia  naturae  tam  vehementer  obdu- 
riiit  ut  a  rebus  cognitione  dignls  abhorrent  easque 
sine  voliiptate  aut  utilitate  aliqua  non  reqfuirat  et 
pro  nibilo  putet  ?  aut  qnis  est  qui  maiorum  *  aut  Afri- 
canorum  aut  eius  quem  tu  in  ore  semper  babes, 
proavi  mei  ceterorumque  virorum  fortium  atque 
omni  virtute  praestantium  facta,  dicta,  consiUa  co- 

:i8  gnoscens  nulla  anirao  afficiatur  voluptate?  Quis 
autem  honesta  in  familia.  institutus  et  educatus  inge- 
nue non  ipsa  turpitudine  etiamsi  eum  laesura  non  sit 
offenditur?  quis  animo  aequo  videt  eum  quem  impure 
ac  ftagitiose  putet  vivere?  quis  non  odit  sordldos, 
vanos,  leves,  futiles?  Quid  autem  dici  poterit,  si 
turpitudinem  non  ipsam  per  se  fugiendam  esse  sta- 
tuemus,  quo  minus  homines  tenebras  et  solitudinem 
nacti  nuUo  dcdecore  se  abstineant,  nisi  eos  per  se 
foeditate  sua  turpitudo  ipsa  deterreat?  Innume- 
rabilia  dici  possunt  in  banc  sententiam :  sed  non 
nccesse  est.  Nihil  est  enim  de  quo  minus  dubitari 
possit  quam  et  honesta  expetenda  per  se  et  eodeni 

J9  modo  turpia  per  se  esse  fugienda.    Constituto  autem 

r  Mdv.   conj.,    but  prints  I'n  I'eisfnrtf 

wllh  MSS.  {w 

/  Weidner  conj.;  Maxt». 


BOOK    111.  xi  ■ 

commit  any  crime  to  achieve  his  end,  and  even 
though  absolutely  secure  of  impunity,  yet  would  not 
a  liuiidred  times  rather  attain  the  same  object  hy 
innocent  than  by  guilty  means? 

37  '  Again,  what  desire  for  profit  or  advantage  under- 
lies our  iluriosily  to  learn  the  secrets  of  nature,  the 
mode  and  the  causes  of  the  movements  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  ?  Who  lives  in  sucli  a  boorish  state, 
or  who  has  become  so  rigidly  insensible  to  natural 
impulses,  as  to  feel  a  repugnance  for  these  lofty 
studies  and  eschew  them  as  valueless  apart  from  any 
pleasure  or  profit  they  may  bring?  Or  who  is  there 
who  feels  no  sense  of  pleasure  when  he  hears  of  the 
wise  words  and  brave  deeds  of  our  forefathers, — of 
the  Africaid,  or  my  great-grandfather  whose  name 
is  always  on  your  lips,  and  the  other  heroes  of  valour 

3S  and  of  virtue?  On  the  other  hand,  what  man  of 
good  breeding,  brought  up  in  an  honourable  family, 
is  not  shocked  by  moral  baseness  as  such,  even  when 
it  is  not  calculated  to  do  him  personally  any  harm? 
who  can  view  without  disgust  a  person  whom  he 
believes  to  be  dissolute  and  an  evil  hver?  who  does 
not  hate  the  mean,  the  empty,  the  frivolous,  the 
worthless?  Moreover,  if  we  decide  that  baseness  is 
not  a  thing  to  be  avoided  for  its  own  sake,  what 
arguments  can  be  urged  against  men's  indulging  in 
every  sort  of  unseemliness  in  privacy  and  under 
cover  of  darkness,  unless  they  are  deterred  by  the 
esseJitial  and  intrinsic  ugliness  of  what  is  base  ? 
Endless  reasons  could  be  given  in  support  of  this 
view,  hut  they  are  not  necessary.  For  nothing  is 
less  open  to  doubt  than  that  what  is  morally  good  is 
to  be  desired  for  its  own  sake,  and  similarly  what  is 
39  morally  bad  is  to  be  avoided  for  its  own  sake.  Again, 
s  257 

illo  de  quo  ante  diximus,  quod  honestum  esset  id  esse 
solum  bonuiDj  intellegi  necesse  est  pluris  id  quod 
honestum  sit  aestimandum  esse  quam  ilia  media  quae 
ex  eo  comparentur.  StuUitiam  autem  et  timiditatem 
et  iniustitiam  et  inteniperantiam  cum  dieynus  ease 
fugienda  propter  eas  res  quae  ex  ipsis  eveniaiit,  non 
ita  diciraus  ut  cum  illo  quod  positum  est,  solum  id 
esse  malum  quod  turpe  sit,  haec  pugnare  videatur 
oratio,  propterea  quod  ea  non  ad  corporis  incommo- 
dum  referuntur  sed  ad  turpes  actiones  quae  oriuntur 
e  vitiis  (quas  enim  Kaicias  Graeci  appellant,  vitia  malo 
quam  malitias  nominare)." 
)  XII,  "Ne  tu,"  inqnam,  "Cato,  verbis  illustribus 
et  id  quod  vis  declaranttbus  I  Itaque  niihi  videris 
Latine  docere  philusopliiam  et  el  quasi  civitatem 
dare;  quae  quidem  adhuc  peregrinari  Eomae  vide- 
batur  nee  oiFerre  sese  nostris  sermonibus,  et  ista 
maxime  propter  liraatam  quandam  et  rerum  et 
verborum  tenuitatem.  (Scio  enim  esse  quosdam  qui 
quavis  lingua  pliilosuphari  possint ;  nullis  enim  parti- 
tionibus,  nullis  definition! bus  utuntur,  ipsique  dicunt 
ea  se  modo  probare  quibus  natura  tacita  assentiatur; 
itaque  in  rebus  minime  obscuris  non  multus  est  apud 
eos  disserendi  labor.)  Quare  attendo  te  studiose  et 
quaecumque  rebus  iis  de  quibus  hie  sermo  est  no- 
mina  imponis  memoriae  mando ;  mihi  enim  erit 
iisdem  istis  fortasse  iam  utendum.  Virtutibus  igitur 
rectissime  mihi  videris  et  ad  consuetudinem  nostrae 
oratiunis  vitia  posnisse  eontraria.     Quod  enim  vitu- 

m  perfect  ion  raibcr 


the  F 


principle  already  discussed,  that  Moral  Worth  is 
the  sole  Good,  involves  the  corollary  that  it  is  of  more 
value  than  those  neutral  things  which  it  procures. 
On  the  other  hand  when  we  say  that  folly,  cowardice, 
injustice  and  intemperance  are  to  be  avoided  because 
of  the  consequences  they  entail,  this  dictum  must 
not  be  so  construed  as  to  appear  inconsistent  with 
the  principle  already  laid  down,  that  moral  baseness 
alone  is  evil ;  for  the  reason  that  the  statement  does 
not  refer  to  bodUy  harm  but  to  the  base  actions  to 

which  these  vices  give  rise  (the  term    vice '  *  I  prefer  

to    badness'  as  a  translation  of  the  Greek  takia}."      |Th«tt«wUliM 

XII,  Indeed,  Cato,"  said  1,  your  language  is  ot  iratU.) 
lucidity  itself;  it  conveys  your  meaning  exactly.  In 
fact  I  feel  you  are  teaching  philosophy  to  speak 
Latin,  and  natural i;ting  her  as  a  Ruman  citizen. 
Hitherto  she  has  seemed  a  foreigner  at  Rome,  and 
not  able  to  fall  in  with  our  ways  of  speaking;  and 
this  is  especially  so  with  your  Stoic  system  because  ■ 
of  its  precision  and  subtlety  alike  of  thought  and 
language.  (There  are  some  philosophers,  I  know,  who 
could  express  their  ideas  in  any  language ;  for  they 
ignore  Division  and  Definition  altogether,  and  them- 
selves profess  that  they  seek  to  commend  only  those 
principles  which  receive  the  tacit  assent  of  nature. 
Hence,  their  ideas  being  so  far  from  recondite,  expo- 
sition is  with  them  no  laborious  matter.)  So  I  am 
following  you  attentively,  and  am  committing  to 
memory  all  the  terms  you  use  to  denote  the  con- 
ceptions we  are  discussing.  For  very  likely  I  shall 
soon  have  to  employ  the  same  terms  myself  Well, 
I  think  you  are  quite  correct  in  calling  the  oppo- 
site of  the  virtues  vices.'  This  is  in  conformity 
witli  the  usage  of  our  language.  The  word  rice ' 
33  859 

perabile  est  per  se  ipsiiin,  id  eo  ipso  vibium  nomina- 
turn  puto,  vel  etiam  a  vitio  dictum  vituperari.  Sin 
KaKiav  malitiam  dixlsses,  ud  aliud  nos  unum  cerium 
vitium  consuetude  Lattna  tradoceret ;  nunc  onmi 
virtuti  vitium  contrario  nomine  opponitur." 

1  Turn  illc:  His  igitur  ita  positis,"  inquit,  'sequi- 
tur  magna  contentio,  quam  tractatam  a  Peripateticis 
mollius  (est  enim  eorum  consuetudo  dicendi  non 
satis  acuta  propter  ignoralionem  dialecticae)  Camea- 
des  tuuH  egregia  qiiadam  exercitatione  in  dialecticis 
summaque  eloquentia  rem  in  Bummum  discrimen 
iidduxit,  propterca  quod  pugnare  non  deslitit  in 
ouini  liac  quaestione  quae  de  bonis  et  maiis  appelletur 
non  esse  rerum  Stoicis  cum  Peripateticis  contro- 
versiam  sed  noniinum.  Mihi  autent  niliil  turn  perspi- 
cuum  videtiir  quam  has  sententias  eorum  pliiloso- 
phorum  re  inter  se  magis  quam  verbis  dissidere: 
maiorem  multo  inter  Stoicos  et  Peripateticos  rerum 
esse  aio  discrepantiani  quani  verborumj  quippe  cum 
Peripatetici  omnia  quae  ipsi  bona  appellant  pertjnere 
dicant  ad  beate  vivendum,  nostri  non  ex  omni  quod 
aestimatione  aliqua  digiium  sit  compleri  vltom  beatam 

;  XIII.  "An  vera  certins  quidquam  potest  esse 
quam  illorum  ratione  qui  dolorem  in  malis  ponunt 
non  posse  sapientem  beatum  esse  cam  eculeo  tor- 
queatur?     Eorum  autcm  qui  dolorcin  in  malis  non 

BOOK  III.  xii-xiii 

denotes,  I  believe,  that  which  is  in  its  own  nature 

'  vituperahle ' ;  or  else  vituperable'  is  derived  from 
vice.'  \^'ht-reas  if  you  had  rendered  kakia  by 
'badness'  ('malice'),  Latin  usage  would  point  us  to 
another  meaning,  that  of  a  single  particulai 
As  it  is,  we  make  vice '  the  oppasite  term  to  virtue ' 
in  general." 

I  WeU,  then,"  resumed   Cato,      these  principles  siofcs'diwgwf- 

established  there  follows  a  great  dispute,  wliich  on  "a\°ti«dor^'" 
the  side  of  the  Peripatetics  w^as  carried  on  with  no  nwieiy  v«;b»i: 
great  pertinacity  {in  fact  their  ignorance  of  logic  ren- 
ders  their  habitual  style  of  discourse  somewhat  defi- 
cient in  cogency) ;  but  your  leader  Cameades  with  his 
exceptional  proficiency  in  logic  and  his  consummate 
eloquence  brougllt  the  controversy  to  a  head.  Car- 
neades  never  ceased  to  contend  that  on  the  whole 
so-called  'problem  of  good  and  evil,'  there  was  no 
disagreement  as  to  facts  littween  the  Stoics  and  the 
Peripatetics,  but  only  as  to  terms.  For  my  [jart,  how- 
ever, nothing"  seems  to  me  more  manifest  than  that 
there  is  more  of  a  real  than  a  verbal  difference  of 
opinion  iietween  those  philosophers  on  these  points. 
I  maintain  that  there  is  a  far  gj'eater  discrepancy 
between  the  Stoics  and  the  Peripatetics  as  to  facts 
than  as  to  words.  The  Peripatetics  say  that  all  the 
things  which  under  their  system  are  calledgoods  con- 
tribute to  happiness;  whereas  our  school  does  not 
believe  that  total  happiness  comprises  everything 
that  deserves  to  have  a  certain  amount  of  value 
attached  to  it. 

i       XIII,      Again,  can  anything  be  more  certain  than  iqe  under  the 
that  on  the  theory  of  the  school  that  counts  pain  as  m'ihesipiBnii' 

an  evil,  the  Wise  Man  cannot  be  happy  when  he  is  nr'-' 

being  tortured  on  the  rack?     Whereas  the  system 


htbail  ratio  eatt  «git  «t  m   n—il 

'eter  bests  rita  sm^ieati.     Knum 

illnd  qitidcm  «t  oaasentmenm,  «t  si  cum  tria  genen 
iMOonnii  si'nt,  quae  tententia  est  Penpatcbconnn,  eo 
beaUor  quuqne  fit,  qno  sit  txoporis  aiit  extemis  bonis 
pl«iii>r.  ut  hoc  ideni  apfwolnndam  ^t  nobis,  ut  qui 
pinra  Itabeat  ea  qnae  in  corporc  nuKni  aestimantur 
lit  beatior.  Illi  eniin  corporis  conunodis  compieri 
viUm  beatam  putant,  nostri  nihil  minus.  Nam  cum 
Ita  placeat,  ne  eorum  quidem  bonorum  quae  nos  bona 
vcre  appellenius  freqaentia  beatiorem  «itam  6eri  aut 
maifin  expetendam  aut  pluris  aeatimandani,  certe 
minus  ad  beatam  vitam  pertinet  multitude  corporis 
I'V  commodorum.  Etenim  si  et  sapere  expetendum  sit 
ct  valere,  coiiiunctuni  utrumque  ma^s  expetenduui 
sit  quam  sapere  solum,  neque  tamen  si  utrumque  sit 
aestimatione  dignum,  pluris  sit  coniunctum  quaui 
«ape re  ipsum  separatim.^  Nam  qui  valetudinem 
aestimatione  altqua  dignam  iudicamus  neque  earn 
tamen  in  bonis  ponimus,  iidem  censemus  nuUam  esse 
tantam  aestimationem  ut  ea  virtuti  antcponatur ; 
quod  idem  Peripatetic!  non  tenent,  quibus  dicenduni 
est  quae  et  lionesta  actio  Bit  et  sine  dolore  earn  magis 
esse  expetendam  quam  si  esset  eadem  actio  cum 
dolore.  Nobis  aliter  videtur ;  recte  seeusne,  p 
sed  poteatne  rerum  maior  esse  dissensio  ? 
^  separalim  MSS. ;  irpamlum  Mdv. 

cusne,  ptKt^^^ 

BOOK  in.  siii 

that  considers  pain  no  evil  clearlyproves  that  the  Wise 
Man  retains  liis  happiness  amidst  the  worst  torments. 
The  mere  fact  that  men  endure  the  same  pain 
easily  wlien  they  voluntarily  undergo  it  for  the  sake  of 
their  country  than  when  they  suffer  it  for  some  lesser 
cause,  shows  that  the  intensity  of  the  pain  depends  on 
the  state  of  mind  of  the  suftereFj  not  on  its  own  intrui- 

13  sic  nature.  Further,  on  the  Peripatetic  theory  tliat  ■"' 
there  are  three  kinds  of  goods,  the  more  abundantly  gij 
supplied  a  man  is  with  bodily  or  external  goods,  the 
happier  he  is ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  we  Stoics  can 
accept  the  same  position,  and  say  that  the  more  a  man 
has  of  those  bodily  things  that  are  highly  valued  the 
happier  he  is.  For  the  Peripatetics  hold  that  thesura  of 
happiness  includes  bodily  advantages,  but  we  deny 
this  altogether.  We  hold  that  the  mtilti plication  even 
of  those  goods  that  in  our  view  are  truly  so  called  does 
not  render  life  happier  or  more  desirable  or  of  higher 
value;  even  less  therefore  is  happiness  affected  by 

■H  the  accumulation  of  bodily  advantages.  Clearly  if 
wisdom  and  health  be  both  desirable,  a  combination 
of  the  two  would  be  more  desirable  than  wisdom 
alone  ;  but  it  is  not  the  case  that  if  both  be  deserv-- 
ing  of  value,  wisdom  pltu  >fealth  is  worth  more  than 
wisdom  by  itself  separately.  We  deem  health  to  be 
deserving  of  a  certain  value,  but  we  do  not  reckon 
it  a  good;  at  the  same  time  we  rate  no  value  so, 
highly  as  to  place  it  above  virtue.  This  is  not  the 
view  of  the  Peripatetics,  who  are  bound  to  say  that  - 
an  action  which  is  both  morally  good  and  not  attended 
by  pain  is  more  desirable  than  the  same  action  if 
accompanied  by  pain.  We  think  otherwise — wlipther 
rightly  or  wrongly,  I  will  consider  later ;  but  bow  could 
there  be  a  wider  or  more  real  difference  of  opinion  ? 



XIV.  Ut  enim  obscuratur  et  offunditur  li 
lumen  lucemae,  et  ut  interit  in '  iiiagnitudine  maris 
Aegaei  stilla  mellis  et  ut  in  divitiis  Croesi  terunci 
acccEsio  et  gradus  unus  in  ea  via  quae  est  hinc  in 
Indiam,  sic,  cum  sit  is  bonoruni  finis  quern  Stoici 
dicunt.  omnis  ista  rerum.  corporearuni  aestimatio 
splendore  virtiitis  et  raagnitudine  obscuretur  et  ob- 
niatur  atque  interest  necesse  est.  Et  quemadmo- 
cluTO  opportonitiLs  (sic  enim  appcllemua  tvKaiptav) 
non  fit  maior  productione  temporis  (habent-  enim 
suiim  modura  quae  opportuna  dtcuntur),  sic  'reet« 
efkctioiKaTopduiiriv  enim  itaappello,  quoniani  rectum 
factum  KnTopfluijm),  recta  igitur  effectio,  item  con- 
venientia,  denique  ipsum  bonuni,  quod  in  eo  positum 
est  ut  naturae  consenliat,  crescendi  accessionem 
nullam  habet.  Ut  enim  opportunitas  ilia,  sic  haec 
de  qui  bus  dixi,  non  fiunt  temporis  productione 
maiora.  Ob  eamque  causam  Stoicis  non  videtur  opta- 
bilior  nee  magis  expetenda  beata  vita  si  sit  longa 
quam  si  brevis ;  utunturque  simili :  Ut,  si  cothurni 
laus  ilia  esset,  ad  pedeni  apte  convenire,  neque  multi 
cothurni  paucis  anteponerentur  nee  maiores  rainori- 
bus,  sic,  quorum  omne  bonum  convenieutiu  atque 
opportunitate  finitur,  ea^  nee  plura  paucioribus  nee 
47  longinquiorabrevioribusanteponentur."  Necverosatis 
acute  dicunt :  Si  bona  valetudo  pluris  aestimanda  sit 
longa  quam  brevis,  sapientiae  quoque  usus  longissimus 
quisque   sit   plurimi.     Non    intelle(;unt  vuletudinis 

'  ."  inserted  by  Halm,  Mdv. 

»ea  inserted  by  Mllller Ifinilur  e  »tc  A), 

' an/efiuiifn/ur  MSS.i  anlc/MHten/  Mdv. 


^^  BOOK  III.  xiv 

45  XIV.  "  Tlie  light  of  a  lamp  is  eclipsed  and  over- 
powered l)y  the  rajs  of  the  sun;  adropof  honey  is  lost 
in  the  vastness  of  the  Aegciui  sea ;  an  additional  six- 
pence is  nothing  amid  the  wealth  of  Croesus,  or  a  single 
step  in  the  journey  from  here  to  India.  Similarly  if 
the  Stoic  definition  of  the  End.of  Goods  he  accepted, 
it  follows  that  all  the  value  you  set  on  bodily  advan- 
tages mQst  be  absolutely  eclipsed  and  annihilated  by 
tiie  brilliance  and  the  majesty  of  virtue.  And  just  Moraifty.ind 
as  opportuneness  (for  so  let  us  translate  eukairia)  is  ?4^Brt^'''''' 
not  increased  by  prolongation  of  time  (since  things  ii»ni»db3 
we  call  opportune  have  attained  their  proper 
measure),  so  right  conduct  (for  thus  I  translate 
kaioTthosis,  since  katoiiluima  is  a  single  right  action), 
right  conduet,  I  say.  and  also  propriety,  and  lastly 
Good  itself,  which  consists  in  harmony  with  nature, 

IG  are  not  capable  of  increase  or  addition.  For  these 
things  that  I  speak  of,  like  opportuneness  before  men- 
tioned, are  not  made  greater  by  prolongation.  And  on 
this  ground  the  Stoics  do  not  deem  happiness  to  be 
any  more  attractive  or  desirable  if  it  be  lasting  than  if 
it  be  brief;  and  they  use  this  illustration:  Just  as,  sup- 
posing the  merit  of  a  shoe  were  to  fit  the  foot,  many 
shoes  would  not  be  superior  to  few  shoes  nor  bigger 
shoes  to  smaller  ones,  so,  in  the  case  of  things  the 
good  of  which  consists  solely  and  entirely  in  pro- 
priety and  opportuneness,  a  larger  number  of  these 
tilings  will  not  be  rated  higher  than  a  smaller 
number  nor  those  lasting  longer  to  those  of  shorter 

Vl  duration.     Nor  is  there  much  point  in  the    argu- 
ment that,  if  good  liealtll   is   more   valuable   when 
lasting  than  when  brief,  therefore  the  « 
wisdom  also  is  worth  most  when  it  continues  longest. 
This  ignores  the  fact  that,  whereas  the   value  i 


St.  ^^ 



aestimationem  spatio  iudicari,  virtutis  opportunitate  ; 
ut  videantur  qui  illud  dicant  iidem  hoc  esse  dicturi, 
bonsm  mortem  et  bonum  partum  meliorem  longum 
esse  quam  brevem.      Non  vident  alia  brevitate  pluris 

i  aestimari,  alia  diutumitate.  Itaque  consentaneum 
est  his  quae  dicta  sunt  ratione  illorum  qui  ilium 
bonorum  Hnem  quod  appellamus  extremum,  quod 
ultimum,  crescere  putent  posse,  iisdem  placere  esse 
alium  alio  etjam  sapientiorem,  itemque  alium  magis 
alio  vel  peccare  vel  recte  facere,  quod  nobis  non 
licet  dicere  qui  crescere  bonorum  finem  iionputamus, 
Ut  enim  qui  demersi  sunt  in  aqua  nihito  magis  respi- 
rare  possunt  si  non  longe  absunt  a  summo,  ut  iam 
iamque  possint  emergere,  quam  si  etiam  turn  essent 
in  profundo,  nee  catulus  ille  qui  iam  appropinquat  ut 
videat  plus  cernit  quam  is  qui  modo  est  natus,  item 
qui  processit  aliquantum  ad  virtutis  habitum  nihilo 
minus  in  miseria  est  quam  ille  qui  nihil  prcwessit. 

XV.  Haec  mirabilia  videri  intellego ;  sed  cum 
certe  superiora  firma  ac  vera  sint,  his  autem  ea 
conseutanea  et  consequentta,  lie  de  horum  quidem 
est  veritate  dubitandum.  Sed  quamquam  negant 
nee  virtutes  nee  vitia  crescere,  tamen  utrumque 
eorum  fundi  quodam  modo  et  quasi  dilatari  putant. 

it  Divitias  autem  Diogenes  censet  non  earn  modo  vim 


e  wlio  use        ^^H 
e  expected         ^^^ 

i  estimated  by  duration,  that  of  v 
isured  by  opportuneness ;  so  that  those  wli< 
e  argument  in  question  might  equally  be  expected 
p  say  tliat  an  easy  death  or  an  easy  child-birth  would 
E  better  if  pi-otracted  than  if  speedy.  They  fail  to 
t  that  some  things  are  rendered  more  valuable 
48  by  brevity  as  others  by  prolongation.  So  it  is  con- 
sistent with  the  principles  already  stated  that  those 
who  deem  the  End  of  Goods,  that  which  we  term  ^ 
the  extreme  or  ultimate  Good,  to  be  capable  of  p= 
degree,  are  on  their  own  theory  also  bound  to 
hold  tliat  one  man  can  be  wiser  than  another,  and 
nilarly  that  one  can  commit  a  more  sinful  or  more 
ighteous  action  than  another ;  which  it  is  not  open 
;  to  say,  who  do  not  think  that  the  End  of 
1  vary  in  degree.  For  just  as  a  drowning 
"man  is  no  more  able  to  breathe  if  he  be  not  tar  from 
the  surface  of  the  water,  so  tliat  he  might  at  any 
moment  emerge,  than  if  he  were  actually  at  the 
bottom  already,  and  just  as  a.  puppy  on  the  point  of 
opening  its  eyes  is  no  less  blind  than  one  just  born, 
similarly  a  man  that  has  made  some  progress  towards 
the  state  of  virtue  is  none  the  less  in  misery  than  he 
that  has  made  no  progress  at  all. 

XV.  I  am  aware  that  all  this  seems  paradoxical ;  yet  capable  o 
but  as  our  previous  conclusions  are  undoubtedly  true  ""^"^^ 
and  welt  established,  and  as  these  are  the  logical 
inferences  from  them,  the  truth  of  these  inferences 
also  cannot  be  called  in  question.  Yet  although  the 
Stoics  deny  that  either  virtues  or  vices  can  be  in- 
creased in  degree,  they  nevertheless  believe  that 
both  of  them  can  be  in  a  sense  expanded  and 
+9  widened  in  scope."     Wealth  again,  in  the  opinion  of  * 



^^^Soods  I 



habere  ut  quasi  duces  sint  ad  voluptatem  et  ad  vale- 
tudinem  bonam,  sed  etiam  uti  ca  contineaiit;  nou 
idem  facere  eas  in  virtute  Deque  in  ceteris  artibus, 
ad  quas  esse  dux  pecuiiia  potest,  eontinere  autem 
non  potest ;  itaque  si  voluptas  aut  si  bona  valetudo 
sit  in  bonis,  dit'itias  quoque  in  bonis  esse  ponendas : 
at  si  sapientia  bonum  sit,  non  sequi  ut  etiam  divitias 
bonum  esse  dicamus.  Neque  ab  ulla  re  quae  non  sit 
in  bonis  id  quod  sit  in  bonis  contineri  potest ;  ob 
eunque  causam,  quia  cognitiones  cumprensionesque 
rerum,  e  quibus  efficiuntur  artes_.  appetitionem  mo- 
vent, cum  divitiae  non  sint  in  bonis,  nulla  ars  divitiis 
I  50  contineri  potest.  Quod  si  de  artibus  concedamus, 
virtutis  tamen  non  sit  eadem  ratio,  propterea  quod 
haec  plurimac  commentation  is  et  exercitationis  iudi- 
geat,  quod  idem  in  artibus  non  sit,  et  quod  virtus 
stabilitatem,  lirmitatemj  constantiaro  totius  ritae 
complectatur  nee  haec  eadem  in  artibus  esse  ndea- 

Deinceps  explicatur  diiTerentia  rerum:  quam  si 
non  uUam  esse  diceremus,  confunderetur  omnis  vita, 
ut  ab  Aristone,  neque  ullum  sapientiae  niunus  aut 
opus  inveniretur,  cum  inter  res  eas  quae  ad  vitam 
degendam  i>ertinerent  nihil  oninino  interesset  Deque 
ullum  dilectum  adhiberi  oporteret.  Itaque  cum 
esset  satis  constitutum  id  solum  esse  bonum  quod 
esset  honestum  et  id  malum  solum  quod  turpe,  tnm 
inter   ilia   quae    nihil    lalerent  ad  beate  miserevc 

"  ll  U  lo  be  remembered  (hat  '  arles,'  technai,  inch 
profcssiona,  Irades  and  handicrafts  afi  u*c 
ihe  line  art!,  and  it  is  of  ihe  simpler  crafls  (hat  pi 
sophcra,  following  Socrates,  were  mostly  (Linking    ' 

Ihey  compared  and  contrasled  the  other 

■ars  Vivendi.* 

Diogenes,  though  so  important  for  pleasure  atid 
health  as  to  be  not  merely  conducive  but  actually 
essential  to  them,  yet  has  not  the  same  efTect  in  rela- 
tion to  virtue,  nor  yet  in  the  case  of  the  other  arts;  for 
money  may  be  a  guide  to  these  but  cannot  form  an 
essential  factor  in  them;  therefore  although  if  plea- 
r  if  good  health  be  a  good,  wealth  also  must  be 
inted  a  good,  yet  if  wisdom  is  a  Good,  it  does  not 
V  that  we  must  also  pronounce  wealth  to  be  a 
,  Nor  can  anything  which  is  not  a  good  be  essen- 
tinl  to  a  thing  that  is  a  good;  and  hence,  because 
acts  of  cognition  and  of  comprehension,  which  form 
the  raw  material  of  the  arts,  excite  desire,  since 
wealth  is  not  a  good,  wealth  cannot  be  essential  to 
,iO  any  art.  But  even  if  we  allowed  wealth  to  be 
essential  to  the  arts,  the  same  argument  neverthe- 
less could  not  be  applied  to  virtue,  because  virtue  (as 
Diogenes  argues)  requires  a  great  amount  of  thought 
and  practice,  which  is  not  the  ease  to  the  same  extent 
with  the  arts,"  and  because  virtue  involves  life-long 
sleadfastness,strength  and  consistency,  whereas  these 

Iualities  are  not  equally  manifested  in  the  arts. 
'Next  foUows  an  exposition  of  the  diiference  be-  lihedocL 
reen  things;  for  if  we  maintained  that  all  things  j,\?-''."*'' 
Pere  absolutely  indifferent,  the  whole  of  life  would 
e  thrown  into  confusion,  as  it  is  by  Aristo,  and  r 
mction  or  task  could  be  found  for  wisdom,  since 
liere  would  be  absolutely  no  distinction  between 
tbe  things  that  pertain  to  the  conduct  of  life,  and 
no  choice  need  be  exercised  among  them.    Accord-  AiithiDgsbut 
ingly  after  conclusively  proving  that  morality  ulone  StSfliflrreni 

I  is  good  and  baseness  alone  evil,  the  Stoics  went  on  iS^^^''^^^ 
tlU^  affirm  that  among  those  tilings  which  were  of  no  lohappinfcs; 
Importance    for    happmess    or  misery,   there    was 


vivendum  aliquid  taraen  quod  differret  esse  voluerunt, 

ut  essent  eornni  alia  aestimabilia,  alia  contra,  alia 

al  neutrum.  Quae  autem  aestimanda  essent,  eorum  in 
aliis  satis  esse  eausae  quamobrem  quibusdam  antepo- 
nerentur,  ut  in  valetudSne,  ut  in  integritate  sensuum, 
ut  in  doloris  vacuitate,  ut  gloriae,  divitiarum,  simi- 
lium  rerum,'  alia  autem  iion  esse  eiusmodi;  itemque 
eorum  quae  nulla  aestimatione  digna  essent,  partim 
satis  habere  causae  quamobrem  reicerentur,  ut  dolo- 
reni,  morbum,  sensuum  amissionem,  paupertatem, 
ignominiam,  similia  horum,  partim  non  item.  Hinc 
est  illud  exortum  quod  Zeno  Trpay]yfi.kvov,  contraque 
quod  a.inmpfyriyii.kyov  nominavit,  cum  uteretur  in 
lingua  copiosa  factis  tamen  nominibus  ac  novis,  quod 
nobis  in  hac  inopi  lingua  Jion  conceditur ;  quaniquam 
tu  hanc  copiosiorem  etiam  soles  dicere.  Sed  non 
alienum  est,  quo  facilius  vis  verbi  intellegatur,  ra- 
tionem  buius  verbi'  faciendi  Zenonis  exponere. 

52  XVI.  Ut  CJiim,  inquit,  nemo  dicit  in  regia  regem 
ipsum  quasi  productum  esse  ad  dignitatem  (id  est 
enim  Trptnjyi^vav),  sed  eos  qui  in  aliquo  honore  sunt 
quorum  ordo  proxime  accedit,  ut  secundus  sit,  ad 
regium  principatum,  sic  in  vita  non  ea  quae  primo 
ordine  sunt,  sed  ea,  quae  secundum  locum  obtinent, 
Trporiyiikva,  id  est,  producta  nominentur ;  quae  vel  ita 
appellemus  (id  erit  verbum  e  verbo)  vel  promota 
remota  vel  ut  dudum  diximus  praeposita  vel  pri 
■n  asH  conj.  O.  Hcin. 

"  firimo  ordine  coa'j.  Mdv.; 
!uco  with  mark  of  corruption 


0  MSS,;/f 

:>ta  <^H 


BOOK  111.  xv-xvi 
nevertheless  an  element  of  difference,  making  som^ 
of  them  of  positive  and  others  of  negative  valued 

51  and  others  neutral.     Again  among  things  valuable  but  iher  in  d 
— e.g.  health,  unimpaired  senses,  freedom  from  pain,  v™u"'l^'ihr 
fame,  wealth  and  the  like — they  said  that  some  afford  «'"ndard  of 
us  adequate  grounds  for  preferring  them  to  other'pr 
things,  while  others  are  not  of  this  nature ;  and  sim 
larlf  among  those  things  which  are  deserving  of  n 
value  some  afford  adequate  grounds  for  uur  rejecting 
them,  such  as  pain,  disease,  loss  of  the  senses,  poverty, 
disgrace,  and  the  like ;  others  not  so.  Hence  arose  the 
distinction,  in  Zeno's  terminology,  between  proegmena 
and  the  opposite,  apoprocgmena — for  Zeno  using  the 
eopious  Greek  language  still  employed  novel  words 
coined  for  the  occasion,  a  licence  not  allowed  to  us 
with  the  poor  vocabulary  of  Latin ;  though  you  are 
fond  of  saying  that  Latin  is  actually  more  copious  than 
Greek.     However,  to  make  it  easier  to  understand 
the  meaning  of  this  term  it  will  not  he  out  of  place 
to  explain  the  method  wliich  Zeno  pursued  in  coin- 
ing it. 

52  XVI.  In  a  royal  court,  Zeno  reuiarks,  no  one 
speaks  of  the  king  himself  as  promoted'  to  honour 
(for  that  is  the  meaning  of  proegmenon),  but  the  term 
is  applied  to  those  holding  some  office  of  state 
whose  rank  most  nearly  approaches,  though  it  is 
second  to,  the  royal  pre-eminence  ;  similarly  in  the 
conduct  of  life  the  title  proegmenort,  that  is,  pro- 
moted,' is  to  be  given  not  to  those  things  which  are 
in  the  first  rank,  but  to  those  which  hold  the  second 
place ;  for  these  we  may  use  either  the  term  aug- 

^_  eested  (for  that  will  be  a  literal  translation)  or 
^^K;«dvanced '  and  'degraded,'  or  the  term  we  have 
^Hfeeen  using  all  along,  '  preferred  '  or  '  superior,'  and 

pua,  et  ilia  reiecta.      Re  enim  intellecta  in  verbo- 

M  ruin  usu  faciles  esse  debemus.  Quoniain  autem 
omne  quod  est  boiium  primum  locuin  tenere  dicimus, 
necesse  est  nee  bonuin  esse  nee  malum  hoc  quod 
praepositum  vel  praecipuutn  nominamus ;  idque  ita 
definimus,  quod  sit  indifferens  cum  aestimatione 
mediocri ;  quod  enim  Uli  a.5ia<S>opoi-  dicunt,  id  mihi 
ita  occurrit  ut  indifferens  dicerem.  Neque  enim 
iUud  fieri  poterat  ullo  modo  ut  nihil  relinqueretur  in 
mediis  quod  aut  secundum  naturam  essetaut  contra, 
nee,  cum  id  relinqueretur,  nihil  in  his  poui  quod 
satis  aestimabile  esset,  nee  hoc  posito  non  aliqna  esse 

S-t  praeposita.  Recte  igitur  hnec  facta  distitictio  est ; 
atque  ettam  ab  its  quo  facilius  res  perspici  possit  lioc 
simile  ponitur :  Ut  enim,  inquiunt,  si  hoc  fingamus 
esse  quasi  finem  et  ultimum,  ita  iacere  talum  ut 
rectus  assistat,  qui  ita  talus  erit  iactus  lit  cadat 
rectus  praepositum  quiddam  habebit  ad  finem,  qui 
aliter  contra,  neque  tamen  ilia  praepositio  tali  ad 
eum  quem  dixi  finem  pertinebit,  sic  ea  quae  sunt 
praeposita  referuntur  ilia  quidem  ad  finem  sed  ad 
eius  vim  naturamque  nihil  pertinent. 

55  Sequitur  ilia  divisio,  ut  bonorura  alia  sint  ad 

illud  ultimum  pertinentia  (sic  enim  appello  quae 
T£A(Ko  dicuutur ;  nam  hoc  ipsum  instituamus,  ut 
placuit,  pluribus  verbis  dicere  quod  uno  nou  poteri- 

a  Tali,  real  or  artificial,  were  used  as  dice  ;  lliey  had  four 
long  sides  and  two  pointed  ends ;  of  the  sides  two  were 
broad  and  two  narrow.     The  lalus  was  said  lo  be  recivs 

when  lying  on  a  narrow  side,  and  firoiius  when  on  a  I ' 

side.     Thus  cadere  rectus,  lo  alight  upright  when  thi 
would  be  the  first  stage  towards        '  '  '       ' 

standing  uprig-ht. 


BOOK  III.  xvL 
fbr  the  opposite    rejected.'     If  the  meaning  is  intel- 
ligible we  need  not  be  punctilious  about  the  use  of 

53  words.  But  since  we  declare  that  everything  that 
is  good  occupies  the  first  rank,  it  follows  that  this 
which  we  entitle  preferred  or  superior  is  neither 
good  nor  evil ;  and  accordingly  we  define  it  as  Ireing 
indifferent  but  possessed  of  a  moderate  value — since 
it  has  occurred  to  me  that  I  may  use  the  word 
indifferent '  to  represent  their  term  adiapkoron. 
For  in  fact,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  class  of  inter- 
mediate things  should  contain  some  things  that  were 
either  in  accordance  with  nature,  or  the  reverse,  and 
this  being  so,  that  this  classshould  include  some  things 
which  ijossessed  moderate  value,  and,  granting  this, 
that  sonie  things  of  this  class  should  be    preferred.' 

i4  There  were  good  grounds  therefore  for  making  this 
distinction  ;  and  furthermore,  to  elucidate  the  matter 
still  more  clearly  they  put  forward  the  following  illus- 
tration :  Just  as,  supposing  we  were  to  assume  that 
our  end  and  aim  is  to  throw  a  knuckle-bone  ^  in  such 
a  way  that  it  may  tiaiid  upright,  a  bone  that  is  thrown 
so  as  to  Jail  upright  will  be  in  some  measure  pre- 
ferred '  or  advanced  in  relation  to  the  proposed  end, 
and  one  that  falls  otherwise  the  reverse,  and  yet 
that  'advance'  on  the  part  of  the  knuckle -bone  will 
not  be  a  constituent  part  of  the  end  indicated,  so 
those  things  which  are  preferred '  are  means  it  is 
true  to  the  End  but  are  in  no  sense  constituents  of 
its  essential  nature. 

3^  Next  comes   the  division  of  goods  into  three  & 

classes,  first  those  which  are     constituents'  of  the  ■, 
final  End  (for  so  I  represent  the  term  telika,  this  jjj 
being  a  case  of  an  idea  which  we  may  decide,  as  we 
agreed,  to  express  in  several  words  as  we  cannot  do 
T  973 


mus,  ut  res  intellegutur),  alia  autem  efficientia,  quwt 
Graeci  wonp-iKa,  alia  iitrimiqiie.  De  pertinentibus 
nihil  est  bonum  praeter  aotiones  honestas,  de  effi- 
cientibus  nihil  praeter  amiciim,  sed  et  pertinentein 
et  efficientem  sapientiam  volunt  esse.  Nam  quia 
sapientia  est  conveniens  actio,  est  in  illo '  pertinenU 
genere  quod  di.\i ;  quod  autem  honestas  actlones 
affert  et  efficit,  id'  efficiens  did  potest. 

)  XVII.  Haec  quae  praeposita  dicimtis  ptartim  sunt 
per  se  ipsa  praeposita,  partim  quod  aliquid  efficiunt, 
partim  utrumque  i  per  se,  ut  quidam  Jiabitus  oris  et 
vultus,  ut  status,  ut  motus,  in  quibus  sunt  et  prae- 
ponenda  qtiacdam  et  reicienda;  alia  ob  earn  rem 
praeposita  diceiitur  quod  ex  se  aliquid  efficiant,  ut 
petunia,  alia  aittem   ob  utramque  rem,  ut  integri 

J  sensus,  ut  bona  valetudo.  De  bona  auteiu  fama 
(quam  euim  appellant  ivSo^ia.i'  aplius  est  bonam 
famam  hoc  loco  appellare  quam  gloriara),  Chrysippus 
quidem  et  Diogenes  detructa  utilitate  lie  digitum 
quidem  eius  causa  porrlgendum  esse  dicebant,  qui- 
bus ego  vehemeuter  assentior.  Qui  auteai  post  eos 
fuerunt,  cum  Cameadein  sustinere  non  possent,  huic 
quam  dixi  bonam  Famam  ipsam  propter  se  praeposi- 
tam  et  simiendam  esse  dixerunt,  esseque  hominis 
ingenui  et  liberaliter  educati  velle  bene  audire  a 
parentibus,  a  propinquis,  a  bonis  etiam  viris,  idque 
propter  rem  ipsam,  non  propter  usum ;  dicuntque,  ut 

BOOK  III.  xvi-xvii 
1  order  to  make  the  meaning  clear] 
secondly  those  wliich  are  '  productive  '  of  the  End, 
the  Greek  poietitn;  and  tliirdly  those  which  are 
both.  The  sole  instance  of  a  good  of  the  con- 
stituent '  class  is  moral  action  ;  the  sole  instance  of 
a  productive '  good  Is  a  friend.  Wisdom,  according 
to  the  Stoics,  is  both  constituent  and  productive ; 
for  as  being  itself  an  appropriate  activity  it 
under  what  I  called  the  constituent  class  ;  as  causing 
and  producing  moral  actions,  it  can  be  called  pro- 

J  XVII.  "These  things  which  we  call  '  preferred " 
*re  in  some  cases  preferred  for  tiieir  own  sake,  in 
others  because  they  produce  a  certain  result,  and  in 
others  for  both  reasons  ;  for  their  own  sake,  as  a 
certain  cast  of  features  and  of  countenance,  or  a 
certain  pose  or  movement,  tilings  which  may  be  in 
themselves  either  preferable  or  to  be  rejected ; 
others  will  be  called  preferred  because  they  produce 
a  certain  result,  for  example,  money ;  others  again 
for  Ijoth  reasons,  like  sound  senses  and  good  health. 

r  About  good  fame  (that  term  being  a  better  transla- 
tion in  this  context  than  'glory'  of  the  Stoic  ex- 
pression eudoiia)  Chrysippus  and  Diogenes  used  to 
aver  that,  apart  from  any  practical  value  it  may 
possess,  it  is  not  worth  stretching  out  a  linger  for ; 
and  1  strongly  agree  with  them.  On  the  other  hand 
their  successors,  finding  themselves  unable  to  resist 
the  attacks  of  Curneades,  declared  that  good  fame, 
as  I  have  called  it,  was  preferred  and  desirable  for 
its  own  sake,  and  that  a  man  of  good  breeding  and 
liberal  education  would  desire  to  have  the  good 
opinion  of  his  parents  and  relatives,  and  of  good 
men  in  general,  and  that  for  its  own  sake  and  not 
t2  275 

liberis  consultum  velimus  etiamsi  postumi  futuri  sint 
propter  ipsos,  sic  futurae  post  mortcra  famae  tamen 
esse  propter  rem  etiam  detracto  usu  consulendum. 

1  '  Sed  cum  guod  lionestum  sit  id  solum  bonum  esse 
dicamus,  consentaneum  tanien  est  fungi  officio  cum 
id  otficium  nee  in  bonis  ponamus  nee  in  mails.  Est 
enim  aliquid  in  his  rebus  probabile,  et  quidem  ita  ot 
eius  ratio  reddi  possit;  ergo  ut  etiam  probabiliter 
acti  ratio  reddi  possit;  est  autem  oHiciiim  quod  ita 
factum  est  ut  eius  facti  probabilis  ratio  reddi  possit ; 
ex  quo  intellegitur  officium  medium  quiddam  esse 
quod  nequc  ill  bonis  ponatur  neque  iu  contrariis. 
Quoniamque  in  iis  rebus  quae  neque  in  virlutibus 
sunt  neque  in  vitiis,  est  tanicn  quiddam  quod  usui 
possit  esse,  tolleiidum  id  non  est.  Est  auteni  eius 
generis  actio  quoque  quaedam,  et  quidem  talis  at 
ratio  postulet  agere  aliquid  et  facere  eorura;  quod 
autem  ratione  actum  est  id  ofRcium  appellamus;  est 
igitur  ofiicium  eius  generis  quod  nee  in  bonis  ponatur 
nee  in  contrariis. 

)       XVIII.      Atque  perspicuum   etiam  illud  est,  in 

istis  rebus  mediis  aliquid  agere  supientem.     ludicat 

igitur  cum  agit  officium  illud  esse.     Quod  quoniam 

numquam  fallitur  in  iudieando,  erit  in  mediis  rebus 


^m  BOOK  III.  xviUxviii 

for  atiy  practical  advantage ;  and  they  argue  that 
just  as  we  study  the  welfare  of  our  children,  even  of 
such  as  may  be  born  after  we  are  dead,  for  their 
own  sake,  so  a  man  ought  to  study  his  reputation 
even  after  death,  for  itself,  even  apart  from  any 

^        "  But  although  we  pronounce  Moral  Worth  to  be  a 
the  sole  good,  it  is  nevertheless  consistent  to  perfor 
an  appropriate  act,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  count  " 
appropriate  action  neither  a  good  nor  an  evil.     For  in  u 
the  sphere  of  these  neutral  things  there  is  an  element  ^ 

of  reasonableness,  in  the  sense  that  an  account  can  dt . 

be  rendered  of  it,  and  therefore  in  the  sense  that  an  a  '^■^- 
account  can  also  be  rendered  of  an  act  reasonably  '' 
perfoiined ;  now  an  appropriate  act  ia  an  act  so  per- 
formed that  a  reasonable  account  can  be  rendered 
of  its  performance ;  and  this  proves  that  an  appro- 
priate act  is  an  intermediate  thing,  to  be  reckoned 
neither  as  a  good  nor  as  the  opposite.  And  since 
those  things  which  are  neither  to  be  counted  among 
virtues  nor  vices  nevertheless  contain  a  factor  which 
can  be  useful,  their  element  of  utility  is  worth  pre- 
ser\'ing.  Again,  this  neutral  class  also  includes  action 
of  a  certain  kind,  viz.  such  that  reason  calls  upon  us 
to  do  or  to  produce  some  one  of  these  neutral  things  ; 
but  an  action  reasonably  performed  we  call  an  appro- 
priate act;  appropriate  action  therefore  is  included 
in  the  class  which  is  reckoned  neither  as  good  nor 
the  opposite. 

iS)  XVIII.  "It  is  also  clear  that  some  actions  are 
performed  by  the  Wise  Man  in  the  sphere  of  those 
neutral  things.  Well  then,  when  he  does  such  an 
action  he  judges  it  to  be  an  appropriate  act.  And 
as  his  judgment  on  this  point  never  errs,  therefore 

officium.  Quodefficitur  hacetintnooncltisionerationis: 
Quoniam  enim  videmUs  esse  quiddam  quod  reete 
factum  appellemus,  id  autem  eat  perfectum  otficium, 
erit  etiam  iiichoutum  ;  ut,  si  iiiste  deposituin  reddere 
in  recte  faclis  sit,  in  officiis  ponatur  deposituin  red- 
dere ;  illo  enim  addito  '  iuste/  fit  recte  factum,  per  se 
autem  hoc  ipsum  reddere  in  oHicio  ponitur.  Quoiii- 
amque  non  dubium  est  quin  in  iis  quae  media  dica- 
mus  sit  aliud  sumendiim,  aliud  reieieudum,  quidquid 
ita  lit  nut  dicitur  omne  officio  continetur.  Ex  quo 
intellegitur  quoniam  se  ipsi  omnes  natura  diligant, 
tarn  insipientera  qunm  sapientem  sumpturum  quae 
secundum  naturam  sint  reierturumque  contraria.  Ita 
est  quoddam  commune  ofiieium  sapientis  et  insi- 
pientis ;  ex  quo  efficitur  versari  in  iis  quae  media 
60  dicamus.  Sed  cum  ab  liis  omnia  proliciscantur 
officia,  non  sine  causa  dicitur  ad  ea  rcferri  omnes 
nostras  cogitationes.  in  his  et  excessum  e  vita  et  in 
rita  mansionem.  In  quo  enim  plura  sunt  quae 
secundum  uaturam  sunt,  huius  officium  est  in  vita 
manere;  in  quo  autem  aut  sunt  plura  contraria  aut 
fore  videntur,  huius  oificium  est  e  vita  excedere, 
K  quo  apparet  et  sapientis  esse  aliquando  oHtcium 

BOOK  III.  Kviii 
«ppropriale  action  will  exist  in  the  sphere  of  these 
neutral  things.  This  is  also  proved  by  the  following 
syllogistic  argument:  We  observe  tliat  something 
exists  which  we  call  right  action ;  but  this  is  an 
appropriate  act  perfectly  performed;  therefore  there 
wilt  also  be  such  a  thing  as  an  imperfect  appropriate 
act :  so  that,  if  to  restore  a  trust  as  a  matter  of  prin- 
ciple is  a  right  act,  to  restore  a  trust  must  be  counted 
as  an  appropriate  act ;  the  addition  of  the  quatiiica- 
tion  on  principle'  makes  it  a  right  action  ;  the 
restitution  in  itself  is  counted  an  appropriate  act. 
Again,sirice  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  the  class 
of  things  we  call  neutral  includes  some  things  worthy 
to  be  chosen  and  others  to  be  rejected;  therefore 
whatever  is  done  or  described  in  this  manner  is  en- 
tirely included  under  the  term  appropriate  action. 
This  shows  that  since  love  of  self  is  implanted  by 
nature  in  all  men,  both  the  foolish  and  the  wise  alike 
will  choose  what  is  in  accordance  with  nature  and  re- 
ject the  contrary.  Thus  there  is  a  region  of  appropriate 
action  which  is  common  to  the  wise  and  the  unwise  ; 
and  this  proves  that  appropriate  action  deals  with 
60  the  things  we  call  neutral.  But  since  these  neutral  4.Pcaoiiiai 
things  form  the  basis  of  all  appropriate  acts,  there  sutcldfmvbi 
is  good  ground  for  the  dictum  that  it  is  with  these  "  ' 
things  that  all  our  pi'actieal  deliberations  deal,  in- 
cluding the  will  to  live  and  the  will  to  quit  this  life.  , 
Wlien  a  man's  circumstances  contain  a  preponderance 
of  things  in  accordance  with  nature,  it  is  appropriate 
for  him  to  remain  alive ;  when  he  possesses  or  sees  ^ 
in  prospect  a  m^ority  of  tile  contrary  things,  it  isl 
appropriate  for  him  to  depart  from  life.  This  make» 
it  plain  that  it  is  on  occasion  appropriate  for  the 
Wise  Man  to  quit  life  although  he  is  linppy.  and  also 

i  vita  cum  beatus  sit,  et  stuiti  n 
til  vita  cum  sit  miser.  Nam  bonum  illud  et  malum  quod 
saepe  iam  dictum  est  postea  consequitur ;  prima  autem 
ilia  naturae  sive  secunda  sive  contraria  sub  judicium 
sapientis  et  dilectum  caduiit,  estque  ilia  subieeta 
quasi  materia  sapientiae.  Itaque  et  manendi  in  vita 
et  migrandi  ratio  Dnmis  iis  rebus  quas  supra  dixi 
metienda.  Nam  neque  . .  }  virtute  retinetur  in  vita, 
nee  iis  qui  sine  virtute  sunt  mors  est  oppetenda.  Et 
saepe  officium  est  sapientis  desciscere  a  vita  cum  sit 
beatjssimus,  si  id  opportune  facere  possit.  Sic  enira 
censent,  opportunitatis  esse  beate  vivere  quod  est 
convenienter  naturae  vivere.'  Itaque  a  sapientia 
praecipitur  se  ipsam  si  usus  sit  sapiens  ut  relinquat. 
Quamobrem  cum  vitiorum  ista  vis  non  sit  ut  causam 
alferant  mortis  voluntariae,  perspicuum  est  etiam 
stultorum  qui  iideni  miseri  sint  officium  esse  manere 
in  vita,  si  sint  in  maiore  parte  earum  rerura  quas 
secundum  naturam  esse  dicimus,  Et  quoniam  exce- 
dens  e  vita  et  manens  aeque  miser  est,  nee  diutumttas 
magis  ei  vitam  fugiendam  facit,  non  sine  causa  dicitur 
iis  qui  pluribus  naturalibus  frui  possint  esse  in  vita 
I  XIX.  "  Pertinere  autem  ad  rem  arbitrantur  in- 
tellegi  natura  fieri  ut  liberi  a  parentibus  amentur ; 

'  Mdv.  < 


anj.  neg,u 



BOOK  III,  sviii-Kix 
of  the  Foolish  Man  to  remain  in  life  although  he  is 

61  miserable.  For  with  the  Stoics  good  and  evil,  as 
has  repeatedly  been  said  already,  are  a  subsequent 
outgrowth ;  whereas  the  primary  things  of  nature, 
whether  favourable  or  the  reverse,  fall  under  the 
judgment  and  choice  of  the  Wise  Man,  and  form 
so  to  speak  the  subject-matter,  the  given  material 
with  which  wisdom  deals.  Therefore  the  reasons 
both  for  remaining  in  life  and  for  departing  from  it 
are  to  be  measured  ^entirely  by  the  primary  things 
of  nature  aforesaid.  For  the  virtuous  man  is  not 
necessarily  retained  in  life  by  virtue,  and  also  those 
who  are  devoid  of  virtue  need  not  necessarily  seek 
death.  And  very  often  it  is  appropriate  for  the  Wise 
Man  to  abandon  life  at  a  moment  when  he  is  enjoy- 
ing supreme  happiness,  if  an  opportunity  offers  for 
making  a  timely  exit.  For  the  Stoic  view  is  that 
happiness,  which  means  life  in  harmony  with  nature, 
is  a  matter  of  seining  the  right  moment.  So  that 
Wisdom  her  very  self  upon  occasion  bids  the  Wise 
Man  to  leave  her.  Hence,  as  vice  does  not  possess 
the  power  of  furnishing  a  reason  for  suicide,  it  is  clear 
that  even  for  the  foolish,  who  are  also  miserable,  it 
is  appropriate  to  remain  alive  if  they  possess  a  pre- 
dominance of  those  things  which  we  pronounce  to 
be  in  accordance  with  nature.  And  since  the  fool  is 
equally  miserable  when  departing  from  life  and 
when  remaining  in  it,  and  the  undesirability  of  his 
life  is  not  increased  by  its  prolongation,  there  is 
good  ground  for  saying  that  those  who  arc  in  a 
position  to  enjoy  a  preponderance  of  things  that  are 
natural  ought  to  remain  in  life. 

62       XIX.      Again,  it  is  held  by  the  Stoics  to  be  im-  S' 
portant  to  understand  that  nature  creates  in  parents  ni 


a  quo  initio  profeftain  communem  liumani  generis 
societatem  persequimur.  Quod  pritnum  intellegi 
del>et  figura  menibrisque  corporum,  quae  ipsa  de- 
clarant, procreandi  a  natura  babitam  esse  rationem. 
Neque  vero  haec  inter  se  congruere  possent  ut  na- 
tura et  procreari  vellet  et  dUigi  procreatos  non 
curaret.  Atque  etiam  in  bestiis  vis  naturae  perspici 
potest ;  quarum  in  fetn  et  in  educatione  lalKirem 
cum  cernimus,  naturae  ipsius  \-«oein  videmur  audire. 
Quare  ut'  perspicuum  est  natura  nos  a  dolore  abbor- 
rere,  sic  apparet  a  naturn  ipsa  ut  eos  quos  genueri- 
63  mus  amemus  inipelli.  Ex  hoe  nascitur  ut  etiam 
communis  hominum  inter  lioraines  naturalis  sit  com- 
mendatio,  ut  oporteat  honiinem  ab  homine  ob  id 
ipsum  quod  homo  sit  ron  alienum  videri.  Ut  enim 
in  membris  alia  sunt  tiunquain  sibi  nata,  ut  oculi,  ut 
aures,  alia  etiam  ccterorum  membrorum  usum  adiu- 
vant,  ut  crura,  ut  manus,  sic  immanes  quaedam 
bestiae  sjhi  solum  natae  sunt,  at  ilia  quae  in  concha 
patula  pinn  dicitur,  isque  qui  enut  e  concha,  qui  quod 
eam  custodit  pinoteres  vocatur,  in  eandeinqiie  cum 
se  recepit  includitur,  ut  videatur  monuisse  ut  cave- 
ret,  itemque  formicae,  apes,  ciconiae  alionim  etiam 
'  u/  inserted  by  edd. 

»A  reminiscence  of  Terence,  who  liumoroiisly  puts  tliis 
Stoic  lag  into  ihe  mouth  of  Cliremcs  as  an  cstciise  for  his 
neighbourly  curiosity!  Homo  sum,  humani  nil  a  mealienum 
puto,  Hiaut.  25,  Cp.  I  3,  11  14. 

b  A  mussel  in  wliose  '  beard  '  a  small  crab  is  oflen  found 
entangled.  The  notion  of  their  paitnership  is  found  il 
flrislotle;  ChtysippilS  introduced  it  as  an  illuslratioit  ^' 

found  M^ 

miion  jH 

^"  BOOK  III.  xi-x 

an  affection  for  their  children ;  and  parental  affec- 
tion is  the  germ  of  that  social  community  of  the 
human  race  to  which  we  afterwards  attain.  This 
cannot  but  be  clear  in  the  first  place  from  the  con- 
formation of  the  body  and  its  members,  which  by 
themselves  are  enough  to  show  that  nature's  scheme 
included  the  procreation  of  offspring.  Yet  it  could  ?■ 
not  be  consistent  that  nature  should  at  once  intend 
offspring  to  be  bom  and  make  no  provision  for  that 
offspring  when  born  to  be  loved  and  cherished. 
Even  in  the  lower  animals  nature's  operation  can  be 
clearly  discerned;  when  we  observe  the  labour  that 
they  spend  on  bearing  and  rearing  their  young,  we 
seem  to  be  listening  to  the  actual  voice  of  nature. 
Hence  as  it  is  manifest  that  it  is  natural  for  us  to 
shrink  from  pain,  so  it  is  clear  that  we  derive  from 
nature  heraelf  the  impulse  to  love  those  to  whom  we  ^^^ 

fis  have  given  birth.  From  this  Impulse  is  developed  PhiUoitinpU. 
the  sense  of  mutual  attraction  which  unites  human 
beings  as  such:  this  also  is  bestowed  by  nature. 
The  mere  fact  of  their  common  humanity  requires 
that  one  man  should  feel  another  man  tn  be  akin  to 
him."  For  just  as  some  of  the  parts  of  the  body, 
Buch  as  the  eyes  and  the  ears,  are  created  as  it  were 
for  their  own  sakes,  while  others  like  the  legs  or  the 
hands  also  subserve  the  utility  of  the  rest  of  the 
members,  so  some  very  large  animals  are  bom  for 
themselves  alone ;  whereas  the  sea-pen,*"  as  it  is 
called,  in  its  roomy  shell,  and  the  creature  named 
the  pinoteres  '  because  it  keeps  watch  over  the  sea- 
pen,  which  swims  out  of  the  sea-pen's  shell,  then  re- 
tires back  into  it  and  is  shut  up  inside,  thus  appear- 
ing to  have  warned  its  host  to  be  on  its  guard — these 
creatures,  and  also  the  ant,  the  bee,  the  stork,  do 



causa  quAedam  faciiuit.     Multo  haec '  coniuni 

homines.^     Itaque  natura  sumus  apti  od  coetus, 
cilia,  civitates. 

t  Mundum   autem  censent  regi  numine  deomim 

eumque  esse  quasi  communeta  urbem  et  civitatem 
liominum  et  deoruiOj  et  imumquemque  nostnim  eius 
mundi  esse  partem;  ex  quo  illud  natura  consequl  ut 
communem  utilitatem  nostrae  anteponamus.  Ut 
eniin  leges  omnium  salutem  siiigularum  saluti  ante- 
ponunt,  sic  vir  bonus  et  sapiens  et  legibus  parens  et 
civilis  oflici  non  ignarus  utilitati  omnium  plus  quam 
unius  alicuius  aut  suae  consulit  Nee  magis  est  vitu- 
perandus  proditor  patriae  quam  communis  utilitatis 
aut  safutis  deserter  propter  suam  utilitatem  aut 
salutem.  Ex  quo  fit  ut  laudaiidus  is  sit  qui  mortem 
oppetat  pro  re  publica,  quod  defeat  cariovem  nobis 
esse  patriam  quam  nosmet  ipsos.  Quoniamque  ilia 
VOX  inhuiuana  et  scelerata  ducitur  eorum  qui  iiegant 
se  recusare  quo  minus  ipsis  mortuis  terrarum  omnium 
deflagratjo  cousequatur  (quod  vulgari  quodam  versu 
Graeco  pronuntiari  solet),  certe  verum  est  etiam  iis 
qui  aliquaudo  futuri  sint  esse  propter  ipsos  con- 
sul endum. 

>  XX.  Ex  liac  animorum  affectione  testamenta 
commendationesque  morientitim  natae  sunt.  Quod- 
que  nemo  iii  summa  soUtudine  vitam  agere  velit  ne 
cum  infinita  quidem  voluptatum  abundantia,  facile 
intellegitur  nos  ad  coniunctionem  congregation em- 
que  liominum  et  ad  naturalem  communitatem  esse 

BOOK  III.  rU-m 
certain  actions  for  the  sake  of  others  besides  them- 
selves.   With  human  beings  this  bond  of  mutual  ai 
is  far  more  intimate.     It  follows  that  we  are  by 
nature  fitted  to  form  unions,  societies  and  states. 

V  Again,  they  hold  that  the  universe  is  governed  TbcCmi 

by  divine  will ;  it  is  a  city  or  state  of  which  both 
men  and  gods  are  members,  and  each  one  of  us  is  a 
part  of  this  universe ;    from  which  it  is  a  natural 
consequence    that_Ke. -Should    prefer   the   common 
advantage    to   our   own.      For  just  as  the   laws   set  J 
tKe~safety  of -all  above  the  safety  of  individuals,  so  i 
a  good,  wise  and  law-abiding  man,  conscious  of  his  I 
duty  to  the  state,  studies  the  advantage  of  all  more  I 
than  that  of  himself  or  of  any  single  individual.    The 
traitor  to  his  country  does  not  deserve  greater  repro- 
bation  than    the   man    who    betrays   the    common 
advantage  or  security  for  the  sake  of  his  own  advan-  i 
tnge  or  security.     This  explains  why  praise  is  owed  Aui 
to  one  who  dies  for  the  commonwealth,  bei'ause  it 
becomes  us  to  love  our  country  more  than  ourselves.    1 
And  as  we  feel  it  wicked  and  inhuman  for  men  to 
declare  (the  saying  is  usually  expressed  in  a  familiar 
Greek  line')  that  they  care  not  if,  when  they  them- 
selves are  dead,  the  universal  conflagration  ensues, 
it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  we  are  bound  to  study 
the  interest  of  posterity  also  for  its  own  sake. 

>  XX.  "This  is  the  feeling  that  has  given  rise  to  Caiefor 
the  practice  of  making  a  wOl  and  appointing  ^"  ''' 
guardians    for  one's   children  when  one  is  dying,  ^^m 

And  the  fact  that  no  one  would  care  to  pass  his  life  ^^H 
alone  in  a  desert,  even  though  supplied  with  pleasures  ^^H 
in  unbounded  profusion,  readily  shows  that  we  are  ^^H 
bom  for  society  and  intercourse,  and  for  a  natural  jbc  imparting 
partnership  with  our  fellow  men.  Moreover  nature  tomwlciiBt. 


n»tos.  ImpelliiuuT  autem  natura  ut  prodesse  velimUB 
quam  plurimis  iu  primisque  docendo  rationibusque 
66  pmdentiae  tradendis.  Itaijue  non  facile  est  iiivenire 
qui  quod  sciat  ipse  non  tradat  alteri ;  ita  non  solum 
ad  discendum  propensi  suraus  verum  etiam  ad  docen- 
duni.  Atque  ut  tauris  natura  datum  est  ut  pro  vi- 
tulis  contra  leones  summa  vi  impetuque  contendant, 
sic  ii  qui  valent  opibus  atque  id  facere  possunt,  ut  de 
Hercule  et  de  Libero  accepimus,  ad  servandura  genus 
hominum  natura  incitaiitur.  Atque  etiam  lovem 
cum  Optimum  et  Maximum  dicimus  cumque  eundem 
SaFutarem,  Hospitalem,  Statorem,  hoc  intellegi  volu- 
mus,  salutem  hominum  in  eius  esse  tutela.  Minime 
autem  convenitj  cum  ipsi  inter  nos  viles  neglectique 
simus,  postulare  ut  dis  immortalibus  cari  simus  et  ab 
iis  dihgamur.  Quemadmodum  igitur  membris  uti- 
mur  prius  quam  didicimus  cuius  ea  utilitatis  causa 
habeamus,  sic  inter  nos  natura  ad  civilem  communi- 
tatem  coniuncti  et  consociati  sumus.  Quod  ni  ita  se 
haberet,  nee  iustitiae  ullus  esset  nee  bonitati  loous. 

Sed  ^  quomodo  hominum  inter  homines  iuris 
esse  vincula  putant,  sic  homini  niliil  iuris  esse  cum 
bestiis.  Praeclare  enim  Chrysippus  eetera  nata  esse 
hominum  causa  et  deorum,  eos  autem  communitatis  et 
societatis  suae,  ut  bestiis  homines  uti  ad  utilitatem 
sUBjn  possint  ^ne  iniuria ;  quoniamque  ea  natur« 
esset  hominis  ut  ei  cum  genere  humano  quasi  civfl* 
■jerfMdv.;  ct  USS. 



inspires  us  with  the  desire  to  benefit  as  many  people 

as  we  can,  and  especially  by  imparting  information  and 

66  the  principles  of  wisdom.  Hence  it  would  be  hard  to 
discover  anyone  who  will  not  impart  to  another  any 
knowledge  that  he  may  himself  possess  ;  so  strong  is 
our  propensity  not  only  to  learn  but  also  to  teach. 
And  just  as  bulls  have  a  natural  instinct  to  fight  niFproi 
with  all  their  strength  and  force  in  defending  tJieir  "'"""" 
calves  against  lions,  so  men  of  enceptional  gifts  and 
capacity  for  service,  like  Hercules  and  Liber  in  the 
legends,  feel  a  natural  impulse  to  be  the  protectors 
of  the  human  race.  Also  when  we  confer  upon  Jove 
the  titles  of  Most  Good  and  Most  Great,  of  Saviour, 
Lord  of  Guests,  Eallier  of  Battles,  what  we  mean  to 
imply  is  that  the  safety  of  mankind  lies  in  his  keep- 
ing. But  how  inconsistent  it  would  be  for  us  to 
expect  the  immortal  gods  to  love  and  cherish  us, 
when  we  ourselves  despise  and  neglect  one  another  I 
Therefore  just  as  we  actually  use  our  limbs  before 
we  have  learnt  for  what  particular  useful  purpose 
they  were  bestowed  upon  us,  so  we  are  by  nature 
united  and  allied  in  the  common  .society  of  the  state. 
Were  tliis  not  so,  there  would  be  no  room  either  for 
justice  or  benevolence, 

67  But  just  as  they  hold  that  man  is  united  with  Auiniais  bivi 
man  by  the  bonds  of  right,  so  they  consider  that  no  "*   '' 
right  exists  as  between  man  and  beast.     For  Chry- 

sippus  well  said,  that  aU  other  things  were  created  for 
the  sake  of  men  and  gods,  but  that  these  exist  for  their         ^^_ 
own  mutual  fellowship  and  society,  so  that  men  can        ^^H 
make  use  of  beasts  for  tlieir  own  purposes  without        ^^H 
injustice,     And  the  nature  of  man,  he  said,  is  such,        ^^| 

Kt  as  it  were  a  code  of  law  subsists  between  the  Tkedabistrf 
ividual  and  the  human  race,  so  that  he  who  up-  "^*"- 
^ i 

ills  intercede  ret,  qui  id  Conservaret  euni  iustum,  qui 
migraret  iniiistum  fore.  Sed  quenoadmodum,  thea- 
trum  cum  commune  sit,  recte  tamen  dici  potest  eius 
esse  enm  locum  quern  quisque  occuparit,  sic  in  urbe 
raundove  coiiimuni  non  adversatur  ius  quo  minus 

(is  suum  quidque  cuiusque  sit.  Cum  autem  ad  tuendos 
conservandosque  homines  hominem  natum  esse  vi- 
deamus,  consentaneum  est  huic  naturae  ut  sapiens 
velit  gererp  et  administrare  rem  publicam  atque,  ut 
e  natura  vivat,  uxorem  adiungere  et  ve!Ie  ex  ea 
liberos.  Ne  amores  quidem  sanctos  a  sapiente  alienos 
esse  arbitrantur.  Cynicorum  autem  rationem  atque 
vitam  alii  cadere  in  sapientem  dicunt,  si  qui  eius- 
modi  forte  casus  incident  ut  id  faciendum  sit,  alii 
iiullo  modo. 

69  XXI.  Ut  vero  conservetur  omnis  homini  erga 
liominem  societas,  coniiinctio,  carilas,  et  emolument» 
etdetrimenta(quaecu^tA.^;io;Taet0\a/i;iaTfii  appellant) 
communia  esse  voluerunt,  quonim  altera  prosunt, 
iioceiit  altera;  neque  solum  ea  communia  veruin 
etiam  paiia  esse  dixerunt.  Incommoda  autem  et 
commoda  (ita  enim  Ei'xpijoTijjiaTa  et  SLiTXpJ)CTn}/iaTa 
appello)  communia  esse  voluerunt,  paria  noluerunt. 
Ilia  enim  quae  prosunt  aut  quae  nocent  aut  bona 
sunt  auf  mala,  quae  sint  paria  necesse  est ;  commoda 
autem  et  incommoda  in  eo  genere  sunt  quae  prae- 
posita  et  reiecta  dicimus;  ea  possunt  paria  non  esse. 
Sed  eraolumenta '  communia  esse  dicuntur,  recte 
'After  emolumenla  Lambinus  inserts  et  detrimental 

1  The  Cynics  cast  off  the  ties  of  country  and  family,  and 
pi-oclaiwed  themselves  Kesmou  Palitai,  citizens  of  the 
Universe  and   memberii    of  Ihe    universal   brotherhood  of 

if  liOOK  III.  xx-xxi 

pblds  this  code  will  be  just  and  he  who  departs  from 
Etf   unjust.     But  just  as  though  the  theatre  i 
pubUc  place  it  is  yet  correct  to  say  that  the  parti- 
cular seat  a  man  has  taken  belongs  to  him,  so  in  the 
state  or  in  the  universe,  though  these  are  common 
to  all,  no  principle  of  justice   militates  against  the 
68  possession  of  private  property.     Again,  since  we  see  Poiiti««J_ 
that  man  is  designed  by  nature  to  safeguard  and  ^''17.''      ' 
protect  his  fellows,  it  follows  from  this  natural  dis- 
position, that  the  Wise  Man  should  desire  to  engage 
^to  politics  and  government,  and  also  to  HVe  in  ac- 
e  with  nature  Ijy  taking  to  himself  a  wife  and 
desiring  to  have  children  by  her.     Even  the  passion 
of  love  when  pure  is  not  thought  incompatible  with 
the  character  of  the  Stoic  Sage.  As  for  the  principles 
and  habits  of  tlie  Cynics,*  some  say  that  these  befit 
the  Wise  Man,  if  cii'cumstanccs  should  happen  to 
indicate  this  course  of  action  ;  but  other  Stoics  reject 
the  Cynic  rule  unconditionally. 
6'9       XXI.    Tosafeguard  the  universal alliance,solidarity  iq, 
and  affection  that  subsist  between  all  mankind,  the  ^P 
Stoicsheld  that  both  benefits'and  injuries' (intheir  inon.a 
terminology,  opheleniaUl  and  blammala)  are  common,  pSs^ 
the  former  doing  good  and  the  latter  harm  ;  and  they  con"™ 
^Bflronounced  them  to  be  not  only  'common'  but  also 
^Hnsgual.'      Disadvantages'  and  'advantages'  (for  so  I 
^V^ftnder  euckreslhnnia  and  tlusckrSsteinala)  they  held  to 
^*^'be    common'  but  not  'equal.'  For  things  'beneficial' 
and    injurious'  are  goods  and  evils  respectively,  and 
these  must  needs  be  equal;  but    advantages'  and 
disadvantages'  belong  to  the  class  we  speak  of  as 
preferred'  and    rejected,'  and  these  may  differ  in 
degree.     But  whereas    benefits'  and    injuries'  are 
V  389 

ftlitem  facta  et    peccata  non   habentur  < 

TO  Amicitiam  autem  adhibendam  esse  censent  quia 

sit  ex  eo  genere  quae  prosunt.  Quamquam  autem 
in  amicitia  alii  dicant  aeque  caram  esse  sapienti 
rationeni  amici  ac  suam,  alii  autem  sibi  cuique 
cariorem  suam,  tamen  hi  quoque  posteriores  fatentur 
alienum  esse  a  iustitia,  ad  quam  nati  esse  videamur, 
detrahere  quid  de  aliquo  quod  sibi  iissumat.  Minime 
vero  probatur  huic  disciplinae  de  qua  loquor  aut 
iustitiam  aut  amicitiam  propter  utilitates  ascisci  aut 
probari.  Eaedem  enim  utilitates  poterunt  eas  labe- 
factarc  atque  pervertere.  Etenim  nee  iustitia  nee 
amicitia  esse  omnino    poterunt   nisi    ipsae    per   se 

7 1  expetuntur.^  lus  autem,  quod  ita  dici  appellarique 
possit,  id  esse  natura;  alienureque  esse  a  sapiente 
non  modo  iniuriam  cui  facere  venim  etiam  nocere. 
Nee  vero  rectum  est  cum  amicis  aut  bene  meritis 
!  aut  coniungere  iniuriam;  gravissiroeque 
defenditur  numquam  aequitatem  ab 
utibtate  posse  seiun^,  et  quidquid  aequum  iustumque 
esset  id  etiam  honestum,  vicissimque  quidquid  esset 
honestum  id  iustum  etiam  atque  uequum  fore. 

'  exfietunfiir  .■  \n{.  MSS,  e.xpetantur.  'jh 

■Moral  and  immoral  acts  (a)  viewed  Tor  their  results'Q^ 
g'ood  and  ill  atfect  all  mankind,  (b)  viewed  in  themselves 
concern  the  agent  only;  while  in  both  aspects  they  do  not 
admit  of  degree,  but  are  either  g-ood  or  bad,  rig-hl  or  wrong 
absolutely.  Whereas  things  IndilTerent  (i.e.  everything  but 
moral  good  and  evil)  are  more  or  less  advantageous  or  the 
reverse,  both  to  the  person  immediately  concerned  and  to 
the  world  at  large, 


BOOK  Hi. 

pronounced  to  be  'common,'  righteous  and  ainfiil 
acts  are  not  considered  'common.'' 

70  They  recommend  the  cultivation  of  friendship,  Friend! 
classing  it  among-    tilings  beneficial.'     In  friendship  tiwotu 
some  profess  that  the  Wise  Man  will  hold  his  friends."  owom 
interests  as  dear  as  his  own,  while  others  say  that  a 
man's  own  interests  must  necessarily  be  dearer  to 

him  ;  at  the  same  time  the  latter  admit  that  to  en- 
rich oneself  by  another's  loss  is  an  action  repugnant 
to  that  justice  towards  which  we  seem  to  possess  a 
natural  propensity.  But  the  school  I  am  discussing 
emphatically  rejects  the  view  that  we  adopt  or  ap- 
prove either  justice  or  friendship  for  the  sake  of 
their  utiHty.  For  if  it  were  so,  the  same  claims  of 
utility  would  be  able  to  undermine  and  overthrow 
them.  In  fact  the  very  existence  of  both  justice 
and  friendship  will  be  impossible  if  tliey  are  not 

7 1  desired  for  their  own  sake.  Right  moreover,  properly 
so  styled  and  entitled,  exists  (they  aver)  by  nature  ; 
and  it  is  foreign  to  the  nature  of  the  Wise  Man  not 
only  to  wrong  l)ut  even  to  hurt  anyone.  Nor  again 
is  it  righteous  to  enter  into  a  partnership  in  wrong- 
doing with  one's  friends  or  benefactors;  and  it  is 
most  truly  and  cogently  maintained  that  honesty 

^^  is  always  the  best  policy,  and  that  whatever  is  fair 
^L^d  just  is  also  honournl^le,''  and  conversely  whatever 
^HlB  honourable  ^  will  also  be  just  and  fair. 


propositi  ratio  postularet.     Verum  admirabilis  com- 

positio  disciplinae  incredibilisque  me  re  rum  traxit 
ordo ;  quern  per  deos  immortales  nonne  miraris  ? 
Quid  enira  aut  in  natura,  qua  nihil,  est  aptius,  nihil 
descriptius,  aut  in  operibus  manu  factis  tarn  compo- 
situm  tamque  compactum  et  coagmentatum  inveniri 
potest  ?  quid  posterius  priori  non  convenit  ?  quid 
sequitur  quod  non  respondeat  superiori  ?  quid  non 
sic  aliud  ex  alio  nectitur  ut  si  ullam  litteram  moveris 
labent  omnia  ?  Nee  tamen  quidquam  est  quod  mo- 
veri  possit. 
i  Quam  gravis  vero,  quam  magnilica,  quam  constans 

confidtur  persona  sapientis  I  qui,  cum  ratio  docuerit 
quod  honestum  esset  id  esse  solum  bonum,  semper 
^  est  beatus  vereque  omnia  ista  nomina 
t  quae  irrideri  ab  imperitis  solent.  Rectius 
enim  appellabitur  reK  quam  Tarquinius  qui  nee  se 
nee  suos  regere  potuit,  rectius  magister  populi  (is 
enim  est  dictator)  quam  Suila  qui  trium  pestifero- 
rum  vitiorum,  luxuriae,  avaritiae,  crudelitatis  magi- 
ster fuit,  rectius  dives  quam  Crassiis  qui  nisi  eguisset 
numquam  Euphraten  nulla  belli  causa  transire  vo- 
luisset.  Recte  eius  omnia  dicentur  qui  scit  uti  solus 
omnibus  ;  recte  etiara  pulcher  appellabitur  (animi 
enim  liniamenta  sunt  pulchriora  quam  corporis)  recte 
solus  liber,  nee  dominationi  cuiusquara  parens  nee 


BOOK  III.  xxii 
plan  that  1  set  before  me.  The  fact  is  that  I  have  been 
led  on  by  the  marvellous  structure  of  the  Stoic  sys- 
tem and  the  miraculous  sequence  of  its  topics  ;  pray 
tell  me  seriously,  does  it  not  fill  you  with  admiration  ? 
Nothing  is  more  finished,  more  nicely  ordered,  than 
nature ;  but  what  has  nature,  what  have  the  pro- 
ducts of  handicraft  to  show  that  is  so  well  con- 
structed, so  firmly  jointed  and  welded  into  t 
Where  do  you  find  a  conclusion  inconsistent  with 
its  premise,  or  a  discrepancy  between  an  earlier  and 
a  later  statement  ?  Where  is  lacking  such  close 
interconne!£ion  of  the  parts  that,  if  you  alter  a  single 
letter,  you  shake  the  whole  structure?  Though 
indeed  there  is  nothing  that  it  would  be  possible  to 
i  " Then,  how  dignified,  how  lofty,  how  consistent  wutMiii 
is  the  character  of  the  Wise  Man  as  they  depict  it! 
Since  reason  has  proved  that  moral  worth  is  the  sole 
good,  it  follows  that  he  must  always  be  happy,  and 
that  all  those  titles  which  the  ignorant  are  so  fond  of 
deriding  do  in  very  truth  belong  to  him.  For  he 
wOI  have  a.  better  claim  to  the  title  of  King  than 
Tarquin,  who  could  not  rule  cither  himself  or  his 
subjects;  a  better  right  to  the  name  of  Master"  of 
the  People '  (for  that  is  what  a  dictator  is)  than 
Sulla,  who  was  a  master  of  three  pestilential  vices, 
licentiousness,  avarice  and  cruelty  ;  a  better  claim  to 
be  called  rich  than  Crassus,  who  had  he  needed 
nothing  would  never  have  been  induced  to  cross  the 
Euphrates  for  any  military  reason.  Rightly  wUI  he 
be  said  to  own  all  things,  who  alone  knows  how  to 
use  all  things  ;  rightly  also  will  he  be  styled  beauti- 
ful, for  the  beauty  of  the  soul  is  fairer  than  that  of 
the  body  ;  rightly  the  one  and  only  free  man,  as  sub* 


obediens  cupiditati^  recte  invictus^  cuius  etUmsi 
corpus  constringatur,  animo  tamen  vincula  inici 
76  nulla  possint.  Nee  exspeetat^  uUum  tempus  aetatis^ 
ut  turn  denique  iudieetur  beatusne  fuerit  cum  ex- 
tremum  vitae  diem  morte  confecerit ;  quod  ille  unus 
e  septem  sapientibus  non  sapienter  Croesum  monuit^ 
nam  si  beatus  umquam  fuisset^  beatam  vitam  usque 
ad  ilium  a  Cyro  exstructuin  rogum  pertulisset.  Quod 
si  ita  est  ut  neque  quisquam  nisi  bonus  vir  et  omnes 
boni  beati  sint^  quid  philosophia  magis  colendum  aut 
quid  est  virtute  divinius  ?  " 

^expectat  ed. :  expectet  MSS.,  edd.  ('transit  ad  poten- 
tialem  orationis  formam  '  Mdv.). 


son  fisw  nf  up  ^jiyw.'tllir 

IT  be  iouJ^ 
«■Jr  'vlmi  hit  b»  rounded  cdTte^  liie^s 
list  dsf  m  doA- — 43k  ^nimtf  namii^  sd  miwise^ 
gnren  to  Gtocihs  br  cM  SaSan.  «e  ckT  ibe  scne» 
Wiselfoi;  iorhidCAiK9KriTTbenliappj,lie^nMald 
hdiTC  cmied  liis  hiinwirife  Mwiwt*«i  i  u|rf#^  to  ibe  pyre 

nised  fiir  Inn  bgr  Cttik.  If  Hkb  it  be  tnie  tbat  all 
the  good  and  none  but  ibe  good  are  bappr,  wbat 
pooesnon  is  move  precjons  tban  philosopby,  wbat 
more  dnrine  tban  YirtBe?** 







1  I.  Quae  cum   dixisset,  finem   ille.     Ego  autem: 
Ne  tu,  iiiquam,  Cato,  ista  exposuisti,  ut  tarn  multa, 

memoriter,  ut  tarn  obscura,  dilucide,  Ituque  aut 
omtttamus  contra  oranino  velle  aliquid  aut  spatium 
sumamus  ad  cof^itanduui ',  tain  enini  diligenter, 
etiamsi  minus  vere  (nam  nondum  id  quideni  Rudeo 
dicere)j  sed  tamen  '  accurate  non  modo  fundatam 
verum  ctiam  exstructatn  disciplinam  non  est  facile 
perdiscere."  Tum  ille;  Ain  tandem?"  inquit ; 
cum  ego  te  Lac  nova  lege  videam  eodem  die  accu- 
satori  respondere  et  tribus  horis  perorare,  in  hac  me 
causa  tempus  dilatunim  putas?  quae  tameii  a  te 
agetur  non  melior  quam  iUae  sunt  quas  interdum 
obtines.  Quare  istam  quoque  aggredere,  tractatam 
praesertim  et  ab  aliis  et  a  te  ipso  saepe,  ut  tibi 

2  deesse  non  possit  oratio."  Tum  ego:  '  Non  meher- 
cule,"  inquam,  soleo  temere  contra  Stoicos,  non  quo 
illis  admodum  assentiar,  sed  pudore  inipedior;  ita 
multa  dicunt,  quae  vis  intellegam."  'Obscura," 
inquit,  quaedani  esse  confiteor;  nee  tamen  ab  dlis 
ita  dicuntur  de  industria,  sed  inest  in  rebus  ipsis 

sed  tarn. 

:  Lambinus  onjeclures  sed  tamen  tarn,  Davis 
rhaps  audeo  dicere,  sed  tamen)  nan  modo;  and 
rate  as  inlerpolaled. 

"Passed  by  Pompey,  51  B.C.,  to  limit  ihe  concluding 
speeches  in  lawsuits  to  two  hours  for  the  prosecution  and 
three  for  the  defence,  both  to  be  delivered  on  the  same  day, 


1  1.  With   these  words   he   conciiided.     "'A  most  Re  (u 
faithful  and    lut^id  expu&itlon,  Catu/'  said  I,  "con-cj«! 
sidering    the    wide  range    of  your  subject  and  its  '""' 
obscurity.     Clearly  I  must  either  give  up  all  idea  ot 
replying,  or  must  take  time  to  think  it  over;  it  is 

no  easy  task  to  get  a  thorough  grasp  of  a  system  so 
elaboratCj  even  if  erroneous  (for  on  that  point  I  do  not 
yet  venture  to  speak),  but  at  all  events  so  highly  finish- 
ed both  in  its  first  principles  and  in  their  working  out," 
You  don't  say  so!"  replied  Cato.  'Do  you  sup- 
pose I  am  going  to  allow  our  suit  to  be  adjourned, 
when  I  see  you  under  this  new  law"  replying  for 
the  defence  on  the  same  day  as  your  opponent  con- 
cludes for  tjie  prosecution,  and  keeping  your  speech 
within  a  three  hours'  limit?  Though  you  will  find 
your  present  case  as  shaky  as  any  of  those  which 
you  now  and  then  succeed  in  pulling  off.  So  tackle 
this  one  hke  the  rest,  particularly  as  the  subject  is 
familiar;  others  have  handled  it  before,  and  so  have 
you  repeatedly,  so  that  you  can  hardly  be  gravelled 

2  tor  lack  of  matter."  I  protest,"  I  exclaimed,  "l 
:im  not  by  way  of  challenging  the  Stoics  lightly; 
not  that  I  agree  with  them  entirely,  but  modesty 
restrains  me :  there  is  so  much  in  their  doctrines 
that  I  can  hardly  understand."     '  I  admit,"  he  said, 

that  some  parts  are  obscure,  but  the  Stoics  do  not 
^^jjiffeet  an  obscure  st^'le  on  purpose;  the  obscurity  is 
^^^dierent  in  the  sulijects  themselves."     "  How  is  it, 

obscuritas."  Cur  igitur  easdem  res,"  mqu&m, 
'  Peripateticis  dicentibus  verbum  nullum  est  quod 
non  intellegatur ? "  "Easdemne  res?"  inquit;  "an 
parnm  disserui  non  verbis  Stoicos  a  Peripateticis  sed 
universa  re  et  tota  sententia  dissidere?"  'Atqui," 
inquam,  Cato,  si  istud  obtinueris,  traducas  me  ad 
tetotumlicebit."  Putabam  equidem  satis,"  inquit, 
me  dixisse.  Quare  ad  ea  primum,  si  videturj  sin 
aliud  quid  voles,  postea."  '  Immo  istud  quidem," 
inquam,  quo  loco  quidque  . . .'  nisi  iniquum  postulo, 
arbitratu  meo."  Ut  placet,"  inquit;  etsi  enJm 
illud  erat  aplius,  aequum  cuique  concedere." 

3  II.  "Existimo  igitur,"  inquam,  "Cato,  veterea 
illos  Platonis  auditores,  Speusippum,  Aristotelem, 
Xenocratem,  deinde  eorum  Polemonem,  Theophra- 
stum,  satis  et  copiose  et  eleganter  habuisse  constitu- 
tam  disciplinam,  ut  non  esset  causa  Zenoni  cum 
Polemonem  audisset  cur  et  ab  eo  ipso  et  a  superiori- 
bus  dissideret;  quorum  fuit  haec  institutio,  in  qua 
animadvertus  velim  quid  mutandum  putes,  nee 
exspeetes  dum  ad  omnia  dicam  quae  a  te  dicta  sunt; 
universa  enim  illaruin  ratione  cum  tota  vestra  con- 

*  fligendura    puto.     Qui  cum  viderent  ita  i 
natos  ut  et  communiter  ad  eas  virtutes  apti  essei 


BOOK  IV.  i-ii 
then,"  I  replied,  "  that  when  the  same  subjects  «re 
discussed  by  the  Peripatetics,  every  word  is  intelli- 
gible? "  The  same  subjects?  "  he  cried.  Have 
I  not  said  enough  to  show  that  the  disagreement 
between  the  Stoics  and  the  Peripatetics  is  not  a 
matter  of  words,  but  concerns  the  entire  substance 
of  their_ whole  system?"  "O  well,  Cato,"  I  re- 
joined, "if  you  can  prove  tliat,  you  are  welcome  to 
claim  me  as  a  whole-hearted  convert."  "l  did 
think,"  said  he,  '  that  I  had  said  enough.  So  let  us 
take  this  question  first,  if  you  like ;  or  if  you  prefer 
another  topic,  we  will  take  this  later  on."  Nay," 
said  I,  as  to  that  matter  I  shall  use  my  own  dis- 
cretion, unless  this  is  an  unfair  stipulation,  and  deal 
with  each  subject  as  it  comes  up."  Have  it  your 
way,"  he  replied  ;  my  plan  would  have  been  n 
suitable,  but  it  is  fair  to  let  a  man  choose  for 

3       II,      My  view  then,  Cato,"  I  proceeded,     is  this,  R 
tliat  those  old  disciples  of  Plato,  Speusippus,  Aris-  , 
totle  and  Xenocrates,  and  afterwards  their  pupils  "' 
Polemo  and  Tlieophrastus,  had  developed  &  body  of  ti 
doctrine  that  left  nothing  to  be  desired  either  in 
fullness  or  finish,  so  that  Zeno  on  becoming  the  pupil  ^i 
of  Polemo  had  no  reason  for  differing  either  from  his 
master   himself  or  from  his  master's  predecessors. 
The  outline  of  their  theory  was  as  follows — but 
I  should  be  glad  if  you  would  call  attention  to  any 
point  you  may  desire  to  correct  without  waiting  for 
me  to  deal  with  the  whole  of  your  discourse ;  for  1 
think  I  shall  have  to  place  their  entire  system  in 

4-  conflict  with  the  whole  of  yours.    Well,  these  philo- 
sophers observed  (l)  that  we  are  so  constituted  as 
to  have  a  natural  aptitude  for  the  recognized  and 

quae  notae  illustresque  suntj  iustitiam  dico,  tempe- 
rantiam,  ceteras  generis  eiusdem  (quae  omnes  similes 
artium  reliquarum  materia  tantum  ad  meliorem 
partem  et  trnctationc  differunt),  casque  ipsas  virtutes 
viderent  nos  itiagnificentius  appetere  et  ardentius: 
habere  etiam  iiisitani  quandam  vel  potius  innatam 
cupiditutetn  seientiae,  natosque  esse  ad  coiigrej^a- 
tionem  hominum  et  ad  sucietatem  com  muni  tatemque 
generis  humani,  eaque  in  maKiinis  ingeniis  niaxinie 
elucere,  totatn  philosophiam  tres  in  partes  diviserunt, 
quam  partitionem  a  Zenone  esse  retentam  videmus. 
J  Quarum  cuoi  una  sit  qua  mprgs  conformari  putantur, 
difFero  earn  partem,  quae  quasi  stirps  est  huius 
quaestionis ;  qui  sit  enim  finis  bonorum,  mox ;  lioc 
loco  tantum  dico  a  veteribus  Peripateticis  Aeademi- 
cisque,  qui  re  consentientes  vocabulis  differebant, 
eum  locum  quern  civilem  recte  appellaturi  videmur 
(Graeci  -jroXiTiKnv)  graviler  et  copiose  esse  tractatiun, 
III.  Quam  muita  illi  de  re  publica  scripserunt, 
quam  muUa  de  legibits  '■  quam  multft  non  solum 
praecepta  in  artibus  sed  etiani  exempla  in  orationi- 
bus  bene  dicendi  reliquerunt !  Primum  enim  ipsa 
ilia  quae  siibtiliter  disserenda  erant  polite  aptegue 
dixerunt,  tum  definientes,  turn  partientes,  ut  vestri 
etiam;  sed  vos  squalidius ;  illorum  vides  quam  niteat 

"-This  sentence  might  appear  to  imply  that  the  three 
departments  of  phiJoaopby  were  (i)  Ethics,  (2)  Physics  and 
Logic,  (3]  Politics;  but  in  the  fallowing  chapters  Cicero 
adopts  the  nonnal  division,  (1)  Logic,  c.  IV,  (i)  Physics, 
c.  V,  (3)  Ethics,  cc.  VI  foil.,  with  its  Iwo  subordinate 
branches  of  Politics  and  Rhetoric  which  are  dismissed 
parenthelically  in  c.  IM. 

standard  virtues  in  general,  I  mean  Justice,  Tem- 
perance and  the  otUera  of  that  class  (all  of  whji 
resemble  the  rest  of  the  arts  and  differ  only  by  ex- 
celling them  in  the  material  with  which  they  work 
and  in  their  treatment  of  it);  they  observed  n 
over  that  we  pursue  these  virtues  with  a  more  lofty 
enthusiasm   than    we    do    the  arts ;   and  (s)   that 
we  possess  an  implanted  or  rather  an  innate  appe- 
tite for  knowledge,  and  (s)  that  we  are  naturally 
disposed   towards  social   life  with  our  felloi 
and  towards   fellowship  and  community  with  the 
human  race ;  and  that  these  instincts  are  displayed 
roost  clearly  in  the  most  highly  endowed  natures." 
Accordingly   they   divided    philosophy    into    three 
departments,  a  division  that  was  retained,  as  we 
>  notice,  by  Zeno.     One  of  these  departments  is  the  Eihiotdniemd 
science  that  is  held  to  give  rules  for  the  formation  pniiiif«»nrt' 
of  moral  character;  this  part,  which  is  the  founda-  {^^f^'^,'^? 
tion  of  our  present  discussion,  I  defer.     For  I  shall  Old  '\aiihmj 
consider  later  the  question,  what  is  the  End  of  Goods.  p"ie[iia. 
For  the  present  I  only  say  that  the  topic  of  what  I 
think  may  fitly  be  entitled  Civic  Science  (the  adjec- 
tive in  Greek  is  poUHtos)  was  handled  with  authority 
and  fiillness  by  the  early  Peripatetics  and  Academics, 
who  agreed  in  substance  though  they  differed  in 

III.  What  a  vast  amount  they  have  written  on 
politics  and  on  jurisprudence !  how  many  precepts  of 
oratory  they  have  left  us  in  their  treatises,  and  how 
many  examples  in  their  discourses!  In  the  first 
place,  even  the  topics  that  required  close  reasoning 
they  handled  in  a  neat  and  polished  manner,  em- 
ploying now  deiinitioD,  now  division ;  as  indeed 
your  school  does  also,  but  your  style  is  rather  out- 
X  305 


6  oratio.  Deinde  ea  quae  requirebant  orationem 
ornatiim  et  gravem,  quam  magnifice  stmt  dicta  ab 
illis,  quam  spleiidide!  de  iustitia,  de  temperantia,  de 
fortitudine,  de  aniicitia,  de  aetate  degeiida,  de  plii- 
losophia,  de  capessenda  re  piiblica,  hominum  nec 
spinas  vellentium,  ul  Stoici,  nec  ossa  nudantium, 
sed  eorum  qui  gratidin  ornate  vellent,  enucleate 
minora  dicere.  Itaque  quae  sunt  eorum  consola- 
tiones,  quae  coliortationes,  quae  etiam  monita  et 
consilia  scripta  ad  summos  viros !  Erat  enim  spud 
COS,  ut  est  reruni  ipsarum  natura,  sic  dicendi  exerci- 
tatio  duplex.  Nam  quidiiuid  quaeritur,  id  habet  aut 
generis  ipsius  sine  personis  teuiporib usque  aut  iis 
adiunctis  facti  aut  iuris  aut  iioniinis  controversiam. 
Ergo  in  utroque  exercebantur ;  eaque  disciplina 
effeeit  lantum  illorum  utroque  in  genere  dicendi 

7  copiani.  Totum  genus  boc  Zeno  et  qui  ab  eo  sunt 
aut  non  potuerunt  tueri  ^  aut  noluerunt,  certe  re- 
liquerunt.  Quamquam  scrips  it  art  em  rbe  tori  cam 
Cleanthes,  Clirj-sippus  etiam,  sed  sic  ut  si  quis 
obmutescere  concupierit  nihil  aliud  legere  debeat. 
Itaque  vides  quoniodo  loquantur:  nova  verlia  fingunt. 
deserunt  usitata.  At  quanta  conanturl- — ^mundum 
hunc  omnem  oppidum  esse  nostrum.  Vides  quan- 
tarn  rem  agat  ut  Circeiis  qui  liabitet  totum  hunc 
mundum  suum  municipium  esse  existimet.   Incendit 

'«ecMQller;  no»  Mdv.;  rff  MSS. 

-(' inserted  by  Cobct,  Mdv.  c 


BOOK   IV.  iii 

>  at-ellxiwsj  while  theirs  is  noticeably  flegunt.  Then, 
in  tliemes  demanding  ornate  and  dignified  treat- 
ment, how  imposing,  how  brilliant  is  their  diction ! 
On  Justice,  Teinperanee,  Courage,  Friendship,on  tlie 
conduct  of  life,  the  pursuit  of  wisdom, 
of  the  statesman, — no  hair-splitting  like  that  of  the 
Stoics,  no  bare  skeleton  of  argument,  but  the  loftier 
passages  studiously  ornate,  and  the  minor  topics 
studiously  plain  and  clear.  As  a  result,  think  of 
their  consolations,  their  exhortations,  even  their 
warnings  and  counsels,  addressed  to  men  of  the 
highest  eminence  1  In  fact,  their  rhetorical  exercises 
were  twofold,  like  the  nature  of  the  subjects  them- 
selves. For  every  question  for  debate  can  be  argued 
either  on  the  general  issue,  ignoring  the  persons  or 
circumstances  involved,  or,  these  also  being  taken 
into  consideration,  on  a  point  of  fact  or  of  law  or  of 
nomenclature.  They  therefore  practised  themselves 
in  both  kinds;   and   this  training  produced   their  ^^,^,;^ 

"  remarkable  Huency  in  each  class  of  discussion.    This  Potttteineg- 
whole    field  Zeno  and  his  successors  were  either  stoia.Vnd'uM 
unable  or  unwilling  to  cover;    at  all  events  they  ^"''^' '"'"■'" 
left  it  untouched.     Cleanthes  it    is  true  wrote    a 
treatise  on  rhetoric,  and  Chrysippus  wrote  one  too, 
but  what  are  they  like?  why,  tliey  furnish  a  com- 
plete manual  for  anyone  whose  ambition  is  to  hold  Ilia 
tongue ;  you  can  judge  then  of  their  style,  coining 
new  words,  discarding  those  approved  by  use.     But,' 
you  will  say,    think  how  vast  are  the  themes  that 
they  essay ;  for  example,  that  this  entire  universe  is 
our    own    town.''      Vou    see    the    magnitude    of 
a  Stoic's  task,  to  convince  an  inhabitant  of  Circeii 
that  the  whole  vast  world  is  his  own  borough !       If 
so,   he    must   rouse    his   audience    to   enthusiasm.' 

igituT  eos  qui  audiunt.  Quid?  ille  incendat?  1 
stinguet  citius  si  ardentem  acceperit.  Ista  i 
quae  tu  breviter,  regem,  dictatorem,  divitem  sol 
esse  sapienteni,  a  te  quid  em  aptc  ac  rotund) 
quippe;  iiabes  enim  a  rhetorilms;  illorum 
ipsa  quam  exsiUa  de  virtutis  vil  quam  tantam  volunt 
esse  ut  lieatum  per  se  efficere  possit.  Pungunt 
enim,  quasi  aculeis,  interrogatiunculis  angustis, 
quibus  etiam  qui  assentiuntur  nihil  coounutantur 
animo  et  iidem  abeunt  qui  venerant;  res  enim  for- 
tasse  verae,  eerte  graves,  noii  ita  tractantur  ut 
debentj  sed  aliquanto  minutius. 
}  IV.  Sequiturdisserendi  ratio  cognitioque  naturae; 
nam  de  sumtno  bono  mox,  ut  dixi,  videbimus  et  ad 
id  explicandum  disputationem  oninem  conferemus. 
In  his  igitur  pnrtibus  duabus  nihil  erat  quod  Zeno 
coromutare  gestiret;  res  enim  ae  praeclare  lialjebat, 
et  quidem  in  utraque  parte.  Quid  enim  ab  antiquis 
ex  eo  genere  quod  ad  disserenduni  valet  praetermis- 
Bum  est?  qui  et  definierunt  plurima  et  definiendi 
artes  reliquerunt,  quodque  est  definitioni  adiun- 
etum,  ut  res  in  partes  dividatur,  id  et  fit  ab  illis  et 
quemadmoduni  fieri  oporleat  traditur ;  item  de  c 
trariis,  a  quibus  ad  genera  formasque  generum  ven^ 
runt  lam  argument!  ratione  conclusi  caput  ( 
faciunt  ea  quae  perspicua  dieunt;  deinde  ordinc^ 
sequuntur;  tum  quid  verum  sit  in  singulis  extresi 

BOOK  IV.  iii-iv 

What?  a  Stoic  rouse  enthusiasm?  He  is  much 
more  likely  to  extinguish  any  enthusiasm  the  student 
may  have  had  to  begin  with.  Even  those  brief 
maxims  that  you  propounded,  that  the  Wise  Man 
alone  is  king,  dictator,  millionaire, — neatly  rounded 
off  no  doubt  as  you  put  them ;  of  course,  for  you 
leamt  them  from  professors  of  rhetoric; — hut  how 
bald  are  those  very  maxims,  on  the  lips  of  the  Stoics, 
when  they  talk  about  the  potency  of  virtue, — virtue 
which  they  rate  so  highly  that  it  can  of  itself,  they 
say,  confer  happiness!  Their  meagre  little  syllo- 
gisms are  mere  pin-pricks;  even  if  they  convince 
the  intellect,  they  cannot  convert  the  heart,  and  the 
hearer  goes  away  no  better  than  he  came.  What 
they  say  is  possibly  true,  and  certainly  important; 
but  the  way  in  which  they  say  it  is  wrong;  it  is  far 
too  niggling. 
i  IV,  'Next  come  Logic  and  Natural  Science;  for  A» 
the  problem  of  Ethics,  as  I  said,  we  shall  notice  adi 
later,  concentrating  the  whole  force  of  the  discussion  '"' 
upon  its  solution.  In  these  two  departments  then, 
there  was  nothing  that  Zeno  need  have  desired  to 
alter ;  since  all  was  in  a  most  satisfactory  state,  and 
that  in  both  departments.  For  in  the  subject  of 
Logic,  what  had  the  ancients  left  undealt  with  ?  They 
defined  a  multitude  of  terms,  and  left  treatises  on 
Definition  ;  of  the  Jjindred  art  of  the  Division  of  a 
thing  into  its  parts  they  give  practical  examples,  and 
lay  down  rules  for  the  process ;  and  the  same  with 
the  Law  of  Contradictories,  from  which  they  arrived 
at  genera  and  species.  Then,  in  Deductive  reason- 
ing, they  start  with  what  they  term  self-evident 
propositions ;  from  these  the  argument  proceeds  by 
rule  ;  and  finally  the  conclusion  gives  the  inference 


9  ponclusio  est.  Quanta  autem  ab  iUis  varietas  argu- 
mentorum  rati  one  concludentium  eommqiie  cum 
captiosis  intt^rrogationibus  dissimilitudo !  Quid  quod 
pluribus  lotis  quasi  denuntiunt  ut  tieque  sensuum 
fideni  sine  ratione  nee  rationis  sine  sensibus  exqui- 
ranius  atqiie  ut  eorum  alterum  ab  altero  ne^  seps- 
remus?  Quid?  ea  quae  diaiectici  nunc  tradunt  el 
docent,  nonne  ab  illis  instituta  sunt?'  De  quibus 
etsi  a  Clirysippo  niaxime  est  elaboratuni,  tanien  a 
Zenone  minus  multo  quam  ab  antiquis ;  ab  hoc  autem 
quaedam  non  melius  quam  veteres,  quaedam  omiiino 
10  rebcta.  Cumque  duae  sint  artes  quibus  perfecte 
ratio  et  oratio  compleatur,  una  inveniendi,  altera 
disserendi,  hanc  posteriorem  et  Stoici  et  Peripatetici, 
priorem  autem  ilb  egregie  tradiderunt,  hi  omnino  ne 
attigenint  quidem.  Nam  e  quibus  ]ocis  quasi  the- 
sauris  argument»  deproiiierentur,  vestri  ne  suspicati 
quidem  sunt,  superiores  autem  artilicio  et  via  tradi- 
derunt. Quae  quidem  ars''  efficit  ne  necesse  sit 
iisdem  de  rebus  semper  quasi  dictata  deeantare  Deque 
a  commentariolis  suis  discedere.  Nam  qui  sciet  ubi 
quidque  positum  sit  quaque  eo  veniut,  is,  etiamsi 
quid  obnitum  erit,  potent  eruere  semperque  esse  in 
disputando  suus.  Quod  etsi  ingeniis  niagnis  praediti 
quidani  dicendi  copium  sine  ratione  cunsequuutur,  ars 

'  ne  supplied  by  Lambinus,  Mdv. 

^  After  inslituia  sunl  all  but  one  Inferior  MS.  add  invcHla 
sunt:  Mdv.  brackets, 

'  ars  Mdv. :  om.  A,  other  MSS.  tes. 

fl  Cp.  I,  39. 
1- '  Inveiilio,'  Topiki. 
lopoi,  pi^on-hoies  as 

HOOK  IV.  iv 
9  valid  in  tiie  particular  rase.  A^aln,  how  mauy  diHerent 
forms  of  Deduction  they  distinguish,  niid  how  widely 
these  differ  from  sophistical  syllogisms" !  Think  how 
earnestly  they  reiterate  the  warning,  that  we  must 
not  expect  to  liiid  truth  i]i  sensation  unaided  by 
reason,  nor  in  reason  without  sensation,  and  that  we 
are  not  to  divorce  the  one  from  the  other !  Was  it 
not  they  who  first  laid  down  the  rules  that  form  the 
stock-in-trade  of  professors  of  logic  to-dny  ?  Logic, 
no  doubt,  was  very  fully  worked  out  by  Chrysippus, 
but  much  less  was  done  in  it  by  Zeno  than  bj'  the 
older  schools ;  and  in  some  parts  of  the  subject 
his  work  was  no  improvement  on  that  of  his  pre- 
decessors, while  other  parts  he  neglected  altogether. 
10  Of  the  two  sciences  which  between  them  cover  or 
the  whole  field  of  reasoning  and  of  oratory,  one  the  ^^ 
Science  of  Topics''  and  the  other  that  of  Logic, 
the  latter  has  been  handled  by  both  Stoics  atid 
Peripatetics,  but  the  former,  though  excellently 
taught  by  the  Peripatetics,  has  not  been  touched  by 
the  Stoics  at  all.  Of  Topics,  the  store- chambers  in 
which  arguments  are  arranged  ready  for  use,  your 
school  had  not  the  faintest  notion,  whereas  their 
predecessors  propounded  a  regular  technique  and 
method.  This  science  of  Topics  saves  one  from 
always  having  to  drone  out  the  same  stock  argu- 
ments on  the  same  subjects  without  ever  departing 
from  one's  notes.  For  a  man  who  knows  under  what 
general  heading  each  argument  comes,  and  how  to 
lay  his  hand  on  it,  will  always  be  able  to  unearth 
any  particular  argument  however  far  out  of  sight  it 
lies,  and  will  never  lose  his  self-possession  in  debate. 
The  fact  is  tliat  altliough  some  men  of  genius  attain 
to  eloquence  without  a  system,  nevertheless  science 


tamen  est  dux  certior  quam  natura.  Aliud  est  enim 
poetarum  more  verba  fundere,  aliud  ea  quae  dicas 
ratione  et  arte  distiiiguere. 

11  V.  Similia  dici  possunt  de  explicatione  naturae, 
qua  et  hi  utuntur  et  vestri,  neque  vero  ob  duas 
modo  causas,  quoniodo  Epicuro  videtur,  ot  pellatur 
mortis  et  religionis  metus;  sed  etiam  modestiam 
quandam  cognitio  rertim  caelestium  afFert  iis  qui 
videant  quanta  sit  etiam  apud  deos  moderatio,  quan- 
tuB  ordo,  et  magnitudinem  animi  dcorum  opera  et 
facta  cernentibus,  justitiam  etiam,  cum  cognitum 
habeas  quod  sit  summi  rectoris  ac  dumini  numeii, 
quod  consilium,  quae  voluntas;  cuius  ad  naturam 
apta  ratio  vera  ilia  et  summa  lex  a  philosophis  dicitur. 

18  Inest  in  eadem  explicatione  naturae  insatiabilis  quae- 
dam  e  cognoscendis  rebus  voluptas,  in  qua  una, 
confectis  rebus  necessarjis,  vacui  negotiis  honeste  ac 
liberaliter  possimus  vivere.  Ergo  in  hac  ratione  tota 
de  maximis  fere  rebus  Stoici  illos  secuti  sunt,  ut  et 
deos  esse  et  quattuor  es  rebus  omnia  constare  dice- 
rent.  Cum  autem  quaereretur  res  admodum  difficilis 
num  quinta  quaedam  natura  videretur  esse  ex  qua 
ratio  et  intellegentia  oriretur,  in  quo  etiam  de  animis 
cuius  generis  essent  quaereretur,  Zeno  id  dixit  esse 
ignem ;  nonnulla  deinde  «liter,  sed  ea  pauca ;  de 
a  autem  re  eodem  modo,  divina  mente  atque 
n  et  hi  Mdv.i  ?«e  hie,  qua  kic  MSS. 

a  ArislQtIe  spoke  of  a  fifth  sort  of  mi 
in  acircle,  aetlierial,  unchanged,'  vvhicl 
ihe  heavenly  liodies  ;  bul  he  nowhere 
composed  of  liiis,  but  on  the  contrary  u 


/ays  regard»  mind 


pouring  ^^H 

cientific  |^| 

is  a  safer  guide  than  nature.  A  poetic  out-pouring 
of  language  is  one  thing,  the  systematic  and  scientific 
marshalhng  of  one's  matter  is  another 

11  V,  Much  the  same  may  be  said  about  Natural  inPhysIeit» 
Philosophy,  which  is  pursued  both  by  the  Peripatetics  JSedecessori' 
and  by  your  school,  and  that  not  merely  for  the  two  ire  muctinfe 
objects,  recognized  by  Epicurus,  of  banishing  super-  oe 
stition  and  the  fear  of  death.  Besides  these  benefits, 
the  study  of  the  heavenly  phenomena  bestows 
a  power  of  self-control  that  arises  from  the  percep- 
tion of  the  consummate  restraint  and  order  that 
obtain  even  among  the  gods  ;  also  loftiness  of  mind 
is  inspired  by  contemplating  the  creations  and 
actions  of  the  gods,  and  justice  by  realizing  the 
will,  design  and  purpose  of  the  Supreme  Lord 
and  Ruler  to  whose  nature  we  are  told  by  philo- 
sophers that  the  True   Reason  and  Supreme  Law 

1 2  are  conformed.  The  study  of  Natural  Philosophy 
also  alfords  the  inexhaustible  pleasure  of  acquiring 
knowledge,  the  sole  pursuit  which  can  afford  an  hon- 
ourable and  elevated  occupation  for  the  hours  of  leisure 
left  when  business  has  been  finished.  Now  in  the  whole 
of  this  branch  of  philosophy,  on  most  of  the  impor- 
tant points  the  Stoics  followed  the  Peripatetics, 
maintaining  the  existence  of  the  gods  and  the 
creation  of  the  world  out  of  the  four  elements. 
Then,  coming  to  the  very  diificult  question,  whether 
we  are  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  fifth  substance,^ 
as  the  source  of  reason  and  intellect,  and  bound  up 
with  this  the  further  question  of  the  nature  of  the 
soul,  Zeno  declared  this  substance  to  be  fire  ;  next, 
as  lo  some  details,  but  only  a  few,  he  diverged  from 
his  predecessors,  but  on  the  main  question  he  agreed 
that  the  universe  as  a  whole  and  its  chief  parts  are 



naturatnundumuniverEun]  atque  eiits  maximas  partes 
administrari.      Materiam  veto  revum  et  copiam  apud 

13  hos  exilcnij  apud  illos  ubeminam  reperiemus.  Quam 
multa  ab  iis  conquisita  et  collects  sunt  de  omnium 
animantiuni  genere,  ortu,  membris,  aetatibus  1  quam 
multa  de  rebus  iis  quae  gignuntur  e  terra  \  quam 
multae  quamque  de  variis  rebus  et  causae  cur  quid- 
que  6at  et  demonstration es  quemadraodum  quidque 
fiat!  qua  e\  omni  copia  plurima  et  certissinia  argii- 
menta  sumuntur  ad  cuiusque  rei  naturam  explican- 
dam.  Ergo  adliuc,  quantum  eqiiidem  intellego, 
cautia  non  videtur  fuisse  inutandi  nominis;  non  enim, 
si  omnia  non  sequebatur,  idcirco  non  erat  ortus 
illinc.  Equideni  etiam  Epicni'um,  in  physicis  quidem, 
Democriteum  puto.  Pauca  mutat,  vel  plura  sane;  at 
cum  de  plurimis  eadeni  dicit,  turn  certe  de  maxi- 
mis.  Quod  idem  cum  vestri  faciant,  non  satis  ma- 
giiam  tribuunt  inventoribus  gratiam. 

1  -1-  VI.  '  Scd  haec  hactenus.  Nunc  vie 
de  summo  bono,  quud  continet  pliili 
tandem  attulerit  quamobrera  ab  inv 
quam  a  parentibus  dissentiret.  Hoc  igitur  loco, 
quaniqiiam  a  te,  Cato,  diligenter  est  explicatum  fmis 
hie  bonorum  et  qui  a  Stoicis  et  quemadmodiuu  di- 
ceretur,  tamen  ego  quoque  exponam,  ut  perspicia- 
muE  si  potuerimus  quidnam  a  Zenone  novi  sit  allatum. 

imus,  quaeso, 
}phiam,  quid 
toribus  tam- 

BOOK   IV.  v-vi 
governed  by  a  divnne  mind  and  substance.    In  point 
of  fullness,  Iiowever,  and  fertility  of  treatment  we 
shall  find  the  Stoics  meagre,  whereas  the  Peripatetics 

}  are  copious  in  the  extreme.  Wliat  stores  of  facts 
they  discovered  and  collected  about  the  classification, 
reproduction,  morphology-  and  biology  of  animals 
of  every  kind  !  and  again  about  plants  I  How- 
copious  and  wide  in  range  tlieir  explanations  of  the 
causes  and  demonstrations  of  the  mode  of  different 
natural  phenomena  '.  and  nil  these  stores  supply  them 
with  numerous  and  conclusive  arguments  to  ex- 
plain the  nature  of  each  particular  thing.  So  far 
then,  as  far  as  I  at  least  can  understand  the  case, 
there  appears  to  have  been  no  reason  for  the  change 
of  name^;  that  Zeno  was  not  prepared  to  follow  the 
Peripatetics  in  every  detail  did  not  alter  the  fact 
that  he  had  sprung  from  them.  For  my  own  part  I 
consider  Epicurus  also,  at  all  events  in  natural 
philosophy, simply  a  pupil  of  Democritus.  He  makes 
a  few  modifications,  or  indeed  a  good  many ;  but  on 
most  points,  and  unquestionably  the  most  important, 
he  merely  echoes  his  master.  Your  leaders  do  the 
same,  yet  neglect  to  acknowledge  their  full  debt  to 
the  original  discoverers. 

!■       VI.  "But  leaving  this  let  us  now,  if  you  please,  in  nihics,  (ha 
turn  to  Ethics.     On  the  subject  of  the  Chief  Good,  'ZtorA  S?" 
which  is  the  keystone  of  philosophy,  what  precise  i^^  j^^^^^ 
contribution  did  Zeno  make  to  justify  his  quarrelling  naiura 
with  his  parents,  the  originators  of  the  doctrine? 
Under  this  head  j'ou,  Cato,  gave  a  careful  exposition 
of  the  Stoics'  conception  of  this    End  of  Goods,'  and 
of  the  meaning  they  attached  to  the  term  ;  still  I  also 
will  restate  it,  to  enable   us  to  perceive,  if  we  can, 
what  element  of  novelty  was  introduced   by  Zeno. 

SIS     ^^^^Bi 

Cum  enim  superiores,  e  quibus  planissime  Polemo, 
secundum  naturam  vivere  summum  bouum  esse 
dixissent,  his  verbis  tria  significari  Stoici  dicunt, 
unum  eiusmodi,  vivere  adhibentem  scientiam  earum 
reram  quae  natura  evenirent ;  himc  ipsum  Zenonis 
aiunt  esse  finem,  declarantem  illud  quod  a  te  dictum 
1 5  est,  convenienter  naturae  vivere.  Alteram  signifi- 
cari idem  ut  si  diceretur  officia  media  omnia  aut 
pleraque  servantem  vivere.  Hoc  sic  expositum  dis- 
simile  est  superiori ;  illud  enim  rectum  est  (quod 
KaTopSuifia  dicebas)  contingitque  sapienti  soli;  hoc 
autera  inchoati  cuiusdam  offici  est,  non  perfecti,  quod 
cadere  in  nonnullos  insipientes  potest,  Tertium 
autein,  omnibus  aut  maximis  rebus  iis  quae  secun- 
dum naturam  sint  fruentem  vivere.  Hoc  non  est 
positum  in  nostra  actione ;  completur  enim  et  ex  eo 
genere  vitae  quod  virtute  fruitor  et  es  iis  rebus 
quae  sunt  secundum  naturam  nequc  sunt  in  nostra 
potestate.  Sed  lioc  summum  bonuni  quod  tertia 
significatione  intellegitur,  eaque  vita  quae  ex  summo 
bono  degitur,  quia  coniuncta  ei  virtus  est,  in  sapien- 
tem  solum  cadit,  isque  finis  bonorum,  ut  ab  ipsis 
Stoicis  scriptum  videmus,  a  Xenocrate  atque  ab 
Aristotele  constitutus  est.  Itaque  ab  iis  constitutio 
ilia  prima  naturae  a  qua  tu  quoque  ordiebare  I 
prope  verbis  exponitur. 

■  BOOK  )V.   vi 

Preceding  thinkers,  and  among  them  most  explicitly 
Polemo,  had  explained  the  Chief  Good  as  being- 
to  live  ill  accordance  with  nature."  This  formula 
receives  from  the  Stoics  three  interpretations, 
first  runs  thus,  Jo  live  in  the  light  of  a  kaowJedge_of  C 
the  naturaj_sequence  of  causation.'  This  conceptior 
oftheT-nd  they  declare  fo  be  identical  with  Zeno's. 
being  an  explanation  of  your  phrase  '  to  hve  in  agree- 

i  ment  with  nature,'  Their  second  interpretation  is  that  ioif-rpceiniu 
it  means  tlie  same  as  'to Jive  in  the  performance  pf  i^trtta'^ec 
all,   or   most,  of  one's   intermediate   dutie^^  The  'n  accordanee 
CEi^Cood  as  thus  expounded  is  not  the  same  as  "1»^"""- 
that  of  the  preceding  interpretation.    That  is    right    " 
action '    (kalorlhihna    was   your    term),    and   i 
achieved  only  by  the  Wise  Man,  but  this  belongs  to 
duty  merely  inchoate,  so  to  speak,  and  not  perfect, 
which  may  sometimes  be  attained  by  the  foolish. 
Again,  the  third  interpretation  of  the  formula  is. '  to 
hveintheenjoymentofall,  or  of  the  greatest,  of  thtrae  \ 
things  which  are  in  accordance- wiUuiaiui».'    This 
does  not  depend  solely  on  our  own  conduct,  for  it 
involves  two  factors,  first  a  mode  of  life  ei\joying 
virtue,  secondly  a  supply  of  the  things  which  are  in 
accordance  with  nature  but  which  are  not  within 
our  control.     But  the  Chief  Good  as  understood  in 
the  third  and  last  interpretation,  and  life  passed  on 
thebasisof  the  Chief  Good,  being  inseparably  coupled 
with  virtue,  lie  within  the  reach  of  the  Wise  Man 
alone  ;  and  this  is  the  account  of  the  End  of  Goods, 
as  we  read  in  the  writings  of  the  Stoics  themselves, 
which  was  given  by  Xenocrates  and  Aristotle.  They 
therefore  describe  the  primary  constitution  of  nature, 
which  was  yom:  starting  point  also,  more  or  less  in 
the  following  terms. 


VII.  Onuiis  natura  vult  esse  conservatris  sui,  ut 
ct  salva  sit  et  in  genere  conservetur  suo.  Ad  banc 
rem  aiunt  artes  quoque  requisitas  quae  naturam 
adtuvarent,  in  quibus  ea  numeretur  in  primis  quae 
est  Vivendi  ars,  ut  tueatur  quod  a  natura  datum  sit, 
quod  desit  acquirat ;  iidemque  diviserunt  naturam 
homintij  in  animum  et  corpus  ;  eumque  eorum  utrum- 
que  per  se  CKpetendum  esse  dixisseut,  virtutes  quo- 
que utriusque  eorum  p^rse  expetendasesse  dieebant; 
et^  cum  aniruum  infinita  quadam  laude  anteponerent 
corpori,  virtutes  quoque  animi  bonis  corporis  ante- 
ponebant.  Sed  cum  sapientiam  totlus  liominis  CU- 
et  procuratricem  esse  vellent,  quae  esset 
et  adiutrix,  boc  sapientiae  munus  esse 
am  eum  tueretur  qui  constaret  ex 
animo  et  corpore,  in  utroque  luvaret  eum  ac  conti- 
neret.  Atque  ita  re  sinipliciter  primo  collocata, 
reliqua  subtilius  persequentes  corporis  bona  facilem 
quandam  rationem  habere  censebant,  de  animi  bonis 
accuratius  exquirebant,  in  primisque  reperiebant  esse 
in  iis  iustitiae  seraina,  primique  ex  omnibus  philo- 
sophis  natura  tributum  esse  docuerunt  ut  ii  qui  pro- 
creati  essent  a  procreatoribus  amarentur,  et,  id  quod 
temporum  ordine  autiquius  est,  ut  coniugia  virorum 
et  uxorum  natura  coniuncta  esse  diccrent,  qua  e« 
stirpe  orirentur  amicitiae  cognationum.  Atque  ab 
liis  initiis  profecti  omnium  virtutum  et  originem  et 

naturae  com 
dicebant   ut 

li  MSS. 

BOOK  fV.  vii 
Ei'cry  natural  organism  aims  at  being  its  ForstirttaB 
1  preserver,  so  as  to  secure  its  safety  and  also  its  stiocioi  «it- 
preservation  true  to  its  specific  type.     With  this  Ss^imk™'- 
object,  they  declare,  man  called  in  the  aid  of  the  coumof  body»' 
arts  also  to  assist  nature  ;  and  chief  aniong  the  arts  ihangb  drcmint 
is  counted  the  art  of  living,  which  aims  at  guarding  ™"^o^°mDor 
the  gifts  that  nature  has  bestowed  and  at  obtaining  ta  ■ 
those  that  are  lacking.     They  further  divided  the 
nature  of  man  into  soul  and  Iwdy.     Each  of  these 
parts  they  pronounced  to  be  desirable  for  its  own 
sake,  and  consequently  they  said  that  the  virtues 
also  of  each  were  desirable  for  their  own  sakes ;  at 
the  same  time  they  extolled  the  sou!  as  infinitely 
surpassing  the  body  in  glory,  and  accordingly  placed 
the  virtues  also  of  the  m.ind  above  the  goods  of  the 
'  body.     But  they  held  tliat  wisdom  is  the  guardian 
and  protectress  of  the  whole  man,  as  being  the  com- 
rade and  helper  of  nature,  and  so  they  said  that  the 
(imction  of  wisdom,  as  protecting  a  being  that  con- 
sisted of  a  mind  and  a  body,  was  to  assist  and  pre- 
serve him  in  respect  of  Irath.     After  thus  laying  the 
first  broad  foundations  of  the  theory,  thej'  went  on 
to  work  it  out  in  greater  detail.      The  goods  of  the 
body,  they  held,  required  no  particular  explanation,  indalsothe 
but  the  goods  of  the  soul  they  investigated  with  E^'Sfd' w^.*ih- 
more  elaboration,  finding  in  the  first  place  that  in  Virtues, 
them  lay  the  germs  of  Justice  ;  and  they  were  the 
first  of  any  philosophers  to  teach  that  the  love  of 
parents  for  their  offspring  is  a  provision  of  nature  ; 
and  that  nature,  so  they  pointed  out,  has  ordained 
the  union  of  men  and  women  in  marriage,  ■ 
prior  in  order  of  time,  and  is  the  root  of  all  the 
family  alfections.     Starting  from  these   first  prin- 
ciples they  traced  out  the  origin  and  growth  of  all 



progress! onem  persecuti  sunt.  Es  quo  magtiitudo 
quoque  arimii  exsistebnt  qua  facile  posset  repugnari 
obsistique  fortunae,  quod  raasimae  res  essent  in 
potestate  sapientis;  varietates  autem  iniuriasque  for- 
tunae facile  veterum  philosophorum  praeceptis  in- 
1  a  stituta  I'ita  superabat.  Principiis  autem  a  natura 
datis  aniplitudines  quaedam  bonorum  excitabantur, 
partim  profectae  a  contemplationc  rerum  occultarum, 
quod  erat  insitus  menti  cognitionis  amor,  e  quo  etiam 
rationis  explicandae  disserendique  cupiditas  conse- 
quebatur ;  quodque  hoc  solum  animal  natum  est 
pudoris  ac  verecundiae  particeps  appetensque  con- 
victum  hominum  ac  societatem  animadvertensque  in 
omnibus  rebus  quas  ageret  aut  diceret  ut  ne  quid  ab 
eo  fieret  nisi  honeste  ac  decore,  his  initiis  et  ^  ut 
ante  dixi  seminibus  a  natura  datis,  temperantia, 
modestia,  iustitia  et  omnis  honestas  perfecte  absoluts 
19  VIII.  Habes,"  inquam,  Cato,  formam  eorum 
de  quibus  loquor  philosophorum.  Qua  exposits 
scire  cupio  quae  causa  sit  cur  Zeno  ab  hac  antiqua 
constitutione  desciverit,  quidnam  horum  ab  eo  non 
naturam  conservatri- 
nne  animal  ipsum  sibi 
in  suo  gen  ere  inco- 
n  omnium  artium  finis 
quaereret,  idem  statui 
It  quod,  cum  ex  animo 

sit  probatum:  quodi 
cem  sui  dixerint,  an   quod 
commendatom  ut  se  salvu 
lumeque  vellet,  an  quod,^  ■ 
is  esset  quern  natura 
debere  de  totius  arte  vitae, 
'(T/inserled  by  Mdv. 
^sesaivum  Lambinus,  Mdv.j 
*  yuorf  inserted  by  Mdv. 



BOOK  IV.  vii-viii 
the  virtues.  From  the  same  source  was  developed 
loftiness  of  mind,  which  could  render  us  proof  against 
tile  assaults  of  fortune,  because  the  things  that 
matter  were  under  the  control  of  the  Wise  Man ; 
whereas  to  tlie  vicissitudes  and  blows  of  fortune  a 
life  directed  by  the  precepts  of  the  old  philosophers 

i  could  easily  rise  superior.  Again,  upon  the  founda- 
tions given  by  nature  was  erected  a  spacious  struc- 
ture of  excellences,  partly  based  on  the  contemplation 
of  the  secrets  of  nature,  since  the  mind  possessed  an 
innate  love  of  knowledge,  whence  also  resulted  the 
passion  for  argument  and  for  discussion ;  and  also, 
since  man  is  the  only  annual  endowed  wit 
of  modesty  and  shame,  with  a  desire  for  intercourse 
and  society  with  his  fellows,  and  with  a  scrupulous 
care  in  all  his  words  and  actions  to  avoid  any  con- 
duct that  is  not  honourable  and  seemly,  from  these 
beginnings  or  germs,  as  I  called  them,  before,  of 
nature's  bestowal,  were  developed  Temperance,  Self- 
control,  Justice  and  moral  virtue  generally  in  full 
flower  and  perfection. 

}       VIII.  "There,  Cato,"  I  said,  "  is  an  outline  of  the  T 
philosophers  of  whom  I  am  speaking.     Having  put  bi 
it  before  you,  I  should  be  glad  to  learn  what  reason  "• 
Zeno    had    for   seceding    from    this   old-established 
system.     Which  precisely  of  these  doctrines  did  he 
think  unsatisfactory:  the  doctrine  that  every  organism 
instinctively  seeks  its  own  preservation  ?  or  that  every 
animal  has  an  affection  for  itself,  prompting  it  to 
desire  its  own  continuance  safe  and  unimpaired  in 
its  specific  type  ?  or  that,  since  the  End  of  every  art 
is  some  special  natural  requirement,  the  same  must 
be  affirmed  as  regards  the  art  of  life  as  a  whole?  c 
that,  as  we  consist  of  soul  and  body,  these  and  aisc 


c'onstaremus  et  corpore,  et  haec  ipsa  et  eorum  vir- 
tutes  per  se  esse  sumendas.  An  vtro  displieuit  ea 
quae  tributa  est  animi  virtutibus  tanta  praestantia? 
an  quae  de  prudentia,  de  cognitione  reriim,  de  con- 
iunctione  generis  humani,  quaeque  ab  iisdem  de 
temperantia,  de  modestia,  de  magnitudine  animi,  de 
omni  honestate  dicuntur?  Fatebuntur  Stoici  haec 
omnia  dicta  esse  praeclare  neqoe  earn  causam  Zenoni 
3  desciscendi  fuisse.  Alia  qiiaedani  dicent,  credo, 
magna  antiquorum  esse  peccata  quae  ille  veri  inve- 
stigandi  ciipidus  nullo  niodo  ferre  potuerit.  Quid 
enim  perversius,  quid  intolerabilius,  quid  stultius 
quatn  bonam  valetudinem,  quam  dulorum  omnium 
vacuitatem,  quam  integrttatem  oi-ulorum  reliquorum- 
que  sensuum  ponere  in  bonis  potius  quam  dicerent 
nihil  omnino  inter  eas  res  iisque  contrarias  interesse? 
ea  enim  omnia  quae  illi  bona  dicerent  praeposita 
esse,  non  bona;  itemque  il!a  quae  in  corpore  excel- 
lerent  atulte  antiquoa  disisse  per  se  esse  espetenda; 
sumenda  potitis  quam  expetenda;  ea  denique  omni 
vita  quae  in  virtute  una  consisleret,  illam  vitam  quae 
etiam  ceteris  rebus  quae  essent  secundum  tiaturam 
abundaret,  magis  expetendam  non  esse  sed  rangis 
sumendam;  cumqiie  ipsa  virtus  efficiat  ita  beatam 
vitam  ut  beatior  esse  non  possit,  tamen  quaedam 
deesse  sapientibus  turn  cum  sint  beatissimi ;  itaque 
eos  id  agere  ut  a  se  dolores,  morbos,  debilitates 

BOOK  IV.  viii 

the  virtues  of  these  are  desirable  for  their  own 
sakes?  Or  again,  did  he  take  exeeptioo  to  the 
ascription  of  such  pre-eminence  to  the  virtues  of  the 
soul?  or  with  what  they  say  about  prudence  and 
knowledge,  about  the  sense  of  human  fellowship,  or 
about  temperance,  self-control,  magnanimity,  and 
moral  virtue  in  general?  No,  the  Stoics  will  admit 
that  all  of  these  doetrines  are  admirable,  and  that 
ao  Zeno's  reason  for  secession  did  not  lie  here.  As  I 
understand;  they  will  accuse  the  ancients  of  certain 
grave  errors  in  other  matters,  which  that  ardent 
seeker  after  truth  found  himself  quite  unable  to 
tolerate.  What,  he  asked,  could  have  been  more 
insufferably  foolish  and  perverse  than  to  take  good 
health,  freedom  from  all  pain,  or  soundness  of  eye- 
sight and  of  tile  other  senses,  and  class  them  as 
goods,  instead  of  saying  that  there  was  nothing 
whatever  to  choose  between  these  things  and  their 
opposites?  According  to  him,  all  these  things 
which  the  ancients  called  good,  were  not  good,  but 
preferred';  and  So  also  with  bodily  cicellences,  it 
was  foolish  of  the  ancients  to  call  them  desirable 
for  their  own  sakes';  they  were  not  'desirable' 
but  worth  adopting';  and  in  short,  speaking 
generally,  a  life  bountifiilly  supplied  with  all  the 
other  things  in  accordance  with  nature,  in  addition 
to  virtue,  was  not  more  desirable,'  but  only  more 
worth  adopting'  than  a  life  of  virtue  and  virtue 
alone ;  and  although  virtue  of  itself  can  render 
life  as  happy  as  it  is  possible  for  it  to  be,  yet 
there  are  some  things  that  Wise  Men  lack  at  the 
very  moment  of  supreme  happiness ;  and  accordingly 
they  do  their  best  to  protect  themselves  from  pain, 
disease  and  infirmity. 

y2  323 


21  IX.  '  O  magnam  vim  ingeni  causamque  iustam  cur 
nova  exsisteret  disciplina!  Pergcporro:  sequuntur 
enim  ea  quae  tu  scientissime  complexus  es,  omnium 
insipientinni,  iniustitiam,  alia  vitia  similia  esse,  om- 
niaque  peccata  esse  paria,  eosque  qui  natura  doctri- 
naque  longe  ad  virtutem  processissent,  nisi  earn 
plane  consecuti  essent,  sumrne  esse  miseros,  neque 
inter  eorura  vitani  et  improbissimorum  quidquam 
omnino  interesse,  ut  Plato,  tantus  ille  vir,  si  sapiens 
non  fiierit,  nihilo  melius  quam  quivis  improbissimus 
nee  beatius  vixerit.  Haec  videlicet  est  correctio 
philosopbiae  veteris  et  emendatio,  quae  omnino 
aditum  nullum  Iiabere  potest  in  urbem,  in  fonnrjj  in 
curiam.  Quis  enim  ferre  posset  ita  loquentem  eum 
qui  se  auctorem  vitae  graviter  et  sapienter  ai^endae 
profiteretur,  nomina  rerum  commutantem,'  cumque 
idem  sentiret  quod  omnes,  quibus  rebus  eandem 
vim  tribueret  alia  nomina  imponentem,  verba  niodo 

22  mutantem,  de  opinionibus  nihil  detrahentem?  Pa- 
tronusne  causae  in  epilogo  pro  reo  dicens  negaret 
esse  malum  essilium.  publicationem  bonorum?  hace 
reicienda  esse,  non  fugienda?  ncc  misericordem 
iudicem  e.sse  oportere  ?  In  contione  autem  si 
loqueretur,  si  Hannibal  ad  portas  vcnisset  murumque 
iaculo  traiecisset,  negaret  esse  in  malis  capi,  venire, 
interfici,  patriani  amittere?    An  senatus,  cum  trium- 

j  brackcled  bj-  Mdv.  and 

BOOK  IV.  ix 

I  JX.  "  What  acuteness  of  intellect '.  What  a  satis-  si 
factory  reason  for  the  creation  of  a  new  philosophy '.  'j 
But  proceed  further;  for  we  now  come  to  the  C' 
doctrine,  of  which  you  gave  such  a  masterly  summary, 
that  all  men's  fully,  injustice  and  other  vices  are 
alike  and  all  sins  are  equal ;  and  that  those  who  by 
nature  and  training  have  made  considerable  pro- 
Sress  towards  virtue,  unless  they  have  actually 
attained  to  it,  are  utterly  miserable,  and  there  is 
nothing  whatever  to  choose  between  tlieir  existence 
and  that  of  the  wickedest  of  mankind,  so  that  the 
great  and  famous  Plato,  supposing  he  was  not  a 
Wise  Man,  lived  a  nn  better  and  no  happier  life 
than  any  unprincipled  scoundrel.  And  this,  if  you 
please,  is  your  revised  and  corrected  version  of  the 
old  philosophy,  a  version  that  could  not  possibly  be 
produced  in  civic  life,  in  the  law-courts,  in  the 
senate '.  For  who  could  tolerate  such  a  way  of  speak- 
ing in  one  who  claimed  to  be  an  authority  on  wise  and 
moral  conduct?  Who  would  allow  him  to  alter 
the  names  of  things,  and  while  really  holding  the 
same  opinions  as  everybody  else,  to  impose  different 
names  on  things  to  which  he  attaches  the  same 
meanings  as  other  people,  just  altering  the  terms 
while  leaving  tlie  ideas  themselves  untouched? 
12  Could  an  advocate  wind  up  his  defence  of  a  client  by 
declaring  that  exile  and  confiscation  of  property  are 
not  evils?  that  they  are  'to  be  rejected,'  but  not 
to  be  shunned'?  that  it  is  not  a  judge's  duty  to 
show  mercy?  Or  supposing  him  to  be  addressing  a 
meeting  of  the  people;  Hannibal  is  at  the  gates 
and  has  flung  a  javelin  over  the  city  walls;  could  he 
say  that  captivity,  enslavement,  death,  loss  of 
country  are  no  evils?  Could  the  senate,  decreeing 

phuin  Africano  decemeret,  quod  eius  virtute,'  aut 
felicitate  '  posset  dicerCj  si  neque  virtus  in  ullo 
nisi  in'  sapiente  nee  felicitas  vere  dici  potest? 
Quae  est  igitur  ista  pliilosophia  quae  communi  more 
in  foro  loquiturj  in  libellis  suo?  praesertim  cum 
quod  illi  suis  verbis  significant*  in  eo  nihil  novetur/ 

33  eaedem  res  tnaneant  alio  mudo.  Quid  enini  interest, 
divitias,  opes,  valetudinem  bona  dicas  anne  prae- 
posita,  cum  ille  qui  ista  bona  dicit  niliilo  plus  iis  tri- 
buat  quam  tu  qui  eadeni  itia  praeposita  nominas? 
Itaque  homo  in  primis  ingenuus  et  gravis,  dignus  ilia 
famiiiaritate  Scipionis  et  Lueli,  Panaetius,  cum  ad 
Q.  Tuberonem  de  dolore  patiendo  scriberet,  quod 
esse  caput  debebat  si  probari  posset,  nusquam  posuit 
non  esse  malum  dolorem.  sed  quid  esset  et  quale, 
quantumque  in  eo  esset  alieni,  deinde  quae  ratio 
esset  perfercndi;  cuius  quidem,  quoniam  Stoicus 
fiiit,  sententia  condemnata  milii  videtur  esse  inanitae 
ista  verborum. 

Si  X.  Sed  ut  propius  ad  ea,  Cato,  accedam  quae  a 
te  dicta  sunt,  pressius  agamus  eaque  quae  modo 
dixisti  cum  iis  conferamus  quae  tuis  antepono.  Quae 
sunt  igitur  communia  vobis  cum  antiquis,  iis  sic 
utamur  quasi  coneessis ;  quae  in  controversiam  ve- 

/«om.  most  MSS. 

'sig^ijicant  Kayser  ;  signijivtnt  MSS,,  Mdv. 
^  Aii-er  novelur  MSS.  add  ae  ipsis  rebus  nihil  t 


^P  BOOK  IV.   ix-x 

a  triumph  to  Africanus,  use  the  formulaj  whereas 
by  reason  of  his  valour,'  or  good  fortune,'  if  no 
one  but  the  Wise  Man  can  truly  be  said  to  possess 
either  valour  or  good  fortune?  What  sort  of  a 
philosophy  then  is  this,  which  speaks  the  ordinary 
language  in  public,  but  in  its  treatises  employs  an 
idiom  of  its  own?  and  that  though  the  doctrines 
which  the  Stoics  express  in  their  own  peculiar 
terms  contain  no  actual  novelty;  the  id' 

S3  tlie  same,  though  clothed  in  another  dress.  Why, 
what  difference  does  it  make  whether  you  call 
wealth,  power,  health  goods,'  or  things  pre- 
ferred,' when  he  who  calls  them  goods  assigns  no 
more  value  to  them  than  you  who  style  exactly  the 
same  things  preferred'?  This  is  why  so  eminent 
and,  high -minded  an  authority  as  Panaetius,  a  worthy 
member  of  the  famous  circle  of  Scipio  and  Laelius, 
in  his  epistle  to  Quintus  'I'ubero  on  the  endurance 
of  pain,  has  nowhere  made  what  ought  to  have  been 
his  most  effective  point,  if  it  could  be  shown  to  be 
true,  namely  that  pain  is  not  an  evil ;  instead  he 
defines  its  nature  and  properties,  estimates  the  de- 
gree of  its  divergence  from  nature,  and  lastly  pre- 
scribes the  method  by  which  it  is  to  be  endured. 
So  that  by  his  vote,  seeing  tllat  he  was  a  Stoic,  your 
terminological  fatuities  seem  to  me  to  stand  con- 

2+  X.  But  1  want  to  come  to  closei'  quarters,  Cato,  r 
with  the  actual  system  as  you  stated  it;  so  let  us  '' 
press  the  matter  home,  and  compare  the  doctrines  hi 
you  have  just  enunciated  with  those  which  I  think" 
superior  to  yours.  Let  us  then  take  for  granted  the  °' 
tenets  that  you  hold  in  common  with  the  ancients, 
but  discuss,  if  you  are  willing,  those  about  which 

ntunt,  de  iis  si  placet  disseramus."  Mihi  vero/' 
inquit,  placet  agi  subtilius  et  ut  ipse  dixisti  pres- 
sius.  Quae  enim  adhuc  protulisti,  popularia  sunt; 
ego  autem  a  te  elegantiora  desideru,"  A  mene 
tu?"  inquam;      sed  tamen  enitar,  et  si  minus  niulta 

95  mihi  occurrent  nou  fiigiam  ista  popularia.  Sed 
posituiu  sit  primum  nosmet  ipsos  commendatos  esse 
nobis  primamque  ex  natura  banc  habere  appetitionem 
ut  conservemus  nosmet  ipsos.  Hoc  tonvenit;  sequi- 
tur  illud  ut  animadvertamus  qui  simus  ipsi,  ut  nos 
quflles  oportet  esse  servemus.  Sumus  igitur  homfties ; 
ex  auimo  constamus  et  corpore,  quae  sunt  cuiusdam 
modi,  nosque  oportet,  ut  prima  appetitio  naturalis 
postulat,  haec  diligere  constituereque  ex  liis  finem 
ilium  sumiDi  boui  atquc  ultimi ;  quern  si  prima  vera 
sunt  ita  constitui  necesse  est,  earum  rerum  quae  sint 
secundum  naturam  quam  plurima  et  quam  maxima 

2fi  adipiaci.  Hunc  igitur  finem  illi  tenuerunt,  quodque 
ego  pluribus  verbis,  illi  brevius,  secundum  naturam 
vivere,  hoc  iis  bonorum  videbatur  extremum. 

XI.  Age  nunc  isti  doceant,  vel  tu  potiua  (quii 
enim  ista  melius?),  quouam  modo  ab  iisdem  princi- 
piis  profecti  efficiatis  ut  honeste  vivere  (id  est  enim 



there  is  dispute."  Oh,"  said  he,  I  am  quite 
willing  for  the  debate  to  go  deeper ;  to  be  pressed 
llome,  as  you  phrase  it.  The  arguments  you  liave 
so  far'put  forward  are  of  tlie  popular  order ;  but  I 
look  to  you  to  give  me  sometiiing  more  out  of  the 
common."  "  What, do  you  look  to  me  ?"  said  I.  "But 
all  the  SHme  I  will  do  my  best,  and  if  I  am  short  of 
matter,  1  shall  not  shrink  from  the  argimients  you  are 

95  pleased  to  call  popular.     But  let  it  be  granted  to  b< 
begin  with,  that  we  have  an  afltction  for  ourselves,^ 
and  that  the  earliest  impulse  bestowed  upon  us  by  cu 
nature  is  a  desire  for  seTPprservation.     On  this  we 
are  agreed ;  and  the  implication  is  that  we  must 
study  what  we  ourselves  are,  in  order  to  keep  our- 
selves true  to  our  proper  character.     We  are  then 
human  beings,  consisting  of  soul  and  body,  and  these 
of  a  certain  kind.     These  we  are  bound  Ui  esteem,  as 
our  earliest  natural  instinct  demands,  and  out  of 
these  we  must  construct  our  End,  our  Chief  and 
Ultimate  Good.     And,  if  our  premises  are  correct, 
this  End  must  be    pronounced    to    consist  in  the 
attainment  of  the  largest  number  of  the  most  im- 

i6  portant  of  the  things  in  accordance  with  nature.  This 
then  was  the  conception  of  the  End  that  they  up- 
held ;  the  supreme  Good  they  believed  to  be  the  thing 
which  I  have  described  at  some  length,  but  which 
they  more  briefly  expressed  by  the  formula  '  life  ac- 
cording to  nature.' 

XI.  "  Now  then  let  us  call  upon  your  leaders,  or  Bu 
better  upon  yourself  (for  who  is  more  qualilied  to  ^' 
speak  for  your  school?)  to  explain  this  :  how  in  the  '"' 
world  do  you  contrive,  starting  from  the  same  first 
principles,  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  Chief 
Good  is  morality  of  life? — for  that  is  equivalent 

to       ^H 

vel  e  virtute  vel  naturae  congruenter  vivere)  sum- 
mum  bonum  sit,  et  quonam  modo  aut  quo  loco 
corpus  subito  deserueritis  omniaque  ea  quae  secun- 
dum naturam  cum  sint  absint  a  nostra  potestatc, 
ipsum  denique  officium.  Quaero  igitur  quomodo  hae 
tantae  commendationes  a  natura  profectae  subito  a 

97  sapientia  relictae  sint.  Quod  si  non  hominis  sum- 
mum  bonum  quaereremus  sed  cuiusdam  animaritiSj 
is  autem  esset  nihil  nisi  animus  (liceat  enim  fingere 
aliquid  eiusmodi  quo  verum  facilius  reperiamus), 
tamen  illi  animo  non  esset  hie  vester  finis.  Deside- 
raret  enim  valetudincm,  vacuitatem  doloris,  appeteret 
etiam  conservation  em  sui  earumque  rerum  custodiam, 
finemque  sibi  constitueret  secundum  naturam  vivere, 
quod  est  ut  dixi  habere  ea  quae  secundum  naturam 

SS  sint  ve!  omnia  vel  plurima  et  masima.  Cuiuscum- 
que  enim  modi  animal  constitueris,  necesse  est, 
etianisi  id  sine  corpore  sit  ut  fingimus,  tamen  ossein 
animo  quaedam  similia  eorum  quae  sunt  in  corpore, 
ut  nulto  modo  nisi  ut  expusui  constitui  possit  finis 
bonorum.  Chrysippus  autem  exponens  differentias 
animantiuni  ait  alias  earum  corpore  excellere,  alias 
autem  animo,  nonnullas  valere  utraque  re;  deinde 
disputat  quod  ciiiusque  generis  animantium  st&tui 
deceat  extremum.  Cum  autem  hominem  in  eo  ge- 
nere  posuisset  ut  ei  tribueret  animi  excellentiam, 

BOOK  IV.  xi 
your  life  in  agreement  with  virtue '  or  '  life  in  har- 
mony with  nature.'  By  what  means  or  at  what 
point  did  you  suddenly  discard  the  body,  and  all 
those  things  which  are  in  accordunee  with  nature 
but  out  of  our  control,  and  lastly  duty  itself?  My  i 
question  then  is,  how  comes  it  that  so  many  things 
that  Nature  strongly  recommends  have  been  sud- 

i7  denly  abandoned  by  Wisdom?  Even  if  we  were  not 
seeking  the  Chief  Good  of  man  but  of  some  Uving 
creature  that  consisted  solely  of  a  mind  (let  us  allow 
ourselves  to  imagine  such  a  creature,  in  order  to 
facilitate  our  discovery  of  the  truth),  even  so  that 
mind  would  not  accept  this  End  of  yours.  For  such 
a  being  would  ask  for  health  and  freedom  from  pain, 
and  would  also  desire  its  own  preservation,  and 
security  for  the  goods  just  specified;  nn'd^f  would 
set  up  as  its  End  to  live  according  to  nature,  which 
means,  as  I  said,  to  possess  either  all  or  most  and  the 
most  impoj^nt  of  the  things  which  are  in  accord- 

28  ance  with  nature.  In  fact  you  may  construct  a 
living  creature  of  any  sort  you  like,  but  even  if  it 
be  devoid  of  a  body  like  our  iniaginary  being,  never- 
theless its  mind  will  be  bound  to  possess  certain 
attributes  analogous  to  those  of  the  body,  and  con- 
sequently it  will  be  impossible  to  set  up  for  it  an 
End  of  Goods  on  any  other  lines  than  those  which  I 
have  laid  down.  Chrysippus,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
his  survey  of  the  different  species  of  living  things 
states  that  in  some  the  body  is  the  principal  part,  in 
others  the  mind,  while  there  are  some  that  are  equally 
endowedinrespect  of  either;  and  then  he  proceeds  to 
discuss  what  constitutes  the  ultimate  good  proper  to 
each  species.  Man  he  has  placed  under  that  species  in 
which  the  mind  is  principal ;  and  yet  he  so  defines 

a  bonum  id  constituit,  non  ut  excellere  ani- 
mus setl  ut  niliil  esse  praeter  animum  videretur. 
XII.  Uno  autem  modo  in  virtute  sola  sununiun 
botium  recte  poneretur,  si  quod  esset  animal  quod 
totum  ex  mente  constaret,  id  ipsum  tamen  sic  ut  ea 
mens  nihil  haberet  in  se  quod  esset  secundum  natu- 

99  ram,  ut  valetudo  est.  Sed  id  ne  cogitari  quidem 
potest  quale  sit  ut  non  repugiiet  ipsum  sibi. 

Sin  dicunt'  obscurari  quaedam  nee  apparere 
quia  valde  parva  sint,  nos  quoque  concediTnus;  quod 
dicit  Epicurus  etiam  de  voluptute,  quae  minimae 
sint  voluptates,  eas  obseurari  saepe  et  obrui ;  sed  non 
sunt  in  eo  genere  tantae  commoditates  corporis 
tamque  productae  tennporibus  tamque  multae.  Ita- 
que  in  qui  bus  propter  eorum  exiguilateni  obscnratio 
conseqiiitur,  saepe  accidit  ut  nihil  interesse  nostra 
fateamur  sint  ilia  necne  sint  (ut  in  sole,  quod  a  tc 
dicebatur,    lucernam   adhibcre    nihil    interest    aut 

30  teruncium  adicere  Croesi  pecuniae);  quibus  autem 
in  rebus  tanta  obscuratio  non  fit,  fieri  tamen  potest 
ut  id  ipsum  quod  interest  non  sit  magnum  (ut  ei 
qui  iucunde  vixerit  an  nos  decern  si  aeque  vita 
iucunda  menstrua  addatur,  quia  momentum  aliquod 
babeat  ad  iueunduin  accesaio,'  bonum  sit ;  si  autem 
id  non  coucedatur,  non  continuo  vita  beata  toltitur). 
Bona  autem  corporis  huic  sunt  quod  posterius  posui 
similiora.  Habent  enim  accessionem  dignam  in  qua 
elaboretur:  ut  mihi  in  hoc  Stoici  iocari  videantur 

•diciinl  Md«.;    dicit   MSS.   (in 
Other  MSS.  have  ad  iucuac 


las   diamt 

^^  BOOR   IV.  xi-3iii 

man's  End  as  to  make  it  appear,  not  that  he  is  prin- 
cipally mind,  but  that  he  consists  of  nothing  else. 
XII.  But  the  only  case  in  which  it  would  be  correct 
to  place  the  Chief  Good  in  virtue  alone  is  if  tliere 
existed  a  creature  consisting  solely  of  pure  intellectj 
with  the  further  proviso  that  this  intellect  were 
devoid  of  any  attribute  that  is  iii  accordance  with 

39  nature,  such  as  health.  But  it  is  impossible  even 
to  imagine  a  self-consistent  picture  of  what  such  a 
creature  would  be  Uke. 

If  on  the  contrary  they  urge  that  certain  things 
are  so  estremely  small  that  they  are  eclipsed  and  lost , 
sight  of  altogether,  we  too  admit  this  ;  Epicurus  also 
says  the  same  of  pleasure,  that  the  smallest  pleasures 
are  often  eclipsed  and  disappear.  But  things  so  im- 
portant, permanent  and  numerous  as  the  bodily 
advantages  in  question  are  nut  in  this  category.  On 
the  one  hand  tjierefore,  with  things  so  small  as  to 
be  eclipsed  from  view,  we  are  often  bound  to  admit 
that  it  makes  no  difference  to  us  whether  we  have 
themornot  (j ust  as,  to  take  your  illustration,  it  makes 
no  difference  if  you  light  a  lamp  in  the  sunshine, 

30  or  add  sixpence  to  the  wealth  of  Croesus) ;  whOe  on 
the  other  hand,  witli  things  which  are  not  so  com- 
pletely eclipsed,  it  may  nevertheless  be  the  case  that 
the  precise  difference  they  make  is  not  very  great 
(thus,  if  a  man  who  has  lived  ten  years  enjoyably 
were  given  an  additional  month  of  equally  enjoy- 
able life,  the  addition  to  his  enjoyment,  being  of 
some  value,  would  be  a  good  thing,  but  yet  the  re- 
fusal of  the  addition  does  not  forthwith  annihilate 
his  happiness).  Now  bodily  goods  resemble  rather 
the  latter  sort  of  things.  For  they  contribute  some- 
thing worth  taking  trouble  to  obtain  ;  so  that  1  feel 


interdum  cum  ita  dicant,  si  ad  illamvitam  quae  cuni 
virtute  degatur  ampulla  nut  atrigilis  accedat,  sum- 
pturum  sapientem  eam  vitam  potius  quo  haec  adiecta 

:  sint  nee  beatiorem  tatneii  ob  eam  causam  fore.  Hoc 
smiile  tandem  est  ?  non  risu  potius  quam  oratione 
eieieudum?  Ampulla  enim  sit  ne cue  sit,  quis  non 
iure  Optimo  irrideatur  si  laboret  ?  At  vero  pravi- 
tate^  membrorum  et  cruciatu  dolonim  si  quis  quem 
levet,  magnam  ineat  gratiam;  nee  si  ille~  sapiens  ad 
tortoris  eculeum  a  tyranno  ire  cogatur  similein  ha- 
beat  vultum  et  si  ampullam  perdidisset,  sed  ut 
magnum  et  difficile  certamen  iniens,  cum  sibi  cum 
capital!  adversario,  dolore,  depugnandum  videret, 
excitaret  omnes  rationes  fortitudinis  ac  patientiae 
quarum  praesidio  iniret  difficile  illud  ut  dixi  ma- 
gnumque  proelium.  Delude  non  quaerimus  quid 
obscuretur  aut  intereat  quia  sit  admoduni  parvuin, 
sed  quid  tale  sit  ut  expleat  summani.  Una  volnptas 
e  multis  obscuratur  in  ilia  vita  voloptaria  ;  sed  tanien 
ea,  quamvis  parva  sit,  pars  est  eius  vitae  quae  posita 
est  in  voluptate.  Nummus  in  Croesi  divitiis  obscu- 
ratur, pars  est  tamen  divitiarum.  Quare  obscurentur 
etiam  liaec  quae  secundum  naturam  esse  dicimus  in 
vita  beata,  sint  modo  partes  vitae  beatae. 

2  Xlll.  Atqui  si,  ut  convenire  debet  inter  nos, 
est  quaedam  appctitio  naturalis  ea  quae  secundum 
naturam  sunt  appetcns,  eorum  omnium  est  aliqua 

BOOK  IV.  xii-xiii 

the  Stoics  must  sometimes  be  joking  on  this  point, 
when  they  say  that  if  to  the  life  of  virtue  he  added 
an  oil-flask  or  a  flesh-brush,  the  Wise  Man  will 
choose  the  life  so  augmented]  by  preference,  but  yet 

31  will  not  on  that  account  be  any  happier.  Pray  does 
this  illustration  really  hold  good  ?  is  it  not  ratlier  to 
be  dismissed  with  a  laugh  than  seriously  refuted  ? 
Who  does  not  richly  deserve  to  be  laughed  at  if  he 
troubles  about  having  or  not  having  an  oiUflask  ?  But 
rid  a  man  of  bodily  deformity  or  agonies  of  pain, 
and  yon  earn  his  deepest  gratitude  ;  and  if  the  Wise 
Man  ia  ordered  by  atyrant  to  go  to  the  rack, he  would 
not  near  the  same  look  as  if  he  had  lost  his  oil-flask. 
He  would  feel  that  he  had  a  severe  and  searching 
ordeal  before  him  ;  and  seeing  that  he  was  about  to 
encounter  the  supreme  antagonist,  pain,  he  would 
summon  up  all  his  principles  of  courage  and  endur- 
ance to  fortify  him  against  that  severe  and  searching 
struggle  aforesaid.^ Again,  the  question  is  not 
whether  such  and  such  a  good  is  so  trifling  as  to  be 
eclipsed  or  lost  altogether,  but  whether  it  is  of  such 
a  sort  as  to  contribute  to  the  sum  total.  In  the  life 
of  pleasure  of  which  we  spoke,  one  pleasure  is  lost  to 
sight  among  tlie  many ;  but  all  the  same,  small  as  it  is, 
it  is  a  part  of  the  life  that  is  based  upon  pleasure.  A 
halfpenny  is  lost  to  sight  amidst  the  riches  of  Croesus ; 
still  it  forms  part  of  those' riches.  Hence  the  circum- 
stances according  to  nature,  as  we  call  them,  may  be 
unnoticed  in  a  life  of  happiness,  only  you  must  allow 
that  tliey  are  parts  of  that  happiness. 

32  Xin.   "  Yet  if,  as  you  and  we  are  bound  to  agree,  ai 
there  does  exist  a  certain  natural  instinct  to  desire  ^ 
the  things  in  accordance  with  nature,  the  right  proce- 
dure is  to  add  together  all  these  things  in  one  definite 



sumina  facienda.      Quo  coostituto  turn  licebit  otiose 

ista  quaerere,  de  magnitudine  rerum,  de  excellentia 

quanta  in   quoque   sit  ad  beate  vivendum,  de   istis 

ipsis  obscurationibus  quae  propter  ejtiguitatem   vix 

aut  ae  viK  quidem  appareant.      Quid  de   quo  nuUa 

?   Nemo  enim  est  qui  aliter  diierit  quin 

1  naturarum  simile   csset  id  ad  quod  omnia 

referrentur,  quod  est  ultimum  rerum  appetendaruro. 

Onmis  enim  est  natura  diligens  sui.     Quae  est  enim 

quae  se  umquam  deserat  aut  partem  aliquam  suj  aut 

s  partis  habitura  aut  vim  aut  ullius  earum  rerum 

le  secmidum  naturam  sunt  aut  motiun  aut  statum  ? 

ae  aiitem  natura  suae  primae  iiistitutionis  oblita 

est?     Nulla  profecto  est^  quin  suam  vim  retineat  A 

33  prim.o  ad  estremum.  Quomodo  igitur  evenit  at 
hooiinis  natura  sola  esset  quae  liominem  relinqueret, 
quae  oblivisceretur  corporis,  quae  summum  bonuin 
non  in  toto  homine  sed  in  parte  liomdnis  poneret? 
Quomodo  autem,  quod  ipsi  etiam  fatentur  constatque 
inter  omnes,  conservabitur  ut  simile  sit  omnium 
naturarum  illud  ultimum  de  quo  quaeritur  ?     Turn 

1  esset  simile  si   in  eeteris  quoque  naturis  id 
cuique  esset  ultimum   quod  in  quaque  escelleret. 

34  Tale  enim  visum  est  ultimum  Stoicorum.  Quid 
dubitas   igitur   mutare  principia  naturae?     Quod* 

Lenim   dicis,  omne    animal,  simul  atque  sit  ortam, 
applicatum  esse   ad    se  diligendum  esseque  in  ae 
conservando  occupatum,  quin  potius  ita  dicis,  omne 
'  fsi  supplied  by  Mdv. 
*gitoiicon}.  MQIIer;  MSS. 


cdd.  Quid—occ^ 

e  open         ^^^M 
;nd  tile  ^H 

^P  BOOK  IV.   Kiu 

total.     This  point  establislied,  it  will  then  be 
to  us  \a  investigate  at  our  leisure  your  questi 
about  .the  importance  of  the  separate  items,  and 
value  of  their  respective  contributions  to  happiness, 
and  about  that  eclipse,  as  you  call  it,  of  the  things 
so  small  as  to  be  almost  or  quite  imperceptible. 
Then  what  of  a  point  on  which  no  disagreement  acm 
exists  ?      I  mean  this  :  no  one  will  dispute  that  the  ^''^ 
supreme  and   final   End,   the   thing  ultimately   de- ite» 
sirable,  is  analogous  for  all  natural  species  alike. 
For  love  of  self  is  inherent  in  every  species  ;  since 
what  species  exists  that  ever  deserts  itself  or  any 
part  of  itself,  or  any  habit  or  faculty  of  any  such  part, 
or  any  of  the  things  in  accordance  with  nature,  either 
in  motion  or  at  rest?     What  species  ever  forgot  its 
own  original  constitution  ?     Assuredly  there  is  not 
one  that  does  not  retain  its  own  proper  faculty  from 

13  start  to  finish.  Huw  then  came  it  about  that,  of  all 
the  existing  species,  mankind  alone  simuld  abandon 
man's  nature,  forget  the  body,  and  find  its  Chief 
Good  not  in  the  whole  man  but  in  a  part  of  man  ? 
How  moreover  is  the  axiom  to  be  retained,  admitted 
as  it  is  even  by  the  Stoics  and  accepted  universally, 
that  the  End  which  is  the  subject  of  our  inquirj'  i.s 
analogous  for  all  species  ?  For  the  analogy  to  hold, 
every  other  species  also  would  have  to  find  its  End 
in  that  part  of  the  orgatQsm  which  in  that  particular 
species  is  the  highest  part ;  since  that,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  how  the  Stoics  conceive  the  End  of  man. 

14  Why  then  do  you  hesitate  to  alter  your  conception  ^^  ,jj 
of  the  primary  instincts  to  correspond?  Instead  of^»"' 
saying  that  every  animal  from  the  moment  of  its  puiw 
birth  is  devoted  to  love  of  itself  and  engrossed  in  p^^n 
preserving  itself,  why  do  you   not  rather  say   that  only. 

z  337 

tinimal  applicatum  esse  ad  id  quod  in  eo  sit  optimuni 
et  in  eius  unius  occup«tum  esse  ciistodia,  reliquasque 
natums  nihil  aliud  agere  nisi  ut  id  conservent  quod 
in  quaque  optimum  sit  ?  Quomodo  autera  optimum,  si 
bonuin  praeterea  nullum  est  ?  Sin  autem  reliqua  appe- 
tenda  sunt,  cur,  quod  est  ultimum  rerum  appetenda- 
rum,  id  non  aut  ex  omnium  earum  aut  ex  pluriraarum 
et  maximarum  appetitione  concluditur  ?  Ut  Phidias 
potest  a  piimo  instituej^  signum  jdque  perficere, 
potest  ab  alio  inchoatum  accipere  et  absolvere,  huic 
similis  est  sapientia ;  nan.  enim  ipsa  genuit  hominem 
sed  accepit  a  natura  inchoatum  ;  hanc  erg-o  intuens 

35  debet  institutum  illud  quasi  signum  absolvere.  Qua- 
lem  igitur  hominein  natura  inchoavit  ?  et  quod  est 
munus,  quod  opus  sapientiae  ?  quid  est  quod  ab  ea 
absolvi  et  perfici  debeat?  Si  nihil  [in  eo  quod 
perficiendum  est]'  praeter  motum  ingeni  quendam, 
id  est,  rationem,  necesse  est  huic  ultimum  esse  ex 
virtute  agere  ;  rationis  enim  perfectio  est  virtus  ;  si 
nihil  nisi  corpus,  summa  erunt  ilia,  valetudo,  vacuitas 

36  doloris,  pulchritudo,  cetera.  XIV.  Nunc  de  hominis 
summo  bono  quaeritur ;  quid  igitur  dubitamus  in 
tota  eius  natura  quaerere  quid  sit  effectuui  ?  Cum 
enim  constet  inter  otnnes  omne  officium  munusque 
sapientiae  in  hominis  cultu  esse  occupatum,  alii  (ne 
me  esistimes  contra  Stoicos  solum  dicere)  eas  sea- 


cp.  Sjm^I 

test.    4^H 

BOOK  IV.  xiii-xiv 
every  animal  is  devoted  to  the  best  part  of  itself 
and  engrossed  in  protecting-  that  alone,  mid  that 
every  other  species  is  solely  cngag-ed  in  preserving 
the  part  that  is  respectively  best  in  each  ?  But  in 
what  sense  is  one  part  the  best,  if  nothing  beside  it 
is  good  at  all  ?  While  if  on  the  contrary  other 
things  also  are  desirable,  why  does  not  the  supremely 
desirable  thuig  consist  in  the  attainment  of  all.  or  of 
the  greatest  possible  number  and  the  most  important, 
of  these  things  ?  A  Pheidias  can  start  to  make  a  statue 
from  the  beginning  and  carry  it  to  completion,  or  he 
can  take  one  roiigh-hewn  by  some  one  else  and 
finish  that.  The  latter  case  typifies  the  work  ofButWMoni 
Wisdom.  She  did  not  create  man  herself,  but  took  iSVt^em 
him  over  in  the  rough  from  Nature  ;  her  business  is  !\*/'"j'i[j*  " 
to  finish  the  statue  that  Nature  began,  keeping  her 

35  eyes  on  Nature  meanwhile.  What  sort  of  thing 
then  is  man  as  rough-hewn  by  Nature  ?  and  what  is 
the  function  and  the  task  of  Wisdom  ?  what  is  it 
that  needs  to  be  consummated  by  her  finishing 
touch  ?  If  it  is  a  creature  consisting  solely  of  a 
certain  operation  of  the  intellect,  that  is,  reason,  its 
highest  good  must  be  activity  in  accordance  with 
virtue,  since  virtue  is  reason's  consummation.  If  it 
is  nothing  but  a  body,  the  chief  things  will  be  health, 

36  freedom  from  pain,  beauty  and  the  rest.  XIV.  But 
as  a  matter  of  fact  the  creature  whose  Chief  Good 
we  arc  seeking  is  man.  Surely  then  our  course  is 
to  inquire  what  Nature's  handiwork  has  been  in 
man — the  whole  man.  All  are  agreed  that  the  duty 
and  function  of  Wisdom  is  entirely  centred  in  the 
work  of  perfecting  man ;  but  then  some  thinkers 
(for  you  must  not  imagine  that  I  am  tilting  at  the 
Stoics  only)  produce  theories  which  place  the  Chief 

z3  339 

tentias  afferunt  ut  summura  bonuin  in  eo  genere 
ponant  quod  sit  extra  nostram  potestatem,  taraquam 
de  inaninio  aliquo'  loquantur,  alii  contra,  quasi 
corpus  nullum  sit  hominisj  ita  praeter  animuni  nihil 
curant,  cum  praesertim  ipse  quoque  . 
inane  nescio  quid  sit  (neque  enim 
legere)  sed  in  quodam  genere  corporis,  ut  oe  is 
quidem  viilute  una  contentus  sit  sed  appetat  vacui- 
tatem  doloris.  Quamobrem  utrique  idem  faciunt  ut 
si  laevam  partem  neglegerent,  dexteram  tuerentur, 
aut  ipsius  animi,  ut  fecit  Erillus,  cognitionem  ample- 
xarentur,  actionem  relin  que  rent.  Eorum  enim  om- 
nium, multa  praetermittentium  dum  eligant  aliquid 
quod  sequantur,  quasi  curta  sententia ;  at  vera  iUa 
perfecta  atque  plena  eorum  qui,  cum  de  hominis 
summo  bono  quaererent,  nullam  in  eo  neque  animi 
neque  corporis  partem  vacuam  tutela  reliquerunt. 
37  Vos  aotem,  Cato,  quia  virtus,  ut  omnes  falemur, 
altissimum  locum  in  homine  et  maxime  excellentem 
tenet  et  quod  eos  qui  sapientes  sunt  absolutos  et 
perfectos  putamus,  aciem  animomm  nostrorum 
virtutis  splendore  praestringitis.  In  omni  enim 
animante  est  summum  aliqutd  atque  optimum,  ut  in 
equis,  in  canibus,  quibus  tamen  et  dolore  vacare 
opus  est  et  valere ;  sic  igitur  in  homine  pert'ectio 
-  ista  in  eo  potissimura  quod  est  optimum,  id  est,  in 
virtute  laudatur.  Itaque  mihi  non  satis  videmini 
considerare  quod  iter  sit  naturae  quaeque  progressio. 
Non  enim,  quod  facit  in  frugibus,  ut,  cum  ad  spicam 
perduxerit  ab  herba,  reliiiquat  et  pro  niliilo  liabeat 
hcrliam,  idem  facit  in  homine  cum  eum  ad  rationis 



BOOK  IV.  xiv 

Good  in  the  class  of  things  entirely  outside  our  con- 
tro],  as  thougli  they  were  discussing  some  creature 
devoid  of  a  mind  ;  while  others  on  the  contrary 
ignore  everything  but  mind,  just  as  if  man  had  no 
body ;  and  that  though  even  the  mind  is  not  an 
empty,  impalpable  something  (a  conception  to 
me  unintelligible),  but  in  some  sort  corporeal,  and 
therefore  even  the  mind  is  not  satisfied  with  virtue 
alone,  but  desires  freedom  from  pain.  In  fact,  with 
each  school  alike  it  is  just  as  if  they  should  ignore 
the  left  side  of  their  bodies  and  protect  the  right, 
or,  in  the  mind,  like  Erillus,  recognize  cognition  but 
leave  the  practical  faculty  out  of  account.  They  pick 
and  choose,  pass  over  a  great  deal  and  fasten  on  a  single 
aspect ;  so  that  all  their  systems  are  one-sided.  The 
full  and  perfect  philosophy  was  that  which,  investi- 
gating the  Chief  Good  of  man,  left  no  part  either  of 
37  his  mind  or  body  uncared-for.  Whereas  your  friends,  ' 
Cato,  on  the  strength  of  the  fact,  which  we  all  f, 
admit,  that  virtue  is  man's  highest  and  supreme  '' 
excellence  and  that  the  Wise  Man  is  the  perfect 
and  consummate  type  of  humanity,  try  to  dazzle  our 
mental  vision  with  virtue's  radiance.  Every  animal, 
for  instance  the  horse,  or  the  dog,  has  some  supreme 
good  quality,  yet  at  the  same  time  they  require  to 
have  health  and  freedom  from  pain  ;  similarly  there- 
fore in  man  that  consummation  you  speak  of  attains 
its  chief  glory  in  what  is  his  chief  excellence,  namely 
virtue.  This  being  so,  I  feel  you  do  not  take  suffi-  a 
cient  pains  to  study  Nature's  method  of  procedure,  f. 
With  the  growing  corn,  no  doubt,  her  way  is  to  guide  ° 
its  development  from  blade  to  ear,  and  then  discard 
the  blade  as  of  no  value ;  but  she  does  not  do  thi 
same  with  man,  when  she  has  developed  in  him  the 


he  ^ 


habitum  perduxit,'^  Semper  enim  ita.  aESumit  aliqnid 
S  Lit  ea  quae  prima  dederit  non  deserat.  Itaque 
sensibus  rationem  adiunxit  et  ratione  elfecta.  sensus 
non  reliquit.  Ut  si  cultura  vitium,  cuias  hoc  munus 
est  ut  elHciat  ut  vitis  cum  omnibus  partlbus  suis 
quam  optime  se  habeat,- — sed  sic  Intellegamus  (licet 
enim,  ut  vos  quoque  soletis,  lingere  aliquid  docendi 
causa):  si  igitur  ilia  cultura  vitium  in  vite  insit  ipsa, 
cetera,  credo,  velit  quae  ad  colendam  vitem  attine- 
bunt  sicut  antea,  se  autem  omnibus  vitis  partibus 
praeferat  statoatque  niliil  esse  melius  in  vite  quam 
se  ;  similiter  sensus,  cum  uccessit  ad  naturam,  tuetur 
illam  quid  em  sed  etiam  se  tuetur ;  cum  autem 
assumpta  est  ratio,  tanto  in  dominatu  local ur  ut 
omnia  ilia  prima  naturae  huius  tutelae  subiciantur. 
'  39  Itaque  non  discedit  ab  eorum  curatione  quibus 
prac-posita  vitam  omnem  debet  gubemare  ;  ut  mirari 
satis  istorum  '  inconstantiam  non  possim.  Naturalem 
enim  appetitioneni,  quam  vocant  opfii'iv,  itemque 
ofEcium,  ipsam  etiam  virtutem  volunt  esse  earum 
rerum  quae  secundum  naturam  sunt.  Cum  autem 
ad  summum  bonum  volunt  pervenire,  transiiiunt 
omnia  et  duo  nobis  opera  pro  uno  relinquunt,  ut 
alia  sumamus,  alia  espetamus,  potius  quam  uno  fine 
utrumque  concluderent.  _ 

)       XV.  "At  enim  [nam]^  dicitis  virtutem  non  poe 

^perduxit  Mdv.  (cp.  V,  41  caepimm 
'  islorum  Mdv. ;  torum  MSS. 
'nam  of  best  MSS.    Mdv.  brackel: 
taitiTa,  and  iam  dicetis. 


:),  pErduxerit  MSSi 
>:  otIierMSS.  vet 

BOOK  IV.  xiv-xv 

faculty  of  reason.     For  she  continually  superadds 

fresh  faculties  without  abandoning  her  previous  gifts. 

38  Thus  she  added  to  sensation  reason,  and  after 
creating  reason  did  not  discard  sensation.  Suppose 
the  art  of  viticulturej  whose  function  is  to  bring  the 
vine  with  all  its  parts  into  the  most  thriving  con- 
dition— at  least  let  us  assume  it  to  be  so  (for  we 
may  Invent  an  imaginary  case,  as  you  are  fond  of 
doing,  for  purposes  of  illustration) ;  suppose  then 
the  art  of  viticulture  were  a  faculty  residing  in  the 
vine  itself,  this  faculty  would  desire,  doubtless,  as 
before,  every  condition  requisite  for  the  health  of 
the  vine,  but  would  rank  itself  above  all  the  other 
parts  of  the  vine,  and  would  consider  itself  the 
noblest  eltment  in  the  vine's  organism.  Similarly 
when  an  animal  organism  has  acquired  the  faculty 
of  sensation,  this  faculty  protects  the  organism,  it  is 
true,  but  also  protects  itself;  Irat  when  reason  has 
been  superadded,  this  is  placed  in  such  a  position  of 
dominance  that  all  the  primary  gifts  of  nature  are 

39  placed  under  its  protection.  Accordingly  Reason 
never  abandons  its  task  of  safeguarding  the  earlier 
elements ;  its  business  is  by  controlling  these  to 
steer  the  whole  course  of  life ;  so  that  I  cannot 
sufficiently  marvel  at  the  inconsistency  of  your 
teachers.  Natural  desire,  which  they  term  horme, 
and  also  duty,  and  even  virtue  itself  they  reckon 
among  tilings  according  to  Nature.  Yet  when  they 
want  to  arrive  at  the  Supreme  Good,  they  leap  over  all 
of  these,  and  leave  us  two  operations  instead  of  one; 
some  things  we  are  to  '  adopt,'  others  to  '  desire  '  ; 
instead  of  including  both  operations  under  a  single 

4-0       XV.  "  But  you  protest  that  if  other  things  than 

constitui,  si  ea  quae  extra  virtutem  sint  ad  lieate 
vivendum  pertineant.  Quod  totum  contra  est;  in- 
troduci  euim  virtus  nullo  modo  potest,  nisi  omnia 
quae  leget  quaeque  reiciet  unam  referentur  ad 
summam.  Nam  si  omnina  nos^  neglegemus,  in 
Aristonea  vitia  incidemus  et  peccata  obliviscemurque 
quae  virtu ti  ipsi  principiadederimus;  si  ea  non  neg- 
legeinus  neque  tamen  ad  Kiiem  summi  boni  refere- 
mus,  non  multum  ab  Erilli  levitate  aberiraus;* 
duamm  enini  vilarum  nobis  erunt  instituta  capienda. 
Facit  enim  ille  duo  seiuucta  ultima  bonoriun,  quae 
ut  essent  vera  coniungi  debuemnt;  nunc  ita  separan- 
tur  ut  diiuiicta  sint,  quo  nihil  potest  esse  perversius. 
41  Itaque  contra  est  ac  dicitis;  nam  constitui  virtus 
nulla  modo  potest  nisi  ea  quae  sunt  prima  naturae 
ut  ad  summam  pertinentia  tenebit.  Quaesita  enim 
virtus  est  non  quae  relinqueret  naturaro  sed  quae 
tueretur;  at  ilia  ut  vobis  placet  partem  quandam 
tuetur,  reliquam  deserit.  Atque  ipsa  hominis  insti- 
tutio  si  loqueretur  hoc  diceret,  primes  suos  quasi 
coeptus  appetendi  fuisse  ut  se  conservaret  in  ea 
natura  in  qua  ortus  esset.  Kondum  autem  explana- 
tum  satis  erat  quid  maxime  natura  vellet.  Explanetur 
igitur.  Quid  ergo?  aliud^  intellegeturnisi  uti  ne  quae 
pars  naturae  neglegatur?    In  qua  si  nihil  est  praeter 

>  nos;  edd.  conj.  ea,  Mdv.  marks  as  corrupt,  and  conj. 
omnina  omnia  praeter  aniaios  nrglegtmiis.  Perhaps  omnina 
nostra  corpora  negfegemus. 

^abtrimus  Cobet  ('admodum  probabililer'  Mdv.  J: 
aberrabimusUdv.,  MSS. 

^Qitid  ergo?  aliud  zd.     Quid  ergo  aiiiiJ  Mdv.  etc. 


BOOK  IV.  sv 
virtue  go  to  make  up  happiness,  virtue  cannot  be 
established.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  entirely  the 
other  way  about :  it  is  impossible  to  find  a,  place  for 
virtue,  unless  all  the  things  that  she  chooses  and  h 
rejects  are  reckoned  towards  one  sum-total  of  good.  ^ 
For  if  we  entirely  ignore  ourselves,'  we  shall  fall  into  i' 
the  mistakes  and  errors  of  Aristo,  forgetting  the  , 
things  that  we  assigned  as  the  origins  of  virtue  ' 
herself;  if  while  not  ignoring  these  things,  we  yet 
do  not  reckon  them  in  the  End  or  Chief  Good,  we 
shall  be  well  on  the  road  towards  the  extravagances 
of  Erillus,  since  we  shall  have  to  adopt  two  ditFerent 
rules  of  life  at  once.  Erillus  sets  up  two  separate 
ultimate  Goods,  which,  supposing  his  view  were 
true,  he  ought  to  have  united  in  one;  but  as  it  is  he 
makes  them  so  separate  as  to  be  mutually  exclusive 
alternatives,  which  issurely  the  extreme  of  perversity. 
41  Henee  the  truth  is  just  the  opposite  of  what  you 
say;  virtue  is  an  absolute  impossibility,  vn/ess  it' 
holds  to  the  objects  of  the  primary  instincts  as 
going  to  make  up  the  sum  of  good.  For  we  started 
to  look  for  a  virtue  that  should  protect,  not  abandon, ' 
nature;  whereas  virtue  as  you  conceive  it  protects  a 
particular  part  of  our  nature  but  leaves  the  remainder 
in  the  lurch.  Man's  constitution  itself,  if  it  could 
speak,  would  declare  that  its  earliest  tentative 
movements  of  desire  were  aimed  at  preserving 
itself  in  the  natural  character  with  which  it  was 
born  into  the  world.  But  at  that  stage  the  principal 
intention  of  nature  had  not  yet  been  fully  revealed. 
Well,  suppose  it  revealed.  Wliat  then?  will  it  be 
construed  otherwise  than  as  forbidding  that  any 
part  of  man's  nature  should  be  ignored?  If  man 
consistssolely  of  a  reasoning  faculty,  let  it  be  granted 

rationem,  sil  in  una  virtute  finis  bonorum ;  sin  est 
etiam  corpus,  ista  explanatio  naturae  nenipe  hoc 
effecerit  ut  ea  quae  ante  explanation  em  tenebamus 
relinquamus.      Ergo    id    est   conveni enter   naturae 

9  vivercj  a  natura  disct'dere.  Ut  quidam  philosophi, 
cum  a  sensibus  profecti  maiora  quaedani  et  diviniora 
vidissent,  sensus  reliquerunt,  sic  istij  eum  ex  appeti- 
tione  rerum  virtu  tis  pulchritudinem  aspexissent, 
omnia  quae  praeter  virtutem  ipsam  viderant  abiece- 
runt,  obliti  naturam  omnem  appetendarum  rerum 
ita  late  patere  ut  a  principiis  permanaret  ad  fines, 
neque  Intel] egunt  se  rerum  illarum  pulclirariun 
atque  admirabilium  fundamentu  subducere. 

3  XVI.  Itaque  mihi  videutur  omnes  quidem  illi 
errasse  qui  finem  'bonorum  esse  dixerunt  boneste 
vivere,  sed  alius  alio  magis;  Pyrrho  scilicet  maxime, 
qui  virtute  constituta  nihil  omninoquod  appetendum 
sit  relinquat;  deiiide  Aristo,  qui  nihil  rehnquere 
non  est  ausus,  introduxit  autem,  quibus  coouDotus 
sapiens  appeteret  aliquld,  '  quodcumque '  in  mentem 
iiicideret'  et  quodcumque  tamquam  occurreret.'  Is 
hoc  melior  quam  Pyrrho  quod  aliquod*  genus  appe- 
tendj  dedit,  deterior  quam  ceteri  quod  penitus  a 
natura  recessit.  Stoici  autem  quod  fineni  bonorum 
in  una  virtute  ponnnt,  similes  sunt  illorum;  quod 
autem    principium    offici    quaerunt,    melius    quam 

'  guodctimgu 

\vel\  al.  Mdv. 


■  %j,; 

fss.,  r^S 


BOOK  IV.  xv-xvi 
that  the  End  of  Goods  is  contained  in  virtue  alone ; 
but  if  lie  hns  a  body  as  well,  the  revelation  of  our 
nature,  on  your  showing,  will  actually  have  resulted 
in  our  relinquishing  the  things  to  which  we  held 
before  that  revelation  took  place.  At  this  rate  to 
live  in  harmony  with  nature'  means  to  depart  from 

12  nature.  There  have  been  philosophers  who,  after 
rising  from  sensation  to  tlie  recognition  of  nobler 
and  more  spiritual  faculties,  thereupon  threw  the 
senses  on  one  side.  Similarly  your  friends,  starting 
from  the  instinctive  desires,  came  to  behold  virtue 
in  all  her  beauty,  and  forthwith  flung  aside  all  they 
had  ever  seen  besides  virtue  herself,  forgetting  that 
the  whole  instinct  of  appetition  is  so  wide  in  its 
range  that  it  spreads  from  the  primary  objects  of 
desire  right  up  to  the  ultiniate  Ends,  and  not  reuli/.- 
ing  that  they  are  undermining  the  very  foundations 
of  the  graces  which  they  so  much  admire. 

13  XVI.     '  In  my  view,  therefore,  while  all  who  have  ThMrfort 
defined  the  End  of  Goods  as  the  life  of  moral  con-  JJ^^S 
duct  are  in  error,  some  are  more  wrong  than  others,  ioiegood 
The  most  mistaken  no  doubt  is  Pyrrho,  because  his  daci[inct__ 
conception  of  virtue  leaves  nothing  as  an  object  of  ^^J^^^'"' 
desire  whatever.     Next  in  error  comes  Aristo,  who  Pyn-hn,  thoug 
did  not  venture  to  go  so  far  us  Pyrrho,  but  who  iho'- prim*  — 
introduced  as  the  Wise    Man's   motives  of  desire  ^^'       ' 
'whatever  chanced  to  enter  his  mind'  and    what- 
ever struck  him.'     Aristo  was  better  than  Pjrrho  in 
so  far  as  he  allowed  desire  of  some  sort,  but  worse 
than  the  rest  because  he  departed  so  utterly  from 
nature.     Now  the    Stoics  in    placing   the  End    of 
Goods   in  virtue  alone   resemble  the  philosophers 
already  mentioned;  but  in  trying  to  find  a  founda- 
tion for  virtuous  action  they  are  an  improvement 


g[int  ad  finem  bono 
quodam  modo  sunt  I 
enim     occurrentia '   ri 

Pyrrho;  qnod  ea  non  'occurrentia'  fing^nt,  vincnnt 
Aristoncm ;  (]uod  auteni  ea  quae  ad  naturam  accom- 
modata  et  per  .se  assumenda  esse  dicunt  non  adiun- 
desciscunt  a  natura  et 
dissimiles  Aristonis.  Die 
>  quae  comininiscebatur; 
hi  autem  ponunt  illi  quidem  prima  naturae,  sed  ea 
seiiingunt  a  finibus  et  summa  bonorum;  quae  cum 
praeponunt'  ut  sit  aliqua  rerum  selectio,  naturam 
videntur  sequi;  cum  autem  negant  ea  quidquam  ad 
beatam  vitam  pertinere,  rursus  naturam  relinquunt 

+4  Atque   adhuc  ea  dixi,    causa   cur   Zenoni    non 

fuisset,'  quamobrem  a  superiorum  auctoritate  dis- 
cederet ;  nunc  reliqua  videanius,  nisi  aut  ad  haec, 
Cato,  dicere  aliquid  vis  aut  nos  iam  longiores  sumus." 
"Neutrum  vero,"  inquit  ille;  "nam  et  a  te  perfid 
istam  disputation  em  volo  nee  tua  mlhi  oratio  loagii 
videri  potest."  "Optime,"  inquam;  "quid  enim 
mihi  potest  esse  optatius  quam  cum  Catone,  omnium 

45  virtutum  auctore,  de  virtutibus  disputare?  Sed  pri- 
mum  illud  vide,  gravissimam  illam  vestram  senten- 
tiam,  quae  familiam  ducit,  honestum  quod  sit  id  esse 
solum  bouum  honesteque  vivere  bonorum  finem, 
communem  fore  vobis  cum  omnibus  qui  in  una  virtute 
constituunt  finera  bonorum;  quodque  dicitis  infor- 
mari   non   posse  virtutem    si    quidquam    nisi    quod 

'  CO  dixi,  causa  CMrZenani  non/uissel  {cuit  (or cut  E)  MSS., 
MQller;  Mdv.  marks  as  corrupt,  and  suggests  earn  dixi 
causam  (i.e.  cam  causaiii  egi,  sic  disputavi,  ut  oslende- 
rem],  ZsTH/ni Hon/Uisse gnamobrem — .  Mdv,  To rmerly  con- 
jectured ea  dixi,  causam  Zenoni  nonfuisse. 

^7  BOOK   JV.  xvi 

upon  Pyrrho,  and  in  not  finding  this  in  imaginary 
things  that  strike  the  mind '  they  do  better  than 
Aristo;  though  in  speaking  of  certain  things  as 
'suitable  to  nature'  and  'to  be  adopted  for  their 
own  sakes,'  and  then  refusing  to  include  them  in 
the  End  of  Goods,  they  desert  nature  and  approxi- 
mate in  some  degree  to  Aristo.  For  Aristo  invented 
his  vague  things  that  strike  the  mind';  while  the 
Stoics,  though  recognizing,  it  is  true,  the  primary 
objects  of  nature,  yet  allow  no  connection  between 
these  and  their  Ends  or  sum  of  Goods.  In  making 
the  primary  objects  preferred,'  so  as  to  admit  a  cer- 
tain principle  of  choice  among  things,  they  seem  to 
be  following  nature,  but  in  refusing  to  allow  them  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  happiness,  they  again 
abandon  nature. 

\'i  So  far  what  I  have  said  was  to  show  why  Zeno 

had  no  grounds  for  seceding  from  the  earlier  autho- 
rities. Now  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  rest  of 
my  points,  unless,  Cato,  you  desire  to  say  anything 
in  reply  to  this,  or  unless  we  have  gone  on  too  long 
already."  Neither  is  the  case,"  he  answered, 
since  I  am  eager  for  you  to  finish  your  argu- 
ment, and  no  discourse  of  yours  could  seem  to  me 
long."  Thank  you  very  much,"  1  rejoined;  for 
what  could  1  desire  better  than  to  discuss  the  sub- 
ject of  virtue  with  that  pattern  of  all  the  virtues 

?5  Cato?  But  first  I  would  have  you  observe  that  the 
most  important  of  all  your  doctrines,  the  head  of 
the  array,  namely  that  Moral  Worth  alone  is  good 
and  that  the  moral  life  is  the  End  of  Goods,  will  be 
shared  with  you  by  all  those  who  make  the  End  of 
Goods  consist  of  virtue  alone ;  and  your  view  that 
it  is  impossible  to  frame  a  conception  of  Virtue  if 
349    - 

honestuin  sit  numeretur,  idem  dicetur  ab  Ulis  quos 
modo  nominavi.  Milii  autem  aequiuB  videbatur 
Zenonem  cum  Polemotie  disceptantem,  a  quo  quae 
essent  principia  naturae  acceperat,  a  communibus 
initiis  progredientem  videre  ubi  primum  insisteret 
et  unde  causa  controversiae  nasceretur,  non,  stantem 
cum  lis  qui  ne  dicerent  quidem  sua  summa  bona 
esse  a  nalura  profecta,  uti  iisdem  argumentis  quibne 
illi  uterentur  iisdem  que  sententiis. 
46  XVH.  Minime  vero  illud  probo  quod,  cum 
docuistis  ut  vobis  videmini  solum  lionum  esse  quod 
hoiiestum  sit,  turn  rursum  dicitls  initiii  proponi  ne- 
ccsse  esae  upta  et  aecommodata  naturae  quorum  eJt 
selectione  virtus  possit  existere.  Non  enim  in  aele- 
ctione  virtus  ponenda  eratj  ut  id  ipsum  quod  erat 
bonorum  ultimum  aliud  aliquid  acquireret.  Nam 
omnia  quae  sumenda  quaeqoe  legenda  aut  optanda 
sunt  inesse  debent  in  summa  bonorum,  ut  is  qui  earn 
adeptus  sit  nihil  praeterea  desideret.  Videsne  ut 
quibus  summa  est  in  voluplate  perspicuum  sit  quid 
lis  faciendum  sit  aut  non  faciendum  ?  ut  nemo  dubi- 
tet  eorum  omnia  officia  quo  spectare,  quid  sequi, 
quid  fugere  debeant  ?  Sit  hoc  ultimum  bonorum 
quod  nunc  a  me  defenditur;  apparet  statim  qute 
sint  officia,  quae  actiones.  Vobis  autem,  quibus  nihil 
•    350 

^V  BOOK  IV.  xvi-xvii 

anything  beside  Moral  Worth  be  counted  in  it,  will 
also  be  maintained  by  the  philosophers  whom  1  just 
now  mentioned.  To  my  mind  it  would  have  been 
fairer  for  Zeno  in  his  dispute  with  Polemo,  whose 
teaching  as  to  the  primary  impulses  of  nature  he 
had  adopted]  to  have  started  from  the  fundamental 
tenets  which  they  held  in  common,  and  to  have 
marked  the  point  where  he  first  called  a  halt  and 
where  occasion  for  divergence  arose ;  not  to  take  his 
stand  with  thinkers  who  did  not  even  profess  to  JiOld 
that  the  Chief  Good,  as  they  severally  conceived 
it,  was  based  on  natural  uistinct,  and  employ  the 
same  arguments  and  the  same  doctrines  as  they  did. 
tS  XVII.  Another  point  to  which  I  take  great  t 
exception  is  that,  when  you  have  proved,  as  yo 
think,  that  Moral  Worth  alone  is  good,  you  the- 
turn  round  and  say  that  of  course  there  must  be  n 
advantages  adapted  to  our  nature  set  before  i 
starting  point,  in  exercising  choice  among  which 
advantages  virtue  may  be  able  to  come  i 
tence.  Now  it  was  a  mistake  to  make_virtue  consist  .^ 
in  an  act  of  choice,"fbr~this  linplles  that  the  very 
thing  that  iS"rtie"iiHiniate  Good  itself  s'eeRs""to^ get 
something  else.  Surely  the.suin^of  Goods  must  ] 
include  everything  worth  ad iJEtjng,  choosing  or 
desirnig,  so  that  he  who  has  attained  it  may  not 
want  anything  more.  In  the— case-  ot  those  whose 
Glifff  OtiWd"  cnnsists  in  pleasure,  notice  how  clear  it  is 
what  things  they  are  to  do  or  not  to  do;  no  one  can- 
be  in  doubt  as  to  the  proper  scope  of  all  their  duties, 
what  these  most  aim  at  and  what  avoid.  Or  grant 
the  ultimate  Good  that  I  am  now  upholding,  and  it 
becomes  clear  at  once  what  one's  duties  are  and 
what  actions  are  prescribed.  But  you,  who  have  no 



estaliudpropoBitum  nisi  rectum  atquehonestum,uiide 
officij  unde  agendi  priticipium  noscatur  non  reperietis. 

'  Hoc  igilur  quaerentes'  omnes,  et  ii  qui  quodcumque 
ill  mentem  veiiiat  aut  quodcuoique  occurrat  se  sequi 
dicunt'  et  vos,  ad  naturam  revertemini."  Quibus 
natura  iure  respondent  iioii  esse  verum  aliunde  finem 
beate  vivendi,  a  se  principia  rei  gerendae  peti  ;  esse 
enini  unam  rationem  qua  et  priucipia  reruni  ageii- 
darum  et  ultima  bonorum  continerentur,  atque  ut 
Aristonis  esset  explosa  sententia  dicentis  niliil  dif- 
ferre  aliud  ab  alio  nee  esse  res  ullas  praeter  virtutes 
et  vitia  inter  quas  quidquam  omnino  interesset,  sic 
errare  Zenonem  qui  nulla  in  re  nisi  in  virtute  aut 
vitio*  propensionem  ne  minimi  quidem  niomenti  ad 
summum  bonum  adipiscendum  esse  diceret  et,  cum 
ad  beatam  vitum  nullum  momentum  cetera  habe- 
rent,  ad  appetitionem  tamen*  rerum  esse  in  iis 
momenta  diceret ;  quasi  vero  haec  appetitio  non  ad 

i  summi  boni  adeptionem  perlineret!  Quid  antem 
minus  consentaneum  est  quam  quod  aiunt  cognito 
suuimo  bono  reverti  se  ad  naturam  ut  ex  ea  petant 
agendi  principium,  id  est  oliici  ?  Non  enim  actionis 
aut  offici  ratio  impellit  ad  ea  quae  secundum  naturam 
sunt  appetendaj  sed  ab  iis  et  appetitio  et  actio  com- 

XVIII.      Nunc  venio  ad  ilia  tua  brcvia,  quae  con- 
sectaria   esse  dicebaSj  et  primum  illud,  quo  i 

'  quaerentes  Gorenz.  Mdv. ;  guaeritU  MSS. 
'' diciint  ed. ;  dicentlA^S.,  Mdv. 
^  rwer/emini  Hdv.  with  inr.  MSS.;  reuer/im 
^aufvilio  some  edil.  bracket. 

"  cclera  kaberenl ,  ,  .  tamen  Mdv.  witli  Davis  and  81 
Ea  res  haheret .  .  .  aulem  AISS. 


^m  BOOK  iV.  xvii-x^iii 

other   standard   in    view    but   abstract    right    and 
morality,  will  not  be  able  to  find  a  source  and  sturt- 

47  ing  poiat  for  duty  and  for  conduct,  tn  the  search 
for  this  you  will  all  of  you  have  to  return  to  nature, — 
both  those  who  say  that  they  follow  whatever  comes 
into  their  mind  or  whatever  occurs  to  them,  and  you 
yourselves.  Both  will  be  met  by  Nature's  verj-  just 
reply  that  it  is  unfair  that  the  standard  of  Happiness 
should  be  sought  elsewhere  while  the  springs  of  con- 
duct are  derived  from  herself;  that  there  is  a  single 
principle  which  must  cover  both  the  springs  of 
action  and  the  ultimate  Goods;  and  that  just  as 
Aristo's  doctrine  has  been  quite  discredited,  that 
everything  is  absolutely  indifferent  and  there  is 
nothing  whatever  to  choose  between  an3'  things 
at  all  excepting  virtues  and  vices,  so  Zeno  was 
mistaken  in  saying  that  nothing  else  but  virtue 
or  vice  affected  even  in  the  smallest  degree  the 
attainment  of  the  Chief  Good,  and  that  although 
other  things  had  no  effect  whatever  upon  happi- 
ness, they  yet  had  some  influence  upon  our  de- 
sires; just  as  though  desire,  if  you  please,  bore  no 
relation  whatever  to  the  attainment  of  the  Chief 

t8  Good  !  But  what  can  be  more  inconsistent  than  the 
procedure  they  profess,  to  ascertain  the  Chief  Good 
first,  and  then  to  return  to  Nature,  and  demand  from 
her  the  primary  motive  of  conduct  or  of  duty  ?  Con- 
siderations of  conduct  or  duty  do  not  supply  the 
impulse  to  desire  the  things  that  are  in  accordance 
with  nature ;  it  is  these  things  which  excite  desire 
and  give  motives  for  conduct. 

XVIII.     "I  now  come  to  those  concise  proofs  of  xheSioioiyiio- 
yours  which  you  said  were  so  conclusive.     I  will  IreXJid'on 
start  with  one  as  concise  as  anything  could   he : 'fjs^p™^^' 
AA  853 


potest  brevius:  'Bonum  omne  laudabile; 
autem  omne  honestum ;  bonum  iffitur  01 
stum.'  O  plumheum  pugionem !  Quia 
primuin  illud  coiicesserit?  Ciuo  quidem 
nihil  opus  est  secundo  ;  si  enim  omne  bonum  lauda- 

49  bile  est,  omne  honestum  est);  quis  igitur  tibi  istud 
dabit  praeter  Pyrrhonem,  Aristonem  eorumve  simi- 
les? quos  tu  non  probas.  Aristoteles,  Xenoeratea, 
tota  ilia  familia  non  dabit,  quippe  qui  valetudinem, 
vires,  divitias,  gloriani,  multa  alia  bona  esse  dicant, 
laudabilia  non  dicant.  Et  hi  quidem  ita  non  sola 
virtute  finem  bonornnj  contineri  putant,  ut  rebus 
tamen  omnibus  virtutem  anteponant ;  quid  censes 
eos  esse  facturos.  qui  omnino  virtutem  a  bonorum 
fine   segregaverunt,  Epicurumj   Hieronjinum,  illos 

50  etiam,  si  qui  Carneadeum  linem  tueri  volunt  ?  lam 
aut  Callipho  aut  Diodorus  quomodo  poterunt  tibi 
istud  concedere,  qui  ad  honestatem  aliud  adiungunt, 
quod  ex  eodem  genere  non  sit  ?  Placet  igitur  tibi, 
Cato,  cuna  res  sumpseris  non  eoncessas,  ex  illis  effi- 
eere,  quod  velis  ?  lam  ille  sorites  est/  quo  nihil 
putatis  esse  vitiosius,  quod  bonum  sit,  id  esse  opta- 
bile;  quod  optabile,  id  expetendum;  quod  expe- 
tendum,  id  laudabile';  dein  reliqui  gradus,  sed  ego 
in  hoc  resisto ;  eodem  enim  modo  tibi  nemo  dabit, 
quod  expetendum  sit,  id  esse  laudabile.     Illud  vero 

^  consectarium,  sed  in  primis  hebes,  illoruiii 

'est  inserted  by  Baites,  Mdv. 

•Cp.  ri 

n  II,  48. 

BOOK  rV.  xviii 

Everytliuig  good  is  praisewortliy ;  but  everything 
praiseworthy  is  honourable  (moral');  therefore 
everytliing  good  is  honourable  (tuomi).'  Wliat  u 
dagger  of  lead !  Wliy,  who  will  grant  you  your 
major  premise  ?  (and  if  this  be  granted  there  is 
no  need  of  the  minor ;  for  if  everything  good  is 
praiseworthy,  then  everything  good  is  honourable). 

*9  Who,  I  say,  will  grant  you  this,  except  Fyrrho, 
Aristo  and  their  fellows,  whose  doctrines  you  reject? 
Aristotle,  Xenocrates  and  the  whole  of  their  follow- 
ing will  not  allow  it;  because  they  call  health, 
strength,  riches,  fame  and  many  other  things  good, 
but  do  not  call  them  praiseworthy.  And  these, 
though  holding  that  the  End  of  Goods  is  not 
limited  to  virtue  alone,  yet  rate  virtue  higher  than 
all  other  things;  Init  what  do  you  suppose  will  he 
the  attitude  of  those  who  entirely  dissociated  virtue 
from  the  End  of  Gpods,  Epicurus,  Hieronymtis. 
and  also  of  any  supporters  of  the  End  of  Canieades  ? 

50  Or  how  will  Callipho  or  Diodorus  be  able  to  grant 
your  premise,  who  combine  with  Moral  Worth 
another  factor  belonging  to  an  entirely  different 
category  ?  Are  you  then  content,  Cato,  to  take 
disputed  premises  for  granted,  and  draw  from  these 
the  conclusion  you  want  ?  And  again,  the  following 
proof  is  a  sorites,  which  according  to  you  is  a  most 
fallacious  form  of  reasoning;  what  is  good  is  to  be 
wished  ;  what  is  to  be  wished  is  desirable  ;  what  is 
desirable  is  praiseworthy*;  and  so  on  through  the 
remaining  steps,  but  I  call  a  halt  at  this  one,  for,  just 
as  before,  no  one  will  grant  you  that  what  is  desira- 
ble is  praiseworthy.  And  once  again,  here  is  an  argu- 
ment which  so  far  from  being  conclusive  is  stupid  to  a 
degree,  though,  of  course,  the  Stoic  leaders  and  not 
aa2  355 


scilicet,  non  tuum,  'g-loriatione  digiiam  esse  beatam 

vitam,  quod  non  possit  sine  honestate  contingere,  ut 

51  iure  quisqnamglorietur.'''  Dabit  hoc  Zenoni  Polemo ; 
etiam  magister  eius  et  lota  ilia  gens  et  reliqui  qui 
virtutem  omnibus  rebus  multo  anteponentea  adiun- 
gunt  ei  tamen  aliquid  summo  in  bono  finiendo ;  si 
enim  virtus  digna  est  gloriatione,  ut  est,  tantuinque 
praestat  reliquis  rebus  tit  dici  vik  possit,  et  beatus 
esse  potent  virtute  una  praeditus  carens  ceteris,  nee 
tamen  illud  tibi  concedet,  praeter  virtutem  nihil  in 
bonis  esse  ducendum.  Illi  auteni  quibus  summum 
bonum  sine  virtute  est,  non  dabunt  fortasse  vitatn 
beatam  habere  in  quo  possit  iure  gloriari;  etsi  illi 
quidem  etiara.  voluptates  faciunt  interdum  gloriosas. 

53  XIX.  "Vides  igitur  te  aut  ea  sumere  quae  non 
concedantur  aut  ea  quae  etiam  concessa  te  nihil 
iuvent.  Equidem  in  omnibus  istis  conclusion ibus 
hoc  putarem  philosophia  nobisque  dignum,  et  maxi~ 
me  cum  summum  bonum  quaere remus,  vitam  nostram, 
consilia,  voluntates,  non  verba  corrigi.  Quis  enim 
potest  istis  quae  te  ut  ais  delectant  brevibus  et 
«cutis  auditis  de  sententia  decedere?  Nam  cum 
esspectant  et  avent  audire  cur  dolor  malum  non  sit, 
dicunt  illi  asperum  esse  dolere,  molestuni,  odiosum, 
contra  naturam,  difficile  toleratu,  sed  quia  nulla  sit 
-    in  dolore  nee  fraus  nee  improbitas  nee  malitia  nee 

'  vl — glorietiir  Maniillus  reji 


^  BOOK  IV.  sviii-xix 

yourself  are  responsible  for  thut :  Happiness  is  a 
thing  to  lie  proud  of,  whereas  it  cannot  lie  the  case 
tliat  anj'UDe  sliould  have  good  reason  to  be  proud 

1  without  Moral  Worth.'  The  minor  premise'  Polemo 
wilt  concede  to  Zeno,  and  so  will  his  master  and  the 
whole  of  their  clan,  as  well  as  all  the  other  pliUoso- 
phers  that  while  ranking  virtue  far  above  all  else  yet 
couple  some  other  thing  with  it  in  defining  the  Chief 
Good  ;  since  if  virtue  is  a  thing  to  be  proud  of,  as  it 
is,  and  if  it  is  almost  inexpressibly  superior  to  every- 
thing else,  Polemo  will  be  able  to  l>e  liappy  if 
endowed  solely  with  virtue,  and  destitute  of  all 
besides,  and  yet  lie  will  not  grant  you  that  nothing 
except  virtue  is  to  be  reckoned  as  a  good.  Those  on 
the  other  hand  whose  Supreme  Good  dispenses  with 
virtue,  will  perhaps  decline  to  grant  that  happiness 
contains  any  just  ground  for  pride;  although  they, 
it  is  true,  sometimes  make  out  even  pleasures  to 
be  things  to  be  proud  of. 

i  XIX.  So  you  see  that  you  are  either  making  lai 
assumptions  which  cannot  be  granted  or  ones  which  5J|,*„ 
even  if  granted  do  you  no  good.  For  my  own  part,  as  p'^ 
regards  all  these  Stoic  syllogisms,  I  should  have 
thought  that  to  be  worthy  of  philosophy  and  of 
ourselves,  particularly  when  the  subject  of  our 
inquiry  is  the  Supreme  Good,  the  argument  ought 
to  amend  our  lives,  purposes  and  wills,  not  just 
correct  our  terminology.  Would  those  concise  epi- 
grams which  you  say  give  you  so  much  pleasure 
make  any  man  alter  his  opinions?  Here  are  people  all 
agog  to'  learn  why  pain  is  no  evil ;  and  the  Stoics  tell 
them  that  though  pain  is  irksome,  annoying,  hateful, 
unnatural  and  hard  to  bear,  it  is  not  an  evil,  because 
it  involves  no  dishonesty,  wickedness  or  malice,  no 

culpa  iiec  turpitude  aon  esse  illud  malum.  Haec 
qui  audierit,  ut  ridere  noii  curet,  discedet  tumen 
nihilo  firmior  ad  dolorem  ferendum  quam  venerat. 
53  Tu  autem  negas  fortem  esse  quemquam  posse  qui 
dolorem  malum  putet.  Cur  fortior  sit  si  illud  quod 
tute  concedis  asperum  et  vL\  ferendum  putabit?  Ex 
rebus  enim  timiditas,  non  ex  vocabulis  nuscitur.  Et 
ais,  si  una  littera  commota  sit,  fore  tota  ut  label  disci- 
plina.  Utrum  igitur  tibi  litteram  videor  an  totas 
paginas  commovere?  Ut  enim  sit  apud  illos,  id 
quod  est  a  te   laudatum,  ordo  rerum  conscrvatus  et 

nter   se  apta  et 

tamen  persequi  non  debemus  si  a  falsis  principiis 
profecta  congruunt  ipsa  sibi  et  a  proposito  non  aber- 

5i  rant.  In  prima  igitur  constitutione  Zeno  tuus  a 
natura  recessit,  cumque  summum  bonum  posuisset 
ill  ingtni  prai^stantia  quaiii  virtutem  vocamus,  nee 
qiiidquam  aliud  esse  bonum  dixisset  nisi  quod  esset 
lionestuiD,  nee  virtutem  posse  constare  si  in  ceteris 
rebus  esset  quidquam  quod  aliud  alio  melius  esset 
aut  peius,  his  prupositis  tenuit  prorsus  consequentia. 
Recte  dicis;  negare  non  possum;  sed  ita  falsa  sunt 
ea  quae  consequuntur,  ut  ilia  e  quibus  haec  nata 

55  sunt  vera  esse  non  possint.  Dofent  enim  nos,  ut 
scis,  dialectic!,  si  ea  quae  rem  aliquam  sequantur, 
falsa  sint,  falsam  illam  ipsam  esse  quam  sequautur. 
Ita  fit  ilia  conclusio  non  solum  vera  sed  ita  perspicua 
ut  dialectic!  ne  rationem  quidem  reddi  putent  opor- 
tere:  Si  illud,  hoc;  non  autem  hoc;  igitur  ne  illud 
quidem.  Sic  consequentibua  vestris  sublatis  prima 

^■^  BOOK  IV.  xix 

tnorat  blame  or  baseness.     He  who  hears  this  may 
or  may  not  want  to  laugh,  but  he  will  not  go  away  any 

53  stronger  to  endure  pain  than  he  eame.  You  how- 
ever say  that  no  one  can  be  brave  who  thinks  pain 
an  evil.  Why  should  he  be  braver  for  thinhing  it 
what  you  yourself  admit  it  to  be,  irksome  and 
almost  intolerable  ?  Timidity  springs  from  facts, 
not  from  words.  And  you  aver  that  if  a  single  letter 
be  altered,  the  whole  system  will  totter.  Well  then, 
do  you  think  I  alter  a  letter  or  whole  pages?  Even 
allowing  that  the  Stoics  deserve  the  praise  you  gave 
them  for  the  methodical  arrangement  and  perfect 
logical  connection  (as  you  described  it)  of  their 
system,  still  we  are  not  bound  to  accept  a  chain  of  m 
reasoning  because  it  is  self-consistent  and  keeps  to  ^ 
the  line  laid  down,  if  it  starts  from  false  premises,  m 

5i  Now  your  master  Zeno  deserted  nature  in  framing  ta 
Ills  first  principles ;  he  placed  the  supreme  Good  in  °} 
that  intellectual  excellence  which  we  term  virtue,  li' 
and  declared  that  nothing  but  Moral  Worth  is  good, 
and  that  virtue  cannot  be  established  if  among  the 
rest  of  things  any  one  thing  is  better  than   any 
other;    and  he  adhered  to  the  logical  conclusions 
from  these  premises.     Quite  true,  I  can't  deny  it. 
But  the  conclusions  are  so  false  tliat  the  premises 

55  from  which  they  sprang  cannot  be  true.  For  the 
logicians  teach  us,  as  you  are  aware,  that  if  the 
conseijuences  that  follow  from  a  proposition  be 
false,  the  proposition  from  which  those  consequences 
follow  must  itself  be  false.  Un  this  is  based  the 
following  syllogism,  which  is  not  merely  true,  but  so 
self-evident  that  the  logicians  assume  it  as  axiomatic : 
If  A  is  B,  C  is  D;  but  C  is  not  D;  therefore  A  is 
not  B.  Tlius,  if  your  conclusions  are  upset,  your 

tolluntur.  Quae  sequuiitiir  igitur?  Omnes  qui 
non  sint  sapientes  aeque  miseros  esse ;  siipjentes 
oiniies  sumnie  beatos ;  recte  facta  omnia  aequalin, 
omnia  peceata  paria ; — quae  cutn  magnifice  primo  dici 
viderentur,  considerata  minus  probaliantur.  Sensus 
enira  cuiusque  et  natura  rerum  atque  ipsa  Veritas 
clamabat  quodam  modo  non  posse  adduci  ut  inter 
eas  res  quas  Zeno  exaequaret  nihil  interesset. 
J  XX.  "  Postea  tuus  ille  Pocnulus  (seis  enira  Citieos 
clientes  tuos  e  Phoenica  profectos),  homo  igitur 
acutus,  eausam  non  obtinens  repugnante  natura,  verba 
versare  coepit;  et  primum  vebus  iis  quas  nos  bonas 
dicimus  concessit  ut  haberentur  aestimabiles  et  ad 
naturam  ac^commodatae^  &terique  coepit  sapienti, 
hoe  est,  summe  beato  commodius  tamen  esse  si  ea 
quoque  habeat  quae  bona  non  audet  appellare, 
naturae  accommodata  esse  concedit ;  negatque  Plato- 
nem,  si  sapiens  non  sit,  eadem  esse  in  causa  qua 
Dionysium :  huic  mori  optimum  esse 
r  desperationem  sapientiae,  iUi  propter  spem 
;  peccata  autem  partim  esse  tolerabilia,  partim 
nullo  modo,  propterea  quod  alia  peceata  plures,  alia 
paueiores  quasi  iiumeros  offici  praeterirent ;  iam 
insipientes  alios  ita  esse  ut  nullo  modo  ad  sapientiam 
possent  pervenire,  alios  qui  possent,  si  id  egissent, 
57  sapientiam  consequi.  Hie  loquebatur  aliter  atque 
omnes,    sentiebat    idem    quod    ceteri.       Nee   vero 

■Zeno  came  from  Citium  in  Cyprus,  said  to  have  been 
the  seat  of  a  Phoenician  colony ;  and  the  Phoenicians  were 
proverbially  crafty.  Cato  superintended  the  reduction  of 
Cyprus  lo  a  Roman  province,  and  Cicero  in  his  Letters 
speaks  of  the  island  as  nnder  Cato's  proteclion. 

BOOK  IV.   xix-xx 
premises  are  upset  also.     What  then  are  your  con- 
ctusiions?     That   those   who   are    not  wise  are   all 
equally  wretched ;  that  the  wise  are  all  supremely 
happy;    that  all  right  actions  are  equal, 
on  a  par;^these  dicta  may  have  had  an  imposing 
sound  at  a  first  hearing,  but  upon  examination  they 
began  to 'seem  less  convinoing.    For  comi 
the   facts  of  nature,  truth  herself  seemed  to  ery 
aloud  that  nothing  should  persuade  them  that  there 
was  actually  no  difference  between  the  things  which 
Zeno  made  out  to  lie  equal. 

56  XX.  "  Subsequently  your  little  Phoenician  (for 
you  are  aware  that  your  clients  of  Citium  originally 
come  from  Phoenicia"),  with  the  cunning  of  his  race, 
on  failing  to  make  good  his  ease  in  defiance  of 
Nature's  protest,  set  about  juggling  with  words. 
First  he  allowed  the  things  that  we  in  our  school 
call  goods  to  be  considered  valuable'  and  suited 
to  nature,'  and  he  began  to  admit  that  thoug-h  a 
man  were  wise,  that  is  supremely  happy,  it  would 
yet  be  an  advantage  to  him  if  he  also  possessed  the 
things  which  he  is  not  bold  enough  to  call  goods, 
but  allows  to  be  suited  to  nature.'  He  main- 
tains that  Plato,  even  if  he  be  not  wise,  is  not  in  the 
same  case  as  tlie  tyrant  Dionysius :  Dionysius  must 
despair  of  wisdom,  and  his  best  fate  would  be  to  die ; 
but  Plato  hasbopesof  it,  and  had  better  live.  Again, 
he  allows  that  some  sins  are  endurable,  while 
others  are  unpardonable,  because  some  sins  transgress 
more  and  others  fewer  points  of  duty;  moreover 
some  fools  are  so  foolish  as  to  be  utterly  incapable  of 
attaining  wisdom,  but  others  might  conceivably  by 

57  great  effort  attain  to  wisdom.  In  all  this  though  his 
language  was  peculiar,  his  meaning  was  the  same  as 


:  nesliiuanda  ducebat  ea  quae  ipse  bona 
negaret  esse  quam  ilti  qui  ea  bona  esse  dicebant. 
Quid  igitur  voluit  sibi  qui  ilia  mutaverit?  Saltern 
all  quid  de  pondere  delraxisset  et  paulo  niinoris 
aestimavisset  ea  quam  Peripatetici,  ut  sentire  quo- 
que  aliud,  non  solum  djcere  videretur.  Quid?  de 
ipsa  beata  vita,  ad  quam  omnia  referuntur,  quae 
dicitis?  Negatis  earn  esse  quae  expleta  sit  iis  rebus 
omnibus  quas  natura  desideret,  totamque  eam  in 
una  virtute  ponitis.  Cumque  omnis  controversia 
aut  de  re  soleat  aut  de  nomuie  esse^  utraque  earum 
nascitur  si  aut  res  ignoratur  aut  erratur  in  nomine. 
Quorum  si  neutrum  est,  opera  danda  est  ut  verbis 
utamur  quam  usitatissimis  et  quam  maxime  aptis,  td 
58  eat  rem  declarantibus.  Num  igitur  dubium  est  quin, 
si  in  re  ipsa  nihil  peccatur  a  superioribus,  verbis  illi 
commodius  utanturr  Videaraus  igitur  sententias 
eorum ;  turn  ad  verba  redeamus. 

XXI.  Dieunt  appetitioneni  animi  nioveri  cum 
aliquid  ei  secundum  naturam  esse  videatur;  omnia- 
que  quae  secundum  naturam  sint  aestimatione 
aliqua  digna,  eaque  pro  eo  quantum  in  quoque  sit 
ponderia  esse  aestimanda;  quaeque  secundum  natu- 
ram sint,  partim  nihil  habere  in  aese  eius  appetitionis 
de  qua  saepe  iam  diximus,  quae  nee  honesta  nee 

^  BOOK  IV.  XX  xxi 

that  of  everybody  else.    In  fact  he  set  n 

n  the  things  he  hiinself  denied  to  be  good  than  did 
those  who  said  they  were  good.  What  then  did 
he  want  by  altering  their  names?  He  ouglit  at 
least  to  have  diminished  their  importance  and  to 
have  set  a  slightly  lower  value  on  them  than  the 
Peripatetics,  so  as  to  make  the  difference  appear  to 
be  one  of  meaning'  and  not  merely  of  language. 
Again,  what  do  you  and  your  school  say  about 
happiness  itself,  the  ultimate  end  and  aim  of  all 
things?  You  will  not  have  it  to  be  the  sum  of  all 
nature's  requirements,  but  make  it  consist  of  virtue 
alone.  Now  all  disputes  usually  turn  either  on 
facts  or  on  names;  ignorance  of  fact  or  error  as  to 
terms  will  cause  one  or  the  other  form  of  dispute 
respectively.  If  neither  source  of  difference  is 
present,  we  must  be  careful  to  employ  the  terms 
most  generally  accepted  and  those  most  suitable, 
i  that  is,  those  that  best  describe  the  fact.  Can  we 
doubt  that,  if  the  older  philosophers  are  not  mis- 
taken on  the  point  of  fact,  their  terminology  is  the 
more  convenient  one?  Let  us  then  consider  their 
opinions  and  return  to  the  question  of  terminology 

XXI.      Their  statements  are  that  appetition  is  The  ant 
excited  in  the  mind  when  something  appears  to  it  gtodm 
to  be  in  accordance  with  nature ;  and  that  all  things  '^"  ^ 
that  are  in  accordance  with  nature  are  worth  some  tuwd  u 
valucj  and  are  to  be  valued  in  proportion  to  the  im-  """"8° 
portance   that   they  severally   possess;   and   that   of 
those  things  which  are  in  accordance  with  nature, 
some  excite  of  themselves  none  of  that  appetition 
of  which  we  have  often  spoken  already,  and  these 
are  to  be  called  neither  honourable  nor  praiseworthy, 


laudabilia  dicantur,  partim  quae  voluptatem  habeant 
in  umni  animante,  sed  in  homine  rationem  etiam; 
ex  en  quae  sint  apta,  ea  honesta,  ea  pulclira,  ea 
laudabilia,  ilia  autem  superiora  naturalia  nomiiiantur, 
quae  CDuiuncta  cum  honestis  vitam  beatam  perficiunt 

.1!)  et  absolvunt.  Omnium  autem  eorum  commodorum 
quibus  non  illi  plus  tribuunt  qui  ilia  bona  esse  dicunt 
quam  Zeno  qui  negat,  longe  praestantissimum  esse 
quod  hoiiestum  esset  atque  laudabile ;  sed  si  duo 
honesta  prop€»sita  sint,  alterum  cum  valetudine, 
alterum  cum  morbo,  non  esse  dubium  ad  utrum 
eorum  natura  nos  ipsa  deductura  sit;  sed  tamen 
tantam  vim  esse  honestatis  tantumque  earn  rebus 
omnibus  praestare  et  exceJlereut  null  is  nee  suppliciis 
nee  praemiis  demoveri  possit  ex  eo  quod  rectum 
esse  decreverit ;  omiiiaque  quae  dura,  difficilia, 
adversa  videantur,  ea  virtutibus  iis  quibus  a  natura 
essemus  oraati  obteri  posse ;  non  facile  ilia  quidem, 
nee  eontemnenda  esse''  (quid  enim  esset  in  nrtnte 
tantum?),  sed  ut  hoc  iudicaremus,  non  esse  in  his 
partem  maximam  positam  beate  aut  secos  vivendi. 

60  Ad  summam  ea  quae  Zeuo  aestimaiida  et  smnenda 
et  apta.  naturae  esse  dixit,  eadem  illi  bona  appellant; 

*  non  facile  iUa  quidem  (sc.  obtEri  poas 
esse  conj.  Mdv.,  who  prints  with  a  mar 
MSS.  nonfaciksillasquide --~."*-- 

Tiark  of  corruption  the 
ntemnandas  {quid  etc.). 

■This  confused  piissage  is  conjecturally  remedied  bj 
W.  M.  L.  Hulcliinson,  de  Fin.  p.  133,  who  for  in  sesr  sug- 
^esta  in  stirpe  (cp.  V,  1  □  stirpium  naturas),  and  for  iw/h- 
piatevt,  valuniatem  (cp.  Tuse.  IV,  li).  Lastly  Ihe  clause 
quae  nee  honesta  nee  laudabilia  dicantur  logically  should 
come  itnmediately  afler  guaeque  secundum  tiaturam  sint. 
thoug-h  Cicero  may  have  carelessly  misplaced  it.  The 

BOOK  IV.  xxi 

while  some  are  thosu  which  are  objects  of  pleasure 
in  every  living  creature,  but  in  man  are  objects  of 
tlie  reason  also;^  those  which  are  suitable  in  accord- 
ance with  reason  are  called  honourable,  beautiful, 
praiseworthy ;  but  the  former  class  are  called  natural, 
the  class  which  coupled  with  things  morally  worthy 

J  render  happiness  perfect  and  complete.  They  fur- 
ther hold  that  of  all  those  advantages,  which  they 
who  call  tliem  goods  rate  no  more  highly  than  does 
Zeno  who  says  they  are  not  goods,  by  far  the  most 
excellent  is  Moral  Worth  and  what  is  praise- 
worthy; but  if  one  is  offered  the  choice  between 
Moral  Worth  plus  health  and  Moral  Worth  plus 
disease,  there  is  no  doubt  to  which  of  the  two  Nature 
herself  will  guide  us ;  though  at  the  same  time 
Moral  Worth  is  so  potent,  and  so  overwhelmingly 
superior  to  all  other  things,  that  no  penalties  or 
rewards  can  induce  it  to  swerve  from  what  it  has 
decided  to  be  right;  and  all  apparent  hardships, 
difficulties  and  obstacles  can  be  trodden  under  foot 
by  the  virtues  with  which  nature  has  adorned  us; 
not  that  these  hardships  are  easily  overcome  or  to 
be  made  light  of  (else  where  were  the  merit  of 
virtue?),  but  so  as  to  lead  us  to  the  verdict  that 
these  things  are  not  the  main  factor  in  our  happi- 

)  ncss  or  the  reverse.  In  fine,  the  ancients  entitle 
the  same  things  good'  that  Zeno  pronounced 
valuable,'    to  be  adopted,'  and     suited  to  nature'; 

which  ihe  Stoifs  pronoi 

often  spoken,  but  (i)  h 
of  rational  phpjce).' 

ice  neither  moral  nor  praiseworthy, 
of  the  appclillon  of  which  we  have 
animais  excite  volition,  and  parli- 
the  reason  al^o  (i.e.  are  the  objects 


vitam  autem  beatam  illi  earn  quae  constaret  ex  iia 
rebus  quas  dixi,  aut  plurimis  aut  gravissimJs,  Zeno 
autem  quod  suam,  quod  propriam'  specietn  hnbeat 
cur  appetendum  sit,  id  solum  bonum  appellat,  bea- 
tam    autem    vilam    earn    solam   quae    cum    virtute 

XXn.  "Si  de  re  diseeptari  oportet,  nulla  mihi 
tecum,  Cato,  potest  esse  dissensio;  nihil  est  enim  de 
quo  aliter  tu  sentias  atque  ego,  modo  commutatis 
verbis  ipsas  res  conferamus.  Nee  hoc  ille  non  vidit 
sed  verborum  magnificentia  est  et  gloria  delectatus; 
qui  si  ea  quae  dicit  ita  sentiret  ut  verba  significant, 
quid  inter  euni  et  vel  Pyrrhonem  vel  Aristoiiera 
interesset?  Sin  autem  eos  non  probabat,  quid  attinuit 
cum  lis  quibuscum  re  concinebat  verbis  discrepare? 
6l  Quid  si  reviviscant  Platonis  illi  et  deinceps  qui  eorum 
auditores  fuerunt  et  tecum  ita  loquantur?  Nos  cum 
te,  M.  Cato,  studios issimum  philosopjiiae,  iuGtissimuin 
virum,  optimum  iudicem,  religioslssimum  testem, 
audiremus,  adniirati  sumus  quid  esset  cur  nobis 
Stoicos  anteferres,  qui  de  rebus  bonis  et  malis  sen- 
tirent  ea  quae  ab  hoc  Polemone  Zeno  cognoverat, 
nominibus  utereiitur  iis  quae  prima  specie  admirati- 
onem,  re  explicata  risum  moverent.  Tu  autem,  si 
tibi  ilia  probabantur,  cur  non  propriis  verbis  ilia 
tenebas?  sin  te  auctoritas  commovebat,  nobisne 
omnibus  et  Platoni  ipsinescio  quern  ilium  antepone- 
bas  ?  praesertim  cum  in   re  publica  princeps  « 

Baiter;  Mdv.conj.  quendampi 



3f  the  ^M 

and  they  call  a  life  happy  which  comprises  e 
the  largest  number  or  the  most  important  of  t 
things  aforesaid:  Zeno  on  the  contrary  calls  nothing 
good    but    that   which    has   a    peculiar   charm   and 
attractiveness  of  its  own,  and  no  life  happy  but  the 
life  of  virtue. 

XXll,  '  If,  Cato,  the  discussion  is  to  turn  on  ^«lo'inuvsl 
facts,  disagreement  between  me  and  yourself  is  out  [^^"nVim- 
of  the  question  :  since  your  views  and  mine  are  the  S^J'^t^'i".'' 
sanie  in  every  particular,  if  only  we  compare  thecicnis? 
actual  substance  alter  making  the  necessary  changes 
in  terms.  Zejio  was  not  unaware  of  this,  but  he  was 
beguiled  by  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  language ; 
had  he  really  thought  what  he  says,  in  the  actual 
sense  of  the  words  he  uses,  what  difference  would 
there  be  between  him  and  either  Pyrrho  or  Aristo? 
If  on  the  other  hand  he  rejected  Pyrrho  and 
Aristo,  what  was  the  point  of  quarrelling  about  words 
with  those  with  whom  he  agreed  in  substance  ? 
[  What  if  the  pupils  of  Plato  were  to  come  to  life 
again,  and  their  pupils  again  in  succession,  and  were 
to  address  you  in  this  fashion  ?  As  we  listened, 
Marcus  Cato,  to  sn  devoted  a  student  of  philosophy,  so 
just  a  man,  so  upright  a  judge,  so  scrupulous  a  witness 
as  yourself,  we  marvelled  what  reason  could  induce 
you  to  reject  us  for  the  Stoics,  whose  views  on  good 
and  evil  were  the  views  that  Zeno  learnt  from  Polemo 
here,  but  who  expressed  those  views  in  terms  at  first 
sight  startling  and  upon  examination  ridiculous.  If 
you  accepted  those  views  on  their  merits,  why  did 
you  not  hold  them  under  their  own  terminology  ?  or 
if  you  were  swayed  by  authority,  could  you  prefer 
that  nobody  to  all  of  us,  even  to  Plato  himself? 
especially  when  you  aspired  to  play  a  leading  part  in 


velles  ad  eamque  tuendam  eura  summa  tua  djgnitate 
maxime  a  nobis  ornari  atque  instrui  posses.  A'  nobis 
enim  ista  quuesita,  a  nobis  dcscripta,  notata,  prae- 
ccpta  sunt,  omniumque  rerum  pubHcarum  rectionis 
genera,  status,  mutationes,  leges  etiam  et  instituta  ac 
mores  civitatum  peracripaimus.  Eloquentiae  vero, 
quae  et  prineipibus  maximo  ornamento  est  et  qua 
te  audimus  valere  plurimum,  quantum  tibi  ex  monu- 
mentis  nostris  addidisses  I  '  £a  cum  dixissent,  quid 
62  tandem  talibus  viris  responderes  ?  "  Rogarem  te," 
inquit,  ut  diceres  pro  me  tu  idem  qui  iUis  orationem 
dictavisses,  vel  potius  paulum  loci  mihi  ut  ils  re- 
sponderem  dares,  nisi  et  te  audire  nunc  mallem  et 
isl^is  tamen  alio  tem.pore  responsurus  essem,  turn 
scilicet  cum  tibi." 

XXIII.  "Atque  si  verum  respondere  velles,  Cato, 
haec  erant  dicenda,  non  eos  tibi  non  probatos,  tautis 
ingeniis  homines  tantaque  auctoritate,  sed  te  anim- 
advertisse  quas  res  illi  propter  antiquitatem  parum 
vidissent,  eas  a  Stoicis  esse  perspectas,  eisdemque  de 
rebus  hos  cum  acutius  disseruisse,  tum  scnsisse  gravius 
et  fortius,  quippe  qui  primum  valetudinem  bonam 
expetendam  negeiit  esse,  eligendam  dicant,  nee  quia 
bonum  sit  vutere  sed  quia  sit  nonnihilo  aestimandum 
(neque  tamen  pluris  illis  videtur,  qui  illud  non  dubi- 
tant  bonum  dicere;)  hoc  vero  te  ferre  non  [wtuisse, 
quod  antiqui  illi  quasi  barbati  (ut  nos  de  Dostris 
'A  inserted  by  Lambinus,  Mdv. 

to  shave,  ,^^^H 


the  state,  and  we  were  the  very  persons  to  a 
equip  you  to  protect  tlie  state  with  all  the  » 

_  eight  of 

your  high  character.  Why,  it  is  we  who  invented 
political  philusophy  ;  its  classifications,  its  nomencla- 
ture, its  practical  rules  are  our  creation  ;  on  all  the 
various  forms  of  Roveniment,  their  stability,  their 
revolutions,  the  laws,  institutions  and  customs  of 
states,  we  have  written  exhaustively.  Oratory  again 
is  the  proudest  distinction  of  the  statesman,  and  in 
it  yoUj  we  are  told,  are  pre-eminent ;  but  how  vastly 
you  might  have  enriched  your  eloquence  froni  the 
records  of  our  genius. '  What  answer,  pray,  could  you 
52  give  to  these  words  from  such  men  as  those  ?  "  I 
would  beg  of  you,"  replied  Cato,  to  be  my  spokes- 
man also,  as  you  have  been  their  prompter  in  this 
harangue ;  or  rather  I  would  ask  you  to  grant  me  a 
moment's  space  in  which  to  answer  them,  if  it  were 
not  that  for  the  present  I  prefer  to  listen  to  you, 
and  also  uitend  to  reply  to  your  champions  at  another 
time,  I  mean  when  I  reply  to  yourself." 

XXIII.    "Well,  Cato,  if  you  wanted  to  answer  Th=sioi«- 
truly,  this  is  what  you  would  have  to  say  :  that  with  accSacy™ 
all  respect  for  the  high  authority  of  men  so  gifted,  "^aniinsd. 
you   had   observed   that  the  Stoics   had  discovered 
truths  which  they  in  those  early  days  liad  naturally 
failed  to  see ;  the  Stoics  had  discussed  the  same  sub- 
jects with  more  insight  and  had  arrived  at  bolder  and 
more  profound  conclusions ;  first,  they  said  that  good 
health  is  not  desu-able  but  is  worthy  of  selection,  and 
that  not  because  to  be  well  is  a  good,  but  because 
it  has  some  positive  value  (not  that  any  greater 
value  is  attached  to  it  by  the  older  school  who  do 
not  hesitate  to  call  it  a  good) ;  well  then,  you  couldn't 
stand  those  bearded*  old  fogies  (as  we  call  our  own 

solemus  dicere)  crediderint,  eius  qui  honeste  viveretj 
si  idem  etiam  bene  valeret,  bene  audiret,  eopiosus 
esset,  optabiliorem  fore  vitam  melioremque  et  magis 
expetendam  quam  illius  qui,  aeque  vir  bonus,  multis 
modis  esset,  ut  Enni  Alcnnaeo, 

eirciiinventua  morbo,  exsilio  atque  inopia.' 

6S  Illi  igitur  antiqui  non  tain  acute  optabiliorem  Ulam 
vitam  putant,  praestantiorem,  beatiorem  ;  Stoici  au- 
tem  taiitummodo  praeponendam  in  seligendo,  non 
quo  beatior  ea  vita  sit,  sed  quod  ad  naturam  accom- 
modatior ;  et  qui  sapientes  non  sint,  omnes  aeque 
miseros  esse.  Stoici  hoc  videlicet  videnint,  Oloa 
autem  id  fugerat  superiores,'  homines  sceleribus  et 
parricidiis  inquinatos  nihilo  miseriores  esse  qu^on  eos 
qui,  cum  caste  et  integre  vivereiit,  nondum  perfe- 

6t  ctam  illam  supientiam  essent  consecuti.  Atque  hoe 
loco  simUitudines  eas  quibus  illi  uti  solent  dissimilli' 
mas  proferebas.  Quis  enim  ignorat,  si  plures  ex 
alto  eraergere  velint,  propius  fore  eos  qutdem  ad 
respirandum,  qui  ad  summam  aquam  iam  appro- 
pinquent  sed  nihilo  magis  respirare  posse  quam  eos 
qui  sint  in  profundo?  nihil  igitur  adiuvat  procedere 
et  progredi  in  virtute  quominus  miserrimus  sit  ante- 
quam  ad  earn  pervenerit,  quoniam  in  aqua  nihil 
adiuvat  Et  quoniam  catuli  qui  iam  dispecturi  sunt 
caeci  aeque  et  ii  qui  modo  nati,  Platonem  quoque 
necesse  est,  quoniam  nondum  videbat  sapientiam, 
aeque  caecum  anlmo  ac  Phalarim  fuisse, 

XXIV.      Ista  simijia  non  sunt,  Cato,  in  quibos 

rabanlur;    «^^B 

^M  BOOK  rV.  xxiii-xxiv 

Roman  ancestors)  believing  that  a  man 
morally,  if  he  also  had  health,  wealth  and  reputation, 
had  a  preferable,  better,  more  desirable  life  than  he 
who,  though  equally  good,  was,  like  Alci 

In  divers  ways  beset 
With  sickness,  banishment  and  poverty. 

j3  Those  men  of  old  then,  with  their  duller  wits,  think 
that  the  former  life  is  more  desirable,  more  excellent, 
more  happy  ;  the  Stoics  on  the  other  hand  consider 
it  merely  to  be  preferred  for  choice,  not  because  it  is 
a  happier  life  but  because  it  is  more  adapted  to 
nature.  The  Stoics  we  must  suppose  discerned  a 
truth  that  had  escaped  their  predecessors,  namely 
that  Itaen  defiled  by  crimes  and  murders  are  no 
more  miserable  than  those  who  though  pious  and 
upright  in  their  lives  have  not  yet  attained  ideal  and 

i4  perfect  wisdom.    It  was  at  this  point  that  you  brought  ti 
forward  those  extremely  false  analogies  which  the  '" 
Stoics  are  so  fond  of  employing.     For  who  cannot  it 
see  that  if  there  are  several  people  plunged  in  deep  "' 
water  and  trying  to  get  out,  those  already  approach- 
ing the  surface,  though   nearer   to    breatliing,  will 
be  no  more  able  actually  to  breathe  than  those  at 
the    bottom  ?     You    infer    that    improvement   and 
progress  in  virtue  are  of  no  avail  to  save  a  man  from 
being  utterly  wretched,  until  he  has  actually  arrived 
at  virtue,  since  to  rise  in  the  water  is  of  no  avail. 
Again,  since  puppies  on  the  point  of  opening  their 
eyes  are  as  blind  as  those  only  just  born,  it  follows 
that  Plato,  not  having  yet  attained  to  the  vision  of 
wisdom,  was  just  as  blind  mentally  as  PhalarisI 

65       XXIV.  '■  Really,  Cato,  there  is  no  analogy  between 
bb3  371 

quamvis  multuni  processeris,  tamen  illud  in  eadem 
causa  est  a  quo  abesse  velis,  donee  evaseris.  Nee 
enim  ille  respirat  antequam  emersit,  et  catuii  aeque 
caeci  priusquani  dispeserunt  ae  si  ita  futiiri  semper 
essent.  Ilia  sunt  siniilia:  hebes  acies  est  cuipiam 
oeuloruTO,  corpore  alios  languescit ' ;  hi  curatione  ad- 

hibita  levantur  in  dies ; 
videt ;  his  similes  sunt 
levantur  vitiis,  levantur  ■ 

Ti.   Gracchui 

alet  alter  plus  cotidie,  alter 
nnnes  qui  virtuti  student ; 
rroribus.  Nisi  forte  censes 
n*  befttiorem  fuisse  quam 
I  publicam  studuerit, 

filium,  cum  alter  stabilin 

alter  evertere.  Nee  tamen  ille  erat  sapiens;  quis 
enim  hoe?  aut  quando?  aut  ubi?  aut  unde?  sed 
quia  studebat  laudi  et  dignitati,  multum  in  virtute 

66  processerat.  Confer^  avum  tuum  Drusum  cum  C 
Graccho,  eius  fere  aequali.  Quae  hie  rei  publicae 
vulnera  iniponebat,  eadem  ille  sanabat.  Si  nihil  est 
quod  tam  miseros  faciat  quam  impietas  et  scelus,  ut 
iam  omnes  insipientes  sint  miseri,  quod  profecto 
suntj  non  est  tamen  aeque  miser  qui  patriae  consuht 
et  is  qui  illam  exstinctam  cupJt.  Levatio  igitur  vi- 
tiorum  magna  fit  in'  lis  qui  habent  ad  virtutem  pro- 

67  gressionis  aliquantum.  Vestri  autem  proj^essionem 
ad  virtutem  fieri    aiunt,  levationem   vitiorum   fieri 

-  negant.     At  quo  utantur  homines  acuti  argumento 
ad   probandum    operae    pretium    est    considerare. 

•  languescit  Inf.  MSS. ;  nescil  B  E  ;  seaesrii  Mdv. 
'nan  inaerlcil  by  edd. 

•  Con/i^am]  MuHer;  Conferam  B  E  ;  Oinfera->a  aulem  Inf. 
MSS.;  Confirant  [au/em}  .  .  .  aeguali?  Mdv, 

•  in  E,  om.  B  and  olher  MSS. 


^■^  BOOK   tV.  xxiv 

progress  in  virtue  and  cases  such  as  you  describe 
whicli  however  far  one  advances,  the  situation  c 
wishes  to  escape  from  still  remains  the  same  until 
one  has  actually  emerged  froni  it.      The  man  does 
not  breathe  until  he  has  risen  to  the  surface;  the 
puppies  are  as  blind  before  they  have  opened  their 
eyes  as  if  they  were  going  to  be  blind  always.     Good 
analogies  would  be  these :  one  man's  eyesight  is  dint, 
another's  general  health  is  weak;  apply  remedies, 
and  tliey  get  better  day  by  day;  every  day  the  o 
is  stronger  and  the  other  sees  better;  similarly  with 
all  who  earnestly  pursue  virtue ;  they  get  better, 
their  vices  and  errors  are  gradually  reduced.      Surely 
you  would  not  maintain   that  the  elder  Tiberius 
Gracchus  was  not  happier  than  his  son,  wh 
devoted  himself  to  the  service  of  the  state  and  the 
other  to  its  destruction.  But  still  the  elder  Gracchus 
was  not  a  Wise  Man;  who  ever  was?  or  when,  or 
where,  or  how  f  Still  he  aspired  to  fame  and  honour, 
and  therefore  had  advanced  to  a  high  point  in  virtue. 

)6  Compare     your    grandfather    Drusus    with    Gaius  Thoobvioui 
Gracchus,  who  was  nearly  his  contemporary.     The  vi^eaoeSp 
former  strove  to  heal  the  wounds  which  the  latter  I'"*""'?'.' 
inflicted  on  the  state.    If  there  is  nothing  tliat  makes 
men  so  miserable  as  impiety  and  crime,  granted  that 
all  wlio  are  foolish  are  miserable,  as  of  course  they 
are,  nevertheless  a  man  who  serves  his  country  is  not 
so  miserable  as  one  who- longs  for  its  ruin.     There- 
fore those  who  achieve  definite  progress  towards 
virtue  undergo  a  great  diminution  of  their  vices. 

57  Your   teachers,  however,  while   allowing   progress 

towards  virtue,  deny  diminution  of  vice.     But  it  is 

worth  while  to  examine  the  argument  on  which  these 

clever  people  rely  for  the  proof.  Their  line  is  this :  In 


Qunrum,  in  quit,  artium  suminae  crescere  posstmt, 
earum  etiam  contrariorum  sumiiia  poterit  augeri;  ad 
virtutis  autem  sunimam  accedere  nihil  potest;  ne 
vitia  quidem  igitur  crescere  poteriint,  quae  sunt  vir- 
tutum  contraria.  Utrum  igitur  tandem  perspicoisne 
dubiaaperiunturandubiisperspicuatolluntur?  Atqui 
hoc  perspicuum  est,  vitia  alia  aliis'  esse  maiora;  illud 
dubium,  ad  id  quod  suinmum  bonum  dicitis  ecquae- 
nam  fieri  possit  accessio.  Vos  autem,  cum  perspicuis 
dubia  debeatis  illustrare,  dubiis  perspicoa  conamini 
6S  toUere.  Itaque  eadem^  ratione  qua  sum  paulo  ante 
usus  haerebitis.  Si  enim  propterea  vitia  alia  aliis 
maiora  non  sunt  quia  ne  ad  finem  quidem  lionorum 
eum  quern  vos  facitis  quidquam  potest  accedere, 
quoniam  perspicuum  est  vitia  non  esse  omnium  paria, 
finis  bonorum  vobis  niutandus  est.  Teneamus  enim 
illud  oecesse  est,  cum  consequens  aliquod  falsum 
sit,  illud  cuius  id  consequens   sit  non  posse   esse 

XXV.  Quae  est  igitur  causa  istarumangustiarum? 
Gloriosa  ostentatio  in  conslituendo  sommo  bono. 
Cum  enim  quod  honestum  sit  id  solum  bonum  esse 
confirmatur,  tolHtur  cura  valetudinis,  diligetitia  rei 
familiaris,  administratio  rei  publicae,  ordo  gerendo- 
rum  negotiorum,  officia  vitae ;  ipsum  denique  illud 
honestum,  in  quo  uno  vultis  esse  omnia,  deserendum 
est;  quae  diligentissime  contra  Aristonem  dicuntur 
a  Chrysippo.  Ex  ea  difficultate  illae  'fallaciloquae,' 
69  ut  ait  AttiuSj  'maUtiae,'  natae  sunt     Quod  enim 

'alia  aliis  tumhinMS 
i^  eadeni  B  E. 


,  Mdv.; 
;  Itaqu 

i  alia  in  aliis  mSS. 
e  rursus  eadem  Bail 

Bailer  iid^H 

^r  BOOK  I^".  xxiT-xxT 

Ae  case  of  «rts  or  sciences  «hkfa  admit  of  advanee- 
ment.  tbe  opposite  of  those  arts  »ad  sciences  «ill  also 
admit  of  advance:  but  virtue  is  absolute  and  incap- 
able of  increase ;  therefore  the  viees  also.  Itcing  the 
opposite  of  the  lirtues,  are  incapable  of  gradation. 
Pray  tell  me  then,  does  a  f^rtaiiity  explain  an  un- 
certainty, or  does  an  uncertainty  disprove  a  cer- 
tainty r  Now,  that  some  vices  are  worse  than  others 
is  certain ;  but  whether  the  Chief  Good,  as  you  Stoics 
conceive  it,  can  be  subject  to  increase  is  not  certain. 
Yet  instead  of  employing  the  certain  to  throw  light 
on  the  uncertain,  you  endeavour  to  make  tlie  uncet^ 

S  tain  disprove  the  certain.  Therefore  you  can  be 
checkmated  by  the  same  argument  as  1  employed 
just  now.  If  the  proof  that  one  vice  cannot  be 
worse  than  another  depends  on  the  fact  that  the  End 
of  Goods,  as  you  conceive  it,  is  itself  incapable  of 
increase,  then  you  must  alter  your  End  of  Goods, 
since  it  is  certain  that  the  vices  of  all  men  are  not 
equal.  For  we  are  bound  to  hold  that  if  a  ci 
is  false,  the  premise  on  which  it  depends  cannot  be 

XXV.  Now  what  has  landed  you  in  this  intpaxtef  TbiStolcsi 
Simply  your  pride  and  vainglory  in  constructing  rij^"!,'^,^ 
your  Chief  Good.  To  maintain  that  the  only  Good  ?{|f''''""J| 
is  Moral  Worth  is  to  do  away  with  the  care  of  one's 
health,  the  management  of  one's  estate,  participation  ^ 
in  politics,  the  conduct  of  affairs,  the  duties  of  life ; 
nay,  to  abandon  that  Moral  Worth  itself,  which 
according  to  you  is  the  be-all  and  the  end -all 
of  existence;  objections  that  were  urged  most 
earnestly  against  Aristo  by  Chrysippus.  This  is  the 
difficulty  that  gave  birth  to  those     base  conceits 

)  deceitful-tongued,'  as  Attius  has  it.    Wisdom  had  no 

sapientia  pedem  ubi  poneret  non  habebat  sublatis 
officiis  omnibus,  officia  autem  tcllebantur  delectu 
orani  et  discrimine  remoto,  quae  esse  non^  poterant 
rebus  omnibus  sic  exaequatis  ut  inter  eas  nihil 
interesset,  ex  his  angustiis  ista  evascrunt  deterlora 
quam  Aristonis.  Ilia  tamen  simplicia;  vestra  ver- 
suta.  Roges  enim  Aristonem,  bonane  ei  videantur 
haee,  vacuitas  doloris,  divitiae,  valetudo;  neget. 
Quid?  quae  contraria  sunt  his  malaue?  Nihilo 
magis.  Zcnonem  roges;  respondeat  totidem  verbis. 
Admirantes  quaeramus  ab  utroque  quonam  modo 
vitam  agere  possimus  si  nihil  interesse  nostra  pute- 
mus,  valeamus  aegrine  simus,  vacemus  an  cruciemur 
dolore,  frigus,  faniem  propulsare  possimus  necne 
possimus.  Vives,  in  quit  Aristo,  raagnifice  atqiie 
praeclare;  quod  erit  cumque  visum  ages;  numquam 

70  angere,  numquam  cupies,  numquam  timebis.  Quid 
Zeno  ?  Portenta  haec  esse  dicit  neque  ea  ratione  ullo 
modo  posse  vivi ;  se  dicere "  inter  honestum  et  turpe 
nimium    quantum,   nescio    quid    tmmensum,    inter 

71  celeras  res  nihil  omnino  interesse.  Idem  adhuc; 
audi  reliqua  et  risum  pontine  si  potes.  Media  ilia, 
inquit,  inter  quae  nihil  interest,  tamen  .eiusmodi 
sunt  ut  eorum  alia  eligenda  sint,  alia  reicienda,  alia 

0  neglegenda,  hoc  est  ut  eorum  alia  velis,  alia 
ilia  non  cures.—  At  modo  dixeras  nihil  in  istis 

'  non  inserted  by  edd. 

*se  iicere  Mdv. ;  sed  dicere  B,  E ;  aed  differre  other  MSS. 

BOOK   IV.  xx^. 

ground  to  staDd  on  when  desires  were  alwUshed; 
desires  were  abolish'ed  when  all  choice  atid  distinc- 
tion was  done  away  with ;  distinction  was  impossible 
when  all  things  were  made  absolutely  equal  and  in- 
different ;  and  these  perplexities  resulted  in  your 
paradoxes,  which  are  worse  than  those  of  Aristo. 
His  were  at  all  events  frank  and  open,  whereas  yours 
are  disingenuous.  Ask  Aristo  whether  he  deems 
freedom  from  pain,  riches,  health  to  be  goods,  and 
he  will  answer  No.  Well,  are  their  opposites  bad  ? 
No,  likewise.  Ask  Zeno,  and  his  answer  would  be 
identically  the  same.  In  our  surprise  we  should 
inquire  of  each,  how  can  we  possibly  conduct  our 
lives  if  we  think  it  makes  no  difference  to  us  whetlier 
we  are  well  or  ill,  free  from  pain  or  in  torments  of 
agony,  safe  against  cold  and  hunger  or  exposed  to 
them.  O,  says  Aristo,  you  will  get  on  splendidly, 
capitally;  you  will  do  exactly  what  seems  good  to 
you;  you  will  never  know  sorrow,  desire  or  fear. 

70  What  is  Zeno's  answer  ?  This  doctrine  is  a  philo- 
sophical monstrosity,  he  tells  ns,  it  renders  life 
entirely  impossible  ;  his  view  is  that  while  between 
the  moral  and  the  base  a  vast,  enormous  gulf  is 
fijied,  between  all  other  thiugs  there  is  no  difference 

71  whatever.  So  far  this  is  the  same  as  Aristo;  but 
hear  what  follows,  and  restrain  your  laughter  if  you 
can.  These  intermediate  things,  says  Zeno,  which 
have  no  difference  between  them,  are  still  of  such  a 
nature  that  some  of  them  are  to  be  selected  and 
others  rejected,  while  others  again  are  to  be  entirely 
ignored  ;  that  is,  they  are  such  that  some  you  wish 
to  have,  others  you  wish  not  to  have,  and  about  others 
you  do  not  care. —  But  you  told  us  just  now  that 
there  was  no  difference  among  them.' —  And  1  say 


esse  quod  interesset.' —  Et  nunc  idem  dico,'  inquiet, 
sed  ad  virtutes  et  ad  vitia  nihil  iiiteresse.' 

i  XXVI.  Quis  islrud,  quaeso,  nesciebnt?  Verum 
audiamus.—  Isla,'  inquit,  quae  dixisti,  valere, 
locupletem  esse,  non  dolere,  bona  nou  dico  sed 
dicani  Graece  irpojjy/tti'a,  l^tine  autetn  producta 
(sed  praeposit^  aut  praecipua  wialo;  sit'  tolerabilius 
et  moltius) ;  ilia  autem,  morbum,  egestatem,  dolorem, 
non  appello  mala  sed  si  libet  reiectanea.  Itaque 
ilia  non  dico  me  expetere  sed  legere,  nee  optare 
sed  sumere,  contraria  autem  non  fiigere  sed  quasi 
seeemere.'  Quid  ait  Aristoteles  reliquique  Pla- 
tonis  alumni?  5e  omnia  quae  secundum  naturam 
sint  bona  appellare,  quae  autem  contra  mala.  Vi- 
desne  igitur  Zen  on  em  tuum  cum  Aristone  verbis 
consistere,'  re  di.ssidere;  cum  Aristotele  et  illis  re 
consentire,  verbis  discrepare?  Cur  igitur  cum  de  re 
conveniat  non  malumus  usitate  loqui?  Aut  doceat 
pmratiorem  me  ad  contemnendam  pecuniani  fore  si 
illam  in  rebus  praepositis  quam  si  in  bonis  duxero, 
fortioremque  in  patiendo  dolore  si  eum  asperum  et 
diflitiilem  pcrpessu  et*  contra  naturam  esse  quam  si 

3  malum  dixero,  Facete  M,  Piso  f'amiliaris  noster  et 
alia  multa  et  hoc  loco*  Stoicos  Irridebat.  'Quid 
eniin?'  aiebat;  bonum  negas  esse  divitias,  praeposi- 
tum  esse  dicis;  quid  adiuvas?  avaritiamne  minuis? 

Garenz,  Miillei 

*  Uco  Mdv.  « 


the  same  now,'  he  will  reply,     but  I  u 
ference  in  respect  of  virtue  and  vice.' 

78  XXVI.  "  Who,  pray,  did  not  know  that?  How-  t 
ever,  let  us  hear  what  he  has  to  say, — 'The  things  ,, 
you  mentioned,'  he  continues,  iiealth,  affluence,  p 
freedom  from  pain,  1  do  not  call  goods,  but  1  will 
call  them  in  Greek  proigniena,  that  is  in  your  lan- 
guage "brought  forward"  (though  I  will  rather  use 
preferred "  or  '  pre-eminent,"  as  these  sound 
smoother  and  mure  acceptable)  and  on  the  other 
hand  disease,  poverty  and  pain  I  do  not  style  evils, 
but,  if  you  please,  things  rejected,"  Accordingly 
I  do  not  speak  of  desiring"  but  selecting"  these 
things,  not  of  wishing"  but  adopting"  them,  and 
not  of  avoiding"  their  opposites  but  so  to  speak 
discarding"  them.'  What  say  Aristotle  and  the 
other  pupils  of  Plato?  That  they  call  all  things  in 
accordance  with  nature  good  and  all  things  contrary 
to  nature  bad.  Do  you  see  therefore  that  between 
your  master  Zeno  and  Aristo  there  is  a  verbal  har- 
mony but  a  real  difference ;  whereas  between  him 
and  Aristotle  and  the  rest  there  is  a  real  agreement 
and  a  verbal  disagreenient ?  Why,  then,  a3  we  are 
agreed  as  to  the  fact,  do  we  not  prefer  to  employ 
the  usual  terminology?  Or  else  let  him  prove  that 
1  shall  be  readier  to  despise  money  if  I  believe  it  to 
be  a  thing  preferred'  than  if  1  believe  it  to  be  a 
good,  and  braver  to  endure  pain  if  I  say  it  is  irk- 
some and  hard  to  bear  and  contrary  to  nature,  than 

?3  if  I  cull  it  an  evil.  Our  friend  Marcus  Piso  was 
often  witty,  but  never  more  so  than  when  he  ridi- 
culed the  Stoics  on  this  score.  What?'  lie  said. 
You  tell  us  wealth  is  not  good  but  you  say  it  is 
preferred";  how  does  that  help  matters?  do  you 

Quomodo?  Si  verbum  sequimur,  prinium  longius 
verbum  praepositum  quam  bonum." —  Niiiil  ad  rem ! ' 
—  Ne  sit  sane;  at  eerte  gravius.  Nam  bonum  ex 
quo  appellatum  sit,  nescio ;  praepositum  ex  eo  credoj 
quod  praeponatur  aliis:  id  mihi  magnum  videtur.' 
Itaque  dicebat  plus  tribui  divitiis  a  Zenone  qui  eas 
in  praepositis  poneret  quam  ab  Aristotele  qui  bonum 
esse  divitiaa  fateretur  sed  neque  magmim  bonum  et 
prae  rectis  honestisque  contemneiidum  ac  despici- 
endum  nee  magno  opere  expetendum ;  omninoque 
de  istis  omnibus  verbis  a  Zenone  mutatis  ita  disputa- 
but,  et  quae  bona  negarentur  esse  ab  eo  et  quae 
mala,  ilia  laetioribus  nominibus  appellari  ab  eo  quam 
a  nobis,  haec  tristioribus.  Piso  igitur  hoc  modo,  vir 
optimus  tuique,  ut  scis,  amantissimus ;  nos  paucis  ad 
haec  additis  finem  faciamus  aliquando ;  longum  est 
enim  ad  omnia  respoadere  quae  a  te  dicta  sunt. 
1  XXVII.  Nam  ex  eisdem  verborum  praestigiis  et 
regna  nata  vobis  sunt  et  imperia  et  divitiae,  et  tantae 
quidem  ut  omnia  quae  ubique  sint  sapientis  esse 
dicatis.  Solum  praeterea  forraosum,  solum  liberum, 
solum  civem;  stultos  omnia  contraria,  quos  etiam 
insanos  esse  vultis.  Haec  irnpaSo^a  illi,  nos  admirs- 
bilia  dicamus.  Quid  autem  habent  admirationis 
cum  prope  accesseriaf  Conferam  tecum  quam  cui 

crted  by  Md' 

im  quam  cuiqi^^ 


■^  BOOK  IV.  xxvi-xxvii 

diminish  avarice?  In  what  way?  If  it  is  a  question 
of  words,  to  begin  with  '  preferred"  is  a  longer 
word  than  good."  '^  That  is  no  matter.' — 
Granted,  l>y  all  means;  hut  it  is  certainly 
impressive.  For  I  do  not  know  the  derivation  of 
good,"  whereas  "preferred"  I  suppose 
placed  before"  other  things;  this  implies  to  my 
mind  something  very  important.'  Accordingly  he 
would  maintain  that  Zeno  gives  more  importance  to 
wealth,  by  classing  it  as  preferred,'  than  did 
Aristotle,  who  admitted  wealth  to  be  a  good,  yet 
not  a  great  good,  but  one  to  be  thought  lightly  of 
and  despised  in  comparison  with  uprightness  and 
Moral  Worth,  and  not  to  be  greatly  desired;  and 
on  Zeno's  innovations  in  terminology  generally  he 
would  declare  that  the  names  he  actually  gave 
to  the  things  which  he  denied  to  be  good  or  evil 
were  pleasanter  and  gloomier  respectively  than  the 
names  by  which  we  call  them.  So  said  Piso,  an 
excellent  man  and,  as  you  know,  a  devoted  friend 
to  yourself.  For  my  part,  let  me  add  a  few  words 
more  and  then  finally  conclude.  For  it  would  be  a 
long  task  to  reply  to  all  your  arguments. 

i       XXVII.      The  same  verbal  legerdemain  supplies  t 
you  with  your  kingdoms  and  empires  and  riches,  |[ 
riches  BO  vast  that  you  declare  that  everything  the  " 
world  contains  is  the  property  of  the  Wise  Man.  h 
He  alone,  too,  you  say,  is  beautiful,  he  alone  a  free 
man    and    a    citi/en ;     while    the    foolish    are    the 
opposite  of  all  these,  and  according  to  you  insane 
into  the  bargain.     The  Stoics  call  these  paraduxa, 
as  we  might  say    startling  truths.'     But  what  is 
there    so    startling   about    them    viewed    at    close 
quarters?    1  will  eonsult  you  as  to  the  meaning  you 




verbo  rem  subicias;  nulla  erit  controversia.  Omnia 
peceata  paria  dicitis,  Non  ego  tecum  iam  ita  ioca- 
bor  ut  iisdem  liis  de  rebus  cum  L.  Murenam  te 
accusante  defenderem.  Apud  imperitos  turn  ilia 
dicta    sunt;    aliquid    etiam    coronae    datum;     nunc 

73  agendum  est  subtilius.  Peceata  paria. — Quonam 
modo? — Quia  nee  honesto  quidquam  honestius  nee 
turpi  turpius. — Perge  porro,  nam  de  isto  magna  dis- 
sensio  est ;  ilia  argumenta  propria  videamus  cur 
omnia  sint  paria  peceata.  — Ut,  inquit,  fidibus  plu- 
ribus,  si  nulla  earum  ita  eontenta  nervis  sit  ut  con- 
centum  servare  possit,  omnes  aeque  ineontentae 
sint,  sie  peceata,  quia  discrepant,  aeque  discrepant; 
paria  sunt  igitur.— Hie  ambiguo  ludimur.  Aeqoe 
enim  contingit  omnibus  fidibus  ut  ineontentae  sint; 
illud  non  continuo  ut  aeque  ineontentae.  CoUatio 
igitur  ista  te  nihil  iuvat ;  nee  enim,  omnes  avaritias 
si  aeque  avaritias  esse  dixerimus,  sequetur  ut  etiam 

76  aequas  esse  dieamus.  Ecce  aliud  simile  djsaimile : 
ut  enim,  inquit,  gubernator  aeque  peccat  si  palearuui 
navem  evertit  et  si  auri,  item  aeque  peccat  qui 
parentem  et  qui  servum  iniuria  verberat. — Hoc  non 
videre,  cuius  generis  onus  navis  veliat,  id  ad  guber- 
natoris  artem  nihil  pertinere  1  itaque  aurum  pale- 
amne  portet,  ad  bene  aut  ad  male  guberoandum 
nihil  interesse;  at  quid  inter  parentem  et  servulum 

sinl  paria  peceata  B,  E.  Mdv.j  peceata  sint  paria  inf. 


•  See  the  remarkable  passage  in  ClCi 

a's  Pro  AfJ^^^ 

HOOK  IV.  Kxvii 
attach  to  eacli  term ;  there  shall  be  no  dispute. 
You  Stoics  say  that  all  transgressions  are  equal.  I 
won't  jest  with  you  now,  as  1  did  on  the  same  sub- 
jects when  you  were  prosecuting  and  I  defending 
Lucius  Murena."  On  that  occasion  I  was  addressing 
a  jury,  not  an  audience  of  scholars,  and  I  even  had 
to  play  to  the  gallery  h  httle ;  but  now  I  must  reason 

75  more  closely.  Transgressions  are  equal.- — How  so, 
pray? — Because  nothing  can  be  better  than  good  or 
baser  than  base. — Explain  further,  for  there  is  much 
disagreement  on  this  point ;  let  us  have  your  special 
arguments  to  prove  how  all  transgressions  are  equal, 
^Suppose,  says  my  opponent,  of  a  number  of  lyres 
not  one  is  so  strung  as  to  be  in  tune;  then  all  are 
equally  out  of  tune;  similarly  with  transgressions, 
since  all  are  departures  from  rule,  all  are  equally 
departures  from  rule ;  therefore  all  are  equal. — 
Here  we  are  put  off  with  an  equivocation.  All  the 
lyres  equally  are  out  of  tune;  but  it  does  not  follow 
that  all  are  equally  out  of  tune.  So  your  com- 
parison does  not  help  you ;  for  it  does  not  follow 
that  because  we  pronounce  every  case  of  avarice 
equally  to  be  avarice,  we  must  therefore  pronounce 

76  them  all  to  be  equal.  Here  is  another  of  these 
false  analogies:  A  skipper,  says  my  adversary,  com- 
mits an  equal  transgression  if  he  loses  his  ship  with 
a  cargo  of  straw  and  if  he  does  so  when  laden  with 
gold;  similarly  a  man  is  an  equal  transgressor  if  he 
beats  his  parent  or  his  slave  without  due  cause. — 
Fancy  not  seeing  that  the  nature  of  the  cargo  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  skill  of  the  navigator  I  so 
that  whether  he  carries  gold  or  straw  makes  no  dif- 
ference as  regards  good  or  bad  seamanship;  whereas 
the  distinction  between  a  parent  and  a  mere  slave 


intersit  intellegi  et  potest  et  debet.  Ergo  in  (fuber- 
nando  nihil,  in  officio  plurimum  interest  quo  in  penere 
peccetur.  Et  si  in  ipsa  gubernatione  neglegentia  est 
navis  eversa,  maius  est  peccatum  in  auro  quam  in 
palea.  Omnibus  enim  artibus  volumus  attributam 
esse  earn  quae  communis  appellatur  prudentia, 
quam  omnes  qui  cuique  artifieio  praesunt  debent 
habere.  Ita  ne  hoc  quidem  modo  paria^  peccata 

7  XXVIII.  "Urguent  tamen  et  nihil  remittunt, 
Quoniam,  inquiunt,  omne  peccatum  imbecillitatis  et 
inconstantiae  est,  haec  autein  vitia  in  omnibus  stultis 
aeque  magna  sunt,  necesse  est  paria  esse  peccata. 
Quasi  vero  aut  concedatur  in  omnibus  stultis  aeque 
magna  esse  vitia  eteademimbecillitate  et  inconstantia 
L.  Tubulum  fuissc  qua  ilium  cuius  is  condemnatus 
est  rogatione  P.  Scaevolum  ;  et  quasi  nihil  inter  res 
quoque  ipsas  in  quibus  peccatur  intersit,  ut,  quo 
hae  maiores  minoresve  sint,  eo  quae  peccentur  in 

i  his  rebus  aut  maiora  sint  aut  minora!  Itaque  (ivn 
enim  concludatur  oratio)  hoc  uno  vitio  maxime  mil^ 
premi  videntur  tui  Stoici,  quod  se  posse  putant  duaa 
contrarias  sententias  obtinere.  Quid  enim  est  tarn 
repugnans  quam  eundem  dicere  quod  honestum  sit 
solum  id  bonum  esse,  qui  dicat  appetitionem  rerum 
ad  vivendum  accommodatarum  a  natura  profectam? 
Ita  cum  ea  volunt  retinere  quae  superiori  sententiae 
■e  Mdv. 

guicuigue  MSS.,  MuIIlt)  n 
ne  hue  quidem  modo  fian'a 
io /mria  guidem  MSS.,  Mdv 


MUlleri    w^^l 

BOOK  IV.  xxTii-xxvui 
is  one  that  cannot  and  ought  not  to  be  overlooked. 
Hence  the  nature  of  the  object  upon  which  the 
ofience  is  committed,  which  in  navigation  makes  no 
difference,  in  conduct  makes  all  the  diBerence, 
Indeed  in  the  case  of  navigation  too,  if  the  loss  of 
the  ship  is  due  to  negligence,  the  ofience  is  greater 
with  a  cargo  of  gold  than  with  one  of  straw.  For 
the  virtue  known  generally  as  prudence  is  an  attri- 
bute as  we  hold  of  all  the  arts,  and  every  master 
craftsman  in  any  branch  of  art  ought  to  possess  it. 
Hence  this  proof  also  of  the  equality  of  transgres- 
sion breaks  down. 

77  XXVIII.  However,  they  press  the  matter,  and 
will  not  give  way.  Every  transgression,  they  argue, 
iaaproof  of  weakness  and  instability  of  character;  but 
all  the  foolish  possess  these  vices  in  an  equal  manner; 
therefore  all  transgressions  must  be  equal.  As  though 
it  were  admitted  that  all  foolish  people  possess  an 
equal  degree  of  vice,  and  that  Lucius  Tubulus  was 
exactly  as  weak  and  unstable  as  Publius  Scaevola  who 
brought  in  the  bill  for  his  condemnation;  and  as  though 
there  were  no  difference  also  between  the  respective 
circumstances  in  which  the  transgressions  are  com- 
mitted, so  that  the  magnitude  of  the  transgression 
varies  in  proportion  to  the  importance  of  the  cir- 

^8  cumstances!  And  therefore  (since  my  discourse 
must  now  conclude)  this  is  the  one  chief  defect ' 
under  which  your  friends  the  Stoics  seem  to  me  to 
labour,^they  think  they  can  maintain  two  contrary 
opinions  at  once.  How  can  you  have  a  greater 
inconsistency  than  for  the  same  person  to  say  both 
that  Moral  Worth  is  the  sole  good  and  that  we  have 
a  natural  instinct  to  seek  the  things  conducive  to 
life  ?  Thus  in  their  desire  to  retain  ideas  consonant 
cc  385 


conveninnt.  in  Aiistonem  incidont:  cum  id  fugiunt, 
re  eadem  deftDduDt  quae  Peripatetici,  terlMi  tenent 
mordicns.  Quae  rarsus  dum  sibi  evelli  ex  ordine 
noluat.'  iiorridiores  evadunt,  asperiores,  duriores  et 

}  oratione  et  moribus.  Quam  illonun  tristitiam  atque 
asperitateiD  fagiens  Panaetius  nee  acerbitatem 
sententianim  nee  disserendi  spinas  probsvit,  fiiitqae 
in  altero  gencre  mitior,  in  altera  illustiior,  semperque 
habuit  in  ore  Platonem,  Aristotelem,  Xenocrateoi, 
Theophrastum,  Dicaearchum,  ut  ipsiu3  scripta  de- 
clarant.    Quos  quidem  tibi   studiose  et  dlligenter 

3  tractandos  itiagna  opere  censeo.  Sed  quoniam  et 
advesperascit  et  milii  ad  villain  revertendum  est, 
nunc  quidem  hactenus;  verum  hoc  idem  faciamns 
saepe."  Nos  vero,"  inquit  Llle;  nam  quid  pos- 
sumus  facere  melius?  Et  hanc  quidem  primam 
exigam  a  te  operam,  ut  audias  me  quae  a  te  dicta  sunt 
refellentem.  Sed  memento  te  quae  nos  sentiamus 
omnia  probare,  nisi  quod  verbis  aliter  utamur,  mihi 
autem  vestrorum  nihil  probari."  Scrupulum,  in- 
quam,  abeunti;  sed  videbimus."  Quae  cum  essent 
dicta,  discessimus. 

MSS.,  Mdv.  (explain 
ilanuiius ;  perhxp^  orationi 
\alunt  inf.  MSS.;  iWiin/  B,  E, 

ig  "exordini 


^^  BOOK  IV.  xxviii 

with  the  former  doctrine  they  are  landed  in  the 
position  of  Aristo;  and  when  they  try  to  eseape  from 
this  they  adopt  what  is  in  reality  the  position  of  the 
Peripatetics,  though  still  clinging'  tooth  and  nail  to 
their  own  terminology.  Unwilling  again  to  take 
the  next  step  and  weed  out  this  terminology,  tUey 
end  by  being  rougher  and  more  uncouth  than  ever, 
full   of  asperities   of  style    and    even   of   manners. 

79  Panaetius  strove  hard  to  avoid  this  uncouth  and  re- 
pellant  development  of  Stoicism,  censuring  alike  the 
harshness  of  its  doctrines  and  the  crabbedness  of 
its  logic.  In  doctrine  he  was  mellower,  and  in 
style  more  lucid.  Plato,  Aiistotle,  Xenocrates, 
Theophrastus  and  Dicearchus  were  constantly  on 
his  lips,  as  his  writings  show;  and  these  authors  I 
strongly  advise  you  to  take  up  for  your  most  careful 

SO  study.  But  evening  is  closing  in,  and  I  must  be 
getting  home.  So  enough  for  the  present ;  but  I  hope 
we  may  often  renew  this  conversation."  Indeed 
we  will,"  he  replied;  what  better  occupation  could 
we  have  ?  and  the  first  favour  I  shall  ask  of  you  is 
to  listen  to  my  refutation  of  what  you  have  said. 
But  bear  in  memory  that  whereas  you  really  accept 
all  of  our  opinions  save  for  the  difference  of  termin- 
ology, I  on  the  contrary  do  not  accept  any  of  the 
tenets  of  your  school."  A  parting  shot  indeed!" 
said  I ;  '  but  we  shall  see."  And  with  these  words 
I  took  my  leave. 



conveniunt,  in  Aristonem  incidunt ;  cum  id  fugiunt, 
n  defeiidunt  quae  Peripatetici,  verbn  tenetit 
mordicus.  Quae  rursus  dum  sibi  evelli  ex  ordine 
nolunt,"  Iiorridiores  evadunt,  asperiores,  duriores  et 

79  oratione  et  moribus.  Quam  illorum  tristitiam  atque 
asperitatem  fugiens  Panaetius  nee  acerbitatem 
fiententiarum  nee  disserendi  spinas  probavit,  iuitque 
in  altero  gcnere  mitior,  in  altero  illustrior,  semperquc 
liabuit  in  ore  Platouem,  Aristotelem,  Xenocratenij 
The ophras turn,  Dicaearchum,  ut  ipsius  seripta  de- 
clarant.    Qitos  quideni  tibi  studiose  et  diligenter 

80  tractandos  magno  opere  censeo.  Sed  quoniam  et 
advesperascit   et  milii   ad   villam   revertendum    est, 

2  quidem  hactenus;  veroni  Iioc  idem  facianius 
saepe."  Nos  vero,"  inquit  ille;  nam  quid  pos- 
melius?  Et  banc  quidem  primam 
exigam  a  te  operam,  ut  audias  me  quae  a  tt  dicta  sunt 
refellentem.  Sed  memento  te  quae  nos  sentiatnus 
i  probare,  nisi  quod  verbis  aliter  utamur,  mihi 
autem  vestrorum  nihil  probari."  Scrupulum,  in- 
quam,  abeunti;  sed  videbimus."  Quae  cum  essent 
dicta,  discessimus. 

ling  ' 

eMSS.,  Mdv.  {expli 
viLius;  perhaps  ci--a/w«f. 
(mf.  MSS.;  voimi/B,  E, 



^m  BOOK  IV.  xxviii 

with  the  former  doctrine  they  are  landed  in  the 
position  of  Aristo ;  and  when  they  try  to  escape  from 
this  they  adopt  what  is  in  reality  the  position  of  tlie 
Peripatetics,  though  still  cUnging  tooth  and  nail  to 
their  own  terminology.  Unwilling  again  to  take 
the  next  step  and  weed  out  this  tenninologyj  tliey 
end  by  being  rougher  and  more  uncouth  than  ever, 
full   of  asperities  of  style    and    even  of  manners. 

79  Panaelius  strove  liard  to  avoid  tins  uneoutli  and  re- 
pellant  development  of  Stoicism,  censurinjf  alike  the 
harshness  of  its  doctrines  and  the  crabbedness  of 
its  logic.  In  doctrine  he  was  mellower,  and  in 
style  more  lucid.  Plato,  Aristotle,  Xenoc rates, 
Theophrastus  and  Dicearehus  were  constantly  on 
his  lips,  as  his  writings  show ;  and  these  authors  I 
strongly  advise  you  to  take  up  for  your  most  careful 

SO  study.  But  evening  is  closing  in,  and  I  must  be 
getting  home.  So  enough  for  the  present;  but  1  hope 
we  may  oilen  renew  this  conversation."  Indeed 
we  will,"  he  replied ;  what  better  occupation  could 
we  have?  and  the  first  favour  1  shall  ask  of  you  is 
to  listen  to  my  refutation  of  what  you  have  said. 
But  bear  in  memory  that  whereas  you  really  accept 
all  of  our  opinions  save  for  the  difference  of  termin- 
ology, I  on  the  contrary  do  not  accept  any  of  the 
tenets  of  your  school."  '  A  parting  shot  indeed!" 
said  I;  'but  we  shall  see."  And  with  these  words 
I  took  my  leave. 


conveniunt,  in  Aristonem  incidunt;  cum  id  fugiimt, 
re  eadem  defendunt  quae  Peripatetic!,  verba  tenent 
mordicus.  Quue  rursua  dum  sibi  evelli  es  ordiiie' 
nolunt,'  horridiores  evadunt,  asperiores,  duriores  et 

79  oratione  et  moribus.  Quam  ittorum  tristitiam  atque 
asperitatem  fugiens  Panaetius  nee  acerbitatem 
sententiarum  nee  dissereiidi  spinas  probavit,  fuitque 
in  altero  genere  milior,  in  nltero  illustriorj  semperque 
habuit  in  ore  Platonem,  Aristotelem,  Xenocratem, 
Theophrastum,  Dicaearchum,  ut  ipsius  scripta  de- 
clarant.    QiKis  quidem   tibi  studiose  et  diligenter 

80  tractandoa  niagno  opere  censeo.  Sed  quoniam  et 
advesperaacit  et  mihi  ad  villam  revertendum  est, 
nunc  quidem  hactenus;  verura  hoc  idem  faciamns 
saepe."  "Nos  vero,"  inquit  ille;  "nam  quid  poB- 
suraus  facere  melius  ?  Et  hane  quidem  primam 
eKigaiD  a  te  operam,  ut  audias  me  quae  a  t£  dicta  sunt 
refellentem.  Sed  memento  te  quae  nos  sentiamus 
omnia  probare,  nisi  quod  verbis  aliter  utamur,  mihi 
autem  vestrorum  nihil  probari."  "Scrupulum,  in- 
quam,  abeunti;  sed  videbimus,"  Quae  cum  essent 
dicta,  discessimus. 

>arc!int  MSS.,  Mdv.  (explaining'. 
(  Manul  ius  j  perliHps  oratione. 
'  nolunl  inf.  MSS. ;  volunt  B,  E. 


BOOK  IV.  xxTiii 

with  the  former  doctrine  they  are  landed  in  the 
positicm  of  Aristo ;  and  when  they  tiy  to  escape  frtan 
this  they  adopt  what  is  in  reality  the  position  of  the 
Peripatetics^  though  stiU  chnginfT  tooth  and  nail  to 
their  own  terminology.  Unwilling  again  to  take 
the  next  step  and  weed  oat  this  tenninology«  they 
end  by  being  rougher  and  more  uncouth  than  ever, 
full  of  asperities  of  style   and   even  of  manners. 

'9  Panaetius  strove  hard  to  avoid  this  uncouth  and  re- 
pellant  development  of  Stoicism^  censuring  alike  the 
harshness  of  its  doctrines  and  the  crabbedness  of 
its  logic.  In  doctrine  he  was  mellower,  and  in 
style  more  lucid.  Plato,  Aristotle,  Xenocrates» 
Theophrastus  and  Dicearchus  were  constantly  on 
his  lips,  as  his  writings  show;  and  these  authors  I 
strongly  advise  you  to  take  up  for  your  most  careful 

10  study.  But  evening  is  closing  in,  and  I  must  be 
getting  home.  So  enough  for  the  present ;  but  I  hope 
we  may  often  renew  this  conversation."  Indeed 
we  will,**  he  replied;  "what  better  occupation  could 
we  have?  and  the  first  favour  I  shall  ask  of  you  is 
to  listen  to  my  refutation  of  what  you  have  said. 
But  bear  in  memory  that  whereas  you  really  accept 
all  of  our  opinions  save  for  the  difference  of  termin- 
o^ogy,  I  on  the  contrary  do  not  accept  any  of  the 
tenets  of  your  school.'*  "A  parting  shot  indeed!" 
said  I;  "but  we  shall  see.*'  And  with  these  words 
I  took  my  leave. 

cc2  387 
















I.  •  Cum  audissem  Antiochum,  Brute,  ut  solebam,^ 
cum  M.  Pisone  in  eo  g3mMiasio  quod  Ptolemaeum 
vocatur,  unaque  nobiscum  Q.  frater  et  T.  Pomponius 
Luciusque  Cicero,  frater  noster  cognatione  patruelis, 
amore  germanus,  constituimus  inter  nos  ut  ambula- 
tionem  postmeridianam  conficeremus  in  Academia, 
maxime  quod  is  locus  ab  omni  turba  id  temporis 
vacuus  esset.  Itaque  ad  tempus  ad  Pisonem  omnes. 
Inde  vario  sermone  sex  ilia  a  Dipylo  stadia  confeci- 
mus.  Cum  autem  venissemus  in  Academiae  non  sine 
causa  nobilitata  spatia,  solitudo  erat  ea  quam  volue- 
ramus.     Tum  Piso:      Naturane  nobis  hoc,"  inquit, 

datum  dicam  an  errore  quodam,  ut,  cum  ea  loca 
videamus  in  quibus  memoria  dignos  viros  acceperi- 
mus  multum  esse  versatos,  magis  moveamur  quam  si 
quando  eorum  ipsorum  aut  facta  audiamus  aut  scri- 
ptum  aliquod  legamus?  Velut  ego  nunc  moveor. 
Venit  enim  mihi  Platonis  in  mentem,  quem  accepi- 
mus  primum  hie  disputare  solitum;  cuius  etiam  illi 
propinqui  hortuli  non  memoriam  solum  mihi  afferunt 
sed  ipsum  videntur  in  conspectu  meo  ponere.  Hie 
Speusippus,  hie  Xenocrates,  hie  eius  auditor  Polemo ; 

^  soleba?n  Mdv. ;  solcbat  MSS. 



Li.  My  Dear  Bhdtub, — Once  I  had  been  attending  Bk.  i 
rleeture'of  Aatioclms,   as   I   was   in    the   habit  ofo,,']J^ 
aoing,  with  Marcus  Piso,  in  tile  building  called  the  ^'n 
School  of  Ptolemy  ;  niid  with  us  were  my  brother  Sctm 
Quintus,  Titus  Pomponius,  and  Lucius  Cicero,  whom  ' 
I  loved  as  a  brother  but  who  was  really  my  first  cousin. 
We  arranged  to  take  our  afternoon  stroll   in  the 
Academy,  chiefly  because  the  place  would  be  quiet 
and  deserted  at  that  hour  of  the  day.     Accordingly 
at  the  time  appointed  we   met  at  our  rendezvous, 
Piso's  lodgings,  and  starting  out  conversed  on  various 
subjects  while  we  covered  the   three-quarters  of  a 
mile  from  the  Dipylou  Gate.    When  we  reached  the 
walks  of  the  Academy,  which  are  sn  deservedly  fa- 
mous, we  had  them  entirely  to  ourselves,  as  we  had 
2  hoped.     Thereupon  Piso  remarked  :  "  Wliether  it  is  PhOo 
a  natural  instinct  or  a  mere  illusion,  I  can't  say;  but  ^^ 
one's  emotions  are  more  strongly  aroused  by  seeing  '^"'^ 
the  places  that  tradition  records  to  have  befln  the 
favourite  resort  of  men  of  note  in  former  days,  than 
by  hearing  about  their  deeds  or  reading  their  writings. 
My  own  feelings  at  the  present  moment  are  a  case 
in  point.      I  am  reminded  of  Plato,  the  first  philoso- 
pher, so  we  are  told,  that  made  a  practice  of  holding 
discussions  in  this  place ;    and  indeed  his  garden 
close  at  hand  yonder  not  only  recalls  his  memory  but 
seems  to  bring  the  actual  man  before  my  eyes.    This 

Ethe  haunt  of  Speusippus,  of  Xenocrates,  and  of 
ocrates"  pupil  Polemo,  who  used  to  sit  on  the 



cuius  i!t«  ipsa  sessio  fiiit  quam  videmus.  Equidmi 
etiain  curiam  nostram  (Hostiliam  dico,  nou  huiic  □O' 
vam,  quae  minor  milii  esse  vidctur  posteaquam  est 
maior)  solebam  intuens  Scipionem,  Catonein,  Lae- 
lium,  nostrum  vero  in  primis  avum  cogitare ;  tanta 
vis  admoTiitionis  inest  in  locis;  ut  non  sine  causa  en 
lis  memoriae  ducta  sit  disciplina." 
J  Tum  Quintus:  "Est  plane,  Piso,  Qt  dicis,"  inquit 
"Nam  me  ipsum  hue  modo  venientem  convertebat 
ad  sese  Colaneus  ille  locus,  cuius  incola  Sophocles 
ob  oculos  versabatur,  quern  scis  quam  admirer  quam- 
que  eo  delecter.  Me  quidem  ad  altiorem  n 
Ocdipodis  hue  venientis  et  illo  mollis! 
quaenam  essent  haec  ipsa  loca  requirentis  species 
quaedam  commovit,  inaniter  scilicet,  aed  commovit 

Turn  Pomponius:  'At  ego,  qucm  vos  ut  deditum 
Epicuro  insectari  soletis,  sum  multum  equidem  cum 
Phaedro,  quern  unice  diligo,  ut  scitis,  in  Epicuri 
hortis,  quos  modo  praeteribamus,  sed  veteris  pro- 
verbi  admonitu  vivorum  memini';  nee  tamcn  Epi- 
curi licet  oblivisci,  si  cupiam,  cuius  imaginem  non 
modo  in  tabulis  nostri  familiares  sed  etiam  in  poculiG 
et  ill  anulis  habent." 

"  The  aenale-house,  ascribed  by  tradition  to  King  Tullus 
Hostilius,  was  enlarjfcd  by  Sulla  a  year  or  two  before  the 
date  af  the  dialogue. 

"  Presumablj'    L.    Piso    Frugi,   the    '  Man   of   Worth/ 

"Greek  Mnemonics  or  memorla  lechnica,  said  lo  have 
been  invented  by  the  poet  Simonldes,  cp.  II,  104,  scenis  10 
have  been  based  on  visual  memory ;  it  arranged  the  subjects 
to  be  remembered  in  riroi,  loci.  The  art  was  associated 
with  Inventio  as  a  branch  of  Rhetoric,  cp.  IV,  10. 

BOOK  V.  i 

very  seat  we  see  over  there.  For  my  own  part 
even  the  sight  of  our  senate-house  at  home  (I  mean 
the  Curia  Hostilia,  not  the  present  new  building, 
which  seems  to  me  to  be  smaller  since  its  enlarge- 
ment}' used  to  call  up  to  me  thoughts  of  Scipio, 
Cato,  Laelius,  and  chief  of  all,  my  grandfather;''  such 
powers  of  suggestion  do  places  possess.  Ko  won- 
der the  scientific  training  of  the  memory  is  based 
upon  locality."' 
i  Perfectly  true,  Piso."  rejoined  Quintus.        I  my- 

self on  the  way  here  just  now  noticed  yonder  village 
of  Colonus,  and  it  brought  to  my  imagination  Sopho- 
cles who  resided  there,  and  who  is  as  you  know  my 
great  admiration  and  delight,  indeed  my  memory 
took  me  further  back  ;  for  I  had  a  vision  of  Oedipus, 
advancing  towards  this  very  spot  and  asking  in  tliose  - 
most  tender  verses,'*  What  place  is  this  ?  ' — a  mere 
fancy  no  doubt,  yet  still  it  affected  me  strongly." 

For  my  part,"  said  Pomponius,  you  are  fond  of 
attacking  me  as  a  follower  of  Epicurus,  and  I  do 
spend  much  of  ray  time  with  Phaedrus,  who  as  you 
know  is  my  dearest  friend,  in  Epicurus's  Gardens' 
which  we  passed  just  now ;  but  I  obey  the  old  saw : ' 
I  'think  of  those  that  are  alive."  Still  I  could  not 
forget  Epicurus,  even  if  I  wanted ;  the  members  of 
our  body  not  only  have  pictures  of  him,  but  even 
have  his  likeness  on  their  drinking-cups  and  rings." 

•J  Sophocles  Oedipus  Colon 

,s.  t   f.! 

2r  AvSpQv  w6'\0' ; 

IS  a  sort  of  college  to  hia  ,sue- 

ccurs  in  Fctronius  43  and  75, 


conveniunt,  in  Aristonem  incidunt;  cum  id  fugiunt, 
re  eadem  defendunt  quae  Peripatetic!,  verba  tenent 
mordicas.  Quae  rursus  dum  sibi  evelli  ex  ordine 
nolunt,"  horridiores  evadunt,  asperiores,  duriores  et 

79  oratione  et  moribus.  Quam  illorum  tristitiam  atque 
asperitatetn  fugiens  Patiaetius  nee  acerbitatem 
Sententiarum  nee  disserendi  spinas  probavit,  fuitque 
in  altero  genere  mitior,  in  altero  illustrior,  seniperquc 
habuit  in  ore  Platonem,  Aristotelem,  Xenocratem, 
Tlieophrastuni,  Dicaearcliuni,  ut  ipsius  scripta  de- 
clarant.    Quos  quidem   tibi  studiose  et  diligenter 

80  tractandos  magno  opere  censeo.  Sed  quoniam  et 
advesperaseit  et  milii  ad  villan)  revertendum  est, 
nunc  quidem  liactenus ;  verum  hoc  idem  faciamus 
saepe."  "Nos  vero,"  inquit  ilte;  "nam  quid  pos- 
sumus  facere  melius?  Et  hanc  quidem  primam 
exigam  a  te  operani,  ut  audias  me  quae  a  te  dicta  sunt 
refellentem.  Sed  memento  te  quae  nos  sentiamus 
omnia  probare,  nisi  quad  verbis  aliter  utamur,  mihi 
autem  vestrorum  nihil  prolMtri."  Scrupulum,  in- 
quam,  abeunti;  sed  videbimus."  Quae  cum  essent 
dicta,  discessimus. 

'  ardine  MSS.,  Mdv.  (explaining  ' 
V  Manutius  ;  perhaps  oratione. 
"  nolunt  inf.  MSS. ;  volunf  B,  E. 




BOOK  V.  ii 

V  II.  "AsforourfriendPomponius.'linterposed,  I 
believe  he  is  joking ;  and  no  doubt  he  is  a  licensed 
wit,  for  he  has  su  taken  root  in  Athens  that  he  is 
ahsost  an  Athenian ;  in  fact  I  expect  he  will  get 
the  surname  of  Atticus!'  But  I,  Piso,  agree  with 
you  ;  it  is  a  common  esperience  that  places  do 
strongly  stimulate  the  imagination  and  vivify  our 
ideas  of  famous  men.  You  remember  how  I  onee 
came  with  you  to  Metnpontum,and  would  not  go  to 
the  house  where  we  were  to  stay  until  I  had  seen  the 
abode  of  Pythagoras  and  the  very  place  where  he 
breathed  his  last.  All  over  Athens,  I  know,  there 
are  many  reminders  of  eminent  men  in  the  actual 
places  where  they  lived ;  but  at  the  present  moment 
it  is  that  hall  over  there  wliich  appeals  to  me  ;  for 
not  long  ago''  it  belonged  to  Carneades.  I  fancy  I 
see  him  now  (for  his  portrait  is  well  known),  and  I 
can  imagine  that  the  very  place  where  he  used  tu  sit 
misses  the  sound  of  his  voice,  and  mourns  the  loss  of 
tliat  mighty  intellect." 

5  "Well,  then,"  said  Piso,  "as  we  all  have  some 
association  that  appeals  to  us,  what  is  it  that  interests 
our  young  friend  Lucius  ?  Does  he  enjoy  visiting  the 
sjiot  where  Demosthenes  and  Aescliines  used  to  fight 
their  battles  }  For  we  are  ail  mainly  influenced  by 
our  own  particular  study." 

Praydon'taskme,"  answered  Lucius  with  ablush; 
I  have  actually  made  a  pilgrimage  down  to  the  Bay 
of  Phalerum,  where  they  say  Demosthenes  used  to 
practise  declaiming  on  the  beach,  to  learn  to  pitch 
hia  voice  so  as  to  overcome  an  uproar.  Also  only  just 
now  I  turned  off  the  road  a  little  way  on  the  right, 
to  visit  the  tomb  of  Pericles.  Though  in  fact  there 

BOOK  V.  ii-iii 
is  no  end  to  it  in  this  city;  wherever  you  go  you 
tread  historic  ground." 

6  Well,  Cicero,"  said  Piso,  these  enthusiasms 
befit  a  young  man  of  parts,  if  they  lead  him  to  copy 
the  example  of  the  great.  If  tiiey  only  stimulate 
antiquarian  curiosity,  they  are  mere  dilettantism. 
But  we  all  of  us  exhort  you — and  1  hope  it  is  a  a 
of  spurring  a  willing  steed — to  resolve  to  imitate 
your  heroes  as  well  as  to  know  about  them."  He 
is  practising  your  precepts  already,  Piso,"  said  I, 

as  you  are  aware;  but  all  the  same  thank  you  for 
encouraging  him."  Well,"  said  Piso,  with  his  usual 
amiability,  let  us  all  join  forces  to  promote  the  lad's 
improvement; and  especially  let  us  try  to  make  him 
spare  some  of  his  interest  for  philosophy,  either  so  as 
to  follow  the  example  of  yourself  for  whom  he  has 
such  an  affection,  or  in  order  to  be  better  equipped  for 
the  very  study  to  which  he  is  devoted.  But,  Lucius," 
he  asked,  do  you  need  our  urging,  or  have  you  a  na- 
tural leaning  ofyour  own  towards  philosophy?  You  are 
keeping  Antiochus's  lectures,  ajid  seem  to  me  to  be  a 
pretty  attentive  listener."  I  try  to  be,"  replied  Lucius 
with  a.  timid  or  rather  a  modest  air ;  but  have  you 
heard  any  lectures  on  Cameades  lately?  He  attracts 
me  immensely ;  but  Antiochus  calls  me  in  the  other 
direction  ;  and  there  is  no  other  lecturer  to  go  to." 

7  HI.  "Perhaps,"  said  Piso,  "it  will  not  be  alto-  b 
gether  easy,  while  our  friend  here  "  (meaning  me)  " 

is  by,  still  I  will  venture  to  urge  you  to  leave  the  J,^ 
present  New  Academy  for  the  Old,  which  includes,  A 
as  you  heard  Antiochus  declare,  not  only  those  who  ^ 
bear  the  name  of  Academics,  Speusippus,  Xenocrates,  " 
Polemo,  Crantor  and  the  rest,  but  also  the  early 
Peripatetics,  headed  by  their  chief,  Aristotle,  who, 

Dmon  U.  lbs 
'ly  Acadeniici 
i  PeripBtaUo. 


dixerim  principem  philosophorum.  Ad  eos  igitur 
converte  te,  quaeso.  Ex  eoruin  enim  scriptis  ct 
institutis  cum  omnis  doctriiia  liberalis,  omiiis  historia, 
omiiis  sermo  etegans  sumi  potest,  turn  varietas  est 
tajita  artium  ut  nemo  sine  eo  instrumento  ad  ullam 
rem  illustriorem  satis  omatus  possit  accedere.  Ab 
his  oratores,  ab  his  imperatores  ac  renim  publicarum 
principes  exstiterunt.  Ut  ad  minora  veniam,  mathe- 
matici,  poetae,  musici,  niedici  denique  ex  hac  tam- 
quam  omnium  artificum  officina  profecti  aunt." 
i  Atque  ego;  Scis  me,"  inquam,  istud  idem  sentire, 
Piso,  sed'a  te  opportune  facta  mentio  est;  studet 
enim  meus  audire  Cicero  quaenam  sit  istius  veteris 
quam  commemoras  Academiae  dc  finibus  bonorum 
Peripateticorumque  sententia.  Censemus  autem 
faeiilime  te  id  explanare  posse,  quod  et  Staseam 
Neapolitanum  multos  aimovhabueris  apud  te  et 
complures  ium  menses  Athenis  haec  ipsa  te  ex 
Antiocho  videamus  exquirere."  Et  ille  ridens: 
'Age,  age,"  inquit,  '(satis  enim  scite  me  nostri 
sermonis  principium  esse  voliiisti),  exponamus  adu- 
lescenti  si  quae  forte  possumos.  Dat  enim  id  nobis 
solitude,  quod  si  qui  deus  diceret,  numquam  putarem, 
me  in  Academia  taraquam  philo^ophum  disputaturiim. 
Sed  ne,  dum  huic  obsequor,  vobis  molestns  sim." 
Mihi,"  inquam,  qui  te  id  ipsum  rogavi?"  Turn, 
Quintus  et  Pomponius  cum  idem  se  yelle  dixissent, 
Piso  exorsus  est ;  cuius  oratio  attende  quaeso,  Bni 

artificum  B,  E,  Miiller 

le  quaeso,  Brt^^^_ 
inf.  M5S.  Mdv^^l 

BOOK  \'.  Ui 
if  Plato  be  escepted,  1  atinost  thick  deser\-es  to  W 
called  the  prince  of  philosophers.  Do  jou  then 
join  them.  I  beg  of  you.  From  their  writings  and 
teachings  can  be  leamt  the  whole  of  libeml  culture, 
of  history  and  of  style;  moreover  they  include  such 
s  variety  of  sciences,  that  without  the  equipment 
that  they  give  no  one  t^an  be  adequately  prepared 
to  embark  on  any  of  the  higher  careers.  They  have 
produced  orators,  generals  and  Statesmen.  To  come 
to  the  less  distinguished  professions,  this  factory  of 
experts  in  all  the  sciences  has  turned  out  nijithcma- 
8  ticians,poels,musiciansaudphysiciaus,"  "Vouknow 
that  I  agree  with  you  about  that,  Piso,"  I  rcplifd; 

but  you  have  raised  the  point  most  opportujiely ; 
for  my  cousin  Cicero  is  eager  to  hear  the  doctrine 
of  the  Old  Academy  of  which  you  speak,  and  of  the 
Peripatetics,  on  the  subject  of  the  Ends  of  Goods. 
We  feel  sure  you  can  expound  it  with  the  greatest 
ease,  for  you  have  had  Staseas  from  Naples  in  your 
household  for  many  years,  and  also  we  know  you 
have  been  studying  this  very  subject  uncicr  Anti- 
ochus  for  several  months  at  Athens."  '  Here  goes, 
then,"  replied  Piso,  smiling,  "(for  you  have  craftily 
arranged  so  that  our  discussion  shall  start  with  me), 
let  me  see  what  I  can  do  to  give  the  lad  a  lecture.  If 
an  oracle  had  foretold  that  I  should  find  myself  dis- 
coursing in  the  Academy  like  a  philosopher.  I  should 
not  have  believed  it,  but  here  I  am,  thanks  to  the 
place  being  so  deserted.  Only  don't  let  me  Itore  the 
rest  of  you  while  I  am  obliging  our  young  friend-" 

What,  bore  me?"  said'I.  '  Why,  it  is  I  who  asked 

you  to  speak."    Thereupon  Quintus  and  Pomponius 

having  declared  that  they  wished  it  too,  Piso  began, 

And  I   wiU  ask  you,  Brutus,   kindly   to    consider 



satisne  videatur  Antiochi  complexa  esse  sentestiam, 
quani  tibi  qui  fratrera  eius  Aristum  frequenter  audi- 
eris  maiiime  proliatam  existiixio. 

IV.  Sic  est  igitur  locutus.        Quantus  omatus  in 
Peripateticoruin   disciplina    sit,  satis   est  a  me,  ut 
brevissime  potuit,  paulo  ante  dietum.    Sed  est  forms 
eius  disciplinae,  sicut  fere  ceterarum,  triplex :  una 
pars  est  naturae,  disserendi  altera,  viveiidi  tertia. 
Natura  sic  ab  ils  investigata  est  ut  nulla  pars  caelo, 
mari,    terra    (ut    poetice    loquar)    praetermissa    ait. 
Quin  etiam,  cum  de  rerum  initiis  omnique  mundo 
modo  probabili  argu  men- 
math  ematicorum  ratione 
materiam  ex  rebus  per  se 
investigatis  ad  rerum  occultanim  cognitionem  attu- 

10  lerunt.  Persecutus  est  Aristoteles  animantium  om- 
nium ortus,  victus,  figuras,  Tlieophrastus  autem 
stirpium  naturas  omniumque  fere  rerum  quae  e  terra 
gignerentur  causas  atque  rationes ;  qua  ex  cognitione 
facilior  facta  est  investigatio  rerum  occultissimarum. 
Disserendique  ab  iisdem  non  dialectice  solum  sed 
etiam  oratorie  praecepta  sunt  tradita;  ab  Aristote- 
leque  principe  de  singulis  rebus  in  utramque  partem 
dicendi  exercilatio  est  instituta,  ut  non  contra  omnia 
semper,  sicut  Arceailas,  diceret,  et  tamen  ut  in  om- 
nibus rebus  quidquid  ex  utraque  parte  dici  posset 

1  ]    espromeret.     Cum  autem  tertia  pars  bene  vivendi 
praecepta  quaereret,  ea  quoque  est  ab  iisdem  non 

locuti  essent,  ut  multa 
tatione  sed  etiam 
conclude  rent. 


BOOK  V.  iii-iv 

whether  you  think  his  discourse  a  satis&ctory  sum- 
mary of  the  doctrine  of  Antiochus^  which  I  believe  to 
be  the  system  which  you  most  approve^  as  you  have 
often  attended  the  lectures  of  his  brother  Aristus. 

IV.  Accordingly  Piso  spoke  as  follows:     About  &  Pr«UinJA«fj 
the  educational  value  of  the  Peripatetic  system  I  i^S!£2tlu?i§ 
have  said  enough^  in  the  briefest  possible  way,  a  few  fSsS^^^' 
moments  ago.     Its  arrangement,  like  that  of  most  PUJofopbr; 
other  systems,  is  threefold :   one  part  deals  with  sS^^cic;  Eit 
nature,  the  second  with  discourse,  and  the  third  ***^  ^<^tkM, 
with  conduct     Natural  Philosophy  the  Peripatetics 
have  investigated  so  thoroughly  that  no  region  in 
sky  or  sea  or  land  (to  speak  poetically)  has  been 
passed  aver.     Nay  more,  in  treating  of  the  origin  of 
creatimi  and  the  constitatian  of  the  universe  they 
have  estaUished  much  of  their  doctrine  not  merely 
by  probaUe  aigumenU  but  by  conclusive  mathe- 
matical demoi]«tiatioii,applylngaquaatity  of  material 
derived  hotn  Ucts  that  they  have  themselves  in- 
vestigated to  the  discovery  of  other  £u^  beyond  the 

0  reach  of  ohservatioii.  Aristotle  gave  a  complete 
acoomtt  of  the  birth,  nutrition  Mod  structure  of  all 
living  creatures,  Tbeophrastus  of  tht  natural  history 
of  plants  and  the  causes  Mod  constitittion  of  vege- 
table orgMMnsnm  in  fgenead;  vad  the  knowledge  thus 
attainrd  fanKtafed  the  investigation  of  the  nnost 
ofascnre  <|Ofstfamu  In  Logie  their  teachings  include 
the  rales  of  rbetorie  as  well  as  of  dialeetic:  and  Aiis- 
totle  tlietr  fousder  set  on  foot  the  praetjtoe  of  ajigu- 
ing  pro  and  oontm  upon  every  Ufpk:^  not  like 
Arcealas,  ahrajs  eontrorertuog  every  propositkon, 
bvt  ^eitmfg  out  all  tlie  possible  aigvnkents  on  either 

1  side  m  ererj  wihQ/wt.    The  third  dii-iskn  of  philo- 
*floplqr  ntrertiipates  dKe  rules  of  human  ireI]4>eiDg; 

phrasti  de  beata  vita  liber,  in  quo  multum  admodam 
fortiuiae  datur;  quod  si  ita  se  habeat,  non  possit 
beatam  vitam  praestare  sapientia.  Haec  mihi  vide- 
tur  delicatior,  ut  ita  dicam,  molliorque  ratio  quam 
virtutis  vis  gravitasque  postulat.  Quare  teneamus 
Aristotelem  et  eios  filium  Nicomachum,  cuius  accu- 
rate scripti  de  moribus  libri  dicuiitur  ill!  quidem 
esse  Aristoteb,  sed  non  video  cur  non  potuerit  patri 
situilis  esse  filius.  Theopbrustum  tamen  adhibeamus 
ad  pleraque,  duni  modo  plus  in  virtutc  teneamus 

IS  quam  ille  tenuit  fimiitatis  et  roboris.  Simus  igitur 
contenti  his.  Namque  borum  poster!  meliores  illi 
quidem,  mea  sententia,  quam  reliquarum  pbilosophi 
disci plinarum,  sed  ita  degenerant  ut  ipsi  ex  se  nati 
esse  videantur.  Primum  Theophrasti,  Strato,  pbysi- 
cum  se  voluit ;  in  quo  etsi  est  magnus,  tamen  nova 
pleraque,  et  perpauca  de  moribus.  Huius,  Lyco, 
oratione  locuples,  rebus  ipsis  ieiunior.  Concinnus 
deinde  et  elegans  huius,  Aristo,  sed  ea  quae  desi- 
deratur  a  niagno  pbilosopho  gravitas  in  eo  non 
fuit;  scripts  sane  et  multa  et  polita,  sed  nescio 
quo  pacto  auctoritatem  oratio  non  liabet. 

1 4  Praetereo  multos,  in  bis  doctum  hominem  et  sua- 

vcm,  Hieronymum,  quem  iam  cur  Peripateticum 
appellem  nescio;  sununum  enim  bonum  exposuit 
vacuitatem  doloris;  qui  autem  de  summo  bono  dis- 

sArislotle's  principal  work  on  Elhics  is  entitled  The Ni- 
chamachean  Elhirs,  lo  distinguish  il  from  two  other  l realise» 
ascribed  to  him,  the  Eudemian  Elhics  and  the  Magna 
Moralia.  The  title  may  imply  that  Ihe  book  was  dedicated 
to,  or  possiblv  that  it  was  edited  by,  Nichomacbus;  but 
hardly,  pace  Cicero,  that  it  was  written  by  him,  since  he 
died  in  battle  while  still  a  youth,  Il  seems  cerlain  thai 
Cicero  had  never  read,  or  had  rorgotten,  thi^  book,  for  he 
entirely  ignores  ita  distinctive  doctrines.  Cp.  IV  is  n. 

BOOK  V.  V 

book  On  Happinea,  in  which  a  very  considerable 
amount  of  importance  is  assigned  to  fortune ;  for 
if  this  be  correct,  wisdom  alone  could  not  guar- 
antee happiness.  This  theory  seems  to  me  to  be, 
if  I  may  so  call  it,  too  enervating  and  unmanly  to  be 
adequate  to  the  force  and  dignity  of  virtue.  Hence 
we  had  better  keep  to  Aristotle  and  his  son  Nico- 
machus;  the  latter's  elaborate  volumes  on  Ethics 
are  ascribed,  it  is  true,  to  Aristotle,  but  I  do  not  see 
why  the  son  should  not  have  been  capable  of  emu- 
lating the  father.*  Still,  we  may  use  Theophrastus 
on  most  points,  so  long  as  we  maintain  a  larger 
element  of  strength  and  solidity  in  virtue  than  he 

\3  did.  Let  us  then  limit  ourselves  to  these  authori-  : 
ties.  Their  successors  are  indeed  in  my  opinion  Sr 
superior  to  the  philosophers  of  any  other  school,  but 
are  so  unworthy  of  their  ancestry  that  one  might 
imagine  them  to  have  been  their  own  fathers.  To 
begin  with,  Theophrastus 's  pupil  Strato  set  up  to  be 
a  natural  philosopher;  but  great  as  he  is  in  this  de< 
partment,  he  is  nevertheless  for  the  most  part  an  in- 
novator ;  and  on  ethics  he  has  hardly  anything.  His 
successor  Lyco  lias  a  copious  style,  but  his  matter  is 
somewhat  barren.  Lyco's  pupil  Aristo  is  polished 
and  graceful,  but  has  not  the  authority  that  we 
expect  to  find  in  a  great  thinker;  he  wrote  much, 
it  is  true,  and  he  wrote  well,  but  his  style  is  some- 
how lacking  in  weight. 

14  '  I  pass  over  a  number  of  writers,  including  the 
learned  and  entertaining  Hieronymus.  Indeed  I 
know  no  reason  for  calling  the  latter  a  Peripatetic 
at  all;  for  he  defined  the  Chief  Good  as  freedom 
from  pain:  and  to  hold  a  dilferent  view  of  the 
Chief  Good  is  to  hold  a  different  system  of  phUo- 

sentit,  de  tota  pbilosbphiae  ratione  dissentit.  Crito- 
laus  imitari  voluit  antiques ;  et  quidem  est  gravitate 
proximus  et  redundat  oratio;  ac  tamen  ne^  is  quidem 
ill  patriis  institutis  manet.  Diodorus,  eius  auditor, 
adiungit  ad  honestatem  vacuitatein  doloris.  Hie 
quoque  suus  est,  de  summoque  bono  dissentiens  diei 
vere  Peripateticus  nou  potest.  Antiquorum  autem 
seiitentiam  Antiochus  noster  mihi  videtur  persequi 
diligentissime,  quam  eandem  Aristoteli  fuisse  et 
Polemonis  docet. 

1 5  VI.  Facit  igitur  Lucius  noster  prudenter  qui 
audire  de  sumnio  bono  potissimuni  vetit;  hoc  enim 
constitute  in  philosophia  constituta  sunt  omnia. 
Nam  ceteris  in  rebus  sive  praetermisauui  sive  igno- 
ratum  est  quidpiam,  non  plus  incommudi  est  quam 
quanti  qiiaeque  earum  reniin  est  in  quibus  negle- 
ctum  est  aliquid ;  sutnmuni  autem  boniim  si  ignore- 
tur,  Vivendi  rationem  ignorari  necesse  est;  ex  quo 
tantus  error  consequitur  ut  quein  in  portum  se 
recipiant  scire  non  possint.  Cognitis  autem  rerum 
finibus,  cum  intellegitur  quid  sit  et  bonorum  extre- 
mum  et  malorum,  invents   vitae   via   est   conforma- 

1 6  tioque  omnium  officiorum,  inventum  igitur,  quo 
quidque  referatur;  ex  quo,  id  quod  omnes  expc- 
tunt,  beate  vivendi  ratio  inveniri  et  comparari  potest. 

Quod  quoniam  in  quo  sit  magna  disseiiBio  est, 
Carneadia  nobis  adliibenda  divisio  est,  qua  noster 

'  ne  added  by  i^dd. 
MSS.  i  cum  exigituT  (i.e.  CKaminaVur)  Mdv, 

BOOK  V.  v-vi 
Sophy  altogether.     Critulaus    professed  to    imitate 
the  aticieats;   and   he  does  in  fact  come   nearest 
to  them  in  weight,  while  his  stjie  is  copious  to  a 
degree;  all  the  same,  even  he  is  not  true  to  his 
Eincestral  principles.     Diodorus,  his  pupil,  couples 
with   Moral   Worth    freedom    from  pain.      He   too 
stands  by  himself;  differing  aliout  the  Chief  Good 
he  cannot   correctly  be   called   a   Peripatetic.      Our 
master  Antiochos  seems  to  me  to  adhere  most  seni-  Aoiiochmhas 
pulously  to   the    doctrine  of  the   ancients,  wliich  J,^^!^ "  ""^ 
according  to  his  teaching  was  common  to  Aristotle 
qpd  to  Polemo, 

15  VI.      Our  young  friend  Lucius  is  therefore  well  a.  ThEfintpric 
advised  in  desiring  most   of  all   to   hear   about   the  Jh=  chirf  Good 
Chief  Good;  for  when  you  iiave  settled  that  point  in  °'^|iJ*J'J|^, 
a  system  of  philosophy,  you  have  settled  everything,  uutmcb. 
■On  any  other  topic,  some  degree  of  incompleteness 

or  uncertainty  causes  no  more  mischief  than  is  pro- 
portionate to  the  importance  of  the  particular  topic 
on  which  the  neglect  has  occurred;  but  uncertainty 
as  to  the  Chief  Good  necessarily  involves  uncertainty 
as  to  the  principles  of  conduct,  and  this  must  carry 
men  so  far  out  of  their  course  that  they  cannot 
know  what  harbour  to  steer  for.  On  the  other  hand 
when  we  have  ascertained  the  Ends  of  things, 
knowing  the  ultimate  Good  and  ultimate  Evil,  we 
have  discovered  a  map  of  life,  a  chart  of  all  the 

1 6  duties;  and  therefore  have  discovered  a  standard  to 
which  each  action  may  be  referred ;  and  from  this 
we  can  discover  and  construct  that  rule  of  happiness 
which  all  desire. 

Now  there  is  great  difference  of  opinion  as  to  Cs 
what  constitutes  the  ultimate  End.   Let  us  therefore  aii  poisbis  et 
adopt   the    classificaUon  of  Carneades,  which  our  ""^™^- 

ipsam  in  se  versari, 
aliud  quod  propositun 
medicina   valetudinis. 

Antiochus  libenter  uti  solet.     Itle  igitur  vidit  n 
modo  quot  fuisseiit  adliuc  philosophoru 
bono    sed   quot    omnino    esse   possent    seutentiae. 
Negabat    igitur   ullam   esse  artem  quae  ipsa  a  se 
prolicisceretur;  etenim  semper  illud  extra  est  quod 
arte  comprehenditur.      Nihil  opus  est  exemplis  hoc 
facere  longius;  est  enim  perspicuum  nullam  artem 
cd   esse  aliud   artem  ipsam, 
sit  arti ;  quoniam  igitur,   ut 
navigationis   gubernatio,    sic 
Vivendi   ars  est  prudentia,  necesse  est  earn  quoque 

1 7  ab  aliqua  re  esse  constitutam  et  profectam.  Consti- 
tit  autem  fere  inter  omnes,  id,  in  quo  prudentia 
versaretur  et  quod  assequi  vellet,  aptum  et  accom- 
modatum  naturae  esse  oportere  et  tale  ut  ipsum  per 
se  invitaret  et  allieeret  appetitunn  animi,  quem  op/i^r 
Uraeci  vocant.  Quid  autem  sit  quod  ita  moveat 
itaque  a  natura  in  primo  ortu  appetatur,  non  constat, 
deque  eo  est  inter  philosophos,  cum  summum  bonum 
exquiritur,  omnis  dissensio.  Totius  enim  quaestionis 
eius  quae  liabetur  de  finibus  bonorum  et  malorum, 
cum  quaeritur  in  his  quid  sit  extremum,  quid  ulti- 
mum,  fons  reperiendus  est  in  quo  sint  prima  invita- 
menta  naturae ;  quo  invento  omnis  ab  eo  quasi  capite 
de  summo  bono  et  malo  disputatio  ducitur. 

1 8  VII.  Voluptatis  alii  primum  uppetitum  putant  et 
primam  depulsionem  doloris;  vacuitatem  doloris  alii 


BOOK  V.  vi-vii 
teacher  Atitioclius  is  very  fond  of  employing.  Car- 
neades  passed  in  review  all  the  opinions  as  to  the 
Chief  Good,  not  only  that  actually  had  been  held  by 
philosophers  hithei'to,  but  that  it  was  possible  to 
hold.  He  then  pointed  out  that  no  science  or  art 
can  start  wholly  from  itself;  it  must  always  have 
subject-matter  which  is  outside  itself.  There  is  no 
need  to  enlarge  upon  or  illustrate  this  point;  for  it 
is  evident  that  no  art  is  occupied  with  itself ;  the  art 
is  distinct  from  the  subject  with  which  it  deals; 
since  therefore,  as  medicine  is  the  art  of  health  and 
navigation  the  art  of  sailing  the  ship,  so  Prudence 
or  Practical.  Wisdom  is.  the  art  of  conduct,  it  follows 
that  Prudence  also  must  take  its  b~eihg  aiid  origm 

17  from" soineEliing,  Now  practically  all  have  agreed 
that  the  subject  with  which  Prudence  is  occupied 
AtiA  the  end  which  it  desires  to  attain  is  iKiiInil  to 
Be  somethilig  intimately  adapted  to  o'lir  nattire^;"it 
must  be  capable  of  directly  arousing  and  awakening 
an  impulse  of  desire,  what  in  Greek  is  called  hormc. 
But  what  it  is  that  at  the  (irst  moment  of  our  es* 
istcnce  excites  in  our  nature  this  impulse  of  desire, 
— as  to  this  there  is  no  agreement.  It  is  at  this 
point  that  all  the  difference  of  opinion  among  stu- 
dents of  the  ethical  problem  arises.  Of'  the  whole 
inquiry  into  the  Ends  of  Goods  and  Evils  and  the 
question  which  among  them  is  ultimate  and  final, 
the  fountain-head  is  to  be  found  in  the  earliest 
instincts  of  nature;  discover  these  and  you  have  the 
source  of  the  stream,  the  starting-point  of  the  debate 
as  to  the  Chief  Good  and  Evil. 

1 8  VU.  "  One  school  holds  that  our  earhest  desire  is 
for  pleasure  and  our  earliest  repulsion  is  from  pain; 
another  thinks  that  freedom  iVom  pain  is  the  earliest 


The  poujble  ol 

appctitloii     or 

frewm  fi«n 
paiD,  (ill)  UiF 

censent  primum  ascitam  et  primum  declinatum  do- 
lorem ;  ab  iis  iilij  quae  prima  secundum  naturam 
nominant  proficiscuntur.  in  quibus  nuineraiit  iiicolu- 
mitatem  conservationemque  omnium  partium,  vale- 
tudinem,  sensus  iiitegros,  doloris  vacuitatem,  vires, 
pulchritudinem,  cetera  generis  eiusdem,  quorum  si- 
milia  Riint  prima  in  animis,  quasi  virtutum  igniculi 
et  semina.  Ex  his  tribus  cum  unum  aliquid  sit  quo 
primum  natura  moyeatur  vel  ad  appetenduna  vel  ad 
repcllendum  nee  quidquam  omnino  praeter  haee 
tria  possit  esse,  necesse  est  omnino  officium  aut 
fufipeiidi  aut  sequendi  ad  eorum  aliqnid  referri,  ut 
illu  prudeiitia  quttm  artem  vitae  esse  diximus  in 
earum  triura  rerum  aliqua  versetur  a  qua  totius  vitae 
ducat  exordium. 
)  Ex  eo  autem  quod  statuerit  esse  quo  primum 

natura  moveatur,  exsistet  recti  etiam  ratio  atque 
houesti,  quae  cum  aliqoo  uno  ex  tribus  illis  congru- 
ere  possit,  ut  aut  id  honestum  sit,  facere  omnia' 
voluptatis  causa  etiamsi  earn  non  eousequare,  aut 
non  dolendi  etiamsi  id  assequi  nequeas,  aut  eorum 
quae  secundum  naturam  sunt  adipiseendi  etiamsi 
nihil,  consequarc.  Its  fit  ut  quanta  differentia  est  in 
principiis  naturaUbus,  tanta  sit  in  finibus  bonorum 
malorumque  dissimilitudo.^ — Alii  rursum  iisdem  a 
principiis  omne  officium  referent  aut  ad  voluptatem 

brackets,      ^^^H 

BOOK  V.  vii 
thing  welcomed,  and  pain  the  earliest  thing  avoided ; 
others  again  start  from  what  they  term  the  primary 
objects  in  accordance  with  nature,  among  which  they 
reckon  the  soundness  and  safety  of  all  the  parts  of 
the  body,  health,  perfect  senses,  freedom  from  pain, 
strength,  beauty  and  the  like,  analogous  to  which 
are  the  primary  intellectual  escellences  which  are 
the  sparks  and  seeds  of  the  virtues.  Now  it  must 
be  one  or  other  of  these  three  sets  of  things  which 
iirst  excites  our  nature  to  feel  desire  or  repulsi< 
nor  can  it  be  anything  whatsoever  beside  these  three 
things.  It  follows  therefore  that  every  right  act 
of  avoidance  or  of  pursuit  is  aimed  at  one  of  these 
objects,  and  that  consequently  one  of  these  three 
must  form  the  subject-matter  of  Prudence,  which  we 
spoke  of  as  the  art  of  life ;  from  one  of  the  three 
Prudence  derives  the  initial  motive  of  the  wliole  of 

)  Now,  from  whicliever   Prudence   decides   to   be  Tha  End  mnsi 

the  object  of  the  primary  natural  impulses,  will  arbe  J^^pi,^?^  | 
a  theory  of  right  and  of  Moral  Worth  which  may  ite  iitiimneni 
correspond  with  one  or  other  of  tlie  three  objects  tiues:  "^ 
aforesaid.  Thus  Morality  will  consist  either  in 
aiming  all  our  actions  at  pleasure,  even  though  one 
may  not  succeed  in  attaining  it ;  or  at  absence  of 
pain,  even  though  one  is  unable  to  secure  it;  or  at 
getting  the  things  in  accordance  with  nature,  even 
though  one  does  not  attain  any  of  them.  Hence 
there  is  a  divergence  between  the  different  concep- 
tions as  to  the  Ends  of  Goods  and  Evils,  precisely 
equivalent  to  the  difference  of  opinion  as  to  tlie 
primary  natural  objects. — Others  again  starting  from 
the  same  primary  objects  will  make  the  sole  stan- 
dard of  right  action  the  actual  attainment  of  plea- 

But  ad  noR  dolendum  aut  od  prima  ilia  secundum 
naturam  obtinenda. 

0  "  Expositis  iam  igitur  sex  de  summo  bono  senten- 
tiis,  trium  proximaruni  hi  principes:  Toluptatis  Ari- 
stippus,  not!  dolendi  Hieronj'nius,  fruendi  rebus  iis 
quas  primas  secundum  naturam  esse  dmmus  Carne- 
ades  non  ille  quidem  auctor  sed  defensor  dlsserendi 
causa  fuit  Superiores  tres  erant  quae  esse  possent; 
quaruin  est  una  sola  defensa  eaque  vehenienter. 
Nam  voluptatis  causa  facere  omnia  cum,  etiamsi  nihil 
consequamur,tamen  ipsuin  illud  consilium  itafaciendi 
per  se  expetendum  et  honestum  etsolam  bonum  sit, 
nemo  dixit.  Ne  vitationem  quidem  doloris  ipsam 
per  se  quisquam  in  rebus  expetendis  putavit  nisi 
etiam  evitare  posset.  At  vero  facere  omnia  ut  adi- 
piscamur  quae  secundum  naturam  sunt  etiamsi  ea 
non  assequamur,  id  esse  et  honestum  et  solum  per 
se  expetendum  et  solum  bonum  Stoici  dicunt. 

1  VIII.  Sex  igitur  hae  sunt  simplices  de  summa 
bonorum  malonimque  sententiae,  duae  sine  patrono, 
quattuor  defensae.  lunctae  autem  et  duplices  ex- 
positiones  aummi  boni  tres  omnino  fiierunt,  nee  vero 
plures,  si  penitus  rerum  naturam  videas,  esse  potue- 
runt.  Nam  aut  voluptas  adiun^  potest  ad  honesta- 
tera,  ut  Calliphonti  Dinomachoque  placuit,  aut  doloris 
vacuitas,  ut  Diodoro,  aut  prima  naturae,  ut  antiquis, 
quos  eosdem  Academicos  et  Peripateticosnominamus. 

"This  is  obviously  incorrect;  for  formal  com  pit  ten  ess, 
Carneades  ought  lo  have  made  six  composite  Ends,  b; 
combining  Morality  witU  the  pursuit  of  each  of  Llie  three 
primary  objects  of  desire  as  well  as  with  their  attainmtnt; 
but  no  douiit  at  this  point  he  fell  the  unreality  of  his  scheme 
and  drew  back,  since  Morality,  according  lo  Aristippus, 
Epicurus  and  the  Sloics  -nias  the  pursuit  of  pleasure,  free- 
dom from  pain,  and  the  natural  goods  respectively. 


BOOK  V.  vii-viii 
EQre,  freedom  from  pain,  or  the  primary  things  in 
accordance  with  nature,  respectively, 

D  Thus  we  have  now  set  forth  six  views  as  to  the  (c 

Chief  Good.  The  leading  upholders  of  the  latter  ^^ 
three  are :  of  pleasure,  Aristippus;  of  freedom  from  ": 
pain,  Hieronymus ;  of  the  enjoyment  of  what  we 
have  called  the  primary  things  in  accordance  with 
nature,  Carneades, — that  is,  he  did  not  originate 
this  view  but  he  upheld  it  for  polemical  purposes. 
The  three  former  were  possible  views,  but  only  one 
of  them  has  been  actually  maintained,  though  that 
with  great  vigour.  No  one  has  asserted  pleasure  to 
be  the  sole  aim  of  action  in  the  sense  that  the  mere 
intention  of  attaining  pleasure,  although  unsuccess- 
ful, is  in  itself  desirable  and  moral  and  the  only 
good.  Nor  yet  has  anyone  held  that  tlie  effort  to 
avoid  pain  is  in  itself  a  thing  desirable,  without  one's 
being  able  actually  to  avoid  it.  On  the  other  hand,  that  H 
morality  consists  in  using  every  endeavour  to  obtain 
the  things  in  accordance  with  nature,  and  that  this 
endeavour  even  though  unsuccessful  is  itself  the  sole 
thing  desirable  and  the  sole  good,  is  actually  main- 
tained by  the  Stoics. 

1       VZII.  "These  then  are  the  sii  simple  views  about  or 
the  End  of  Goods  and  Evib;  two  of  them  without  a  ™ 
champion,  and  four  actually  upheld.     Of  composite  ?p 
or  dualistic  definitions  of  the  Supreme  Good  there  vi 
have  been  three  in  alt ;  nor  were  more  than  three 
possible,  if  you  examine  the  nature  of  the   case 
closely.'     There  is  the  combination  of  Morality  with 
pleasure,    adopted    by    Callipho    and    Dinomachus; 
with  freedom  from  pain,  by  Diodonis ;  or  with  the 
primary  objects  of  nature,  the  view  of  the  ancients,  as 
we  entitle  both  the  Academics  and  the  Peripatetics. 


Sed  quoniam  non  possunt  omnia  siinu)  dici,  haec 

in  praesentia  not»  esse  debebunt,  voluptatem  semo- 

vendam  esse,  quando  ad  maiora  quaedam,  ut  iam  ap- 

parebit,  nati  sumus.    De  vacuitate  doloris  eadem  fere 

23  did  solent  quae  de  voluptate.'  Nee  vero  alia  sunt 
quaerenda  contra  Cameadiam  illam  sentetttiam ;  quo- 
cumque  enim  modo  summum  bonum  sic  exponitur  ut 
id  vacet  hnnestate,  nee  officia  nee  virtutes  in  ea  ratione 
nee  amicitiaecotistare possunt  Coniunctioautemeum 
honestate  vel  voUiptatis  vel  non  dolendi  id  ipsum 
honestutn  quod  ampiecti  vult  id  efRcit  turpe.  Ad  eas 
enim  res  referre  quae  a^as,  quarum  una  si  quis  malo 
careat  in  summo  eum  bono  dicat  esse,  altera  versetur 
in  levissima  parte  naturae,  obscurantis  est  omnem 
splendorem  honestatis,  ne  dicani  inquinantis.  Hestant 
Stoici,  qui,  cum  a  Peripateticis  et  Academicis  omnia 
transtulissent,  nominibus  aliis  easdem  res  secuti  aunt. 
"Hos  contra  singulos  dici  est  melius;  sed  nunc 
quod  a^mus;  de  ilHs  cum  volemus. 

23  Dcmocritiautemseeuritas,  quae  est  animitranquii- 

litas,^  quam  appellavit'  fi&viiiav,  eo  separanda  fiiit  ab 
hac  disputatione,  quia  ista  animi  tranquillitas  ea 
est  ipsa  beata  vita;  quaerimus  auten)  non  quae  sit 
sed  unde  sit.  lam  explosae  eieetaeque  sententiae 
Pyrrhonis,   Aristonis,   Erilli,  quod  in    hunc   orbem 

'After  voluplate,  MSS.  add:  Qaoniam  igitur  rt  de 
volvptate  cum  Torguefo  et  de  konestater  in  qua  una  omnt 
boiium  ponetelur,  aim  Cataite  est  disputalum,  primtim, 
quae  contra  vutuplatem  ditia  sunt,  tadem  fere  cadu»! 
contra  vacuifatem  doloris.  Edd.  reject  (his  rererence  to 
the  two  earlier  dialogues  as  an  interpolation,  since  they  are 
supposed  to  lake  place  at  a,  lalerdate  than  (he  present  oiw. 

^ Iranguillitas  Muller,-  tranquilUtas  tanquam  B  E  i  \$^ 
juoro]  Iranq.    Mdv.  " 

'  appellavit  inf.  MSS.,  Mfjller;  appellant  B,E,  UdttM 

BOOK  V.  viii  ^H 

But  it  is  impossible  to  set  forth  the  whole  of  our  BejMiiBg  mch 
position  at  once ;  so  for  the  present  we  need  only  ii'v^™ni5^e 
notice  that  pleasuremust  be  discarded,  on  the  ground  '°  ''«Ei^  P'"- 
that,  as  will  be  shown  later,  we  are  intended  by  gf  pain,  or  do 
nature  for  greater  things.     Freedom  from  pain  is  tue.os'weu'ai" 
open  to  practically  the  same  objections  as  picture.  '^f'^j"'™Y'" 
iS  Nor  need  we  look  for  other  arguments  to  refiite  the  an  under  the 
opinion  of  Cumeades;  for  any  conceivable  account  "^"^^^^^l" 
of  the  Chief  Good  which  does  not  include  the  factor  't''V^^''i''' 
of  Morul  Worth  gives  a  system  under  which  there  ud  Poipatetici 
is  no  room  either  for  duty,  virtue  or  iriendsiiip.  Ji^'toHhcSioit 
Moreover  the  combination  with  Moral  Worth  either  '«■.  vti.  Vifun 
of  pleasure  or  of  freedom  from  pain  debases  the  goods- 
very  morality  that   it  aims  at   supporting.      For   to 
uphold  two  standards  of  conduct  jointly,  one  of  which 
declares  freedom  from  evil  to  be  the  Supreme  Good, 
wliile  the  other  is  a  thing  concerned  with  tlie  most 
frivolous  part  of  our  nature,  is  to  dim,  if  not  to  defile, 
all  the  radiance  of  Moral  Worth.     There  remain  the 
Stoics,  who  took  over  their  whole  system  from  the 
Peripatetics  and  the  Academics,  adopting  the  )Mme 
ideas  under  other  names. 

The  best  way  to  deal  with  these  diiferent  schools 
would  be  to  refute  each  separately;  but  for  the  present 
we  must  keep  to  the  business  in  hand ;  we  will  dis- 
cuss these  other  schools  at  our  leisure. 
i  '  The  calmness  or  tranquillity  of  mind  which  is 
the  Chief  Good  of  Demoeritus,  eul/iumia  as  he  calls  it, 
has  had  to  be  excluded  from  this  discussion,  because 
this  mental  tranquillity  is  in  itself  the  happiness  in 
question;  and  we  are  inquiring  not  what  happim 
is,  but  what  produces  it.  Again,  the  discredited 
and  abandoned  theories  of  Pyrrho,  Aristo  and  EriUus 
cannot  be  brought  within  the  circle  we  have  drawn, 



q^uem  circmnscripsimus  incidere  non  possunt,  a 
bendae  omnino  non  fuerunt.  Nam  cum  omnis  haec 
quaestio  de  finibus  et  quasi  de  extremis  bonorum  et 
malonun  ab  eo  proficiscatur  quod  disimus  naturae 
esse  aptum  et  accommodatum,  quodque  ipsum  per 
se  primum  appetatur,  hoc  totum  et  il  tollunt  qui  in 
rebus  iis  in  quibus  nihil  aut  honestum  aut  turpe  sit 
negant  esse  ullam  causam  cur  aliud  alii  anteponatur 
nee  inter  eas  res  quidquam  omnino  putant  interesse, 
et  Erillua,  si  ita  sensit,  niliil  esse  bonum  praeter 
scientiam,  omnem  consili  capiendi  causam  inven- 
tion emque  offici  sustulit. 

Sic  exclusis  sententiis  reliquorum,  cum  praeter- 
ea  nulla  esse  possit,  haec  antiquorum  valeat  ne- 
cesse  est.  Igitur  instituto  veterum,  quo  etiam  Stoid 
utuntuT,  hinc  capiamus  exordium. 
I  IX.  '  Omne  animal  se  ipsum  diligit,  ac  simul  est 
ortum "  id  agit  ut  se  conservet,  quod  hie  ei  primus  ad 
omnem  vitam  tuendam  appetitus  a  natura  datur,  se 
ut  conservet  atque  ita  sit  atfectum  ut  optime  secun- 
dum naturam  afTectum  esse  possit.  Hanc  initio  in- 
stitutionem  confusam  habet  et  incertam,  ut  tantum- 
modo  se  tueatur  qualecumque  sit ;  sed  nee  quid  sit 
nee  quid  possit  nee  quid  ipsius  natura  sit  intelleKit 
Cum  autem  processit  paulum  et  quatenus  quidque' 
se  attingat  ad  seque  pertinent  perspicere  coepit,  tum 
sensim  incipit  progredi  seseque  ognoscere  et  intelle- 

'  Igitur: 

i  fiiid^uid  MSS.,  Mdv. 



BOOK  V.  \ 

and  so  we  have  not  been  concerned  to  consider  them 
at  all.  For  the  whole  of  this  inquiry  into  the  Ends 
or,  so  to  speak,  the  limits  of  Goods  and  Evila  must 
begin  from  that  which  we  have  spoken  of  as  adapted 
and  suited  to  nature  and  which  is  the  earliest  object 
of  desire  for  its  own  sake;  now  this  is  entirely  done 
away  with  by  those  who  maintain  that,  in  the  sphere 
of  things  which  contain  no  element  of  Moral  Worth 
or  baseness,  there  is  no  reason  why  any  one  thing 
should  be  preferred  to  any  other,  and  who  consider 
these  things  to  be  absolutely  indifferent ;  and  Erillus 
also,  if  he  actually  held  that  there  is  nothing  good  but 
knowledge,  destroyed  every  motive  of  rational  action 
and  every  clue  to  riglit  conduct. 

'Thus  we  have  eliminated  the  views  of  all  the 
other  philosophers;  and  no  other  view  is  possible, 
therefore  this  doctrine  of  tile  Ancients  must  hold 
good.  Let  us  then  follow  the  practice  of  the  old 
philosophers,  adopted  also  by  the  Stoics  and  mike 
this  our  starting-point, 
t  IX.  Every  living  creature  loves  itself  and  from 
the  moment  of  birth  strives  to  secure  its  own  preser- 
vation ;  because  the  earliest  impulse  bestowed  on  it 
by  nature  for  its  life-long  protection  is  the  instinct 
for  self-preservation  arid  for  the  maintenance  of 
itself  in  the  best  condition  possible  to  it  in  accord- 
Mice  with  its  nature.  At  the  outset  this  tendency 
is  vague  and  uncertain,  so  tliat  it  merely  aims  at  pro- 
tecting itself  whatever  its  character  may  be ;  it  does 
notunderatanditselfnorits  own  capacities  and  nature. 
When,  however,  it  has  grown  a  little  older,  and  has 
begun  to  notice  the  measure  in  which  different 
things  affect  and  concern  itself,  it  now  gradually 
commences   to   make   progress.     Self-consciousness 

EE  417 


gere  quam  ob  causam  habeat  eum  quern  diximus 
animi  appetitum,  coeptatque  et  ea  quae  naturae  sentit 
apta  appetere  et  propulsare  contraria.  Ergo  omni 
animali  illud  quod  appetit  posltum  est  in  eo  quod 
naturae  est  acconimodatunj.  Ita  finis  bonorum 
exsistit,  secunduni  naturam  vivere  sic  afTeetum  ut 
optinie  affici  possit  ad  naturamque  accomntodatissime. 

3  Quoniaiu  autem  sua  euiusque  animantis  natura  est, 
necesse  est  finem  qiioque  omniuni  hunc  esse  lit  natura 
expleatur  (nihil  enim  prohibet  quaedara  esse  et  inter 
se  animalibus  reliquis  et  eum  bestiis  homini  conunu- 
nia,  quoniam  omnium  est  natura  communis).  Bed 
extrema  ilia  et  sumnia  quae  quaerimus  inter  anima- 
lium  genera  distincta  et  dispertita  sint  et  sua  cuique 
propria  et  ad  id  apta  quod  cuiusque  natura  desideret. 

S  Quare  ctim  dicimus  omnibus  animalibus  extremvuD 
esse  secundum  uaturam  vivere,  non  ita  accipiendum 
est  quasi  dicaraus  ununi  esse  omnium  extremura ; 
sed  ut  omnium  artium  recte  dici  potest  commune 
esse  ut  in  aligua  scientia  versentur,  scientlnm  autem 
suam  cuiusque  artis  esse,  sic  commune  animalium 
omnium  secundum  naturam  vivere,  sed  naturas  esse 
diversas,  ut  aliud  equo  sit  e  natura,  aliud  bovi,  aliud 
homini,  et  taineninomnibussummacoinniunis,etqui* 
n  in  animalibus  sed  etiam  in  rebus 

BOOK  V.  ix 
dawns,  and  the  creature  begins  to  understand  the 
reason  why  it  possesses  the  instinctive  appetition 
aforesaid,  and  to  try  to  obtain  the  things  wtiich  it 
perceives  to  be  adapted  to  its  nature  and  to  repel 
their  opposites.  Every  living  creature  therefore 
finds  its  object  of  appetition  in  the  thing  suited  to 
its  nature.  Thus  arises  the  End  of  Goods,  namely 
toJiECjn  accordance  withnature  and  in  that  condi- 
tion which  is  the  best  and  moat  suited  to  nature 

25  thjrtris~possible.  At  the-same-tiiHe-  evety  animal  has 
its  own  nature  ;  -and  consequently,  whQe  for  all  alitfc 
the  End  consists  in  the  satisfaction  of  that  nature 
(for  there  is  no  reason  why  certain  things  should 
not  i>e  common  to  all  the  lower  animals,  and  also| 
to  the  lower  animals  and  man,  since  all  have  a  cora-l 
mon  nature),  yet  the  ultimate  and  supreme  objectsj 
that  we  are  investigating  must  be  differentiated  andl 
distributed  among  the  different  kinds  of  animals,! 
each  kind  having  its  own  peculiar  to  itself  and 
adapted  to  the  requirements  of  its  individual  nature. 

26  Hence  when  we  say  that  the-End-o£all__living  crea- 
tureslsTrolive  in  accordance  with  naturcj  this  must 
not  be  construed  as  ineahing   that    all    have  one 

_jind  the  same  End  ;  but  just  as  it  is  correct  to  say 
that  all  the  arts  and  sciences  have  the  common 
characteristic  of  occupying  themselves  with  some 
branch  of  knowledge,  while  each  art  has  its  own 
particular  branch  of  knowledge  belonging  to  it,  so 
all  animals  have  the  common  End  of  living  accord- 
ing to  nature,  but  their  natures  are  diverse,  ao  that 
one  thing  is  in  accordance  with  nature  for  the  horse, 
another  for  the  ox,  and  another  for  man,  and  yet  in 
all  the  Supreme  Ejid  is  common,  and  that  not  only 
in  animals  but  also  in  all  those  things  upon  which 
ee2  419 


omnibus  iis  quus  natura  alit,  auget,  tuetur ;  in  quibus 
vidimus  ca  quae  ^ignuntur  e  terra  multa  quodam 
niodo  efficere  ipsa  sibi  per  se  quae  ad  viveiiduni  cre- 
scendumque  valeant,  ut  suo^  genere  perv-eniant  ad 
extremum;  ut  am  1  ceat  una  comprehensione  ononia 
complecti  no  dui»  tai  temque  dicere  oranem  naturani 
esse  servatricem  s  i  dque  habere  propositum  quasi 
finem  et  extremun  se  ut  c  stodiat  quara  in  optimo 
sui  generis  statu  t  nece  ';e  sit  omnium  rcrum  quae 
natitra  vigeant  s  n  len  esse  finera,  non  eundem.  Ex 
quo  intellegi  debet  hotnini  id  esse  ill  bonis  ultimum, 
secundum  iiaturam  vivere,  quod  ita  iiiterpretemur, 
vivere  ex  bominis  natura  undique  perfecta  et  nihil 
27  requirente.  Haee  igitur  nobis  ejtpHcanda  sunt ;  sed 
si  enodatius,  vos  ignoscetis.  Huius  enim  aetati 
nunc'  haec  primum  fortasse  audientis  servive  debe- 
mus."  Ita  prorsus,"  inquam  ;  '  etsi  ea  quidem 
quae  adhuc  disisti  quamvis  ad  aetatem  rccte  isto 
niodo  dicerentur." 

X.  Expo sita  igitur,"  inquit,  terminatione  rerum 
expetendarura,  cur  ista  se  res  ita  habeat  ut  diid 
deinceps  demonstrandum  est,  Quaniobrem  ordia- 
mur  ab  eo  quod  primum  posui,  quod  idem  respse 
primum  est,  ut  inteiiegamus  omne  animal  se  ipsura 
diligere.  Quod  quamquam  dubitationem  non  habet 
(est  enim  intixum  in  ipsa  natura  comprehenditurque' 
suis  cuiusque  sensibus,  sic  ut  contra  si  quis  dicere 

'  ut  suo  Mdv. ;  el  sua  MSS.  i  Miiller  conj.  iit  in  sua. 
^mtaH  nunc  .  .  audifntis  (conj.  Mdv.)  MGIler  ;  attati  tl 

BOOK  V.  ix-x 
nature  bestows  nourishment,  increase  and  protec- 
tion. Among  these  things  we  notice  that  plants 
can,  iua  sense,  perform  on  their  own  behalf  a  n 
ber  of  actions  conducive  to  their  life  and  growth,  so 
that  they  may  attain  their  End  after  their  kind.  So 
that  finally  we  may  embrace  all  animate  existence  in 
one  broad  generali nation,  and  say  without  hesitation, 
that  all  nature  is  self-preserving,  and  has  before  it 
the  end  and  aim  of  maintaining  itself  in  the  best  pos- 
sible condition  after  its  kind  ;  and  that  consequently 
all  things  endowed  by  nature  with  life  have  a  similar, 
but  not  an  identical,  End.  This  leads  to  the  inference, 
that  the  ultimate  Good  of  man  is  life  in  aecordai 
with  nature,  which  we  may  interpret  as  meaning  life 
in  accordance  with  human  nature  developed  to  its 
S7  ftill  perfection  and  supplied  with  all  its  needs.  This,  h 
then,  is  the  theory  that  we  have  to  expound ;  but  if  it  ^ 
requires  a  good  deal  of  explanation,  you  will  receive  >" 
it  with  forbearance.  For  this  is  perhaps  the  first  di 
time  that  Lucius  has  heard  the  subject  debated,  and 
we  must  make  allowance  for  his  youth."  '  Very 
true,"  said  I ;  albeit  the  style  of  your  discourse  so 
far  has  been  suited  to  hearers  of  any  age." 

X.  Well  then,"  he  resumed,  having  explained  a 
what  the  principle  is  which  determines  what  tilings  "" 
are  desirable,  I  have  next  to  show  why  the  matter  is 
as  I  have  stated.  Let  us  therefore  begin  from  the  posi- 
tion which  I  laid  down  first  and  which  isalso  first  in  the 
order  of  reality :  let  us  understand  that  every  living 
creature  loves  itself.  The  fact  that  this  is  so  admits  of 
no  doubt,  for  indeed  it  is  a  fiindamental  fact  of  nature, 
and  one  that  everybody  can  grasp  for  himself  by  the 
evidence  of  bis  senses,  so  much  so  that  did  anyone 
choose  to  deny  it,  he  would  not  get  a  hearing ; 

velit  non  audiatur),  tamen  ne  quid  praetermittamns 

28  rationes  quoque  cur  hoc  ita  sit  afferendas  puto.  Etsi 
qui  potest  intellegi  aut  cogitari  esse  aliquod  Hnimal 
quodseoderit?  Res enim concurrent contrariae.  Nam 
cum  appetitus  ille  animi  aliquid  ad  sc  trahere  coeperit 
Qonsulto  quod  sibi  obsit,  quia  sit  sibi  inimicus,  cum 
id  sua  causa  faciet,  et  oderit  se  et  simul  diliget,  quod 
fieri  non  potest.  Necesseque  est  si  quis  ipse  sibi 
inimicus  est  eum  quae  bona  sunt  mala  putare,  bona 
contra  quae  mala,  et  quae  appetenda  fugere  et  quae 
fugienda  appetere  ;  quae  sine  dubio  vitae  est  eversio. 
Neque  eniin,  si  aonnulli  rcperiuntur  qui  aut  laqueos 
aut  alia  exitia  quaeraat,  aut'  ille  apud  Terentium, 
qui  decrevit  tautisper  se  minus  iniuriae  suo  nato 
facere  (ut  ait  ipse)  dtim  tiat  miser,'  inimicus  ipse  sibi 

29  putandus  est.  Sed  alii  dolore  moventur,  alii  cupidi- 
tate  ;  iracundia  etiam  oiulti  efferuntur  et,  cum  in 
inala  scientes  irruunt,  turn  se  optime  sibi  consulere 
arbitrantur.     Itaque  dicunt  nee  dubitant : 

Mihi  sic  est  usus;  tibi  ut  opus  est  facto,  face.' 
Qui  ipsi  sibi '  bellum  indixissent,  crucian  dies,  noetes 
torqueri  velJent,  nee  vero  sese  ipsi  accusarent  ob  earn 
causam  quod  se  male  suis  rebus  consuluisse  dicercnt; 
eorum  enim  est  liaec  querela  qui  sibi  can  sunt  sese- 
que  diligunt.     Quare,  quotienscumque  dicetur  male 

.-  aul  ut  M.SS. ;  aut  [ut]  Mdv, 

'  ipsi  sibi  MSS.,  tdd.;  qvi  ipsi  s 

i.       Perhaps  Qui  si  ipsi  sibi  ed. 


■  Terence  tieautontitnorumenos  (The  Self- 
b  From  the  sanie  play,  1.  So. 

BOOK  V.  X 

nevertheless^  so  that  no  step  may  be  omitted^  I  sup- 
pose I  ought  also  to  give  reasons  to  show  why  it  is 

28  so.  Yet  how  can  you  form  any  intelligible  conc«p-  for  (i)  to  des 
tion  of  an  animal  that  should  hate  itself?  The  thing  fs"Jcontai<S 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  For  the  creature  being  tion  in  terms 
its  own  enemy,  the  instinctive  appetition  we  spoke 

of  will  deliberately  set  about  drawing  to  itself  some- 
thing harmful  to  itself;  yet  it  will  be  doing  this 
for  its  own  sake ;  therefore  the  animal  will  both 
hate  and  love  itself  at  the  same  time,  which  is  im- 
possible. Also,  if  a  man  is  his  own  enemy,  it  follows 
that  he  will  think  good  evil  and  evil  good ;  that  he 
will  avoid  things  that  are  desirable  and  seek  things 
that  ought  to  be  avoided ;  but  this  undeniably  would 
mean  to  turn  the  whole  of  life  upside  down.  A  few 
people  may  be  found  who  attempt  to  end  their  lives 
with  a  halter  or  by  other  means ;  but  these,  or  the 
character  of  Terence*  who  (in  his  own  words)  re- 
solved that  if  he  made  himself  to  suffer,  he  so  made 
less  the  wrong  he  did  his  son/  are  not  to  be  put  down 

29  as  haters  of  themselves.  The  motive  with  some  is 
grief,  with  others  passion ;  many  are  rendered  insane 
by  anger,  and  plunge  into  ruin  with  their  eyes  open, 
fancying  all  the  time  that  what  they  do  is  for  their 
own  best  interests.  Hence  they  say,  and  say  in  all 
sincerity : 

It  is  my  way ;  do  you  do  as  it  suits  you.*** 


Men  who  had  really  declared  war  against  themselves 
would  court  days  of  torment  and  nights  of  anguish, 
nor  would  they  reproach  themselves  for  having 
done  so  and  say  that  they  had  been  misguided  and 
imprudent :  such  lamentations  show  that  they  love 
and  care  for  themselves.     It  follows  that  whenever 



quis  de  se  niercri  sibique  inimicus  esse  atque  hostis, 

vitam  dfnique  fugere,  intellegatur  aliquam  subesse 
eiifSmodi  oausam  ut  ex  eo  ipso  intellegi  possit  sibi 

)  quemque  esse  carum.  Nee  vero  id  satis  est,  nemi- 
Dem  esse  qui  ipse  se  oderit,  sed  illud  quoque  intelle- 
geiidum  est,  neniinem  esse  qui  quomodo  se  habeat 
nihil  sua  censeat  interesse.  ToUetur  enim  appetitus 
animi  si,  ut  in  iis  rebus  inter  quas  nihil  interest 
neutram  in  partem  propensiores  sum  us,  item  in 
nobismet  ipsis  quemadmodiim  affecti  siraus  nihil 
nostra  arbitrabimiu-  interesse. 

XI,  '  Atque  ctiam  illud  si  qui  die  ere  vclit,  perab- 
surdum  sit,  ita  diligi  a  sese  quemque  ut  ea  vis 
ipsum  qui  sese  diligat.  Hoc  cum  in  amicitiis,  cum 
in  olfidis,  cum  in  vlrtutibus  dicitiir,  quomodocumqoe 
dicitur,  intellegi  tamen  quid  dicatur  potest :  in 
nobismet  ipsis  autem  ne  intellegi  quidem  ut' 
propter  aliam  quampiam  rem,  verbi  gratia  propter 
voiuptattm,  noE  amemus  ;  propter  nos  enim  illara, 

1  non  propter  earn  nosmet  ipsos  diligimus.  Quain- 
quam  quid  est  quod  magis  perspicuum  sit  quam  *  non 
niodo  carum  sibi  quemque,  verum  etiam  vehementer 
earum  esse  f  quis  est  enim  aut  quotus  quisque  cui 
niors  cum  appropinquet  non 

refugiat  timido  sanguen  atque  exalbescat  metu"? 
Etsi  hoc  quidem  est  in  vitio,  dissolutionem  naturae 

'  Kg,  ut,  quam  inserted  by  edJ. 

L  IV,  6z. 

e  passage  of   Enniua's  AUtnaeon 


BOOK  V.  x-xi 
it  is  said  of  a  man  that  he  has  ruined  himself  and 


is  his  own  worst  enemy,  and  that  he  is  tired  of 
life,  you  may  be  sure  that  there  is  really  an  ex- 
planation which  would  justify  the  inference,  even 
from  such  a  case  as  this,  that  every  man  loves  him-  (u)  nor  is  any- 

30  self.  Nor  is  it  enough  to  say  that  nobody  exists  to  hte  own^ 
who  hates  himself;  we  must  also  realize  that  no- ^*^i 
body  exists  who  thinks  it  makes  no  difference  to  him 
what  his  own  condition  is.  For  it  will  be  destructive 
of  the  very  faculty  of  desire  if  we  come  to  think  of 
our  own  circumstances  as  a  matter  of  indifference  to 
us,  and  feel  in  our  own  case  the  absolute  neutrality 
which  is  our  attitude  towards  the  things  that  are 
really  indifferent. 

XI.        It  would  also  be  utterly  absurd   if  any-  (m)  love  of  ot 
one  desired  to  maintain  that,  though  the  fact  of  *„ j^^g*;ijj 
self-love  is  admitted,  this  instinct  of  affection  is  really  self-love; 
directed  towards  some  other  object  and  not  towards 
the  person  himself  who  feels  it.     When  this  is  said 
of  friendship,  of  right  action  or  of  virtue,  whether 
correct  or  not,  it  has  some  intelligible  meaning ;  but 
in  the  case  of  ourselves  it  is  utterly  meaningless  to 
say  that  we  love  ourselves  for  the  sake  of  something 
else,  for  example,  for  the  sake  of  pleasure.  Clearly  we 
do  not  love  ourselves  for  the  sake  of  pleasure,  but 

5 1   pleasure  for  the  sake  of  ourselves.    Yet  what  fact  is  (iv)  sdf-iove 
more  self-evident  than  that  every  man  not  merely  of  deathj  ««n 
loves  himself,  but  loves  himself  very  much  indeed  ?  ^«^  ^^^^ 
For  who   is  there,   what  percentage  of  mankind, 

Blood  does  not  ebb  with  horror,  and  face  turn  pale 
with  fear,'* 

at  the  approach  of  death  ?    No  doubt  it  is  a  fault  to 



tam  valde  perhorrescere  (quod  item^  est  reprehen- 
dendum  in  dolore) ;  sed  quia  fere  sic  afficiuntur 
omnes^  satis  argumenti  est  ab  interitu  naturam  ab- 
horrere ;  idque  quo  magis  quidam  ita  faciunt  ut  iure 
etiam  reprehendantur,  hoc  magis  intellegendum  est 
haec  ipsa  nimia  in  qUibusdam  futura  non  fuisse  nisi 
quaedam  essent  modica  natura.  Nee  vero  dico 
eorum  metum  mortis  qui,  quia  privari  se  vitae  bonis 
arbitrentur  aut  quia  quasdam  post  mortem  formidines 
extimescant  aut  si^  metuant  ne  cum  dolore  morian- 
tur,  idcirco  mortem  fugiant ;  in  parvis  enim  saepe 
qui  nihil  eorum  cogitant,  si  quando  iis  ludentes 
minamur  praecipitaturos  alicunde,  extimescunt.  Quin 
etiam  ferae,*  inquit  Pacuvius, 
quibus  abest  ad  praecavendum  intellegendi  astutia/ 
32  iniecto  terrore  mortis  horrescunt/  Quis  autem  de 
ipso  sapiente  aliter  existimat  quin,  etiam  cum  decre- 
verit  esse  moriendum,  tamen  discessu  a  suis  atque 
ipsa  relinquenda  luce  moveatur?  Maxime  autem 
in  hoc  quidem  genere  vis  est  perspicua  naturae,  cum 
et  mendicitatem  multi  perpetiantur  ut  vivant,  et 
angantur  appropinquatione  mortis  confecti  homines 
senectute,  et  ea  perferant  quae  Philoctetam  videmus 
in  fabulis ;  qui  cum  cruciaretur  non  ferendis  dolori- 
bus,  propagabat  tamen  vitam  aucupio ;  configebat 
tardus  celeres,  stans  volantes,*  ut  apud  Attium  est, 

'  item  :  Mdv.  conj.  idem, 
^si:  Miiller  conj.  quia, 


BOOK  V.  xi 
recoil  so  violently  from  the  dissolution  of  our  being 
(and  the  same  timidity  in  regard  to  pain  is  blai 
worthy)  ;  but  the  fact  that  practically  everybody  has 
this  feeling  is  conclusive  proof  that  nature  shrinks 
from  destruction ;  and  the  more  some  people  act  thus 
— as  indeed  they  do  to  a  blameworthy  degree — the 
more  it  is  to  be  inferred  that  this  very  excess  would  not 
have  occurred  in  exceptional  cases,  were  not  a  cer- 
tain moderate  degree  of  such  timidity  nutural.  I  am 
not  referring  to  the  fear  of  death  felt  by  those  who 
shun  death  because  they  believe  it  means  the  loss  of 
the  good  things  of  life,  or  because  they  are  afraid 
of  certain  horrors  after  death,  or  if  they  dread  lest 
death  may  be  painful :  for  very  often  young  children, 
who  do  not  thinli  of  any  of  these  things,  are  terribly 
frightened  if  in  fun  we  threaten  to  let  them  fall 
from  a  height    Even '  wild  creatures,"  says  Pacuvius, 

when    seized    with    fear    of    death,      bristle    with 

I  horror.'  Who  does  not  suppose  that  the  Wise  Man  in 
himself,  even  when  he  has  resolved  that  he  must '" 
die,  will  yet  be  affected  at  parting  from  his  friends 
and  quitting  the  very  light  of  day  ?  The  strength 
of  natural  impulse,  in  this  manifestation  of  it,  is 
extremely  obvious,  since  many  men  endure  to  beg 
their  bread  in  order  that  they  may  live,  and  men 
broken  with  age  sufiFer  anguish  at  the  approach  of 
death,  and  endure  torments  like  those  of  Philoctetes 
in  the  play;  who  though  racked  with  intolerable 
pains,  nevertheless  prolonged  his  life  by  fowling; 

Slow  he  pierced  the  swift  i 
Lshot  them  on  the  wing/ 

ith  I 

,  standi! 


pennarumque  contentu  corpori  tegumetita  faciebat. 

33  De  hominum  genere  aut  omnino  de  animalium  lo- 
quor,  cum  arborum  et  stirpium  eadem  paene  natura 
sit  ?  Sive  enini,  ut  doctissimis  viris  visum  est,  maior 
aliqun  causa  atque  divinior  hanc  vim  ingenuit,  sive 
hoc  ita  fit  fortuito,  videmus  ea  quae  terra  gignit 
eorticibus  et  radicibus  valida  servari,  quod  contingit 
animalibuE  sensuum  distributione  et  quadam  com- 
pactione  membrorum.  Qua  quidem  de  re  quamquain 
assentior  lis  qui  haec  omnia  regi  natura  putant,  quae  si 
natura  neglegat,  ipsa  esse  non  possit,  tamen  concedo 
utquidehocdissentiunt  existiment  quod  velint  acvel 
hoc  intellegant,  si  quando  naturam  hominis  dicam,  ho- 
minem  dicere  me ;  nihil  enim  hoc  differt.  Nam  prius 
a  se  poterit  quisque  discedere  quam  appetitum  earum 
rerum  quae  sibi  conducant  amittere.  lure  igitiir 
gravissimi  philosopbi  initium  summi  buni  a  natura 
petiverunl  et  ilium  appetitum  rerum  ad  naturam 
accommodatarum  ingeueratum  putavenint  omnibus, 
quia  continetur^  ea  commendatione  naturae  qua  se 
ipsi  diligunt. 

34  XII.  Deinceps  videndum  est,  quoniam  satis 
apeilum  est  sibi  quemque  natura  esse  canim,  quae 
sit  hominis  natura.  Id  est  enim  de  quo  quaerimus. 
Atqui  perspicuum  est  hominem  e  corpore  animoque 
constare,  cum  primae  sint  aninii  partes,  sceundac 

I  ^DSiiV  B.  E,  Mdv. !  fiossinl  inf.  MSS. 

''quia  conlinelur  sujigesied   by  Mdv..   who  prints  guia 
ctmfintnlHT ;  g-ui  ronlinentur  MSS. ;  qui  conliiiehir  Sch5- 

^M  BOOK  V.  xi-xii 

as  Attius  has  it,  and  wove  their  plumage  together  to  M  the  b» 

.'!3  make  himself  garments.  But  do  1  speak  of  the  "b^^nn' 
human  race  or  of  animals  generally,  when  the  nature  «nini»'»Mt 
of  trees  and  plants  is  almost  the  same  ?  For  whether 
it  be,  as  very  learned  men  have  thought^  that  this 
capaeity  has  been  engendered  in  them  by  some 
higher  and  diviner  power,  or  whether  it  is  the  result 
of  chance,  we  see  that  the  vegetable  species  secure 
by  means  of  their  bark  and  roots  that  support  and 
protection  whieli  animals  derive  from  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  sensory  organs  and  irom  the  well-knit 
framework  of  the  limbs.  On  this  mattei*  I  agree,  it 
is  true,  with  those  who  hold  that  all  these  things 
are  regulated  by  nature,  because  if  nature  were  to 
neglect  them  her  own  existence  would  be  impossible ; 
yet  1  allow  those  who  think  otlierwise  on  this  point 
to  hold  what  view  they  please :  whenever  1  men- 
tion 'the  nature  of  man,'  let  them,  if  they  like, 
understand  me  to  mean  'man,'  as  it  makes  no 
difference.  For  the  individual  can  no  more  lose  the 
instinct  to  seek  the  things  that  are  good  for  him 
than  he  can  divest  himself  of  hia  own  personality. 
The  wisest  authorities  have  therefore  been  right  in 
Jinding  the  Imsis  of  the  Chief  Good  in  nature,  and  in 
holding  that  this  instinctive  desire  for  things  suited 
to  our  nature  is  innate  in  all  men,  because  it  is 
founded  on  that  natural  attraction  which  makes 
them  love  themselves. 

:ii  XII.  "Having  made  it  sufficiently  clear  that  r, 
every  one  by  nature  loves  himself,  we  must  next  ™ 
examine  what  is  the  nature  of  man.  For  it  i."!  human 
nature  that  is  the  object  of  our  investigation.  Now 
it  is  manifest  that  man  consists  of  body  and  mind, 
although  the  parts  of  the  mind  hold  the  first  place 


corporis.  Deinde  id  quoque  videmus,  et  ita  figu- 
ratum  corpus  ut  excellat  aliis,  animumque  ita  coiisti- 
tutum  ut  et  sensibus  instructus  sit  et  habeat  prae- 
stantiam  mentis  cui  tota  hominis  natura  pareat,  in 
qua  sit  mirabilis  quaedam  vis  rationis  et  cognitionis 
et  scientiae  virtutumque  omnium.  Nam  quae  corpo- 
ris sunt  ea  nee  auctoritatem  cum  animi  partibus 
comparandam  et  cognitionem  habent  faciliorem. 
Itaque  ab  his  ordiamur. 
35  Corporis  igitur  nostri  partes  totaque  figura  et 

forma  et  statura  quam  apta  ad  naturam  sit  apparet, 
neque  est  dubium  quin  irons,  oculi,  aures  et  reliquae 
partes  quales  propriae  sint  hominis  intellegatur ;  sed 
certe  opus  est  ea  valere  et  vigere  et  naturales  motus 
ususque  habere,  ut  nee  absit  quid  eorum  nee  aegrum 
debilitatumve  sit.  Id  enim  natura  desiderat.  Est 
autem  etiam  actio  quaedam  corporis  quae  motus  et 
status  naturae  congruentes  tenet ;  in  quibus  si 
peccetur  distortione  et  depravatione  quadam  ac 
motu  statuve  deformi,  ut  si  aut  manibus  ingrediatur 
quis  aut  non  ante  sed  retro,  fugere  plane  se  ipse  et 
hominem  exuens  ex  homine  naturam  odisse  videatur. 
Quamobrem  etiam  sessiones  quaedam  et  flexi  fracti- 
que  motus,  quales  protervorum  hominum  aut  mollium 

esse  Solent,  contra  naturam  sunt,  ut  etiamsi  animi 

BOOK  V.  xii 

and  those  of  the  body  the  second.  Next  we  further 
observe  both  that  man's  body  is  of  a  structure  sur- 
passing that  of  other  animals^  and  that  his  mind  is  so 
constituted  as  not  only  to  be  equipped  with  senses 
but  also  to  possess  the  predominant  factor  of  intel- 
lect, which  commands  the  obedience  of  the  whole 
of  man's  nature,  being  endowed  with  the  marvellous 
faculties  of  reason,  of  cognition,  of  knowledge  and  of 
all  the  virtues.  For  the  attributes  of  the  body  are 
not  comparable  in  importance  with  the  parts  of  the 
mind ;  and  moreover  they  are  easier  to  understand. 
We  will  therefore  begin  with  them. 

It  is  manifest  how  well  the  parts  of  our  body.  The  bodv:  its 
and  its  entire  figure,  form  and  stature  are  adapted  |^es?DdS^ 
to  our  nature ;  and  that  special  conformation  of  the  by  its  parts, 
brow,  eyes,  ears  and  other  parts  which  is  appropriate 
to  man,  can  be  recognized  without  hesitation  by  the 
understanding;  but  of  course  it  is  necessary  that 
these  organs  should  be  healthy  and  vigorous  and 
possessed  of  their  natural  motions  and  uses ;  no  part 
must  be  lacking  and  none  must  be  diseased  or  en- 
feebled. This  is  a  requirement  of  nature.  Again, 
our  body  also  possesses  a  faculty  of  action  which 
keeps  its  motions  and  postures  in  harmony  with 
nature;  and  any  error  in  these,  due  to  distortion 
or  deformity  or  abnormality  of  movement  or  pos- 
ture,— for  example,  if  a  man  were  to  walk  on  his 
hands,  or  backwards  instead  of  forwards, — would 
make  a  man  appear  alienated  from  himself,  as 
if  he  had  stripped  off  his  proper  humanity  and 
hated  his  own  nature.  Hence  certain  attitudes  in 
sitting,  and  slouching,  languishing  movements,  such 
as  are  affected  by  the  wanton  and  the  effeminate,  are 
contrary  to  nature,  and  though  really  arising  from  a 


vitio  id  eveniat  tamen  in  corpore  mutari  hominis 
S6  natura  videatur.  Itaque  e  contrario  moderati  aequa- 
bilesqiie  habitus,  affectiones  ususque  corporis  apli 
esse  ad  naturam  videntur. 

Ift  o  animus  non  esse  solum  sed  etiam  cuius- 

dau  modi  debet  esse,  ut  et  omnes  partes  suas  habeat 
n  olun       et  de  virtutibus  nulla  desit.     Atque  iii 
n    bu       t  sua  cuiusque  virtus,  ut  ne  quid  impediat 
q  o  n  nu    suo  sensus  qiiisque  munere  fungatur  in 
1  u       eleriter    expediteque    percipiendis  quae 
b      t         nt  seiisibus,     XIII.  Animi  autem  et  eius 
animi  p     t     quae  princeps  est  quaeque  mtns  nomi- 
natu     [  1       s  sunt  virtutes,  sed   duo  prima  genera, 
n   m  mi  quae  ingenerantur  suapte   uatura  ap- 

p  llaiit  tfque  non  voluntariae,  alterum '  earum  quae 
in  lu  tate  positae  magis  proprio  nomine  appellari 
solent,  quarum  est  escellens  in  animoruin  laude  prae- 
stantia.  Prioris  generis  est  docilitas,  meuioria;  quae 
fere  omnia  appellantur  uno  ingeni  nombie,  easque 
virtutes  qui  babent  ingeniosi  vocantur.  Alterum 
autem  genus  est  magnarum  verarumque  virtutum 
quas  appellamus  voluntarias,  ut  prudentiam,  tem- 
perantiam,  fortitudinem,  iustitiam  et  reliquas  generis 

J7  "  Et  summatim  quidera  haec  erant  de  corpore  ani- 
moque  dicenda,  quibus  quasi  informatuin  est  quid 
hominis  natura  pustulct ;  ex  quo  perspicuum  est, 
quoniam  ipsi  a  nobis  diligumur  omnjaque  e 

ilnf.  MSS.,Mdv,; 

;  et  in  aniini^^ 


BOOK  V.  xii-xiii 

defect  of  mind,  suggest  to  the  eye  a  bodily  perver- 
»6  sion  of  man's  nature.  And  so,  on  the  contrary,  a 
controlled  and  well-regulated  bearing,  condition  and 
movement  of  the  body  have  the  appearance  of  being 
in  harmony  with  nature. 

Turning  now  to  the  mind,  this  must  not  only  The  Sense& 
exist,  but  also  be  of  a  certain  character;  it  must 
have  all  its  parts  intact  and  lack  none  of  the  virtues. 
The  senses  also  possess  their  several  virtues  or  excel- 
lences, consisting  in  the  unimpeded  performance  of 
their  several  functions  of  swiftly  and  readily  per- 
ceiving the  objects  presented  to  them.     XIII.  The  The  mind,  aadi 
mind,  on  the  other  hand,  and  that  dominant  part  of  f^*i^n?te!vi2. 
the  mind  which  is  called  the  intellect,  possess  many  "?*«^ctu^ 
excellences .  or  virtues,  but  these  are  of  two  main  pending  on  vol 
classes ;  one  class  consists  of  those  excellences  which  vSum!*  '  ™°" 
are  the  result  of  our  natural  endowments  and  which 
are   called  non- volitional ;  and  the  other  of  those 
which,  depending  on  our  volition,  are  usually  styled 
virtues  *  in  the  more  special  sense ;  and  the  latter  are 
the  pre-eminent  glory  and  distinction  of  the  mind. 
To  the  former  class  belong  receptiveness  and  memory; 
and  practically  all  the  excellences  of  this  class  are 
included  under  one  name    of     talent,*    and   their 
possessors  are  spoken  of  as    talented.*     The  other 
class  consists  of  the  lofty  virtues  properly  so  called, 
which  we  speak  of  as  dependent  on  volition,  for 
instance.  Prudence,  Temperance,  Courage,  Justice, 
and  the  others  of  the  same  kind. 
7  Such  is  the  account,  a  brief  one,  it  is  true,  that  Sdf-iovc  com- 

it  was  necessary  to  give  of  the  body  and  the  mind.  S^^tion  of  ai 
It  has  indicated  in  outline  what  the  requirements  t*»ese  excel- 


of  man's   nature   are ;    and  it   has   clearly   shown 

that,  since  we  love  ourselves,  and  desire  all  our 

FF  433 


et  in  corpore  perfecta  velimus  esse,  ea  nobis  ipsa 
cara  esse  propter  se  et  in  iis  esse  ad  bene  vivendum 
momenta  maxima.  Nam  cui  proposita  sit  conservatio 
sui,  necesse  est  huic  partes  quoque  sui  caras  esse, 
carioresque  quo  perfectiores  sint  et  magis  in  suo 
genere  laudabiles.  Ea  enim  vita  expetitur  quae  sit 
animi  corporisque  expleta  virtutibus,  in  eoque  sum- 
mum  bonum  poni  necesse  est,  quando  quidem  id  tale 
esse  debet  ut  rerum  expetendarum  sit  extremum. 
Quo  cognito  dubitari  non  potest  quin,  cum  ipsi 
homines  sibi  sint  per  se  et  sua  sponte  cari,  partes 
quoque  et  corporis  et  animi  et  earum  rerum  quae 
sunt  in  utriusque  motu  et  statu  sua  caritate  colantur 
38  et  per  se  ipsae  appetantur.  Quibus  expositis  facilis 
est  coniectura  ea  maxime  esse  expetenda  ex  nostris 
quae  plurimum  habent  dignitatis,  ut  optimae  cuius- 
que  partis  quae  ^  per  se  expetatur  virtus  sit  expetenda 
maxime.  Ita  fiet  ut  animi  virtus  corporis  virtuti 
anteponatur  animique  virtutes  non  voluntarias  vin- 
cant  virtutes  voluntariae,  quae  quidem  proprie  vir- 
tutes appellantur  multumque  excellunt,  propterea 
quod*ex  ratione  gignuntur  qua  nihil  est  in  homine 
divinius.  Etenim  omnium  rerum  quas  et  creat  na- 
tura  et  tuetur,  quae  aut  sine  animo  sunt  aut  non*"^ 
multo  secus,  earum  summum  bonum  in  corpore  est; 
ut  non  inscite  illud  dictum  videatur  in  sue,  animum 
illi  pecudi  datum  pro  sale,  ne  putisceret.    XIV.  Sunt 

'  Perhaps  quae  maxime  per  se  ed, 
*  non  inserted  by  edd. 


KOOK  V.  xiu 
attributes  both  of  mind  and  body  to  be  perfect, 
oar  mind  and  body  are  themselves  dear  to  us  for 
their  own  sakes,  and  are  of  the  highest  importance 
for  our  general  well-being.  For  he  who  aims  at  the 
preservation  of  himself,  must  necessarily  feel  an  affec- 
tion for  the  parts  of  himself  also,  and  the  more  so, 
the  more  perfect  and  admirable  in  their  own  kind 
they  are.  For  the  life  we  desire  is  one  fully  equipped 
with  the  virtues  of  mind  and  body;  and  such  a  life 
must  constitute  the  Chief  Good,  inasmuch  as  it  must 
necessarily  be  such  as  to  be  the  limit  of  things  desir- 
able. This  truth  realized,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that, 
as  men  feel  an  affection  towards  themselves  for  their 
own  sakes  and  of  their  own  accord,  the  parts  also  of 
tile  body  and  mind,  and  of  those  faculties  which  arc 
displayed  in  each  while  in  motion  or  at  rest,  are 
esteemed  for  their  own  attractiveness  and  desired 
38  for  their  own  sake.  From  these  explanations,  itavtdMym 
may  readily  be  inferred  that  the  most  desirable  of  l^r^ingtoni' 
our  attributes  arc  those  possessed  of  the  highest  JS^lJ^o, 
intrinsic  worth ;  so  that  the  most  desirable  excel-  mani 
lences  are  the  excellences  of  the  noblest  parts  of  us, 
which  are  desirable  for  their  own  sake.  The  result 
will  be  that  excellence  of  mind  will  be  rated  higher 
than  excellence  of  body,  and  the  volitional  virtues 
of  the  mind  will  surpass  the  non- volitional ;  the 
former,  indeed,  are  the  virtues'  specially  so  called, 
and  are  far  superior,  in  that  they  spring  from  reason, 
the  most  divine  element  in  man.  For  the  inanimate 
or  nearly  inanimate  creatures  that  are  under  nature's 
charge,  all  of  them  have  their  supreme  good  in  the 
body;  hence  it  has  been  cleverly  said,as  I  think, about 
the  pig,  that  a  mind  has  been  bestowed  upon  this 
animal  to  serve  as  salt  and  keep  it  from  going  bad, 
ffS  435 

autem  bestiae  qu&edam  in  quibus  inest  aliquid  simile 
virtutia,  ut  in  leonibus.  ut  in  canthtis.  ut^  in  equis, 
in  quibus  non  rorporum  solum  ut  in  suibus  sed  etiam 
animoriitn  aliqaa  ex  parte  motiis  quosdani  videmus. 
In  hoamie  autem  somma  omnis  animi  est  et  in  animo 
rationis,  ex  qua  virtus  est,  quae  rationis  absolutio 
deiiiiitur,  quam  etiam  atque  etiam  explicandam 

yfl  Earum   etiam  rerum  quas  terra  gignit  educatio 

quaedam  et  perfectio  est  non  dissimilis  animantium ; 
itaque  et  vivere  vitem  et  mori  dicimus,  arboremque 
et  novellam  et  vetnlam  et  vigere  el  senescere ;  ei 
quo  non  est  alienum  ut  animantibiis  sic  illis  et  apts 
quaedam  ad  naturam  putare  et  aliena,  earumquc 
augendarum  et  alendarum  quandam  cultricem  esse, 
quae  sit  scientia  atque  ars  agricolarum,  quae  cirpum- 
tura  ferat  eo  possint  ire ;  ut  ipsae  vites  si  loqui  possint 
ita  se  tractandas  tucndasque  esse  fateantur.  Et  nunc 
quidem  quod  earn  tuetuFj  «t  de  vite  xwtissimum 
loquar,  est  id  extrinsecus ;  in  ipsa  enim  parum  magna 
vis  inest  ut  quam  optime  se  liabere  possit  si  nulla 

iO  cultiira  adhibeatur.  At  vero  si  ad  vitem  sensus  ac- 
Cfsserit,  ut  appetitura  quendam  habeat  et  per  se 
ipsa  moveatur,  quid  facturam  putas?  An  ea  quae 
per  vinitorem  antea  consequebatur  per  se  ipsa  cura- 

'u/ inserted  by  edd. 


e  and  the  doclrii 


w)  are  Stoic  tends  foisted  on  the  Peri- 


BOOK  V.  siv 
XIV.    But  lh«re  are  some  animals  which  possess 
something   resembling'   virtue,   for    example,  h 
dogs  and  horses ;  in  these  we  observe  not  only  bodily 
movements  as  in  pigs,  but  in  some  degree  a  sort  of 
mental  activity  also.     In  man,  however,  the  Supreme 
End  appertains  entirely  to  the  mind,  and  to  the 
rational  part  of  the  mind,  which  is  the 
virtue ;  and  virtue  is  defined  as  the  perfection  of 
reason,'  a  doctrine  which  the  Peripatetics  think  can- 
not be  expounded  too  often. 

39  Plants  also  have  a  development  and  progress  to  but 
maturity  that  is  not  unlike  that  of  animals  ;  hence  ^\ 
we  speak  of  a  vine  as  living  and  dying,  or  of  a  tree  ^_ 
as  young  or  old,  in  the  prime  of  life  or  decrepit; 
consequently  it  is  appropriate  to  suppose  that  with  ' 
them  as  with  animals  certain  things  are  suited  and 
certiain  other  things  foreign  to  their  nature ;  and 
that  their  growth  and  nurture  is  tended  by  a  foster- 
mother,  the  science  and  art  of  husbandry,  which 
trims  and  prunes,  straightens,  raises  and  props, 
enabling  them  to  follow  the  course  that  nature  pre- 
scribes, till  the  vines  themselves,  could  they  speak, 
would  acknowledge  this  to  be  their  proper  mode  of 
treatment  and  of  tendance.  In  reality,  of  course, 
the  power  that  tends  the  vine,  to  take  that  parti- 
cular instance,  is  something  outside  of  it ;  for  the 
vine  does  not  possess  force  enough  in  itself  to  be 
able  to  attain  its  highest  possible  development  with- 

40  out  the  aid  of  cultivation.  But  suppose  the  vine  to 
receive  the  gift  of  sensation,  bestowing  on  it  some 
degree  of  appetition  and  power  of  movement;  then 
what  do  you  think  it  will  do  ?  Will  it  not  endeavour 
to  provide  for  itself  the  benefits  which  it  previously 
obtained  by  the  aid  of  the  vine-dresser?     But  do 


ihar»  with 

bit?  Sed  videsne  accessuram  ei  curam  ut  sensus 
quoque  suos  eonimque  omnem  appetitum  et  si  qua 
sint  adiuncta  ei  membra  tueatur?  Sic  ad  ilia  quae 
semper  habuit  iunget  ea  quae  postea  nccesserint, 
nee  eundem  fiiiem  habebit  quern  cultor  eius  habebat, 
sed  volet  secundum  cam  naturam  quae  postea  eiadiun- 
cta  erit*  vivere.  Ita  similis  erit  ei  finis  boni  atque 
antea  fuerat,  neque  idem  tamen ;  non  enim  iam  stirpis 
bonum  quacret  sed  animalis.  Quid  si  non  sensus 
modo  ei  datus  sit  verum  etiam  animus  hominis?  non 
necesse  est  et  ilia  pristiiia  manere  ut  tuenda  slnt  et 
haec  multo  esse  cariora  quae  accesserint,  animique 
optimam  quamque  partem  carissimam,  in  eaque  ex- 
pletione  naturae  summi  boni  finem  consistere,  cum 
longe  multumque  praestet  mens  atque  ratio?  Sic 
exatitit^  extremum  omnium  appetendonim  atque 
ductum  a  prima  commendatione  naturae  multis 
grsdibus  ascendit  ut  ad  sumroum  perveniret,  quod 
cutnulatur  es  integrltate  corporis  et  ex  mentis  rutione 
I  XV.  "Cum  igitur  ea  sit  quam  exposui  forma  na- 
turae, si  ut  initio  dixi  simul  atque  ortus  esset  se 
quisque  cognosceret  iudicareque  posset  quae  vis  et 
totius  esset  naturae  et  partium  singularum,  continue 
videret  quid  esset  hoc  quod  quaerimuB,  omnium 
rerum  quas  expetimus  summuni  et  ultinium,  nee 
ulia  in  re  peccare  posset.  Nunc  vero  a  prime  quidem 
mirabiliter    occulta    natura    est   nee   perspici   nee 


»/  MSS.,  edd.:  Mdv.  augge 

er;  sil  MSS.;  «^  Mdv. 

t  Mdv.  i  lie  tt,  sicque,  sUgue  MSS. 

BOOK  V.  xiv-xv 

you  mark  how  it  will  further  be  concerned  to  pro- 
tect its  sensory  faculties  also  and  all  their  appetitive 
instincts^  and  any  additional  organs  it  may  have 
developed?  Thus  with  the  properties  that  it  always 
possessed  it  will  combine  those  subsequently  added 
to  it,  and  it  will  not  have  the  same  End  as  the  hus- 
bandman who  tended  it  had,  but  will  desire  to  live  in 
accordance  with  that  nature  which  it  has  subsequently 
acquired.  And  so  its  End  or  Goodwill  be  similar  to,  but 
not  the  same  as,  what  it  was  before ;  it  will  no  longer 
seek  the  Grood  of  a  plant,  but  that  of  an  animal.  Sup- 
pose again  that  it  have  bestowed  upon  it  not  merely 
sensation  but  also  a  human  mind.  Will  it  not  result 
that  while  its  former  properties  remain  objects  of 
its  care,  these  added  properties  will  be  far  more  dear 
to  it,  and  that  the  best  part  of  the  mind  will  be  the 
dearest  of  all?»  Will  it  not  find  its  End  or  Chief 
Good  in  this  crowning  development  of  its  nature, 
inasmuch  as  intellect  and  reason  are  far  and  away 
the  highest  faculties  that  exist  ?  Thus  there  has  Man't  End  ti 
emerged  the  final  term  of  the  series  of  objects  of  SJhoS bSSig' 
desire;  thus  guided  by  the  primary  attraction  of 
nature  it  has  risen  by  many  stages  till  it  has  reached 
the  summit,  the  consummation  of  perfect  bodily  in- 
tegrity combined  with  the  full  development  of  the 
mental  faculty  of  reason. 

XV.      The  plan  of  our  nature  being  then  that  Man  attains  < 
which  I  have  explained,  if,  as  I  said  at  the  outset,  ^wiedge^i 
every  man  as  soon  as  he  is  bom  could  know  himself  ****°*'^*"' 
and  could  appreciate  the  powers  of  his  nature  as  a 
whole  and  of  its  several  parts,  he  would  at  once  per- 
ceive what  is  this  thing  that  we  seek,  the  highest  and 
last  of  the  objects  of  our  desires,  and  he  would  be  in- 
capable of  error  in  anjrthing.    But  as  it  is,  our  nature 



cognosci  potest ;  progredienlibus  autem  aetatibus 
sensim  tardeve  potius  quasi  nosmet  ipsos  cogiioscimus. 
Itaque  prima  ilia  coiiimendatio  quae  a  natura  nostri 
facta  est  nobis  ineerta  et  obscura  est,  primusque 
appetituE  ille  animi  tan  turn  agit  ot  salvi  atque 
integri  esse  possinius;  cum  autem  dispicere  ooepi- 
mus,^  et  sentire  quid  simus  et  quid  ab^  animaatibus 
ceteris  difieramus,  turn  ea  seqtii  ineipimus  ud  quae 
42  Dati  sumus.  Quam  similitudinem  videmus  in  bestiis, 
quae  primo  in  quo  loco  natae  sunt  ex  eo  se  non 
commovent;  deindc  sno  quaeque  appetitu  niovetur; 
serpcre  anguiculos,  nare  anaticulas,  evoliire  menilas, 
cornibus  uti  videmus  boves,  nepas  aculeis,  suam 
denique  cuique  naturam  esse  ad  vivendum  ducem. 
Quae  similitude  in  genere  etiam  humuno  apparet, 
Farvi  enim  primo  ortu  sic  iacent,  tamquam  omnino 
sine  aniino  sint;  cum  autem  pauium  lirmitatis  acces- 
sit,^  et  animo  utuntur  et  sensibus,  conitanturque 
sese  ut  erigant,  et  manibus  utuntur,  et  eos  agno- 
seunt  a  quibus  educantur;  deinde  aequalibus  dele- 
ctantur  libenterque  se  cum  iis  congregant  dantque 
se  ad  ludendum  fabellarumque  auditione  ducuntur, 
deque  eo  quod  ipsis  superat  aliis  gratificari  volimt] 
animadvertuntque  ea  quae  domi  fiunt  curiosius, 
incipiuntque  commcntari  aliquid  et  discere,  et  eorum 
quos  vident  volunt  non  ignorare  nomina,  quibusque 
rebus  cum  aequalibus  decertant  si  vicerunt  efTerunt 
se  laetitia,  victi  debilitantur  aniniosque  demittunt; 

'  cocpimus  Mdv.  wUh  some  MSS.  (cp.  42  arcessil),  coeptri- 
mm  B,  E. 
'aS  added  by  edd. 

inf.  MSS.  . 


«^f^      I 


at  the  beginning  is  curiously  hidden  from  us«  and  we 
cannot  fully  realize  or  understand  it ;  yet  as  we  grow 
older  we  gradually  or  I  should  say  tardily  come,  as  it 
were,  to  know  ourselves.  Accordingly,  the  earliest 
feeling  of  attraction  which  nature  has  created  in  us 
towards  ourselves  is  vague  and  obscure,  and  the 
earliest  instinct  of  appetition  only  strives  to  secure 
our  safety  and  freedom  from  injury.  When,  however, 
discernment  dawns  and  we  begin  to  perceive  what 
we  are  and  how  we  differ  from  the  rest  of  living 
creatures,  we  then  commence  to  pursue  the  objects 
4-2  for  which  we  are  intended  by  nature.  Some  re- 
semblance to  this  process  we  observe  in  the  lower 
animals.  At  first  they  do  not  move  from  the  place 
where  they  were  born.  Then  they  begin  to  move, 
under  the  influence  of  their  several  instincts  of 
appetition;  we  see  little  snakes  gliding,  ducklings 
swimming,  blackbirds  flying,  oxen  using  their  horns, 
scorpions  their  stings;  each  in  fact  has  its  own 
nature  as  its  guide  to  life.  A  similar  process  is 
clearly  seen  in  the  human  race.  Infants  just  born 
lie  as  if  absolutely  inanimate;  when  they  have 
acquired  some  small  degree  of  strength,  they  exer- 
cise their  mind  and  their  senses;  they  strive  to 
stand  erect,  they  use  their  hands,  they  recogni/.e 
their  nurses;  then  they  take  pleasure  in  the  society 
of  other  children,  and  enjoy  meeting  them,  they 
take  part  in  games  and  love  to  hear  stories;  they 
desire  to  bestow  of  their  own  abundance  in  bounty 
to  others ;  they  take  a  keen  interest  in  what  g«(!s  on 
in  the  household;  they  begin  to  reflect  and  to  learn, 
and  want  to  know  the  names  of  the  people  they 
see ;  in  competition  with  their  companions  they  are 
elated  by  victory,  discouraged  and  disheartened  by 



43  quorum  sine  causa  fieri  nihil  putandum 
enim  natura  sic  generata  vis  hominis  ut  b 
virtutem  percipiendam  facta  videatur,  ob  eamque 
causam  parvi  virtu  turn  simulacris  quarum  in  se 
habent  semina  sine  doctrina  moventur;  sunt  enim 
prima  elements  naturae,  quibus  auctis  virtutis  quasi 
germen '  efficitur.  Nam  cum  ita  nati  factique  simus 
ut  et  agendi  aliquid  et  ditigendi  aliquos  et  liberali- 
tatis  et  referendae  gratiae  principia  in  nobis  contine- 
remus  atque  ad  scientiam,  prudentiam,  fortitndinem 
aptos  animos  haberemus  a  contrariisque  rebus  alienos, 
noTi  sjncf  causa  eas  quas  dixi  in  pueris  virtutum  quasi 
scintillas  videmus,  e  quibus  accendi  philosopbi  ratio 
debet,  ut  earn  quasi  deum  ducem  subsequens  ad 
naturae  perveniat  extremum.  Nam  ut  saepe  iam 
disi  in  iufirmft  aetate  irabecillaque  mente  vis  uaturae 
quasi  per  caliginem  cernitur ;  cum  autem  progrediens 
confirmatur  animus,  agnoscit  ille  quidem  naturae 
vira,  sed  ita  ut  progredi  possit  longius,  per  se  sit 
tantum    inchoata. 

44.  XVI.  Intrandum  igitur  est  in  rerura  naturam  et 
penitus  quid  ea  postulet  pervidendom ;  aliter  enim 
nosmet  ipsos  nosse  non  possiimus.  Quod  praeceptum 
quia  maius  erat  quam  ut  ab  homine  videretur,  idcirco 
assignatum  est  deo.  lubet  igitur  nos  Pytbiu3  Apollo 
noscere  nosmet  ipsos  ;  cognitio  autem  haec  est  una 
nostri  ut  vim  corporis  animique  norimus  sequai 
que  earn  vitam  quae  rebus  iis  '  perfruatur. 
B  MSS. 




.  §46  and  IV,  28. 
l,E;  rebus  ifisis  inf.  MSS.  ;  [rebus] 

a  Mdv.  J  /c 

BOOK  V.  xv-xvi 

defeat.     For  every  stage  of  this  development  there 
^3  must  be  supposed  to  be  a  reason.     It  is  that  human  (but  the  germ 
capacity  is  so  constituted  by  nature  that  it  appears  ^^^^ 
designed  to  achieve  every  kind  of  virtue ;   hence  ^  ^®i^5^* 
children,  without  instruction,  are  actuated  by  sem- 
blances of  the  virtues,  of  which  they  possess  in  them- 
selves the  seeds,  for  those  are  primary  elements  of 
our  nature,  which  seeds  sprout  and  blossom  into 
virtue.     For  we  are  so  constituted  from  birth  as  to 
contain  within  us  the  primary  instincts  of  activity,  of 
affection,  of  liberality  and  of  gratitude ;  we  are  also 
gifted  with  minds  that  are  adapted  to  knowledge, 
prudence  and  courage,  and  averse  from  their  oppo- 
sites;  hence  we  see  the  reason  why  we  observe  in 
children  those  sparks  of  virtue  I  have  mentioned, 
from  which  the  philosopher's  torch  of  reason  must 
be  kindled,  that  he  may  follow  reason  as  his  divine 
guide  and  so  arrive  at  nature's  goal.     For  as  I  have 
repeatedly  said  already,  in  the  years  of  immaturity 
and  intellectual  weakness  the  powers  of  our  nature 
are  discerned  as  through  a  mist;  but  as  the  mind 
grows  older  and  stronger  it  leanis   to    know  the 
capacity  of  our  nature,  while  recognizing  that  this 
nature  is  susceptible  of  further  development  and  has 
by  itself  only  reached  an  incomplete  condition. 
\f       XVI.      We  must   therefore   penetrate   into   the  To  know  our- 
nature  of  things,  and  come  to  understand  thoroughly  whole  o?natun 
its  requirements ;  otherwise  we  cannot  know  our-  must  be  studie- 
selves.     That  precept  was  too  high  for  man's  dis- 
cernment, and  was  therefore  ascribed  to  a  god.     It 
is  therefore  the  Pythian  Apollo  who  bids  us*  know 
ourselves' ;  but  the  sole  road  to  self-knowledge  is  to 
know  the  powers  of  body  and  of  mind,  and  to  follow 
the  path  of  life  that  gives  us  their  full  realization. 


"Quoniam  autem  is  animi  appetitus  a  principio  fuil, 
lit  eaquae  dixi  quam  perfectissimanaturahaberemus, 
confitendum  est,  cum  id  adepti  sinius  quod  appctitum 
sit,  in  eo  quasi  in  ultimo  consistere  naturam  alque 
id  esse  summum  bonum ;  quod  certe  universum  sua 
sponte  ipsum  expeti  et  propter  se  necesse  est,  quo- 
niam ante  demon  stratum  estetiamsingulaseius  partes 
esse  per  se  expeteiidas. 

i  '  In  enumerandis  autem  corporis  commodis  si  quis 
praetermissara  a  nobis  voluptatem  putabit,  in  aliud 
Icmpus  ea  quaestio  differatur.  Utrum  enim  sit  volu- 
ptas  in  iis  rebus  quas  primas  secundum  naturam  esse 
dbdmus  necne  sit,  ad  id  quod  agimus  nihil  interest. 
Si  enim,  ut  mllii  quidem  videtur,  non  explet  bona 
naturae  voluptas,  iure  praetermissa  est;  sin  autem 
est  in  ea  quod  quidam  volunt,  nihil  impedit  hane 
nostram  compreliensionem  summi  buni ;  quae  enim 
constituta  sunt  prima  naturae,  ad  ea  si  voluptas  acces- 
serit,  unum  aliquod  aecesserit  commodum  corporis 
ueque  earn  constitutionem  summi  boni  quae  est  pro- 
posita  mutaverit. 

J  XVII.  Et  udlinc  quidem  ita  nobis  progressa  ratio 
est  ut  ea  duceretur  omnis  a  prima  commendatione 
naturae.  Nunc  autem  aliud  ium  argumentandi  se- 
quamur  genus,  ut  non  solum  quia  nos  diligamus  sed 
quia  cuiusque  partis  naturae  et  in  corpore  et  in 
animo  sua  quaeque  vis  sit,  idcirco  in  his  rebus  summe' 
'' sutnmc  edd.j  suni'ma  MSS. 


BOOK  V.  xvi-xvii 


Now  inasmuch  as  our  original  instinct  of  desire  The  perfectioi 
was  for  the  possession  of  the  parts  aforesaid  in  their  siins  thwfa 
fullest  natural  perfection,  it  must  be  allowed  that,  the  chief  Goo< 
when  we  have  attained  the  object  of  our  desire,  our 
nature  takes  its  stand  in  this  as  its  final  End,  and 
this  constitutes  our  Chief  Good ;  and  that  this  End 
as  a  whole  must  be  desired  intrinsically  and  in  and 
for  itself,  follows  of  necessity  from  the  fact  that  the 
several  parts  of  it  also  have  already  been  proved  to 
be  desirable  for  themselves. 

If  however  anyone  thinks  that  our  enumeration  (it  is  immater 
of  bodily  advantages  is  incomplete  owing  to   the  ^ or i&votS- 
omission  of  pleasure,  let  us  postpone  this  question  to  S"^^  "*  £|^ 
another  time.     For  whether  pleasure  is  or  is  not  one  good.) 
of  the  objects  we  have  called  the  primary  things  in 
accordance  with  nature  makes  no  difference  for  our 
present  inquiry.     If,  as  I  hpld,  pleasure  adds  nothing 
to  the  sum-total  of  nature's  goods,  it  has  rightly  been 
omitted.     If  on  the  contrary  pleasure  does  possess 
the  property  that  some  assign  to  it,  this  fact  does 
not  impair  the  general  outline  we  have  just  given  of 
the  Chief  Good ;  since  if  to  the  primary  objects  of 
nature  as  we  have  explained  them,  pleasure  be  added, 
this  only  adds  one  more  to  the  list  of  bodily  advan- 
tages, and  does  not  alter  the  interpretation  of  the 
Chief  Good  which  has  been  propounded. 

XVII.      So  far  as  our  argument  has  proceeded  (B)  The  perfec 
hitherto, it  has  been  based  entirely  upon  the  primary  t?^^%^il\ 
attractions  of  nature.     But  from  this  point  on  let  us  man's  natare 
adopt  a  different  line  of  reasoning,  namely  to  show  its  own  sake. 
that,  in  addition  to  the  argument  from  self-love,  the 
fact  that  each  part  of  our  nature,  both  mental  and 
bodily,  possesses  its  own  peculiar  energy  goes  to  prove 
that  the  activity  of  our  several  parts  *  is  pre-eminently 



nostra  sponte  moveamur.  Atque  ut  a  corpore  ordiar, 
videsne  ut  si  quae  in  membris  prava  aut  debilitata 
aut  imminuta  sint  occultent  homines  ?  ut  etiam  con- 
tendant  et  elaborent,  si  effieere  possint,  ut  aut  non 
appareat  corporis  vitium  aut  quam  minimum  ap- 
pareatj  multosque  etiam  dolores  curationis  causa 
perferant  ut,  si  ipse  usus  membrorum  non  modo  non 
maior  verum  etiam  minor  futurus  sit,  eorum  tamen 
species  ad  naturam  revertatur  ?  Etenim  cum  omnes 
natura  totos  se  expetendos  putent,  nee  id  ob  aliam 
rem  sed  propter  ipsos,  necesse  est  eius  etiam  partes 
propter  se  expeti  quod  universum  propter  se  expe- 
47  tatur.  Quid  ?  in  motu  et  in  statu  corporis  nihil  inest 
quod  animadvertendum  esse  ipsa  natura  iudicet? 
quemadmodum  quis  ambulet,  sedeat,  qui  ductus  oris, 
qui  vultus  in  quoque  sit?  nihilne  est  in  his  rebus 
quod  dignum  libero  aut  indignum  esse  ducamus? 
Nonne  odio  multos  dignos  putamus  qui  quodam 
motu  aut  statu  videntur  naturae  legem  et  modum 
contempsisse  ?  Et  quoniam  haec  deducuntur  de 
corpore,  quid  est  cur  non  recte  pulchritudo  etiam 
ipsa  propter  se  expetenda  ducatur  ?  Nam  si  pravita- 
tem  imminutionemque  corporis  propter  se  fugiendam 
putamus,  cur  non  etiam,  ac  fortasse  magis,  propter 
se  formae  dignitatem  sequamur  ?  Et  si  turpitudinem 
fugimus  in  statu  et  motu  corporis,  quid  est  cur  pul- 
chritudinem  non  sequamur  ?  Atque  etiam  vale- 
tudinem,  vires,  vacuitatem  doloris  non  propter 
utilitatem  solum  sed  etiani  ipsas  propter  se  ex- 

BOOK  V.  xvii 

spontaneous.  To  start  with  the  body,  do  you  notice  The  body: 
how  men  try  to  hide  a  deformed  or  infirm  or  maimed  and  hc^o^^ 
limb  ?  They  actually  take  great  pains  and  trouble  ^^jjj^^*^®^^ 
to  conceal,  if  they  possibly  can,  their  bodily  defect, 
or  at  all  events  to  let  it  be  seen  as  little  as  possible ; 
they  even  undergo  painful  courses  of  treatment  in 
order  to  restore  the  natural  appearance  of  their 
limbs,  even  though  the  actual  use  of  them  will  not 
only  not  be  improved  but- will  even  be  diminished. 
In  fact,  since  every  man  instinctively  thinks  thjat  he 
himself  in  his  entirety  is  a  thing  to  be  desired,  and 
this  not  for  the  sake  of  anything  else  but  for  his  own 
sake,  it  follows  that  when  a  thing  is  desired  as  a 
whole  for  its  own  sake,  the  parts  also  of  that  thing 
are  desired  for  their  own  sakes.  Again,  is  there 
nothing  in  the  movements  and  postures  of  the  body 
which  Nature  herself  judges  to  be  of  importance  ?  A 
man's  mode  of  walking  and  sitting,  his  particular 
cast  of  features  and  expression  ?  is  there  nothing  in 
these  things  that  we  consider  worthy  or  unworthy 
of  a  free  man  ?  Do  we  not  often  think  people 
deserving  of  dislike,  who  by  some  movement  or 
posture  appear  to  have  violated  a  law  or  principle  of 
nature  ?  And  since  people  try  to  get  rid  of  these 
defects  of  bearing,  why  should  not  even  beauty 
have  a  good  claim  to  be  considered  as  desirable 
for  its  own  sake  ?  For  if  we  think  imperfection  or 
mutilation  of  the  body  things  to  be  avoided  for  their 
own  sake,  why  should  we  not  with  equal  or  perhaps 
still  greater  reason  pursue  dignity  of  form  for  its 
own  sake?  And  if  we  avoid  ugliness  in  bodily 
movement  and  posture,  why  should  we  not  pursue 
beauty?  Health  also,  and  strength  and  freedom 
from  pain  we  shall  desire  not  merely  for  their  utility 


pet  emus.  Qiioniam  eniin  natura  suis  omnibus 
e.xpleri  partilius  vult,  hunp  statuni  corporis  per  se 
ipsiim  pxpetit  qui  est  maxime  e  natiira,  quae  tota 
perturbatur  si  aut  aegruni  corpus  est  aitt  dolet  aul 
caret  viribus. 

48  XVIII,  Videamus  aiiimi  partes,  quarum  est  con- 
spectus illustrior;  quae  quo  sunt  e^fcelsiores,  eo  dant 
clariora  indicia  naturae.  Tantus  est  igitur  iunutus  in 
nobis  cognitionis  amor  et  seientiae  ut  nemo  dubitare 
possit  quin  ad  eas  res  hominum  natura  nullo  eniolu< 
mento  invitata  rapiatur.  Videmusne  ut  pueri  ne  ver- 
lieribus  quidem  a  contemplandis  rebus  perquirendis- 
que  deterreantur  ?  ut  pulsi  reciirrant?  ut  aliquid  scire 
se  gaudeant?  ut  id  aliis  narrare  gestiant?  ut  pompa, 
ludis  atque  eiusmodi  spectaculis  teneantur  ob  eamque 
rem  vel  famem  et  sitim  perferant?  Quid  vero?  qui 
ingenuis  stiidiis  atque  artibus  delectaiitur,  nonne 
videmus  eos  nee  valetudinis  nee  rei  famitiiiris  habere 
rationem  omniaque  perpeti  ipsa  cognitione  et  scientia 
captos  et  cum  curis  et  laboribus  compensare 

49  eani  quam  ex  discendo  capiant  voluptatem?  Mihi 
qtiideni  Humerus  huiusmodi  quiddam  vidisse  videtur 
in  lis  quae  de  Sirenum  caiitibus  finxerit.'  Neque 
enim  vocum  suavitate  videntur  aut  novitate  quadam 
et  varietate  cantandi  revocare  eos  solitae  qui  prae- 
tervehebantur,  sed  quia  multa  se  scire  profitebantur, 
ut  homines  ad  earum  saxa  discendi  cupiditate  ad- 

^Jinxerit  inf.  MSS.;  others  finxil  (perliaps  nglitly  Mdv.); 

BOOK  V.  xvii-xvui 

but  also  for  their  own  sakes.     For  since  our  nature 
aims  at  the  full  development  of  all  its  parts,  she 
desires  for  its  own  sake  that  state  of  body  which  is 
most  in  accordance  with  himself;    because   she   is 
thrown  into  utter  disorder  if  the  body  is. diseased  or 
in  pain  or  weak. 
i8       XVIII.      Let  us  consider  the  parts  of  the  mind,  The  mind:  (i) 
which  are  of  nobler  aspect.     The  loftier  these  are,  facu^yTknow 
the   more   unmistakable   indications   of  nature  do  ledge  attractiv 

apart  from 

they  afford.  So  great  is  our  innate  love  of  learning  its  utiuty: 
and  of  knowledge,  that  no  one  can  doubt  that 
man's  nature  is  strongly  attracted  to  these  things 
even  without  the  lure  of  any  profit.  Do  we 
notice  how  children  cannot  be  deterred  even  by 
punishment  from  studying  and  inquiring  into  the 
world  around  them  ?  Drive  them  away,  and  back 
they  come.  They  delight  in  knowing  things  ;  they 
are  eager  to  impart  their  knowledge  to  others ; 
pageants,  games  and  shows  of  that  sort  hold  them 
spell-bound,  and  they  will  even  endure  hunger 
and  thirst  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  them.  Again, 
take  persons  who  delight  in  the  liberal  arts  and 
studies ;  do  we  not  see  them  careless  of  health  or 
business,  patiently  enduring  any  inconvenience 
when  under  the  spell  of  learning  and  of  science, 
and  repaid  for  endless  toil  and  trouble  by  the 
^9  pleasure  they  derive  from  acquiring  knowledge  ?  For 
my  part  I  believe  Homer  had  something  of  this  sort 
in  view  in  his  imaginary  account  of  the  songs  of  the 
Sirens.  Apparently  it  was  not  the  sweetness  of 
their  voices  or  the  novelty  and  diversity  of  their 
songs,  but  their  professions  of  knowledge  that  used 
to  attract  the  passing  voyagers ;  it  was  the  passion 
for  learning  that  kept  m^n  rooted  to  the  Sirens* 
GO  449 


haerescerent.     Ita  enim  invitant  Ulixem  (nam  verti, 
ut  quaedam  Homeri,  sic  istum  ipsum  locum) : 

O  decus  Argolicum,  quin  puppim  flectis,  Ulixes, 
Auribus  ut  nostros  possis  agnoscere  cantus  ? 
Nam  nemo  haec  umquam  est  transvectus  caerula 

Quin  prius  astiterit  vocum  dulcedine  captus^ 
Post,  variis  avido  satiatus  pectore  musis, 
Doctior  ad  patrias  lapsus  pervenerit  oras. 
Nos  grave  certamen  belli  clademque  tenemus, 
Graecia  quam  Troiae  divino  numine  vexit, 
Omniaque  e  latis  rerum  vestigia  terns. 

Vidit  Homerus  probari  fabulam  non  posse  si  canti- 
unculis  tantus  irretitus  vir  teneretur ;  scientiam 
pollicentur,  quam  non  erat  mirum  sapientiae  cupido 
patria  esse^  cariorem.  Atque  omnia  quidem  scire 
cuiuscumquemodi  sint  cupere  curiosorum,  duci  vero 
maiorum  rerum  contemplatione  ad  cupiditatem  sci- 
entiae  summorum  virorum  est  putandum. 
50  XIX.  Quem  enim  ardorem  studi  censetis  fuisse  in 
Archimede,  qui  dum  in  pulvere  quaedam  describit 
attentius,  ne  patriam  quidem  captam  esse  senserit ! 
quantum  Aristoxeni  ingenium  consumptum  videmus 
in  musicis  !  quo  studio  Aristophanem  putamus  aeta- 
tem  in  litteris  duxisse  I  Quid  de  Pythagora,  quid 
de  Platone  aut  de  Democrito  loquar?  a  quibus 
propter  discendi  cupiditatem  videmus  ultimas  terras 
esse  peragratas.  Quae  qui  non  vident^  nihil  um- 
quam magnum  ac^  cognitione  dignum  amavenint 

^  esse  most  MSS.  omit. 

^  magnum  ac  Bremius,  Mdv.  ;  magna  MSS. 

*  Odyssey,  12,  184  IF. 

BOOK  V.  xviii-xix 

rocky  shores.  This  is  their  invitation  to  Ulysses 
(for  I  have  translated  this  among  other  passages  of 
Homer) : 

Ulysses,  pride  of  Argos,  turn  thy  bark 
And  listen  to  our  music.     Never  yet 
Did  voyager  sail  these  waters  blue,  but  stayed 
His  course,  enchanted  by  our  voices  sweet. 
And  having  filled  his  soul  with  harmony, 
Went  on  his  homeward  way  a  wiser  man. 
We  know  the  direful  strife  and  clash  of  war 
That  Greece  by  Heaven's  mandate  bore  to  Troy, 
And  whatsoe'er  on  the  wide  earth  befalls.* 

Homer  was  aware  that  his  story  would  not  sound  plau- 
sible if  the  magic  that  held  his  hero  immeshed  was 
the  charm  of  mere  melody !  It  is  knowledge  that  the 
Sirens  offer,  and  it  was  no  marvel  if  a  lover  of  wisdom 
held  this  dearer  than  his  home.  An  itch  for  miscel- 
laneous omniscience  no  doubt  stamps  a  man  as  a 
mere  dilettante ;  but  it  must  be  deemed  the  mark 
of  a  superior  mind  to  be  led  on  by  the  contemplation 
of  high  matters  to  a  passionate  love  of  knowledge. 

XIX.  What  an  ardour  for  study,  think  you,  pos- 
sessed Archimedes,  who  was  so  absorbed  in  a  diagram 
he  was  drawing  in  the  dust  that  he  was  unaware  even 
of  the  capture  of  his  native  city !  What  genius  do 
we  see  expended  by  Aristoxenus  on  the  theory  of 
music!  Imagine  the  zeal  of  a  lifetime  that  Ari- 
stophanes devoted  to  literature !  Why  should  I  speak 
of  Pythagoras,  or  of  Plato,  or  Democritus  ?  For  they, 
we  are  told,  in  their  passion  for  learning  travelled 
through  the  remotest  parts  of  the  earth !  Those 
who  are  blind  to  these  facts  have  never  been  en- 
amoured of  some  high  and  worthy  study.  And 
oo2  451 

Atque  hoc  loco  qui  propter   animi  voluptates   coli 
dicunt  ea  studia  quae  dixi,  non  intellegunt  idcirco 
esse  ea  propter  se  expetenda  quod  nulla  utilitate 
obiecta  delectentur  animi  atque  ipsa  scientia  etiamsi 

51  incommodatura  sit  gaudeant.  Sed  quid  attinet  de 
rebus  tarn  apertis  plura  requirere  ?  Ipsi  enim  quae- 
ramus  a  nobis  stellarum  motus  contemplationesque 
rerum  caelestium  eorumque  omnium  quae  naturae 
obscuritate  occultantur  cognitiones  quemadmodum 
nos  moveant,  et  quid  historia  delectet  quam  solemus 
persequi  usque  ad  extremum,  praetermissa  repeti- 
mus,  inchoata  persequimur.  Nee'  vero  sum  nescius 
esse  utilitatem  in  historia,  non  modo  voluptatem. 
Quid  cum  fictas  fabulas  e  quibus  utilitas  nulla  elici 

52  potest  cum  voluptate  legimus  ?  Quidr  cum  volumus 
nomina  eorum  qui  quid  gesserint  nota  nobis  esse, 
parentes,  patriam,  multa  praeterea  minime  neces- 
saria  ?  Quid  quod  homines  infima  fortuna,  nulla  spe 
rerum  gerendarum,  opifices  denique  delectantur 
historia  ?  maximeque  eos  videre  possumus  res  gestas 
audire  et  legere  velle  qui  a  spe  gerendi  absunt  con- 
fecti  senectute.  Quocirca  intellegi  necesse  est  in 
ipsis  rebus  quae  discuntur  et  cognoscuntur  invita- 
menta  inesse  quibus  ad  discendum  cognoscendumque 

53  moveamur.    Ac  ve teres  quidem  philosophi  in  beato- 

rum  insulis  fingunt  qualis  futura  sit  vita  sapientium, 

BOOK  V.  xix 
those  who  in  this  conaexiou  allege  that  the  studies 
I  have  mentioned  are  pursued  for  the  sake  of  mental 
pleasure  fail  to  see  that  they  are  proved  to  be 
desirable  for  their  own  sake  by  the  very  fact  that 
the  mind  feels  delight  in  them  when  no  bait  of 
advantage  is  held  out,  and  finds  enjoyment  in  the 
mere  possession  of  knowledge  even  though  it  is 
likely  to  he  a  positive  disadvantage  to  its  possessor. 

51  But  what  is  the  point  of  inquiring  further  into 
matters  so  obvious  i  Let  us  ask  ourselves  the  ques- 
tion, what  feelings  are  produced  in  us  hy  the  motions 
of  the  stars  and  by  contemplating  tile  ileavenly 
bodies  and  studying  all  the  obscure  and  secret  realms 
of  nature ;  what  pleasure  we  derive  from  books  on 
history,  which  we  are  so  fond  of  perusing  to  the  very 
last  page,  turning  back  to  parts  we  have  omitted, 
and  pushing  on  to  the  end  when  we  have  once  he- 
gun.  Not  that  I  am  unaware  that  history  js  useful 
as  well  as  entertaining.      But  what  of  our  reading 

52  fiction,  from  which  no  utUity  can  he  extracted?  What 
of  our  eagerness  to  learn  the  names  of  people  who 
have  doue  something  notable,  their  parentage,  birth- 
place, and  many  quite  unimportant  details  beside? 
What  of  the  delight  that  is  taken  in  history  by  men 
of  the  humblest  station,  who  have  no  expectation  of 
participating  in  public  life,  even  mere  artisans  ?  Also 
we  may  notice  that  the  persons  most  eager  to  hear 
and  read  of  public  affairs  are  those  who  arc  debarred 
by  the  infirmities  of  age  from  any  prospect  of  taking 
part  in  them.  Hence  we  are  forced  to  infer  tliat 
the  objects  of  study  and  knowledge  contain  in  them- 
selves the  allurements  that  entice  us  to  study  and  to 

53  learning.  The  old  philosophers  picture  what  the  life 
of  the  Wise  will  be  in  the  Islands  of  the  Blest,  and 



quos  cura  omni  liberates,  nullum  necessarium  vitae 
cultum  aut  paratum  requirentes,  nihil  aliud  acturos 
putant  nisi  ut  omne  tempus  inquirendo  ac  discendo 
in  naturae  cognitione  consumant.  Nos  autem  non 
solum  beatae  vitae  istam  esse  oblectationem  videmus 
sed  etiam  levamentum  miseriarum ;  itaque  multi 
cum  in  potestate  essent  hostium  aut  tyrannorum, 
multi  in  custodia,  multi  in   exsilio   dolorem  suum 

54  doetrinae  studiis  levarunt.  Prineeps  huius  civitatis 
Phalereus  Demetrius,  cum  patria  pulsus  esset  iniuria, 
ad  Ptolemaeum  se  regem  Alexandream  contulit. 
Qui  cum  in  hac  ipsa  philosophia  ad  quam  te  horta- 
mur  excelleret  Theophrastique  esset  auditor,  multa 
praeclara  in  illo  calamitoso  otio  scripsit  non  ad  usum 
aliquem  suum  quo  erat  orbatus ;  sed  animi  cultus 
ille  erat  ei  -quasi  quidam  humanitatis  cibus.  Equi- 
dem  e  Cn.  Aufidio,  praetorio,  erudito  homine,  oculis 
capto,  saepe  audiebam  cum  se  lucis  magis  quam  utili- 
tatis  desiderio  moveri  diceret.  Somnum  denique 
nobis,  nisi  requietem  corporibus  et  medicinam  quan- 
dam  laboris  afFerret,  contra  naturam  putaremus 
datum ;  aufert  enim  sensus  actionemque  tollit  om- 
nem ;  itaque  si  aut  requietem  natura  non  quaereret 
aut  eam  posset  alia  quadam  ratione  consequi,  facile 
pateremur,  qui  etiam  nunc  agendi  aliquid  discendi- 
que  causa  prope  contra  naturam  vigilias  suscipere 

5  5  XX.  "  Sunt  autem  etiam  clariora  vel  plane  perspicua 
minimeque  dubitanda  indicia  naturae,  maxime  scilicet 

BOOK  V.  xix-xx 

imag^e  them  released  from  all  anxiety,  needing  none 
of  the  necessary  equipment  or  accessories  of  life,  and 
with  nothing  else  to  do  but  to  spend  their  whole  time 
upon  study  and  research  in  the  science  of  nature.  We  on 
the  other  hand  see  in  such  studies  not  only  the  amuse- 
ment of  a  life  of  happiness,  but  also  the  alleviation  of 
misfortune ;  hence  the  numbers  of  men  who  when  they 

,  had  £sillen  into  the  power  of  enemies  or  tyrants,  or 
when  they  were  in  prison  or  in  exile,  have  solaced  their 

)4  sorrow  with  the  pursuit  of  learning.  Demetrius  of 
Phalerum,  the  ruler  of  this  city,  when  unjustly 
banished  from  his  country,  repaired  to  the  court  of 
King  Ptolemy  at  Alexandria.  Being  eminent  in  the 
very  system  of  philosophy  which  we  are  recommend- 
ing to  you,  and  a  pupil  of  Theophrastus,  he  employed 
the  leisure  afforded  by  his  disaster  in  composing  a 
number  of  excellent  treatises,  not  for  any  practical 
use  in  his  own  case,  for  from  this  he  was  debarred ; 
but  he  found  a  sort  of  food  for  his  intellectual  tastes 
in  thus  cultivating  his  mind.  I  myself  frequently 
heard  the  blind  ex-praetor  and  scholar  Gnaeus  Aufi- 
dius  declare  that  he  felt  the  actual  loss  of  light  more 
than  the  inconvenience  of  blindness.  Take  lastly  the 
gift  of  sleep :  did  it  hot  bring  us  repose  for  our  bodies 
and  an  antidote  to  labour,  we  should  think  it  a  viola- 
tion of  nature,  for  it  robs  us  of  sensation  and  entirely 
suspends  our  activity  ;  so  that  if  our  nature  did  not 
require  repose  or  could  obtain  it  in  some  other  man- 
ner, we  should  be  quite  content,  inasmuch  as  even 
as  it  is  we  frequently  deny  ourselves  slumber,  almost 
to  the  point  of  doing  violence  to  nature,  in  the  in- 
terests of  business  or  of  study. 

5       XX.  "  Even  more  striking,  and  in  fact  absolutely  (U)  the  moral 
obvious  and  convincing  natural  indications  are  not  Sf  Swity^ 

455  universaL 

ill  bomine  sed  in  omni  animali,  nt  appetat  animus 
agere  semper  aliquki  neqiie  iilla  condicione  quietem 
senipiternam  possit  pati.  Facile  est  hoc  cernere  in 
pi'imis  puerorum  aetatulis.  Quamijuam  enini  vereor 
ne  niniius  in  hoc  genere  videar,  tamen  omaes  veteres 
philof^ophi,  maxiiue  nostri,  ad  incuuabul»  accedunt, 
quod^  ill  pueritia  facillime  se  arbitrentur  naturae 
voluntatem  posse  eogiioscere.  Videmus  igitur  ut 
conquiescere  ne  infantes  quidem  possiut;  cum  vero 
paulum  protesserunt,  lusionibus  vel  laboriosis  dele- 
ctantuTj  ut  ne  verberibus  (juideni  deterreri  possint. 
Eaque  cupiditus  agendi  aliquid  adulescit  una  cum 
aetatibus.  Itaque  ne  si  iucundissimis  quidem  nos 
soniniis  usuros  putemus,  End^mionis  sonmum  nobis 
velimus  dari,  idque  si  accidat  mortis  instar  putemus. 

56  Quin  etiam  inertissimos  homines,  nescio  qua  singu- 
lari  nequitia  praeditos,  videmus  tamen  et  corpore  et 
animo  moveri  semper  et,  cum  re  nulla  impediantur 
necessaria,  aut  alveolum  poscere  aut  quaerete  quem- 
piam  ludum  aut  sermon  em  aliquem  require  re,  cumque 
non  habeant  ingeuuas  ex  doctrinaoblectationes,  circu- 
losaliquos  et  sessiunculas  consectari.  Ne  bestiae  qui- 
dem quas  delectationis  causa  conoludimus,  cum  copio- 
sius  alantur  quam  si  essent  liberae,  faeile  patiuntur 
sese  contineri,  motusque  solutos  et  vagos  a  natura  sibi 

57  tributos  requirunt,  Itaque  ut  quisqiie  optime  natus 
institutusque  est,  esse  omnino  nolit  in  vita  si  gerendis 
negotiis  orbatus  possit  paratissimis  vesci  voluptatibus. 


.  arhlt. 

ren«.r  inf.  MSS.,  Mullerj 

r- .  .  orbilriml«r  B,  E,  Mdv. 


.  MSS. 

,  Mdv.i  gui»  Ht  B,  gkin  ie 



wanting^  more  particularly  no  doubt  in  man,  but 
also  in  every  living  creature,  of  the  presence  of  a 
positive  craving  for  constant  activity.  Perpetual  re- 
pose is  unendurable  on  any  terms.  This  is  a  fact 
that  may  be  readily  detected  in  children  of  the 
tenderest  age,  if  I  may  risk  being  thought  to  lay  un- 
due stress  on  a  field  of  observation  sanctioned  by  the 
older  thinkers,  all  of  whom,  and  my  own  school  more 
than  others,  go  to  the  nursery,  because  they  believe 
that  Nature  reveals  her  plan  to  them  most  clearly  in 
childhood.  Even  infants,  we  notice,  are  incapable  of 
keeping  still.  Children  of  a  somewhat  more  advanced 
age  delight  in  games  involving  considerable  exertion, 
from  which  not  even  fear  of  punishment  can  restrain 
them.  And  this  passion  for  activity  grows  as  they 
grow  older.  The  prospect  of  the  most  delightful 
dreams  would  not  reconcile  us  to  falling  asleep  for 
ever:  Endymion's  fate  we  should  consider  an  exact 

56  image  of  death.  Observe  the  least  energetic  among 
men :  even  in  a  notorious  idler  both  mind  and  body 
are  constantly  in  motion ;  set  him  free  from  unavoid- 
able occupations,  and  he  calls  for  a  dice-board,  goes 
off  to  some  sport,  or  looks  for  somebody  to  chat  with, 
seeking  at  the  club  or  at  some  trivial  social  gather- 
ing a  substitute  for  higher  and  more  intellectual 
amusements.  Even  the  wild  animals  that  we  keep  in 
cages  for  our  entertainment  find  their  captivity  irk- 
some, although  they  are  better  fed  than  if  they  were 
at  large ;  they  miss  their  natural  birthright  of  free  and 

)7  untranmielled  movement.  Hence  the  abler  and 
more  accomplished  a  man  is,  the  less  he  would  care 
to  be  alive  at  all  if  debarred  from  taking  part  in 
affairs,  although  allowed  to  consume  an  unlimited 
supply  of  pleasures.     Men  of  ability  either  choose 


Nam  aut  privatim  aliquid  gerere  malunt^  aut  qui 
altiore  animo  sunt  capessunt  rem  publicam  honoribus 
imperiisque  adipiscendis,  aut  totos  se  ad  studia  do- 
ctrinae  conferunt ;  qua  in  vita  tantum  abest  ut  volu- 
ptates  consectentur,  etiam  curas,  sollicitudines,  vigi- 
lias  perferunt,  optimaque  parte  hominis,  quae  in  nobis 
divina  ducenda  est,  ingeni  et  mentis  acie  fruuntur, 
nee  voluptatem  requirentes  nee  fugientes  laborem; 
nee  vero  intermittunt  aut  admirationem  earum  rerum 
quae  sunt  ab  antiquis  repertae  aut  investigationem 
novarum;  quo  studio  cum  satiari  non  possint,^  om- 
nium ceterarum  rerum  obliti  nihil  abiectum,  nihil 
humile  cogitant;  tantaque  est  vis  talibus  in  studiis, 
ut  eos  etiam  qui  sibi  alios  proposuerunt  fines  bonorum, 
quos  utilitate  aut  voluptate  dirigunt,  tamen  in  rebus 
quaerendis  explicandisque  naturis  aetates  conterere 
58  XXI.  Ergo  hoc  quidem  apparet,  nos  ad  agendum 
esse  natos.  Actionum  autem  genera  plura,  ut  ob- 
scurentur  etiam  maioribus  minora,  maximae  autem 
sunt  primum,  ut  mihi  quidem  videtur  et  iis  quorum 
nunc  in  ratione  versamur,  consideratio  cognitioque 
rerum  caelestium  et  earum  quas  a  natura  occultatas 
et  latentes  indagare  ratio  potest,  deinde  rerum  publi- 
carum  administratio  aut  administrandi  scientia,  turn 
prudens,  temperata,  fortis,  iusta  ratio,  reliquaeque 
virtutes  et  actiones  virtntibus  congruentes,  quae  uno 
verbo  complexi  omnia  honesta  dicimus ;  ad  quorum 
^  possint  Ernesti,  Miiller  ;  possunt  MSS.,  Mdv. 

a  A   reference   to  the   Epicureans'    interest    in    natural 
science,  illustrated  by  Lucretius. 


BOOK  V.  xx-xxi 

a  life  of  private  activity,  or,  if  of  loftier  ambition, 
aspire  to  a  public  career  of  political  or  military  office, 
or  else  they  devote  themselves  entirely  to  study  and 
learning;  and  the  devotees  of  learning  are  so  far 
from  making  pleasure  their  aim,  that  they  actually 
endure  care,  anxiety  and  loss  of  sleep,  and  in  the 
exercise  of  the  noblest  part  of  man's  nature,  the 
divine  element  within  us  (for  so  we  must  consider 
the  keen  edge  of  the  intellect  and  the  reason),  they 
ask  for  no  pleasure  and  avoid  no  toil;  they  are 
ceaselessly  occupied  in  marvelling  at  the  discoveries 
of  the  ancients  or  in  pursuing  new  researches  of  their 
own;  insatiable  in  their  appetite  for  study,  they 
forget  all  else  besides,  and  harbour  not  one  base  or 
mean  thought.  So  potent  is  the  spell  of  these  pur- 
suits, that  even  those  who  profess  to  follow  other 
Ends  of  Goods,  defined  by  utility  or  pleasure,  may 
yet  be  seen  to  spend  their  whole  lives  in  investigating 
and  unfolding  the  processes  of  nature.* 
>8  XXI.  It  is  therefore  at  all  events  manifest  that  The  virtues  .- 
we  are  designed  by  nature  for  activity.  Activities  pJl^^^s"" 
are  of  various  kinds,  so  much  so  that  the  more  im-  instincts  by 
portant  actually  eclipse  the  less ;  but  the  most  developed  by 
important  are,  first  (according  to  my  own  view  and  ^®**^- 
that  of  those  with  whose  system  we  are  now  occu- 
pied) the  contemplation  and  the  study  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  and  of  those  secrets  and  mysteries  of 
nature  which  reason  has  the  capacity  to  penetrate  ; 
secondly,  the  practice  and  the  theory  of  politics ; 
thirdly,  the  principles  of  Prudence,  Temperance, 
Bravery  and  Justice,  with  the  remaining  virtues  and 
the  activities  consonant  therewith,  all  of  which  we 
may  sum  up  under  the  single  term  of  Morality ; 
towards  the  knowledge  and  practice  of  which,  when 



et  cognitionem  et  usum  iam  corroborati  natura  ipsa 
praeeunte  deducimur.  Omnium  enim  rerum  prin- 
cipia  parva  sunt^  sed  suis  progressionibus  usa  augen- 
tur ;  nee  sine  causa ;  in  primo  enim  ortu  inest 
teneritas  ae  moUitia  quaedam,  ut  nee  res  videre 
optimas  nee  agere  possint.  Virtutis  enim  beataeque 
vitae,  quae  duo  maxime  expetenda  sunt,  serius  lumen 
apparet,  multo  etiam  serius,  ut  plane  qualia  sint 
intellegantur.  Praeelare  enim  Plato:  Beatum  cui 
etiam  in  senectute  contigerit  ut  sapientiam  verasque 
opiniones  assequi  possit !  *  Quare  quoniam  de  primis 
naturae  commodis  satis  dictum  est,  nunc  de  maioribus 

59  consequentibusque  videamus.  Natura  igitur  corpus 
quidem  hominis  sic  et  genuit  et  formavit  ut  alia  in 
primo  ortu  perficeret,  alia  progrediente  aetate  finge- 
ret,  neque  sane  multum  adiumentis  externis  et 
adventiciis  uteretur ;  animum  autem  reliquis  rebus 
ita  perfecit  ut  corpus ;  sensibus  enim  ornavit  ad  res 
percipiendas  idoneis  ut  nihil  aut  non  multum  adiu- 
mento  ullo  ad  suam  confirmationem  indigerent  ^ ;  quod 
autem  in  homine  praestantissimum  atque  optimum 
est,  id  deseruit.  Etsi  dedit  talem  mentem  quae 
omnem  virtutem  accipere  posset,  ingenuitque  sine 
doctrina  notitias  parvas  rerum  maximarum  et  quasi 
instituit  docere,  et  induxit  in  ea  quae  inerant 
tamquam    elementa  virtutis.     Sed   virtutem   ipsam 

60  inchoavit ;  nihil  amplius.  Itaque  nostrum  est  (quod 
nostrum  dico,  artis  est)  ad  ea  principia  quae  accepi- 

^  indigerent  Bremi ;  indigeret  Mdv.  with  MSS. 

a  Plato,  Laws  653A. 

BOOK  V.  xxi 

we  have  grown  to  maturity,  we  are  led  onward  by 
nature's  own  guidance.  All  things  are  small  in  their 
first  beginnings,  but  they  grow  larger  as  they  pass 
through  their  regular  stages  of  progress.  And  there 
is  a  reason  for  this,  namely  that  at  the  moment  of 
birth  we  possess  a  certain  weakness  and  softness 
which  prevent  our  seeing  and  doing  what  is  best. 
The  radiance  of  virtue  and  of  happiness,  the  two  things 
most  to  be  desired,  dawns  upon  us  later,  and  far  later 
still  comes  a  fiiU  understanding  of  their  nature. 
'  Happy  the  man/  Plato  well  says,  who  even  in  old 
age  has  the  good  fortune  to  be  able  to  achieve  wisdom 
and  true  opinions.**  Therefore  since  enough  has 
been  said  about  the  primary  goods  of  nature,  let  us 
now  consider  the  more  important  things  that  follow 

>9  later.  In  generating  arid  developing  the  human 
body,  Nature's  procedure  was  to  make  some  parts 
perfect  at  birth,  and  to  fashion  other  parts  as  it 
grew  up,  without  making  much  use  of  external  and 
artificial  aids.  The  mind  on  the  other  hand  she  endowed 
with  Its  remaining  faculties  in  the  same  perfection  as 
the  body,  equipping  it  with  senses  already  adapted 
to  their  function  of  perception  and  requiring  little  or 
no  assistance  of  any  kind  to  complete  their  develop- 
ment; but  the  highest  and  noblest  part  of  man's 
nature  she  neglected.  It  is  true  she  bestowed  an 
intellect  capable  of  receiving  every  virtue,  and  im- 
planted in  it  at  birth  and  without  instruction 
embryonic  notions  of  the  loftiest  ideas,  laying  the 
foundation  of  its  education,  and  introducing  it  to  the 
elements  of  virtue,  if  I  may  so  call  them,  which  it 
already  possessed.    But  of  virtue  itself  she  merely 

50  gave  the  germ  and  no  more.  Therefore  it  rests 
with  us  (and  when  I  say  with  us,  I  mean  with  our 



mus  consequentia  exquirere,  quoad  sit  id  quod 
volumus  efFectum ;  quod  quidem  pluris  est  haud 
paulo  magisque  ipsum  propter  se  expetendum  quam 
aut  sensus  aut  corporis  ea  quae  diximus,  quibus 
tantum  praestat  mentis  excellens  perfectio  ut  vix 
cogitari  possit  quid  intersit.  Itaque  omnis  honos^ 
omnis  admiratio,  omne  studium  ad  virtutem  et  ad 
eas  actiones  quae  virtuti  consentaneae  sunt  refertur, 
eaque  omnia  quae  aut  ita  in  animis  sunt  aut  ita 
geruntur  uno  nomine  honesta  dieuntur. 

Quorum  omnium  quae  sint  notitiaequaeque  signi- 
ficentur  rerum^  vocabulis  quaeque  cuiusque  vis  et 

61  natura  sit  mox  videbimus ;  XXII.  hoc  autem  loco 
tantum  explicemus,  haec  honesta  quae  dico,  praeter- 
quam  quod  nosmet  ipsos  diligamus^  praeterea  suapte 
natura  per  se  esse  expetenda.  Indicant  pueri,  in 
quibus  ut  in  speculis  natura  cemitur.  Quanta  studia 
decertantium  sunt !  quanta  ipsa  certamina !  ut  illi 
efFeruntur  laetitia  cum  vicerunt !  ut  pudet  victos  !  ut 
se  accusari  nolunt  I  quam  cupiunt  laudari !  quos  illi 
labores  non  ^  perferunt  ut  aequalium  principes'  sint ! 
quae  memoria  est  in  iis  bene  merentium,  quae 
referendae  gratiae  cupiditas !  Atque  ea  in  optima 
quaque  indole  maxime  apparent,  in  qua  haec  honesta 
quae  intellegimus  a  natura  tamquam  adumbrantur. 

62  Sed  haec  in  pueris ;  expressa  vero  in  iis  aetatibus 
quae  iam  confirmatae  sunt.     Quis  est  tam  dissimilis 

^  significentur  rerum  inf.  MSS.,  Mdv.  ;  significent  rerum, 
B,  £  ;  Mdv.  conj.  significentur  eorum ;  Davis  quibusque 
significentur  [rerum], 

*  non  bracketed  by  Mdv. 

a  Viz.  §  67. 

BOOK  V.  xxi-xxu 

science),  in  addition  to  the  elementary  principles 
bestowed  upon  us,  to  seek  out  their  logical  develop- 
ments, until  our  full  purpose  is  realized.  For  this  is 
much  more  valuable  and  more  intrinsically  desirable 
than  either  the  senses  or  the  endowments  of  the 
body  above  alluded  to ;  since  those  are  surpassed 
in  an  almost  inconceivable  degree  by  the  matchless 
perfection  of  the  intellect.  Therefore  all  honour, 
all  admiration,  all  enthusiasm  is  directed  towards 
virtue  and  towards  the  actions  in  harmony  with 
virtue,  and  all  such  properties  and  processes  of  the 
mind  are  entitled  by  the  single  name  of  Moral 

"  The  connotation  of  all  these  conceptions  and  the  ^°^^*^®!j!JJ 
signification  of  the  terms  that  denote  them,  and  their  proved  from  {, 
several  values  and  natures  we  shall  study  shortly^;  ^dren"*^'°^ 

)1  XXII.  for  the  present  let  us  merely  explain  that  this 
Morality  to  which  I  allude  is  an  object  of  our  desire, 
not  only  because  of  our  love  of  self,  but  also  intrinsi- 
cally and  for  its  own  sake.  A  hint  of  this  is  given  by 
children,  in  whom  nature  is  discerned  as  in  a  mirror. 
How  hotly  they  pursue  their  rivalries!  how  fierce 
their  contests  and  competitions !  what  exultation 
they  feel  when  they  win,  and  what  shame  when 
they  are  beaten !  How  they  dislike  blame !  how  they 
covet  praise!  what  toils  do  they  not  undergo  to 
stand  first  among  their  companions !  how  good  their 
memory  is  for  those  who  have  shown  them  kindness, 
and  how  eager  they  are  to  repay  it!  And  these 
traits  are  most  apparent  in  the  noblest  characters,  in 
which  the  moral  excellences,  as  we  understand  them, 

l2  are  already  roughly  outlined  by  nature.     But  this  (^)  pop^^^ 
belongs  to  childhood ;  the  picture  is  filled  in  at  the 
age  when  the  character  is  fully  formed.    Who  is 



homini  qui  non  moveatur  et  ofFensione  turpitudinis 
et  comprobatione  honestatis  ?  quis  est  qui  non  oderit 
libidinosam^  protervam  adulescentiam  ?  quis  contra  in 
ilia  aetate  pudorem^  constantiam^  etiamsi  sua  nihil 
intersit,  non  tamen  diligat  ?  quis  Pullum  Numitorium 
Fregellanum  proditorem,  quamquam  rei  publicae  no- 
strae  profuit,  non  odit?  quis  huius^  urbis  conserva- 
torem  Codrum,  quis  Erechthei  filias  non  maxime 
laudat  ?  cui  Tubuli  nomen  odio  non  est  ?  quis  Aristi- 
dem  non  mortuum  diligit  ?  An  obliviscimur  quanto 
opere  in  audiendo  in^  legendoque  moveamur  cum 
pie^  cum  amice^  cum  magno  animo  aliquid  factum 
6S  cognoscimus  ?  Quid  loquor  de  nobis  qui  ad  laudem 
et  ad  decus  nati,  suscepti,  instituti  sumus?  qui 
clamores  vulgi  atque  imperitorum  excitantur  in  the- 
atris,  cum  ilia  dicuntur : 

Ego  sum  Orestes, 

contraque  ab  altero : 

Immo  enimvero  ego  sum,  inquam,  Orestes ! 

Cum  autem  etiam^  exitus  ab  utroque  datur  contur- 
bato  errantique  regi : 

Ambo  ergo  una  necarier  precamur, 

quotiens  hoc  agitur,  ecquandone  nisi  admirationibus 
maximis?  Nemo  est  igitur  quin  hanc  afFectionem 
animi  probet  atque  laudet  qua  non  modo  utilitas 
nulla  quaeritur  sed  contra  utilitatem  etiam  conserva- 
64  tur  fides.  Talibus  exemplis  non  fictae  solum  fabulae 
verum   etiam    historiae   refertae   sunt,   et   quidem 

*  huitis  inserted  by  MuUer,  sug-g-ested  by  Mdv. 
^tn  Mdv.  brackets. 

a  Cf.  II,  79,  note. 

BOOK  V.  xxii 

so  unlike  a  human  being  as  to  feel  no  repulsion  at 
baseness  and  no  approval  for  goodness?  Who  is 
there  that  does  not  hate  a  youth  spent  in  debauchery 
and  wantonness?  Who  on  the  contrary  would  not 
esteem  modesty  and  orderliness  in  the  young,  even 
though  he  has  no  personal  concern  in  them  ? 
Who  does  not  hate  the  traitor  Pullus  Numitorius  of 
Fregellae,  although  he  did  a  service  to  our  country  ? 
Who  does  not  praise  and  extol  Codrus,  the  preserver 
of  this  city,  or  honour  the  daughters  of  Erechtheus  ? 
or  loathe  the  very  name  of  Tubulus  ?  or  love  the 
memory  of  Aristides?  Do  we  forget  the  strong 
emotion  that  we  feel  when  we  hear  or  read  of  some 
6S  deed  of  piety,  of  friendship  or  of  magnanimity  ?  But 
I  need  not  speak  of  ourselves,  whose  birth,  breeding 
and  education  point  us  towards  glory  and  towards 
honour ;  think  of  the  uneducated  multitude, — what 
a  tempest  of  applause  rings  through  the  theatre  at 
the  words : 

I  am  Orestes, 

and  at  the  rejoinder  : 

No,  no,  *tis  I,  I  say,  I  am  Orestes. 

And  then  when  each  offers  a  solution  to  the  king  in 
his  confusion  and  perplexity  : 

Then  prithee  slay  us  both  ;  we'll  die  together : 

as  often  as  this  scene*  is  acted,  does  it  ever  fail  to 
arouse  the  greatest  enthusiasm  ?  This  proves  that  all 
men  without  exception  approve  and  applaud  the  dis- 
position that  not  only  seeks  no  advantage  for  itself, 
but  is  loyal  and  true  even  to  its  own  disadvantage. 
5*  These  high  examples  crowd  the  pages  not  only  of 
romance  but  also  of  history,  and  especially  the  history 
HH  465 


maxime  nostrae.  Nos  enim  ad  sacra  Idaea  accipienda 
•  optimum  virum  delegimus ;  nos  tutores  regibus  misi- 
mus  ;  nostri  imperatores  pro  salute  patriae  sua  capita 
voverunt ;  nostri  consules  regem  inimicissimum 
moenibus  iam  appropinquantem  monuerunt  a  veneno 
ut  caveret ;  nostra  in  re  publica  et  quae  per  vim 
oblatum  stuprum  voluntaria  morte  lueret  inventa 
est  et  qui  filiam  interficeret  ne  stupraretur ;  quae 
quidem  omnia  et  innumerabilia  praeterea  quis  est 
quin  intellegat  et  eos  qui  fecerint  dignitatis  splendore 
ductos  immemores  fuisse  utilitatum  suarum  nosque 
cum  ea  laudemus  nulla  alia  re  nisi  honestate  duel  ? 

XXIII.  Quibus  rebus  breviter  expositis  (nee 
enim  sum  copiam  quam  potui,  quia  dubitatio  in  .re 
nulla  erat,  persecutus),  sed  his  rebus  concluditur 
profecto  et  virtutes  onmes  et  honestum  illud  quod 
ex  iis  oritur  et  in  illis  haeret  per  se  esse  expetendum. 
65  In  omni  autem  honesto  de  quo  loquimur  nihil  est 
tam  illustre  nee  quod  latius  pateat  quam  coniunctio 
inter  homines  hominum  et  quasi  quaedam  societas 
et  communicatio  utilitatum  et  ipsa  caritas  generis 
humani;  quae  nata  a  primo  satu^  quod  a  procreatori- 
bus  nati  diliguntur  et  tota  domus  coniugio  et  stirpe 
coniungitur^  serpit  sensim  foras^  cognationibus  pri- 
mum,  tum  affinitatibus,  deinde  amicitiis,  post  vicini- 

a  Publius  Cornelius  Scipio  Nasica,  chosen,*in  obedience  to 
an  oracle,  as  man  of  blameless  life,  to  receive  \he  iinage  of 
Pyl^ele,  which  was  brought  from  Phrygia  to  Rome  204  B.C. 

^  M.  Aemilius  Lepldus  administered  Egypt,  on  the  death 
of  King  Ptolemy  Epiphanes,  181  B.C.,  as  guardian  of  his 

c  The  Decii,  cp.  II,  61. 

<^C.  Fabricius  artd  Q.  Aemilius  Papius,  278  B.C.,  warned 
Pyrrhus  that  his  physician  had  offered  to  poison  him. 

e  Lucretia,  cp.  II,  66.  '  Virgin|us,  ibfd, 


BOOK  V.  xnii-)(xiii 
of  our  own  country.  It  was  we  who  chose  our  most 
virtuous  citizen'  to  receive  the  sacred  emblems  from 
Ida;  we  who  sent  guardians  to  royal  princes;''  our 
generals'  sacrificed  their  lives  to  save  their  country  ; 
our  consuls'*  warned  the  king  who  was  their  bitterest 
foe,  when  close  to  the  walls  of  Rome,  to  be  on  his 
guard  against  poison ;  in  our  commonwealth  was 
found  the  lady'  who  expiatt-d  her  outraged  honour 
by  a  self-sought  death,  and  the  father'  who  killed 
his  daughter  to  save  her  from  slinme.  Who  is  there 
who  cannot  see  that  all  these  deeds  and  countless 
others  besides  were  done  by  men  who  were  inspired 
by  the  splendour  of  moral  greatness  to  forget  all 
thought  of  interest,  and  are  praised  by  us  from  no 
other  consideration  but  that  of  Moral  Worth  ? 

XXIII.  "The  considerations  thus  briefly  set  «"t  l?^,*^"^' 
(for  I  have  not  aimed  at  such   a  fiiU  account  as  I  ^d  eitemal 
might  have  given,  since  the  matter  admitted  of  no  e«pdi.         ^_ 
uncertainty),  these  considerations  then  lead  to  the  ^^M 

undoubted  conclusion  that  all  the  virtues,  and  the  ^^M 

Moral  Worth  which  springs  from  them  and  inheres  || 

>  in   them,  are  intrinsically  desirable.     But   in    thd  jusiiceiiHina- 
whole  moral  sphere  of  which  we  are  speaking  there  ^i^^^'ijSdH' 
is   nothing  more  glorious  nor  of  wider  range  than  «1=1«'. 
the  solidarity  of  mankind,  that  species  of  alliance 
and  partnership  of  interests  and  that  actual  affection 
which  exists  between  man  and  man,  which,  coming 
into  existence  immediately  upon  our  btrth,  owing  to  . 
the  fact  that  children  are  loved  by  their  parents  and 
the  family  as  a  whole,  is  bound  together  by  tlie  ties 
of  marriage  and  parenthood^  gradually  spreads  its 
influence  beyond  the  home,  first  by  blood  relation- 
ships, then  by  connections  through  marriage,  later  by 
friendshipB,afterwards  by  the  bondsof  neighbourhood, 
hh2  *67 

tatibus^  turn  civibus  et  iis  qui  publice  socii  atque 
amici  sunt^  deinde  totius  complexu  gentis  humanae ; 
quae  animi  afFectio  suum  cuique  tribuens  atque  banc 
quam  dico  societatem  coniunctionis  humanae  muni- 
fice  et  aeque  tuens  iustitia  dicitur,  cui  sunt  adiun- 
ctae  pietas,  bonitas^  liberalitas,  benignitas,  comitas, 
quaeque  sunt  generis  eiusdem.  Atque  haec  ita 
iustitiae  propria  sunt  ut  sint  virtutum  reliquarum 

66  communia.  Nam  cum  sic  hominis  natura  generata 
sit  ut  habeat  quiddam  ingenitum  quasi  civile  atque 
populare,  quod  Graeci  ttoXitikov  vocant,  quidquid 
aget  quaeque  virtus,  id  a  communitate  et  ea  quam 
exposui  caritate  ac  societate  humana  non  abhorrebit, 
vicissimque  iustitia,  ut  ipsa  fundet  se  usu  in  ceteras 
virtutes,  sic  illas  expetet.  Servari  enim  iustitia  nisi 
a  forti  viro,  nisi  a  sapiente  non  potest.  Qualis  est 
igitur  omnis  haec  quam  dico  conspiratio  consensus- 
que  virtutum,-- tale  est  illud  ipsum  honestum ;  quando 
quidem  honestum  aut  ipsa  virtus  est  aut  res  gesta 
virtute ;  quibus  rebus  vita  consentiens  virtutibusque 
respondens  recta  et  honesta  et  constans  et  naturae 
congruens  existimari  potest. 

67  ^' Atque   haec   coniunctio    confusioque   virtutum 

tamen  a  philosophis  ratione  quadam  distinguitur. 

Nam  cum  ita  copulatae  connexaeque  sint  ut  omnes 

omnium  participes  sint.. nee  alia  ab  alia  possit  se- 

parari,  tamen  proprium  suum  cuiusque  munus  est, 

BOOK  V.  xxiii 

then  to  fellow-citizens  and  political  allies  and  friends, 

and  lastly  by  embracing  the  whole  of  the  human  race. 

sentiment^  assigning  each  his  own  and  main-  \ 

.ySg^lllt' gcilerosity  and  equity  that  human  soli-    j 

ity  and  alliance  of  which  I  speak^  is  termed   / 

Jdstic^^    connected  with   it   are   dutiful   affection,  I 

idness^   liberality,   good-will,   courtesy   and    the 

other  graces  of  the  same  kind.     And  while  these 

belong  peculiarly  to  Justice,  they  are  also  factors 

36  shared  by  the  remaining  virtues.     For  human  nature 

is  so  xQQstitutsd.  .at_birth  as  to  possess  an  innate 

Greek  jw&^tfaatl -Conseqi^ntly  ^BT  the   aciious  of  A 
every  virtue  will  be  in  harmony  ^«-  htiniiiii'T .  ' 
nffnrti on  nnd^liclarity TTiave "described,  and  Justice  * 
in  turn  will  diSuselt»*«geiu:y  through  the  other  vir- 
tues, and  so  will  aim  at  the  promotion  of  these.    1' or 
only  a  brave  and  a  wise  man  can  preserve  Justice. 
Therefore  the  qualities  of  this  general  union  and 
combination  of  the  virtues  of  which  I  am  speaking 
belong  also  to  the  Moral  Worth  aforesaid ;  inasmuch 
as  Moral  Worth  is  either  virtue  itself  or  virtuous 
action ;  and  life  in  harmony  with  these  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  virtues  can  be  deemed  right,  moral, 
consistent,  and  in  agreement  with  nature. 
)7       *^At  the  same  time  this  complex  of  interfused  although  they 
virtues   can   yet  be  theoretically  resolved  into  its  ^hed   '^^ 
separate  parts  by  philosophers.     For  although  the  thcoreUcaUy. 
virtues  are  so  closely  united  that  each  participates 
in  every  other  and  none  can  be  separated  from  any 
other,  yet  on  the  other  hand  each  has  its  own  special 
function.     Thus  Courage  is  displayed  in  toils  and 
dangers.  Temperance   in   forgoing   pleasures.  Pru- 
dence in  the  choice  of  goods  and  evils.  Justice  in 



ut  fortitude  in  laboribus  periculisque  cematur,  tem- 
perantia  in  praetermittendis  voluptatibus^  prudentia 
in  delectu  bononim  et  malorum^  iustitia  in  suo  cuique 
tribuendo.  Quando  igitur  inest  in  oinni  virtute 
cura  quaedam  quasi  foras  spectans  aliosque  appetens 
atque  complectens^  exsistit  illud^  ut  amici^  ut  fratres^ 
ut  propinqui,  ut  affines^  ut  cives,  ut  omnes  denique 
(quoniam  unam  societatem  liominum  esse  volumus) 
propter  se  expetendi  sint.  Atqui  eorum  nihil  est 
eius  generis  ut  sit  in  fine  atque  extremo  bonorum. 

68  Ita  fit  ut  duo  genera  propter  se  expetendorum  re- 
periantur^  unum  quod  est  in  iis  in  quibus  completur 
illud  extremum^  quae  sunt  aut  animi  aut  corporis; 
haec  autem  quae  sunt  extrinseeus,  id  est  quae  neque 
in  animo  insunt  neque  in  corpore,  ut  amici^  ut  paren- 
tes^  ut  liberie  ut  propinqui^  ut  ipsa  patria^  sunt  ilia 
quidem  sua  sponte  cara,  sed  eodem  in  genere  quo 
ilia  non  sunt.  Nee  vero  umquam  summum  bonum 
assequi  quisquam  posset  si  omnia  illa^  quae  sunt  extra 
quamquam  expetenda,  sununo  bono  continerentur. 

69  XXIV.  Quomodo  igitur,  inquies,  verum  esse 
poterit  omnia  referri  ad  summum  bonum,  si  amici- 
tiae,  si  propinquitates,  si  reliqua  externa  summo 
bono  non  continentur  ?  Hac  videlicet  ratione,  quod 
ea  quae  externa  sunt  iis  tuemur  officiis  quae  oriuntiu* 
a  suo  cuiusque  genere  virtutis.  Nam  et  amici  cultus 
et  parentis  ei  qui  officio  fungitur  in  eo  ipso  prodest 
quod  ita  fungi  officio  in  recte  factis  est,  quae  sunt 
orta  a  ^  virtutibus.  Quae  quidem  sapientes  sequuntur 
utentes  tamquam^  duce  natura ;  non  perfecti  autem 

1  a  inserted  by  Lambinus,  Mdv. 

^  utentes  tamquam  Mdv.  brackets ;  utentes  sequuntur 
tamquam  MSS.;  Mdv.  conj.  videntes  sequuntur  duce  natura 
earn  viam. 


BOOK  V.  xxiii-xxiv 

giving  each  his  due.     As  then  each  virtue  contains  «Jn^JdlTo^ 
an  element  not  merely  self-regarding,  which  em-  men;  which j 
braces  other  men  and  makes  them  its  end,  there  external  ro« 
resiilts  a  state  of  feeling  in  which  friends,  brothers,  Sws°bufm 
kinsmen,  connections,  fellow-citizens,  and  finally  all  f.^}f°i^, 
human  beings  (since  our  belief  is  that  all  mankind 
are  united  in  one  society)  are  things  desirable  for 
their  own  sakes.     Yet  none  of  these  relations  is 
such  as  to  form  part  of  the  End  and  Ultimate  Good. 

68  Hence  it  results  that  we  find  two  classes  of  things 
desirable  for  their  own  sakes ;  one  class  consists  of 
those  things  which  constitute  the  Ultimate  Good 
aforesaid,  namely  goods  of  mind  or  body ;  the  latter 
set,  which  are  external  goods,  that  is,  goods  that 
belong  neither  to  the  mind  nor  to  the  body,  such  as 
friends,  parents,  children,  relatives  and  one's  country 
itself,  while  intrinsically  precious  to  us,  yet  are  not 
included  in  the  same  class  as  the  former.  Indeed, 
no  one  could  ever  attain  the  Chief  Good,  if  all  those 
goods,  which  though  desirable  are  external  to  us, 
formed  part  of  the  Chief  Good. 

69  XXIV.        How  then,  you  will  object,  can  it  be  although  to  c 
true  that  all  things  are  means  to  the  Chief  Good,  if  others  is  a°pa 
friendships  and  relationships  and  the  other  external  °^  virtue. 
goods  are  not  part  of  the  Chief  Good  ?     The  answer 

is  that  it  is  in  this  way :  we  maintain  these  external 
goods  by  those  acts  of  duty  which  spring  from  tha 
particular  class  of  virtue  connected  with  each.  For 
example,  dutiful  conduct  towards  friends  and  parents 
benefits  the  doer  from  the  very  fact  that  such  per- 
formance  of  duty  is  a  right  action,  and  right  actions 
take  their  rise  from  virtues.  And  whereas  the  Wise,  Love  of  honoi 
under  nature's  guidance,  make  right  action  their  virtue. 
aim,  on  the  other  hand  men  not  perfect  and  yet 



homines  et  tamen  ingeniis  excellentibus  praediti 
excitaniur  saepe  gloria,  quae  habet  speciem  hone- 
statis  et  similitudinem.  Quod  si  ipsam  honestatem 
undique  perfectam  atque  absolutam,  rem  unam  prae- 
clarissimam  omnium  maximeque  laudandam,  penitus 
viderent,  quonam  gaudio  complerentur,  cum  tanto 

70  opere  eius  adumbrata  opinione  laetentur?  Quem 
enim  deditum  voluptatibus,  quem  cupiditatum  in- 
cendiis  inflanmiatum  in  iis  potiendis  quae  acerrime 
concupivissettanta  laetitia  perfundiarbitramur  quanta 
aut  superiorem  Africanum  Hannibale  victo  aut  poste- 
rior em  Carthagine  e versa  ?  Quem  Tiberina  descensio 
festo  illo  die  tanto  gaudio  afFecit  quanto  L.  Paulum, 
cum  regem  Persem  captum  adduceret,  eodem  flumine 

7 1  invectio  ?  Age  nunc,  Luci  noster,  exstrue  animo  altitu- 
dinem  excellentiamque  virtutum ;  iam  non  dubitatis 
quin  earum  compotes  homines  magno  animo  erectoque 
viventes  semper  sint  beati ;  qui  omnes  motus  fortunae 
mutationesque  rerum  et  temporum  leves  et  imbecillos 
fore  intellegant  si  in  virtutis  certamen  venerint.  Ilia 
enim  quae  sunt  a  nobis  bona  corporis  numerata  com- 
plent  ea  quidem  beatissimam  vitam,  sed  ita  ut  sine 
illis"possit  beata  vita  exsistere.  Ita  enim  parvae  et 
exiguae  sunt  istae  accessiones  bonorum  ut,  quemad- 
modum  stellae  in  radiis  solis,  sic  istae  in  virtutum 

72  splendore  ne  cernantur  quidem.  Atque  hoc  ut  vera 
dicitur,  parva  esse  ad  beate  vivendum  momenta  ista 
corporis  commodorum,  sic  nimis  violentum  est  nulla 
esse   dicere ;    qui   enim   sic   disputant,  obliti  mihi 

a  The  festival  of  Fors  Fortuna,  June  24,  described   by 
Ovid  Fasti,  6,  774. 


BOOK  V.  xxiv 

endowed  with  noble  characters  often  respond  to  the 
stimulus  of  honour,  which  has  some  show  and  sem-  \ 
blance  of  Moral  Worth.  But  if  they  could  fully  \ 
discern  Moral  Worth  itself  in  its  absolute  perfection  ■ 
and  completeness,  the  one  thing  of  all  others  most  ; 
splendid  and  most  glorious,  how  enraptured  would 
they  be,  if  they  take  such   a  delight  in  the  mere  ; 

70  shadow  and  reputation  of  it?  What  devotee  of  plea- 
sure, though  consumed  by  most  glowing  passions, 
can  be  supposed  to  feel  such  transports  of  rapture  ' 
in  winning  the  objects  of  his  keenest  desires,  as  were 
felt  by  the  elder  Africanus  upon  the  defeat  of 
Hannibal,  or  by  the  younger  at  the  overthrow  of 
Carthage  ?  Who  ever  experienced  so  much  delight 
from  the  voyage  down  the  Tiber  on  the  day  of  the 
festival^  as  Lucius  Paulus  felt  when   he  sailed  up 

the  river  leading  King  Perses  captive  in  his  train  ?  Virtue  alone 

71  Come  now,  my  dear  Lucius,  build  in  your  imagina-  boSygooS* 
tion  the  lofty  and  towering  structure  of  the  vir-  S^Se^^tol 
tues ;  then  you  will  feel  no  doubt  that  those  who 

-  achieve  them,  guiding  themselves  by  magnanimity 
and  uprightness,  are  always  happy ;  realizing  as  they 
do  that  all  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune,  the  ebb  and 
flow  of  time  and  of  circumstance,  will  be  trifling  and 
feeble  if  brought  into  conflict  with   virtue.     The 

•  things  we  reckon  as  bodily  goods  do,  it  is  true,  form 
a  factor  in  supreme  happiness,  but  yet  happiness  is 
possible  without  them.  For  those  supplementary 
goods  are  so  small  and  slight  that  in  the  full  radiance 
of  the  virtues  they  are  as  invisible  as  the  stars  in 

72  sunlight.  Yet  true  though  it  is  that  these  bodily 
advantages  are  of  but  slight  importance  for  happi- 
ness, to  say  that  they  are  of  no  importance  is  too 
sweeping ;  those  who  maintain  this  appear  to  me  to 



videntur  quae  ipsi  fecerint^  principia  naturae.  Tri- 
buendum  est  igitur  his  aliquid^  dum  modo  quantum 
tribuendum  sit  intellegas.  Est  enim^  philosophi  non- 
tarn  gloriosa  quam  vera  quaerentis  nee  pro  nihilo 
putare  ea  quae  secundum  naturam  illi  ipsi  gloriosi 
esse  fateantur,*  et  videre  tantam  vim  virtutis  tan- 
tamque  ut  ita  dicam  auctoritatem  honestatis  esse*  ut 
reliqua  non  ilia  quidem  nulla  sed  ita  parva  sint  ut 
nulla  esse  videantur.  Haec  est  nee  omnia  spementis 
praeter  virtutem  et  virtutem  ipsam  suis  laudibus 
amplificantis  oratio ;  denique  haec  est  undique  com- 
pleta  et  perfecta  explicatio  summi  boni. 

Hinc  ceteri  particulas  arripere  conati  suam 
quisque  videri  voluit  afferre  sententiam.  XXV. 
73  Saepe  ab  Aristotele,  a  Theophrasto  mirabiliter  est 
laudata  per  se  ipsa  rerum  scientia;  hoc  uno  captus 
Erillus  scientiam  summum  bonum  esse  defendit, 
nee  rem  ullam  aliam  per  se  expetendam.  Multa 
dicta  sunt  ab  antiquis  de  contemnendis  ac  despi- 
ciendis  rebus  humanis ;  hoc  unum  Aristo  tenuit : 
praeter  vitia  atque  virtutes  negavit  rem  esse  ullam 
aut  fugiendam  aut  expetendam.  Positum  est  a 
nostris  in  iis  esse  rebus  quae  secundum  naturam 
assent  non  dolere ;  hoc  Hieronymus  summum  bonum 
esse  dixit.  At  vero  Callipho  et  post  eum  Diodorus^ 
cum  alter  voluptatem  adamasset^  alter  vacuitatem 

^fecerint  Lambinus,  Mdv.;  egerint  MSS.;  iecerint  Gifa- 

^enim  Davis,  Mdv.;  tamen  MSS. 

^fateantur  (conj.  Mdv.)  Miiller;  fatentur  E,  Mdv.;  fate- 
bantur  B  and  inf.  MSS. 

*  esse  inserted  by  Mdv. 


BOOK  V.  xxiv-xxv 

have  forf?otten  those  first  principles  of  nature  which 
they  have  themselves  established.  Some  weight 
then  must  be  given  to  bodily  goods  provided  one 
understands  what  is  the  proper  amount  of  weight. 
The  genuine  philosopher^  who  aims  at  truth  and  not 
ostentation,  while  refusing  on  the  one  hand  to  deny 
all  value  to  the  things  which  even  those  high- 
sounding  teachers  themselves  admit  to  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  nature,  will  on  the  other  hand  realize 
that  virtue  is  so  potent.  Moral  Worth  invested  so  to 
speak  with  such  authority,  that  all  those  other  goods, 
though  not  worthless,  are  so  small  as  to  appear 
worthless.  This  is  the  language  that  a  man  will 
hold  who  while  not  despising  all  else  but  virtue  yet 
extols  virtue  herself  with  her  own  proper  praises  ;  in 
short,  this  is  the  full,  finished  and  complete  account 
of  the  Chief  Grood. 

"  From  this  system  all  the  other  schools  have  en-  (d)  This  the 
deavoured  to  appropriate  fragments,  which  each  has  S^^Sk 
JS  hoped  may  pass  for  original.     XXV.  Aristotle  and  ^ve  borrow* 
Theophrastus  often  and  admirably  praised  knowledge  the  s^cs  ha 
for  its  own  sake ;  Erillus,  captivated  by  this  single  ShSe.^^ " 
tenet,  maintained  that   knowledge  was  the  Chief 
Good  and  that  nothing  else  was  desirable  as  an  end  in 
itself.     The  ancients  enlarged  on  the  duty  of  rising 
proudly  superior  to  human  fortunes ;  Aristo  singled 
out  this  one  point,  and  declared  that  nothing  but 
vice  or  virtue  was  either  to  be  avoided  or  desired. 
Our   school    included   freedom   from    pain    among 
the  things  in  accordance  with  nature ;  Hieronymus 
made  it  out  to  be  the  Supreme  Good.    On  the  other 
hand  Callipho  and  later  Diodorus,  the  one  having 
fallen  in  love  with  pleasure,  and  the  other  with 
freedom  from  pain,  could  neither  of  them  dispense 



doloris,  neuter  honestate  carere  potuit,  quae  est  a 

74  nostris  laudata  maxime.  Quin  etiam  ipsi  voluptarii 
devertieula  quaerunt  et  virtutes  habent  in  ore  totos 
dies  voluptatemque  dumtaxat  primo  expeti  dicunt/ 
deinde  consuetudine  quasi  alteram  quandam  naturam 
effici,  qua  impulsi  multa  faciant^  nuUam  quaerentes 
voluptatem.  Stoici  restant.  Ei  quidem  non  unam 
aliquam  aut  alteram  rem^  a  nobis^  sed  totam  ad  se 
nostram  philosophiam  transtulerunt.  Atque  ut 
re^iqui  fures  earum  rerum  quas  ceperunt  signa  com- 
mutant^  sic  illi  ut  sententiis  nostris  pro  suis  uterentur 
nomina  tamquam  rerum  notas  mutaverunt.  Ita  re- 
linquitur  sola  haec  diseiplina  digna  studiosis  ingenu- 
arum  artium^  digna  eruditis^  digna  claris  viris^  digna 
principibus,  digna  regibus.'* 

75  Quae  cum  dixisset  paulumque  institisset^  Quid 
est?"  inquit;  satisne  vobis  videor  pro  meo  iure  in 
vestris  auribus  commentatus?**  Et  ego;  Tu  vero," 
inquam^  Piso^  ut  saepe  alias^  sic  hodie  ita  nosse  ista 
visus  es  ut,  si  tui  nobis  potestas  saepius  fieret,  non 
multum  Graeeis  supplicandum  putarem.  Quod  qui- 
dem eo  probavi  magis  quia  memini  Staseam  Neapo- 
litanum,  doetorem  ilium  tuum,  nobilem  sane  Peripa- 
tetieum,  aliquanto  ista  secus  dieere  solitum,  assen- 
tientem  iis  qui  multum  in  fortuna  seeunda  aut 
adversa,  multum  in  bonis  aut  malis  corporis  pone- 
rent.  ' '  Est  ut  dicis,'  *  inquit ;  sed  haec  ab  Antiocho, 
familiari  nostro,  dicuntur  multo  melius  et  fortius 

^  quaerunt ,  .  habent .  .  dicunt  Lambinus,  Miiller ;  quae- 
rant ,  .  ha  bean  t  *  .  dicant  MSS.,  Mdv.,  with  mark  of  cor- 
ruption ;  quaerunt,  ut .  .  habeant .  .  dicant  Davis. 

'^faciantT.  Bentley,  Muller;  /«««n/MSS.,  Mdv. 

'  rem  inserted  by  T.  Bentley,  Mdv. 



with  Moral  Worth,  which  by  our  school  was  extolled 

74  above  all  else.  Even  the  votaries  of  pleasure  take 
refuge  in  evasions :  the  name  of  virtue  is  on  their 
lips  all  the  time,  and  they  declare  that  pleasure  is 
only  at  first  the  object  of  desire,  and  that  later  habit 
produces  a  sort  of  second  nature,  which  supplies  a 
motive  for  many  actions  not  aiming  at  pleasure  at 
all.  There  remain  the  Stoics.  The  Stoics  have 
conveyed  from  us  not  some  one  or  other  item,  but 
our  entire  system  of  philosophy.  It  is  a  regular 
practice  of  thieves  to  alter  the  marks  upon  stolen 
goods;  and  the  Stoics,  in  order  to  pass  off  our 
opinions  as  their  own,  have  changed  the  names, 
which  are  the  marks  of  things.  Our  system  there- 
fore is  left  as  the  sole  philosophy  worthy  of  the 
student  of  the  liberal  arts,  of  men  of  learning,  of 
men  of  eminence,  rank,  and  power." 

75  After  these  words  he  paused,  and  then  added: 
How  now?     Do  you  judge  me  to  have  used  my 

opportunity  well.»*  Does  the  sketch  I  have  given 
satisfy  my  audience?**  Why,  Piso,**  I  replied, 
you  have  shown  such  a  knowledge  of  your  theory, 
on  this,  as  on  many  other  occasions,  that  I  do  not 
think  we  should  have  to  rely  much  upon  the  aid  of 
the  Greeks,  if  we  had  more  frequent  opportunities 
of  hearing  you.  And  I  was  all  the  more  ready  to 
be  convinced  by  you  because  I  remember  that  your 
great  teacher,  Staseas  of  Naples,  a  Peripatetic  of 
unquestionable  repute,  used  to  give  a  somewhat 
different  account  of  your  system,  agreeing  with 
those  who  attached  great  importance  to  good  and 
bad  fortune,  and  to  bodily  goods  and  evils.**  That 
is  true,'*  said  he ;  but  our  friend  Antiochus  is  a  far 
better  and  far  more  uncompromising  exponent  of  the 



quam  a  Stasea  dicebantur.  Quamquam  ego  iion 
quaero  quid  tibi  a  me  probatum  sit,  sed  huic  Ciceroni 
nostro,  quern  discipulum  eupio  a  te  abdueere.** 

76  XXVI.  Turn  Lucius :  Mihi  vero  ista  valde  pro- 
bata sunt,  quod  item  fratri  puto.'*     Turn  mihi  Piso: 

Quid  ergo?"  inquit;  dasne  adulescenti  veniam? 
an  eum  discere  ea  mavis  quae  cum  plane  perdidi- 
cerit  nihil  sciat?"  Ego  vero  isti,**  inquam,  per- 
mitto;  sed  nonne  meministi  licere  mihi  ista  probare 
quae  sunt  a  te  dicta  ?  Quis  enim  potest  ea  quae  pro- 
babilia  videantur  ei^  non  probare?**  An  vero," 
inquit,  quisquam  potest  probare  quod  perceptum, 
quod  comprehensum,  quod  cognitum  non  habet?" 

Non  est  ista,**  inquam,  Piso,  magna  dissensio. 
Nihil  est  enim  aliud  quamobrem  mihi  percipi  nihil 
posse  videatur  nisi  quod  percipiendi  vis  ita  definitur 
a  Stoicis  ut  negent  quidquam  posse  percipi  nisi  tale 
verum  quale  falsum  esse  non  possit.  Itaque  haec 
cum  illis  est  dissensio,  cum  Peripateticis  nulla  sane. 
Sed  haec  omittamus ;  habent  enim  et  bene  longam 

77  et  satis  litigiosam  disputationem ;  illud  mihi  a  te 
nimium  festinanter  dictum  videtur,  sapientes  omnes 
esse  semper  beatos.  Nescio  quomodo  praetervolavit 
oratio.  Quod  nisi  ita  efficitur,  quae  Theophrastus 
de  fortuna,  de  dolore,  de  cruciatu  corporis  dixit,  cum 
quibus  coniungi  vitam    beatam   nuUo   modo  posse 

^  et  MSS,,  edd.;  ea  two  inf.  MSS.;  perhRps  potest  quae 
probabilia  sibi  videantur  ea  ed. 

*  A  reference  to  the  scepticism  of  the  New  Academy  of 
Arcesilas  and  Carn^ades;  their  doctrines,  that  certainty  was 
unattainable  and  that  reasonable  probability  was  a  suffi- 
cient guide  for  life,  are  avowed  by  Cicero  in  the  following 


BOOK  V.  xxv-xxvi 

system  than  Staseas  used  to  be.  Though  I  don't 
want  to  know  how  far  I  succeeded  in  convincing 
you,  but  how  far  I  convinced  our  friend  Cicero  here ; 
I  want  to  kidnap  your  pupil  from  you.'* 

76  XXVI.  To  this  Lucius  replied:  "Oh,  I  am  quite  5.  Charge  of  i 
convinced  by  what  you  have  said,  and  I  think  my  bunted («?6-i 
brother  is  so  too."     "  How  now?"  said  Piso  to  me,  ^yS^ 

Has  the  young  man  your  consent?  or  would  you  jJJ^^^Je^rim 
rather  he  should  study  a  system  which,  when  he  is  pies  of  the  Ne 
perfect  in  it,  will  end  in  his  knowing  nothing?"*. 

Oh,  I  leave  him  his  liberty,"  said  I ;  but  don't 
you  remember  that  it  is  quite  open  to  me  to  approve 
the  doctrines  you  have  stated?  Since  who  can 
refrain  from  approving  statements  that  appear  to 
him  probable?"  But,"  said  he,  can  anyone 
approve  that  of  which  he  has  not  full  perception, 
comprehension  and  knowledge?"  There  is  no 
great  need  to  quarrel  about  that,  Piso,"  I  rejoined. 

The  only  thing  that  makes  me  deny  the  possibility 
of  perception  is  the  Stoics'  definition  of  that  term ; 
they  maintain  that  nothing  can  be  perceived  except 
a  true  presentation  having  such  a  character  as  no 
false  presentation  can  possess.  Here  then  1  have  a 
quarrel  with  the  Stoics,  but  certainly  none  with  the 
Peripatetics.  However  let  us  drop  this  question, 
for  it  involves  a  very  long  and  somewhat  contentious 

77  debate.     It  is  the  doctrine  that  the  Wise  Man  is  ^ut  is  it  con- 
always  and  invariably  happy  that  I  would  challenge  "^Jf°*^  ^L^, 
as   too   hurriedly   touched   upon    by    you.      Your  form  part  of  t 
discourse  somehow  skimmed  past  this  point.     But  si^dent  for^ 
unless   this    doctrine    is  proved,   I  am  afraid  that  happiness? 
the  truth  will  lie  with  Theophrastus,  who  held  that 
inisfortune,  sorrow  and  bodiljr  unguish  were  incom- 



putavit,  vereor  ne  vera  sint.  Nam  illud  vehementer 
repugnat,  eundem  beatum  esse  et  multis  malis  op- 
pressum.  Haec  quomodo  eonveniant  non  sane  in- 
tellego."  Utrum  igitur  tibi,"  inquit,  non  placet 
virtutisne  esse  tantam  vim  ut  ad  beate  vivendum  se 
ipsa  eontenta  sit^  an^  si  id  probas^  fieri  ita  posse  negas 
ut  ii  qui  virtutis  compotes  sint  etiam  quibusdam 
malis  afFecti  beati  sint?"  Ego  vero  volo  in  virtute 
vim  esse  quam  maximam;  sed  quanta  sit  alias^  nunc 
tantum  possitne  esse  tanta^  si  quidquam  extra  virtu- 

78  tem  habeatur  in  bonis."  Atqui/*  inquit,  si  Stoicis 
concedis  ut  virtus  sola  si  assit  vitam  efficiat  beatam^ 
concedis  etiam  Peripateticis.  Quae  enim  mala  illi 
non  audent  appellare,  aspera  autem  et  incommoda  et 
reicienda  et  aliena  naturae  esse  concedunt,  ea  nos 
mala  dicimus  sed  exigua  et  paene  minima.  Quare 
si  potest  esse  beatus  is  qui  est  in  asperis  reiciendis- 
que  rebus,  potest  is  quoque  esse  qui  est  in  parvis 
malis."  Et  ego :  Piso,  inquam,  si  est  quisquam  qui 
acute  in  causis  videre  soleat  quae  res  agatur,  is  es 
profecto  tu.  Quare  attende,  quaeso.  Nam  adhuc, 
meo  fortasse  vitio,  quid  ego  quaeram  non  perspicis." 
"istic  sum,"  inquit,  exspectoque  quid  ad  id  quod 
quaerebam  respondeas. 

79  XXVII.  Respondebo  me  non  quaerere,"  inquam, 
"hoc  tempore  quid  virtus  efficere  possit,  sed  quid 
constanter    dicatur,   quid   ipsum   a   se    dissentiat." 

'  Quo,"  inquit,     modo?"        Quia  cum  a  Zenone," 


BOOK  V.  xxvi-xxvii 

patible  with  happiness.  F<h-  that  a  man  can  be  at 
once  happy  and  overwhekned  with  evils  is  violently 
repugnant  to  comnKm  sense.  How  happiness  and 
misfortune  can  go  together  I  entirely  £ul  to  under- 
stand." Which  position  then  do  you  question  ?  " 
he  replied ;  that  virtue  is  so  potent  that  she  need 
not  look  outside  herself  for  happiness  ?  or,  if  you 
accept  this^  do  you  deny  that  the  virtuous  can  be 
happy  even  when  afflicted  by  certain  evils  ?  "  Oh,  I 
would  rate  the  potency  of  virtue  as  high  as  possible ; 
but  let  US  defer  the  question  of  her  exact  degree  of 
greatness;  the  only  pcnnt  is  now,  could  she  be  so 
great  as  she  is,  if  anything  outside  virtue  be  classed 
as  a  good?"  '  Yet,"  said  he,  ^^ if  you  concede 

8  as  a  good?  "  Yet,"  said  he,  if  you  concede  to  the  Piso:  Yes,  virtue 
Stoics  that  the  presence  of  virtue  alone  can  produce  ^  hTppiS^^ 
happiness,  you  concede  this  also  to  the  Peripatetics,  external  evu»  an 

■w-K-n  m      A  1  1  11         .1      intignificant. 

What  the  Stoics  have  not  the  courage  to  call  evils, 
but  admit  to  be  irksome,  detrimental, '  to  be  rejected,' 
and  not  in  accordance  with  nature,  we  say  are  evils, 
though  small  and  almost  negligible  evils.  Hence  if  a 
man  can  be  happy  when  surrounded  by  circumstances 
that  are  irksome  and  to  be  rejected,  he  can  also  be 
happy  when  surrounded  by  trifling  evils."  Piso,"  I 
rejoined,  you,  if  anyone,  are  a  sharp  enough  lawyer 
to  see  at  a  glance  the  real  point  at  issue  in  a  dispute. 
Therefore  I  beg  your  close  attention.  For  so  far, 
^ough  perhaps  I  am  to  blame,  you  do  not  grasp  the 
point  of  my  question."  ^'l  am  all  attention,"  he 
replied,"  and  await  your  reply  to  my  inquiry." 

XXVII.  "  My  reply  will  be,"'  said  I, "  that  I  am  not  ^1«««:  But  ij^ 
at  the  present  asking  what  result  virtue  can  produce,  «vUs,  can  Virtw 
but  what  is  a  consistent  and  what  a  self-contradic-  I^J^JjJ? 
tory  account  of  it."        How  do  you  mean ?  "  said  he. 
**  Why,"  I  said,  "  first  Zeno  enunciates  the  lofty  and 
ic  481 


inquam,  hoc  magnifice  tainquam  ex  oraculo  editur: 
'  Virtus  ad  beate  vivendum  se  ipsa  content»  est,' 
Quare?"  inquit;  respondet;  Quia  nisi  quod  hone- 
stum  est  nullum  est  aliud  bonum.'  Non  quaero  iam 
verumne  sit ;  illud  dico,  ea  quae  dicat  praeclare  inter 

)  se  cohaerere.  Dixerit  hoc  idem  Epicurus,  semper 
beatum  esse  sapientem ;  quod  quidem  solet  ebullire  " 
Donnumquam ;  quern  quidem  cum  sumDiis  doloribus 
conficiatur,  ait  dicturum:  Quam  suave  est  I  quam 
nihil  euro!'  Non  pugnem  cum  homine,  cur  tantum 
aberret^  in  natura  boni;  illud  urgueam,  non  intel- 
Icgere  eum  quid  sibi  dicendura  sit  cum  dolorem  sum- 
mum  malum  esse  dixerit.  Eadem  nunc  mea  adver- 
sum  te  oratio  est.  Dicis  eadem  omnia  et  bona  et 
mala  quae  quidem^  dicunt  ii  qui  numquam  philoso- 
phum  pictum  ut  dicitur  viderunt,  valetudinem,  vires, 
staturam,  formam,  integritatem  unguieulorura  om- 
nium   bona,^    deformitatem,   morbum,    debilitatem 

t  mala.  Iam  ilia  externa  parce  tu  quidem  ;  sed  haec 
cum  corporis  bona  sint,  eorum  conficientiu  certe  in 
bonis  numerabis,  amicos,  liberos,  propinquos,  divitias, 
honores,  opes.  Contra  hoc  attende  me  nihil  dicere; 
illud  dicere/  si  ista  mala  sunt  in  quae  potest  incidere 
sapienSj  sapientem  esse  non  satis  esse  ad  beate  vi- 
vendum." Imrao  vero,"  inquit,  ad  beatissime 
vivendum  parum  est,  ad  beate  satis."  Animad- 
verti,"  inquam,  te  isto  niodo  paulo  ante  ponerc,  et 
scto  ab  Antioclio  iiostro  dici  sic  solere ;    sed  quid 

^  abeml  iiaUer  t  AabeatMSS,;  aica/ (' tarn  lunge  a  nobis 

^  iiidem  Mdv.  brackets. 

'Asnn  inserted  by  LambiiiU! , 

«iWiirfrficrre  inserted  by  Mdv. 




BOOK  V.  xxvii 

oracular  utterance.  Virtue  need  not  look  outside 
herself  for  happiness';  Why?'  says  some  one. 
Because,*  he  answers,  nothing  else  is  good  but 
what  is  morally  good/  I  am  not  now  asking  whether 
this  is  true ;  what  I  say  is  that  Zeno's  statements  are 

to  admirably  logical  and  consistent.  Suppose  Epicurus 
to  say  the  same  thing,  that  the  Wise  Man  is  always 
happy, — for  he  is  fond  of  ranting  like  this  now  and 
then,  and  indeed  tells  us  that  when  the  Wise  Man  is 
suffering  torments  of  pain,  he  will  say  How  pleasant 
this  is!  how  little  I  mind!' — Well,  I  should  not  join 
issue  with  the  man  as  to  why  he  goes  so  far  astray 
about  the  nature  of  the  Good ;  what  I  should  insist 
is  that  he  does  not  understand  what  is  the  necessary 
corollary  of  his  own  avowal  that  pain  is  the  supreme 
evil.  I  take  the  same  line  now  against  you.  As  to 
what  is  good  and  what  is  evil,  your  account  agrees 
entirely  with  that  of  those  who  have  never  set  eyes 
on  a  philosopher,  even  in  a  picture,  as  the  saying  is : 
you  call  health,  strength,  height,  beauty,  soundness 
of  every  part  from  top  to  toe,  goods,  and  ugliness, 

)1  disease  and  weakness  evils.     As  for  external  goods, 
you  were,  it  is  true,  cautious ;  but  since  these  bodily 
excellences  are  goods,  you  will  doubtless  reckon  as 
goods  the  things  productive  of  them,  namely  friends, 
children,  relations,  riches,  rank  and  power.     Mark 
that  against  this  I  say  nothing;  what  I  say  is,  if  mis- 
fortunes which  a  Wise  Man  may  encounter  are  as  you 
say  evils,  to  be  wise  is  not  enough  for  happiness. ' '     Say  Piso :  Yes, 
rather,"  said  he,  *^not  enough  for  supreme  happiness,  the^eat^t 
but  it  is  enough  for  happiness."     "  I  noticed,"  I  happiness. 
replied,      you  made  that  distinction  a  little  time  Cicero:  How 
ago,  and  I  am  aware  that  our  master  Antiochus  is  ^i^^^ 
fond  of  saying  the  same ;  but  what  can  be  more  un-  J^ppine»? 
ii2  483 


minus  probandum  quam  esse  aliquem  beatum  nee 
satis  beatum?  Quod  autem  satis  est^  eo  quidquid 
accessit^  nimium  est;  et  nemo  nimium  beatus  est; 

82  igitur^  nemo  beato  beatior.**  Ergo,**  inquit,  tibi 
Q.  Metellus,  qui  tres  filios  consules  vidit,  e  quibus 
unum  etiam  et  censore^l  et  triumphantem,  quartum 
autem  praetorem,  eosque  salvos  reliquit  et  tres  filias 
nuptas,  cum  ipse  consul,  censor,  augur  fuis